LESTER KNOX COLEMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2006; 10:00
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
A.M.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000557-MR
LESTER KNOX COLEMAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00995
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Lester Knox Coleman, 1 pro se, has appealed 2 from
the May 28, 2004, order of the Fayette Circuit Court which
denied his motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to CR 3
60.02(f). 4
Having concluded that the trial court did not err in
1
The record indicates that Coleman had the following aliases during this time
period: Thomas Leavy, Thomas O’Leavy, and Lex Coleman.
2
Coleman has a second appeal pending before this Court regarding a separate
order in the same case, Case No. 2004-CA-001134-MR.
3
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
Coleman references the order denying his motion for relief under CR 59.01
throughout his brief. However, this order was not included in his notice of
appeal filed March 10, 2005, and we will not address its validity herein.
finding Coleman competent to stand trial and in finding he
received effective assistance of counsel, we affirm.
On September 28, 1999, Coleman was indicted on 42
counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the
second degree, 5 and on one count of being a persistent felony
offender in the second degree (PFO II). 6
all counts on October 1, 1999.
He pled not guilty to
The charges against Coleman
arose from his attempt to pass forged checks in the total amount
of approximately $7,300.00, allegedly drawn on overseas banks,
and his use of various forged documents of identification, such
as Social Security numbers, passports, driver’s licenses, and
credit cards. 7
Coleman’s legal aid attorney filed a motion for
evaluation on September 17, 1999.
On September 20, 1999,
Coleman filed a pro se motion requesting that he be relocated to
a medical facility based on a letter from Dr. Harvey Berman, his
treating clinical psychologist, stating that Coleman suffered
from major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.
On
September 21, 1999, the trial court entered an order for Coleman
to be evaluated to stand trial and a pre-mental examination form
5
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 516.060.
6
KRS 532.080(2).
7
These facts were set out in this Court’s unpublished opinion of Coleman’s
first appeal, Case No. 2000-CA-001158-MR.
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was filled out by Coleman on September 20, 1999.
On October 25,
1999, Coleman was evaluated by Dr. Harwell F. Smith and his
evaluation report was filed with the trial court on November 1,
1999.
Dr. Smith gave a provisional diagnosis and opinion of
Coleman’s competency to stand trial.
In this evaluation, Dr.
Smith found Coleman’s “memory for immediate and recent events is
good.”
Dr. Smith found that Coleman knew his attorney and could
specify the terms of the deal being offered to him.
Smith
further opined that Coleman knew “the roles of the principal
actors in the courtroom,” and was “aware of his right not to
testify.”
Smith further stated, “Since [Coleman] doesn’t have a
symptom complex that would go along with an elaborate delusional
system, the conclusion is that [Coleman] knows his story is
untrue.”
In conclusion, Dr. Smith stated as follows:
[Coleman] has the mental capacity to
appreciate the nature of the charges against
him. He has the mental capacity to
participate rationally in his own defense.
Regarding criminal responsibility,
not enough is known about [Coleman’s] level
of involvement in the alleged crime and
about the details of the case against him to
fairly assess his criminal responsibility
without extensive observation, interviewing
and collateral interviews. Accordingly,
[Coleman] will need to be examined as an
inpatient for his Criminal Responsibility.
If the defense attorney still desires a
Criminal Responsibility evaluation, the
court will want to write a new order
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specifying that [Coleman] be examined at the
Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center
The court will want to order the examining
doctor to express opinions about both
[Coleman’s] Competency to Stand Trial and
his Criminal Responsibility. . . [emphasis
original].
Neither Coleman, nor his trial counsel, made any further
requests for a mental evaluation of Coleman to determine his
competency to stand trial.
A jury trial was held on March 13 through 16, 2000.
At trial, Coleman presented the expert testimony of Dr. Berman,
who had been treating Coleman since February 1997.
Dr. Berman
testified that Coleman suffered from major depression, global
amnesia, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and severe
anxiety.
Dr. Berman stated that these conditions resulted from
abuse Coleman suffered while held in federal custody in August
1996, until February 1997. 8
8
Coleman argues that Dr. Berman’s testimony is supported by the stateauthorized mental evaluation conducted by Rosa Kathleen Riggs, a few days
after September 11, 2001, to determine whether Coleman was entitled to
disability benefits. In this report, Riggs states that Coleman was afflicted
with the mental conditions described by Dr. Berman at the time of his arrest
and trial. She further noted that Coleman had had “a regressive mental
breakdown” due to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which led to
his leaving the state and violating the terms of his probation in 2002.
