SHIRL PERRY v. GREGORY PARKS, NANCY B. SMITH, AND KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED:
MARCH 17, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2005-CA-000401-MR
AND
NO. 2005-CA-000493-MR
SHIRL PERRY
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00043
v.
GREGORY PARKS,
NANCY B. SMITH, AND
KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU
INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
On October 13, 2001, a vehicle owned and operated
by Gregory Parks collided with a vehicle operated by Nancy
Smith.
Shirl Perry was a passenger in the Smith vehicle.
In
February 2002, Perry brought suit for damages against Parks.
In
October 2002, Parks filed a third-party complaint against Smith
in which he sought “indemnity or contribution or apportionment.”
Perry then obtained leave to amend her complaint, ostensibly to
add a claim against Smith.
By summary judgment entered February
9, 2005, the Morgan Circuit Court dismissed “all claims” against
Smith, but explained that the judgment was not intended to
preclude an apportionment instruction between the two drivers.
Perry’s claim against Parks was then tried before a jury on
February 22, 2005.
At the trial Parks was permitted to present
evidence, including testimony by an accident reconstructionist,
tending to show that he had not been negligent and that Smith
had been.
The instructions included one permitting the jury to
apportion fault between Parks and Smith.
Because the jury
exonerated Parks, however, it did not reach the apportionment
instruction.
Finally, on February 25, 2005, the trial court
entered judgment in accord with the jury’s verdict.
It is from
that judgment and the February 9, 2005, summary judgment that
Perry has appealed.
She contends that the trial court erred by
dismissing her claim against Smith, by permitting an
apportionment instruction after Smith had been dismissed from
the case, and by allowing expert testimony (the
reconstructionist) that had not been timely disclosed.
Persuaded by none of these contentions, we affirm.
Although they differed in important respects, the
parties’ pre-summary-judgment accounts of the accident were
largely in accord.
It occurred about 2:00 p.m.
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The day was
clear and driving conditions were good.
Smith was south-bound
on a straight section of old Kentucky Highway 172 not far east
of West Liberty.
She was driving slowly preparing to make a
right-hand turn into her son’s driveway.
Parks came upon her
from the rear, and, thinking that she was turning left,
attempted to pass on the right.
Instead, Smith turned to the
right in front of Parks, whose left headlight and bumper
collided with the passenger side of Smith’s vehicle just behind
the front tire.
Parks maintained that Smith made no signal, and
that in the course of making what proved to be a wide right-hand
turn she had pulled almost entirely into the left or north-bound
lane, leading him to believe that she was turning left.
Smith
and Perry both testified that Smith signaled a right-hand turn
and did not cross over into the opposite lane.
Parks simply ran
into them, they claimed, possibly because he was going too fast.
Perry contends that the trial court should not have
summarily dismissed her complaint against Smith.
As Smith
notes, however, to maintain a cause of action for negligence,
one must allege that the defendant was at fault.1
Although
Perry’s amended complaint alleged generally that both defendants
were negligent, when asked during her deposition to specify how
Smith had been at fault, Perry denied that she had been and
asserted in particular that Smith had signaled her turn and had
1
M & T Chemicals, Inc. v. Westrick, 525 S.W.2d 740 (Ky. 1974).
-3-
not strayed from her lane.
These admissions could properly be
deemed binding and conclusive.2
Absent an allegation of fault,
the trial court did not err by ruling that Perry’s claim against
Smith must fail.
The trial court also dismissed Parks’s third-party
complaint against Smith, apparently concluding that Parks was
not entitled either to indemnity or contribution and that
apportionment, the real relief that Parks sought, did not
require and would not support a cause of action.
This seems to
be the thrust of the court’s ruling that Parks was entitled to
an apportionment trial and an apportionment instruction even
though his third-party complaint had been dismissed.
contends that the trial court erred.
Perry
She maintains that the
dismissal of all claims against Smith amounts to a matter-of-law
determination that Smith was not negligent and thus rendered
apportionment moot.
Although we do not agree with Perry’s
interpretation of the error, for clearly the record did not
support a summary judgment vis-à-vis Parks absolving Smith of
all responsibility, nevertheless we agree that Parks’s complaint
ought not to have been dismissed.
