JOSEPH R. SPALDING; MARY SPALDING; AND BILLY SHERRILL v. CHARLES SAPP
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RENDERED:
MARCH 17, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000393-MR
JOSEPH R. SPALDING;
MARY SPALDING; AND
BILLY SHERRILL
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00051
v.
CHARLES SAPP
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, MINTON, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
This appeal stems from an adverse possession
action originating in Marion Circuit Court.
Appellants, Joseph
R. Spalding (Spalding), Mary S. Spalding,1 and Billy Sherrill
(Sherrill)2 filed suit against Appellee, Charles Sapp (Sapp)
February 19, 2003 claiming ownership of property totaling
1
Joseph R. Spalding’s wife. She was not a witness at the bench trial nor
gave a deposition in this matter.
2
Spalding sold a portion of his property to Sherrill in January 2003.
Sherrill is relying upon the Spaldings’ use of the disputed property in his
adverse possession claim.
approximately one-quarter of an acre3 that was situated between
the parties’ parcels.
The section in dispute is located between
fields primarily used for various agricultural purposes4 by the
parties.
plat map.5
Sherrill’s parcel is referred to as Tract 3 on the
The Spaldings’ parcel is referred to as Tract 2 on
the plat map.6
We first examine Sapp’s adjoining parcel.7
Sapp purchased his parcel of property April 26, 1974.
At that time, he was a resident of Indiana and remained as such
until his retirement in 1987.8
Marion County.
At that time, Sapp relocated to
At various periods of time, Sapp would lease the
parcels to third parties for their agricultural use.
Sapp, nor
his lessees, used the disputed property until early 2003.
We
now turn to the Spaldings’ parcels, including the parcel later
purchased by Sherrill.
Spalding purchased his parcels at a Commissioner’s
sale in 1986 following a foreclosure action against the prior
owner and Spalding immediately began living on the property.9
3
The section in dispute is approximately 10 feet wide and 881 feet long.
4
The parcels have been used for pasturing horses, growing crops or hay, and
raising livestock.
5
Sherrill’s property is located on the inside lower left of the plat map.
6
The Spalding’s property is located on the upper left of the plat map.
7
Sapp’s property is located on the right side of the plat map adjoining
Tracts 2 and 3.
8
9
During this time, Sapp did frequently visit his property in Marion County.
A house was present on the property at the time of purchase.
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Five wooden posts had been placed in the field10 in the adjoining
section between Spalding and Sapp.11
were his boundary line.
Spalding presumed the posts
Shortly after moving in, Spalding
placed iron stakes in between the wooden posts and put a single
strand of electric fence wire12 on the stakes and posts.
Joe Robert Buckman (Buckman) began leasing Sapp’s
property adjoining the Spaldings’ Tract 2 in 198713 to grow corn
and soybeans.
In the 1990’s Spalding subleased the adjoining
portion of Sapp’s property to his Tract 2 from Buckman for a few
years.
Spalding used the subleased property for additional land
for his horses to graze.
During this time, Spalding removed a
portion of the single strand of electric fence wire to allow his
horses to pass through to the subleased property.
never removed any of the iron or wooden posts.
Spalding
When the Buckman
lease terminated as to the Sapp property, the electric fence
wire was put back up along the iron and wooden posts.
Spalding had a survey performed by Scott Hardin on
December 1, 2002, because he was considering selling his
property.
Mr. Hardin placed surveyor stakes into the ground to
represent the actual boundary line described in Spalding’s deed
10
None of the parties were aware who originally placed these posts into the
ground.
11
This section was adjacent to Tracts 2 and 3.
12
The electric fence was used by Spalding to keep his horses on his property.
13
Date taken from copy of lease submitted by Sapp as Defendant’s Exhibit 2.
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and he also prepared a plat representing the same.
At this
point, Spalding became aware that his fence actually intruded
onto the property of Sapp by approximately ten feet.
The
sequence of events which occurred after this discovery is
disputed by the parties.
Ultimately, in early 2003, Sapp
removed Spalding’s entire fence14 and tried to straighten the
wire with the surveyor stakes in order to represent the proper
boundary line as described in the parties’ deeds.
Suit was filed, and a bench trial was held February 9,
2004.
The trial court rendered its decision August 30, 2004,
holding that the Spaldings failed to meet their burden of proof
relating to Tract 2, but found the burden of proof satisfied as
to Tract 3.