Further, he alleges that his attorney had a copy of Riggs’s report, but
neglected to introduce it before the trial court at any time prior to the
warrant for his arrest being issued in 2002. Coleman stated that he was not
aware of the contents of this report until he received it in August 2004 from
the Kentucky Department of Corrections Mental Health Services. The trial
court addressed this report in its January 25, 2005, order, noting that it
was dictated some 18 months following Coleman’s conviction. The trial court
stated: “The report references information regarding treatment by Dr. Berman,
which is consistent with the testimony offered at trial by Dr. Berman on
behalf of [Coleman]. . . . As such [Coleman] presents no new information or
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The jury found Coleman guilty on 36 counts of criminal
possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. 9
Coleman
was sentenced on April 10, 2000, to ten years in prison, with
two, four-year sentences, and two, one-year sentences to run
consecutively with each other, and the one-year sentences on the
remaining 32 counts to run concurrently with all other
sentences.
The trial court then suspended imposition of
Coleman’s ten-year prison sentence and granted him probation for
five years. 10
Coleman directly appealed his convictions to this
Court on May 10, 2000; 11 however, he did not raise in his appeal
claims that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him
competent to stand trial, or that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding his competency to stand trial.
On June 11, 2002, the office of probation and parole
filed an affidavit stating that Coleman had violated the terms
of his probation. 12
Following several delays in serving a bench
evidence, which would justify the relief requested under CR 60.02.”
agree.
We
9
Six counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second
degree, as well as the PFO II charge, were dismissed.
10
Under Coleman’s probation restrictions he was required, among other things,
to maintain good behavior, submit to physical examinations, and not to leave
the state without permission.
11
A panel of this Court affirmed Coleman’s direct appeal on August 2, 2002,
in Case No. 2000-CA-001158-MR. The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied
discretionary review of the case on September 3, 2002, in Case No. 2002-SC000701.
12
The June 11, 2002, affidavit to revoke Coleman’s probation stated grounds
as follows: “On May 14, 2002 the probationer was sent a letter instructing
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warrant on Coleman for the probation violation, 13 the trial court
held a probation revocation hearing on May 23, 2003.
An order
was entered on May 29, 2003, revoking Coleman’s probation and
formally sentencing him to serve ten years in prison. 14
On September 5, 2003, 15 Coleman filed a motion to
vacate his sentence pursuant to RCr 16 11.42. 17
Coleman did not
allege any issue as to his competency to stand trial in this
him to report to the Probation Office at Lexington on June 4, 2002 at 11:00
AM. The probationer failed to report at that time. On June 6, 2002 this
officer talked with probationer by telephone. It was agreed that the
probationer would visit in person in the Probation Office at Lexington on
June 7, 2002 at 1:00 PM. The probationer again failed to report.” The
August 14, 2002 addendum to the affidavit to revoke probation states
additional grounds as follows: “1. On or about March 13, 2002 probationer
left Garrard County, Kentucky and relocated to Fort Campbell, Kentucky where
he did not have permission to be. 2. On July 19, 2002 in open Court the
probationer’s Attorney advised that the probationer was in Saudi Arabia,
where he did not have permission to be.”
13
Coleman was arrested on May 16, 2003.
14
Coleman filed a motion for sentence modification, which the trial court
denied by order entered on July 3, 2003. Then, on July 24, 2003, Coleman
filed a motion for shock probation, which was denied by the trial court by
order entered on September 4, 2003.
15
Coleman filed a motion for shock probation reconsideration on October 29,
2003, which was denied by the trial court on October 30, 2003. He then filed
another motion for shock probation reconsideration on December 19, 2003, and
a motion rehearing-shock probation on December 29, 2003, both of which the
trial court denied by order entered December 31, 2003. Coleman filed another
motion to vacate probation revocation on January 12, 2004, which was denied
by the trial court by order entered January 26, 2004. Coleman then filed a
notice of appeal in this Court on January 26, 2004, Case No. 2004-CA-000201MR, which was dismissed on September 10, 2004, for failure to file a brief.
The order was final on October 27, 2004.
16
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
17
RCr 11.42(1) states, in relevant part, that “[a] prisoner in custody under
sentence or a defendant on probation, parole or conditional discharge who
claims a right to be released on the ground that the sentence is subject to
collateral attack may at any time proceed directly by motion in the court
that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct it.”
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motion. 18
The trial court entered an order on May 28, 2004,
denying Coleman’s RCr 11.42 motion, and Coleman appealed.