As the parties note, with KRS 411.182 the General
Assembly codified the doctrine of comparative negligence first
2
Sutherland v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743, 151 S.W.2d 1021 (Ky. 1941).
-4-
adopted by our Supreme Court in Hilen v. Hays.3
Under that
statute, “[i]n all tort actions . . . involving fault of more
than one party to the action, including third-party defendants,”
the jury must determine “[t]he percentage of the total fault of
all the parties to each claim that is allocated to each
claimant, defendant, [and] third-party defendant.”
By its
express terms, the statute contemplates a third-party action for
apportionment against a third-party defendant who allegedly
shares fault for the first-party plaintiff’s injury.
The third-
party defendant must be within the trial court’s jurisdiction
and must not be immune from suit altogether.4
She need not,
however, be subject to a claim for damages for the apportionment
claim to lie.
She may have settled, she may have a defense, she
may, as in this case, simply be a person from whom no one else
wishes to recover; nevertheless the apportionment is not moot
because it will determine the extent of the third-party
plaintiff’s responsibility.
The third-party defendant ought not
to be dismissed from the apportionment action, moreover, because
she may wish to contest the imputation of fault even if her own
damages are not at stake.
The trial court erred, therefore,
when it dismissed Parks’s third-party apportionment claim
3
673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
4
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Smolcic, 142
S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2004); Copass v. Monroe County Medical
Foundation, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 617 (Ky.App. 1995).
-5-
against Smith.
With respect to Parks and Perry, however, the
error was harmless because the court allowed them to try the
apportionment issue and submit it to the jury.
And with respect
to Smith the error is moot because she did not object; indeed
she is the one who sought to be excluded from the apportionment
action.
The error, therefore, does not entitle Perry to relief.
Finally, Perry contends that the trial court abused
its discretion by permitting an accident reconstructionist to
testify who had not been noticed in Parks’s initial, 2002,
interrogatory responses, and was not noticed in an amended
response until a week before the February 2005 trial.
This
Court has recently held that the admission of undisclosed expert
testimony, where there has been a violation of both “the letter
[and] the spirit” of CR 26.02(4), may constitute an abuse of the
trial court’s discretion.5
Here, however, we are convinced that
the spirit, at least, of the Civil Rules was not violated and
that the trial court’s decision to admit the reconstructionist’s
testimony was neither arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, nor
unsupported by sound legal principles.
Parks concedes that he did not amend his interrogatory
responses until the eve of trial, but asserts without
contradiction that in March 2004, nearly a year prior to trial,
he fully disclosed during the parties’ mediation the
5
Clephas v. Garlock, 168 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Ky.App. 2004).
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reconstructionist’s identity, the subject matter of his
testimony, and the substance and basis of his opinions.
During
the pre-trial conference about two weeks before trial, moreover,
when Perry objected to admission of the expert’s testimony,
Parks waived any objection to a continuance so that Perry might
have additional time to meet the expert’s evidence.
declined a continuance.
Perry
Although timely amendment of Parks’s
interrogatory responses would have been the better practice, we
cannot say in these circumstances that Perry was unfairly
surprised or denied the opportunity to prepare for trial
contemplated by the Civil Rules.
The trial court, therefore,
did not abuse its discretion by permitting Parks’s
reconstructionist to testify.
In sum, although the trial court properly dismissed
Perry’s negligence claim against Smith when Perry failed to
allege that Smith had breached a duty of care, it should not
have dismissed Parks’s third-party claim against Smith for
apportionment.
KRS 411.182 contemplates such a claim even
divorced from a claim for damages.
The court’s error was
harmless, however, because notwithstanding the dismissal the
apportionment claim was fully tried and properly submitted to
the jury.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion,
finally, by admitting expert testimony of which Perry had had
adequate notice even if not the precise notice contemplated by
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CR 26.
Accordingly, we affirm the February 9, 2005, and
February 25, 2005, judgments of the Morgan Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE PARKS:
Teddy L. Flynt
Flynt Law Offices
Salyersville, Kentucky
John J. Ellis
Dehner & Ellis, PSC
Morehead, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SMITH:
Pierce W. Hamblin
Bradley C. Hooks
Landrum & Shouse LLP
Lexington, Kentucky
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