Sapp filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate
September 10, 2004.15
On February 3, 2005, the trial court
rendered its Order on Post-Judgment Motions which vacated its
prior conclusions of law and judgment related to Tract 3 and
entered judgment for Sapp.
The Spaldings and Sherrill now
appeal to our court.
With respect to property title issues, the appropriate
standard of review is whether or not the trial court was clearly
erroneous or abused its discretion, and the appellate court
should not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court
14
Bordering Tracts 2 and 3.
15
The trial court’s order references competing motions to alter, amend or
vacate; however, Spalding’s motion was not included in the record.
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absent clear error.
(Ky.App. 2003).
Phillips v Akers, 103 S.W.3d 705, 709
In an action tried without a jury, the factual
findings of the trial court shall not be set aside unless they
are clearly erroneous, that is not supported by substantial
evidence.
Id.; see also Ky. CR 52.01.
Substantial evidence has
been conclusively defined by Kentucky courts as that which, when
taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient
probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable
person.
Secretary, Labor Cabinet v. Boston Gear, Inc., a Div.
of IMO Industries, Inc., 25 S.W.3d 130, 134 (Ky. 2000).
Additionally, the test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.
Commonwealth v. English,
993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
There are five elements, all of which must be
satisfied, before adverse possession will bar record title:
(1)
possession must be hostile and under a claim of right, (2) it
must be actual, (3) it must be exclusive, (4) it must be
continuous, and (5) it must be open and notorious.
Appalachian
Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 824
S.W.2d 878, 880 (Ky. 1992).
One may obtain a perfect title to
real property by adverse possession for the statutory period of
time of fifteen years even when there is no intention by the
adverse possessor to claim land not belonging to him.
-5-
Id. at
879-880.
The party claiming title through adverse possession
bears the burden of proving each element by clear and convincing
evidence.
Phillips, supra 103 S.W.3d at 709.
We next examine
each element in more detail.
The first element of adverse possession is that the
possession must be hostile and under a claim of right.
Property
used as owners are accustomed to do shows a hostile entry which
amounts to a public pronouncement of hostility to the title of
the real owner.
1955).
Tartar v. Tucker, 280 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Ky.
Further, the character of the property, its physical
nature and the use to which it has been put, determine the
character of the acts necessary to put the true owner on notice
of the hostile claim.
Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc.
supra 824 S.W.2d at 880, (citing Ely v. Fuson, 180 S.W.2d 90
(Ky. 1944)).
We believe the second and third elements of adverse
possession that the possession must be actual and exclusive are
self-explanatory.
The fourth element of adverse possession is
that the possession must be continuous.
The one claiming
adverse possession need not be present on the premises at all
times.
Thompson v. Ratcliff, 245 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Ky. 1952).
The important consideration is whether or not the physical use
of the property by the adverse possessor or his representative,
the erection of structures, or the keeping of chattels thereon
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demonstrates that he is asserting dominion over the property.
Id.
The final element of adverse possession is that the
possession must be open and notorious.
The open and notorious
element requires that the possessor openly evince a purpose to
hold dominion over the property with such hostility that will
give the non-possessory owner notice of the adverse claim.
Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown Bottling
Co., supra 824 S.W.2d at 880.
Mere intentions or verbal
expressions of a claim to the property is not sufficient absent
physical acts appearing on the land evidencing a purpose to hold
the property hostile to the rights of and giving notice to the
title holder.
Phillips supra 103 S.W.3d at 708.
An intent to
exercise dominion over land may be evidenced by the erection of
physical improvements on the property.
Appalachian Regional
Healthcare, Inc. supra 824 S.W.2d at 880, (citing Kentucky
Women’s Christian Temperance Union v. Thomas, 412 S.W.2d 869
(Ky. 1967)).
It is not necessary that a well-defined boundary
be a fence or any enclosure, but there must be some evidence of
a boundary, made so by a continuous cultivation to a certain
point, or in some other manner, that the claim of ownership and
possession will give notice to the adjoining owner.
Watson, 105 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Ky. 1937).
judgments of the trial court.
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Greenway v.
We now turn to the
First, we note that the trial court’s abandonment of
its initial finding as to Tract 3 does not affect the weight of
the trial court’s amended judgment.
power to amend its own judgments.