This
appeal is currently before our Court and an opinion is
forthcoming. 19
On September 30, 2004, Coleman filed a motion for
hearing and/or to vacate sentence and/or to vacate probation
revocation pursuant to CR 60.02(f).
In support of his motion,
Coleman argued that he was not competent to stand trial and that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
counsel did not seek a court-ordered psychological evaluation
either before trial or before his probation revocation hearing. 20
He further requested an evidentiary hearing as to these issues.
The trial court denied Coleman’s CR 60.02(f) motion by order
entered on January 25, 2005, including his motion for an
evidentiary hearing.
Subsequently, on February 7, 2005, Coleman
18
Coleman argued that he was denied his statutory right to a “jury fixed”
sentence because the trial court ran his sentences consecutively, rather than
concurrently as recommended by the jury. Coleman further argued that counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s failure to follow
his “jury fixed” sentence.
19
Case No. 2004-CA-001134-MR.
20
On November 8, 2004, the trial court entered an order that Coleman’s
psychiatric evaluation be released by the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric
Center (KCPC). On November 15, 2004, Coleman filed a motion for the trial
court to order release of the psychologist’s reports prepared by the
Department of Corrections, Division of Mental Health. On November 15, 2004,
Coleman also filed a motion to proceed as no psychological evaluation was
ever done by the KCPC. The trial court sustained Coleman’s motion to receive
a copy of the psychologist’s report on November 17, 2004, which the trial
court acknowledged receipt of on November 24, 2004, by order providing the
competency evaluation to Coleman and the Commonwealth. On December 8, 2004,
the Commonwealth filed a response to Coleman’s RCr 60.02(f) motion and on
December 20, 2004, Coleman filed a reply to the Commonwealth’s response.
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filed a “petition to set aside and set for cause of action
pursuant to CR 59.01(a).” 21
The trial court denied this motion
by order entered on February 10, 2005.
This appeal followed.
CR 60.02 “applies in criminal cases only because Rule
13.04 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that ‘the
Rules of Civil Procedure shall be applicable in criminal
proceedings to the extent not superseded by or inconsistent with
these Rules of Criminal Procedure.’” 22
The sections of CR 60.02
on which Coleman relies state as follows:
On motion a court may, upon such terms
as are just, relieve a party or his legal
representative from its final judgment,
order, or proceeding upon the following
grounds: . . . (f) any other reason of an
extraordinary nature justifying relief. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable
time. 23
The decision on whether to grant relief under CR 60.02 “is one
that is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial
21
CR 59.01(a) states: “A new trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes:
(a) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or prevailing party,
or an order of the court, or abuse of discretion, by which the party was
prevented from having a fair trial.”
22
Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).
23
It is well settled that a CR 60.02(f) motion must be filed within a
reasonable time, and it is within the trial court’s sound discretion to
determine, on a case-by-case basis, what constitutes a reasonable time. See
Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858. The trial court did not discuss the timeliness
issue of Coleman’s CR 60.02 motion, and we do not believe that its timeliness
is an issue, but rather its substance.
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court[,]” 24 and its ruling will not be overturned on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion. 25
“‘A [ ] court abuses its
discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact,
or when it improperly applies the law or uses an [ ] erroneous
legal standard’” [citations omitted]. 26
The process for attacking a final judgment “is
organized and complete . . . [and] is set out in the rules
related to direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and thereafter in CR
60.02” [emphasis original]. 27
The purpose of CR 60.02 is to
allow the trial court a method to correct errors in judgment
upon a showing of “facts or grounds, not appearing on the face
of the record and not available by appeal or otherwise, which
were discovered after the rendition of the judgment without
fault of the party seeking relief.” 28
“[A] CR 60.02 movant must
demonstrate why he is entitled to this special, extraordinary
relief.” 29
Coleman has already had a direct appeal and has an
RCr 11.42 appeal pending before this Court.
The trial court
found that the grounds of the CR 60.02 motion were known, or
24
Schott v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 692 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Ky.App.
1985). See also Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858.
25
Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Ky. 1998).
26
Romstadt v. Allstate Insurance Co., 59 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 1995).
27
Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856.
28
Harris v. Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Ky. 1956).
29
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997).
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should have been known, at the time of his first appeal and
should have been argued in his earlier appeal. 30
Upon our review
of the record, we agree and find no abuse of discretion.
“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who
is not competent to stand trial” [citations omitted]. 31
“[T]he
standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant
has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has ‘a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him’” [citations omitted]. 32
There is an initial
presumption that a criminal defendant is mentally competent to
stand trial, which disappears “when there are reasonable grounds
to hold a competency hearing.” 33
“An incompetency hearing is
only required when the trial judge is presented with sufficient
evidence of reasonable doubt of competency to stand trial” 34 and
upon such determination, the trial court must appoint a
qualified person “to report on the defendant’s competency”
30
McQueen, 948 S.W.2d at 416; Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856.
