S.S. and J.S. v. CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; AND H.E., AN INFANT
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 6, 2006, 10:00
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
A.M.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000498-ME
S.S. and J.S.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KEVIN L. GARVEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-AD-500575
v.
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES;
AND H.E., AN INFANT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, MINTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
S.S. and J.S., the maternal great-grandparents
of H.E., an infant, appeal from an order entered February 10,
2005, by the Jefferson Family Court denying their motion to
intervene in a proceeding to involuntarily terminate the
parental rights of H.E.’s parents.
We affirm.
On January 31, 1998, H.E. was born to sixteen-year old
B.E.
Following the birth, B.E. and H.E. lived with B.E.’s
maternal great-grandparents, S.S. and J.S. 1
B.E. and H.E. lived
with S.S. and J.S. until sometime in 2000.
In August 2003, a petition was filed in the Jefferson
Family Court alleging that H.E. was an abused and neglected
child. 2
B.E. again stipulated to the abuse.
Following a
temporary removal hearing on August 14, 2003, the family court
placed H.E. in the temporary custody of S.S.
In October 2003,
S.S. and J.S. apparently moved to Florida taking H.E. with them.
On December 18, 2003, the court returned H.E. to B.E.’s custody.
In September 2004, the guardian ad litem for H.E.
contacted S.S. in Florida.
S.S. reported to the guardian that
despite the family court’s December 2003 order, B.E. did not
take physical custody of H.E.
Florida with S.S. and J.S.
Rather, H.E. was still living in
S.S. indicated that B.E. had weekly
phone contact with H.E., but had not visited H.E. since June
2004.
S.S. also admitted utilizing the family court’s August
2003 order, awarding her temporary custody of H.E., to enroll
H.E. in school in Florida and to obtain medical insurance
coverage for her.
On September 2, 2004, the family court again
awarded temporary custody of H.E. to S.S.
A permanent custody
hearing was scheduled for October 7, 2004.
1
S.S. is the maternal great-grandmother of H.M.E. J.S. is married to S.S.
and is the maternal step great-grandfather of H.M.E.
2
A previous petition alleging abuse and neglect had been filed in January
2002. Despite a stipulation of abuse, the Cabinet allowed H.E. to remain in
B.E.’s custody.
-2-
The guardian ad litem for H.E. and the Cabinet
purportedly agreed that permanent custody of H.E. should be
placed with S.S.
In preparation for the custody hearing, the
guardian prepared a motion requesting that S.S. be awarded
permanent custody of H.E.
The guardian also prepared an
affidavit for S.S. to sign in support of the motion.
S.S.
refused to sign the affidavit because she believed it contained
untrue statements about B.E. abusing H.E. 3
Although the parties give different reasons, the
custody hearing scheduled for October 7, 2004, was rescheduled
to October 28, 2004.
At the October 28 hearing, the family
court made a finding that H.E. was at risk of abuse or neglect
from both S.S. and B.E, and thus granted temporary custody of
H.E. to the Cabinet.
On November 17, 2004, the Cabinet filed a petition
seeking to involuntarily terminate B.E.’s parental rights.
On
January 6, 2005, S.S. and J.S. filed a motion to intervene in
the involuntary termination action.
Following a hearing, the
court entered an order denying the motion on February 10, 2005.
S.S. and J.S. subsequently filed a “Motion to Reconsider.”
3
The
Although B.E. had stipulated to the abuse, S.S. did not believe the abuse
actually occurred, and asserted that H.E. should be ultimately returned to
B.E.
-3-
court also denied that motion by order entered February 24,
2005. 4
This appeal follows.
S.S. and J.S. contend the family court erred by
denying their motion to intervene in the involuntary termination
of parental rights action.
Specifically, S.S. and J.S. contend
that pursuant to Baker v. Webb, 127 S.W.3d 622 (Ky. 2004) and
Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 24.01, the family court should have
permitted their intervention in the termination action.
CR 24.01 provides for intervention as a matter of
right and states in relevant part:
[A]nyone shall be permitted to intervene in
an action (a) when a statute confers an
unconditional right to intervene, or (b)
when the applicant claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede
the applicant's ability to protect that
interest, unless that interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
In Baker, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed whether
biological relatives of a child could intervene under CR 24.01
in an adoption proceeding.
Relying upon 922 KAR 1:140, in
regard to foster care and adoption permanency services, the
Court concluded that qualified relatives of a child should be
given preference for placement in an adoption proceeding.
4
The
An order was also entered February 24, 2005, terminating the parental rights
of B.E. and W.S., H.E.’s biological parents. That order is not before the
Court of Appeals in this appeal.
-4-
Court held that pursuant to the regulations and policies of the
Cabinet, the relatives had a “sufficient, cognizable legal
interest in the adoption proceeding” and, thus, should be
allowed to intervene pursuant to CR 24.01.
Baker, 127 S.W.3d at
625.
In the case sub judice, the parties were seeking to
intervene in a termination of parental rights action, not an
adoption proceeding.
We do not interpret Baker so broadly as to
allow intervention in a termination of parental rights action.
The sole purpose of a termination proceeding is to determine
whether the parental rights of the child’s biological parents
should be terminated.
et seq.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 625.050,
KRS 625.060 specifically limits the parties to an
involuntary termination proceeding to the child, the Cabinet (if
not the petitioner), the petitioner and the biological parents.
Since neither S.S. nor J.S. was the petitioner, each lacked
standing to intervene in this action.
Even if S.S. and J.S. had been permitted to intervene,
we do not believe the family court could have granted them
relief in the termination proceeding under the statutes.
Accordingly, we believe S.S. and J.S. did not have standing to
intervene as a matter of right in the termination of parental
rights action pursuant to CR 24.01.
-5-
S.S. and J.S. also contend the circuit court erred by
denying their motion to intervene pursuant to CR 24.02.
CR
24.02 provides for permissive intervention and states, in
relevant part, as follows:
[A]nyone may be permitted to intervene in an
action . . . (b) when an applicant's claim
or defense and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common. . . .
In exercising its discretion the court shall
consider whether the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties.
S.S. and J.S. specifically contend that the “common question” in
the termination proceeding was H.E.’s best interest.
While
H.E.’s best interest is undoubtedly important, the only purpose
of the termination proceeding was to determine whether the
parental rights of the H.E.’s biological parents should be
terminated.
Again, S.S. and J.S. could not have been granted
relief in the termination proceeding under applicable law.
As
such, we cannot conclude that the family court abused its
discretion by denying the parties’ motion to intervene under CR
24.02.
See Webster v. Board of Ed. of Walton-Verona Ind. School
Dist., 437 S.W.2d 956 (Ky. 1969).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Family Court denying S.S. and J.S.’s motion to intervene in the
termination proceeding is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
-6-
Troy DeMuth
John H. Helmers, Jr.
HELMERS DEMUTH & WALTON PLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Erika L. Saylor
Cabinet for Health & Family
Services
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR H.E., AN INFANT:
Teresa M. Kinberger
Guardian Ad Litem
Louisville, Kentucky
-7-
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