S.W.3d 888, 891-892 (Ky. 2005).
A trial court has unlimited
Gullion v. Gullion, 163
In rendering its decisions, the
trial court stated the following in determining the Appellants
failed to prove their adverse possession claim:
Tract 216
Spalding’s use of the land in dispute
as to Tract 2 was not open and
notorious, hostile, exclusive and
continuous for a period of 15 years.
Spalding fenced part of Tract 2
sometime around 1987 but removed the
fence in 1990. He then subleased a
portion of Sapp’s property which
bordered him. Also, Sapp put a
temporary fence on the disputed
property in 2001 which means that
Spalding did not have the exclusive use
of the land in dispute as to Tract 2
for a period of 15 years. In any
event, the use was interrupted when
Spalding subleased Sapp’s property from
1990 to 1996.
Tract317
Spalding’s use of the land in dispute as to
Tract 3 was not open and notorious, hostile,
exclusive and continuous for a period of 15
years. Spalding’s use of Tract 3 was not
open, notorious, hostile and exclusive as he
quit running horses on Tract 3 approximately
six years ago. Spalding’s use of Tract 3
was not open and notorious, hostile,
16
Taken from the August 30, 2004, Order and Judgment.
17
Taken from the February 3, 2005, Order on Post-Judgment Motions.
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exclusive and continuous for a period of 15
years as Sapp would occasionally use a
sickle bar mower to cut the weeds on the
disputed property. Spalding’s use of Tract
3 was not open and notorious, hostile,
exclusive and continuous for a period of 15
years as the fence erected by Spalding laid
on the ground a majority of the time and was
not visible, open or notorious. As a
result, this court vacates its conclusions
of law and judgment granting the
[Appellants’] claim for the land in the
disputed section of Tract 3.
Before we more closely examine the trial court’s
judgment as to Tract 2, we would like to take notice that an
important portion of Sapp’s testimony at the February 9, 2004,
bench trial was contradictory with prior testimony at a January
19, 2004, deposition.18
We believe this discrepancy seriously
harmed the credibility of Sapp.19
The trial court found that Spalding’s sublease with
Buckman as well as the sublease itself caused Spalding’s use of
the disputed property to be interrupted.
We agree.
We believe
Spalding’s sublease constituted permissive use of the disputed
property.
Possession by permission cannot ripen into title no
matter how long it continues.
Phillips supra 103 S.W.3d at 708.
The sublease defeated any adverse possession claim the Spaldings
18
We also note that on the trial video, while on the witness stand, Sapp
mouths a question then makes hand gestures (thumbs up and thumbs down) to an
individual out of the camera’s range to Sapp’s left. This occurred during
cross-examination by opposing counsel while opposing counsel had his back
turned.
19
Sapp offered no other witnesses at the bench trial or the depositions to
support his case.
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had as to Tract 2.
As such, it is not necessary to examine the
remainder of the trial court’s judgment related to Tract 2.20
We
turn now to the trial court’s judgment regarding Tract 3.
In its February 3, 2005, Order on Post-Judgment
Motions, the trial court vacated its original judgment in
relation to Tract 3 and found that the Spaldings and Sherrill
failed to prove their adverse possession claim.
The trial court
first found that “Spalding’s use of Tract 3 was not open,
notorious, hostile and exclusive as he quit running horses on
Tract 3 approximately six years ago.”
We disagree.
The one
claiming adverse possession need not be present on the premises
at all times.
Thompson supra 245 S.W.2d at 593.
The important
consideration is whether or not the physical use of the property
by the adverse possessor or his representative, the erection of
structures, or the keeping of chattels thereon demonstrates that
he is asserting dominion over the property.
Id.
Any court,
though required to follow precedent established by a higher
court, can set forth the reasons why, in its judgment, the
20
However, we would like to note that we disagree with the trial court’s
finding when Sapp put a temporary fence up in the disputed property for his
cattle in 2001. Sapp testified at the bench trial that he placed a temporary
electric fence six to eight feet from the old fence on his side of the
property because he did not want his cows going where they did not belong.
Sapp testified to this at the bench trial while looking at the plat map which
contained a notation for only one fence, the Spaldings’. Further, on the
trial video, Sapp clearly pointed to the right of the Spaldings’ fence away
from the disputed property on the plat map when asked where his temporary
fence was located. For the court to find that Sapp’s temporary fence was
located on the disputed property was clearly erroneous in that it was not
supported by substantial evidence.