31
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353
(1992).
32
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321
(1993).
33
Gabbard v. Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d 547, 551 (Ky. 1994).
34
Lear v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Ky. 1994).
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[citations omitted]. 35
In viewing a challenge to the trial
court’s failure to hold a competency hearing, Kentucky courts
“have long followed the criterion that reasonable ground must be
called to the attention of the trial court by the defendant or
must be so obvious that the trial court cannot fail to be aware
of them.” 36
In his CR 60.02 motion, Coleman claims that he was not
competent to stand trial at the time; however, he states that he
is fully recovered now. 37
He claims that he only vaguely
remembers what occurred during the time of his trial, sentencing
hearing, and probation revocation hearing.
However, Dr. Berman,
his expert witness, did not identify any specific evidence that
should have alerted the trial court to Coleman’s alleged
incompetency.
The record reveals that Coleman stated that he
was symptom-free of his mental conditions at the time he was
reincarcerated in 2003.
A few months later in September 2003,
he filed an RCr 11.42 motion, with no mention of his
incompetency to stand trial.
Almost one year later, Coleman
filed this appeal based on CR 60.02, after acknowledging that he
had been competent since at least 2003.
35
The record shows that
Gabbard, 887 S.W.2d at 550.
36
Smith v. Commonwealth, 567 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Ky. 1978).
S.W.2d at 659.
37
See also Lear, 884
Coleman stated that he “ultimately obtained, with the assistance of friends
and his family, private therapy” and that he is currently “symptom free and
does not require medication.”
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Coleman could have raised this issue on direct appeal, or in the
prior RCr 11.42 proceeding.
He failed to raise the issue either
time.
The record contains several letters that Coleman
wrote to the trial court that demonstrate that he was aware of
the legal procedure and the nature of the charges against him,
and, thus, negate his allegations of incompetency.
Coleman
wrote his first letter to the trial court on October 10, 1999,
in which he requested bail that he could afford and he attached
three letters from different persons stating that he was an
upstanding citizen, husband, and father.
There were no
references in these letters concerning Coleman’s claims that he
was mentally ill or incompetent to stand trial.
On October 27,
1999, Coleman wrote a letter to the trial court informing it of
witnesses he would call at trial.
On December 10, 1999, Coleman
wrote a letter to the trial court asking for a bond reduction.
In the letter, Coleman informed the trial court that he was
disabled and suffering from PTSD, and he gave the trial court
personal references to his good name.
Never in this letter does
Coleman mention his alleged incompetency to stand trial.
On
March 8, 2000, Coleman wrote the trial court a letter regarding
correspondence sent by a friend on his behalf, and apologized
for the contents of the letter.
On March 24, 2000, two of
Coleman’s friends wrote letters to the trial court asking for
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“clemency” in Coleman’s sentencing.
On April 10, 2000, Coleman
wrote a letter to the trial court explaining that, despite his
disabilities, he was able to support his family and pay his
debts.
From March 28, 2000, through April 14, 2000, the trial
court received more than ten letters from different individuals
informing the trial court that Coleman was a great family man
and asking that he be released to take care of his family.
There was no concern shown in any of the letters as to Coleman’s
competency to stand trial.
On November 11, 2001, Coleman wrote
a letter to the clerk regarding his disability and his medical
maltreatment while in custody, and on November 26, 2001, he
wrote a letter to the clerk informing him that he was still
suffering with PTSD.
On May 23, 2003, the trial court received
more letters from individuals asking the trial court not to
revoke Coleman’s probation.
On June 11, 2003, Coleman wrote the
trial court apologizing for violating his probation and
explained that he did not appear for the probation-related
hearing because he was afraid.
In this letter, Coleman asked
the trial court for shock probation and told the trial court
that he was going to pay restitution.
On June 19, 2003, the
trial court received two more letters from individuals on
Coleman’s behalf, and on June 30, 2003, the trial court received
a letter regarding the loss of Coleman’s job.
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On July 3, 2003, Coleman asked the trial court to
modify his sentence because he was a productive member of
society, a responsible head of household, who could contribute
much to the community.
At this time, Coleman also became more
involved in directly working on his case.
On July 16, 2003, he
sent a letter to the clerk requesting parts of the record, and
on July 24, 2003, he filed his own motion to obtain court
records.