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established precedent should be overruled but cannot, on its
own, overrule the established precedent set by a higher court.
Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. 1986).
Spalding testified that even after he quit pasturing his horses
on Tract 3, he still maintained the fence and mowed up to the
posts until early 2003.21
The trial court’s finding that
Spalding’s cessation of pasturing his horses on Tract 3 defeated
his adverse possession claim is contrary to precedent.
Therefore, the trial court erred in relation to this matter.
The trial court next found that “Spalding’s use of
Tract 3 was not open and notorious, hostile, exclusive and
continuous for a period of 15 years as Sapp would occasionally
use a sickle bar mower to cut the weeds on the disputed
property.”
We disagree.
Sapp blatantly contradicted prior
testimony from his January 19, 2004, deposition at the bench
trial in relation to this matter.
At his deposition, Sapp
testified that he cleared out underneath Spalding’s fence line
and that he did not cross the fence.
He stated, “I didn’t
believe in getting on somebody else’s property.”
This was quite
a contrast to his testimony at the bench trial in which he
testified he crossed the fence and bushhogged the disputed
portion, as well as, used the sickle bar mower under the fence
as he felt the disputed portion needed it.
21
When this
Testimony from bench trial and January 19, 2004, deposition.
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discrepancy was pointed out to Sapp, he finally admitted that he
never crossed the fence line.
As stated earlier, we believe
this discrepancy seriously harmed the credibility of Sapp’s
testimony.
Further, Spalding testified at his January 19, 2004,
deposition and at the bench trial that Sapp did occasionally mow
under his fence, but Sapp never crossed said fence.
Therefore,
we believe it was error and an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to find that Sapp used a sickle bar mower to cut weeds on
the disputed property, because it was not supported by
substantial evidence.
The trial court lastly found that “Spalding’s use of
Tract 3 was not open and notorious, hostile, exclusive and
continuous for a period of 15 years as the fence erected by
Spalding laid on the ground a majority of the time and was not
visible, open or notorious.”
We again disagree.
Spalding
testified at the bench trial that even though honeysuckle did
break down part of the wire on the fence it was always at least
one foot off the ground and the iron and wooden posts always
remained.
Also, Sherrill testified at the hearing that the
Spaldings’ fence was clear, definite, and visible at all times.22
Sapp testified at the bench trial that the Spaldings’ wire laid
22
Sherrill had been familiar with the properties since Spalding’s purchase in
1986. Also, Sherrill made a video of the Spaldings’ fence before it was
moved by Sapp and then after. Unfortunately, it was not included in the
record.
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on the ground probably ninety percent of the time during the
last four or five years.
Sapp then testified that he raised the
Spaldings’ wire for a reference point in a video made by
Sherrill even though he was not asked about the video.
Given
Sapp’s other contradictory testimony, we believe his testimony
in relation to this issue cannot rise to the level of
substantial evidence.
Therefore, the trial court erred and
abused its discretion in relation to this matter.
Following a review of the record, we agree with the
trial court’s original judgment related to Tract 3.23
We believe
that the Appellants satisfied each element of their adverse
possession claim as to this tract.
The Spaldings’ possession of
the disputed property adjacent to Tract 3 was hostile and under
a claim of right, actual, exclusive, continuous, and open and
notorious for more than the required statutory period of time.
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court
that the Spaldings failed to establish their adverse possession
claim as to Tract 2.
However, we believe the trial court erred
in its amended judgment related to Tract 3.
Therefore, we
affirm as to Tract 2 and reverse and remand as to Tract 3 to the
23
In its August 30, 2004, Order and Judgment the trial court stated, “the
Spaldings’ use of the land in dispute as to Tract 3 (now owned by Sherrill)
was open and notorious, hostile, exclusive and continuous for a period of 15
years. A fence was erected in 1987 on the property. This fence was never
removed. The Spaldings used this tract to pasture horses and Sapp never
crossed over onto Tract 3 from 1987 until 2003. Sherrill through his
predecessors, the Spaldings, would own the disputed 10 foot tract by adverse
possession.”
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Marion Circuit Court for a judgment consistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel Todd Spalding
Lebanon, Kentucky
Bryan E. Bennett
Campbellsville, Kentucky
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