On August 4, 2003, Coleman filed his own motion for
shock probation, stating that he realized that “he, and he
alone, caused himself to be in this position and acknowledge[d]
the seriousness of his prior actions. . . ,” and he took full
responsibility for his actions, now able to function with a
“clear mind.”
Then, on August 14, 2003, Coleman wrote a letter to
the trial court regarding his probation revocation.
He stated:
“Please allow me to clarify that Attorney Meehan is not at fault
regarding my admitted violation of probation on May 23, 2003.
Mr. Meehan has not acted ‘ineffectively’ regarding the motion
before you. . . .
The actions leading to my present
incarceration are my responsibility, despite any mitigating
circumstance.”
Then, on October 5, 2003, Coleman filed his
motion for relief under RCr 11.42, and in a letter dated October
29, 2003, Coleman proposed his own parole stipulations.
On
October 28, 2003, Coleman also wrote a letter to the trial court
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acknowledging that he had made a terrible mistake.
On February
2, 2004, Coleman wrote the trial court regarding pending motions
that he had filed.
In a February 23, 2004, letter Coleman
stated that he has been symptom-free since his reincarceration
in 2003.
In all of his letters Coleman appears lucid.
The
letters are coherent and well-written, and none of the letters
mention that Coleman did not understand the legal process,
because of his incompetency.
Further the failure of defense
counsel, the Commonwealth’s Attorney, or the trial court to
raise the issue of competency, the out-pouring of support from
friends for his release, and Coleman’s letters to the trial
court, all indicate that Coleman was competent.
Regardless, the
record indicates that both, at the time of trial and at the time
of the probation revocation hearing, Coleman acknowledged having
a mental condition upon his initial arrest.
Thus, there is no
doubt that if a competency issue existed, Coleman was aware of
it at the time of his direct appeal.
Specifically, as early as
August 2003, he wrote to the trial court that he was no longer
having mental problems, and one month later he filed his motion
for RCr 11.42 relief, leaving no doubt that he could have raised
this issue at that time, but did not do so for almost another
year.
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Coleman also claims that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his CR 60.02 (f) motion. 38
“Before the
movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he must
affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify vacating the
judgment and further allege special circumstances that justify
CR 60.02 relief.” 39
“The decision to hold an evidentiary hearing
is within the trial court’s discretion and we will not disturb
such absent any abuse of that discretion” [citation omitted]. 40
The record clearly details the evidence necessary for the trial
court to rule on the CR 60.02 motion; and therefore, it did not
abuse its discretion in denying a hearing on the related
matters.
As the grounds of Coleman’s motion are matters which
should have been known to him at the time of conviction and were
proper for the direct appeal of that conviction, absent a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, these issues may not now
be raised in a post-conviction proceeding. 41
Coleman argues that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have his
competency evaluated prior to trial or the probation revocation
38
He also requested an evidentiary hearing for his CR 59.01 motion.
39
Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856.
40
Land v. Commonwealth, 986 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Ky. 1999).
41
Bronston v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 666, 667 (Ky. 1972).
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hearing.
However, the record indicates that Coleman was
evaluated and found competent to stand trial.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a person must satisfy a two-part test showing both
“that counsel’s performance was deficient” and that the
deficiency “prejudiced the defense, depriv[ing] the defendant of
a fair trial”. 42
The burden is on the defendant to overcome a
strong presumption “that under the circumstances [counsel’s]
action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy’” [citations
omitted]. 43
A court must be “highly deferential” in reviewing
defense counsel’s performance and should avoid second-guessing
counsel’s actions based on hindsight. 44
Coleman fails to identify any objective evidence that
would have alerted counsel to the possibility of his
incompetence.
The record refutes any claim that but for
counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that
Coleman would not have been found guilty or the outcome of a
competency hearing would have been different. 45
Trial counsel’s
alleged failure to determine Coleman’s competency prior to trial
42
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984).
43
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. See also Moore v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d
479, 482 (Ky. 1998); and Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 911-12 (Ky.
1998).
44
Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311, 315 (Ky. 1998).
45
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
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or the revocation of his probation fails to satisfy either prong
of Strickland.
In conclusion, Coleman filed a direct appeal to this
Court, and later sought RCr 11.42 relief.
He was required to
raise the instant issues, if at all, via one of these
proceedings.
The basis for this requirement is well-established
and is geared toward increasing judicial economy and bringing
finality to the proceedings. 46
We conclude that the trial court
properly denied Coleman’s motion for CR 60.02 relief.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lester K. Coleman, Pro Se
Central City, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
46
McQueen, 948 S.W.2d at 416.
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