JEFFREY WILLIAM ROBINSON v. LAURA MICHELLE ROBINSON
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RENDERED: MARCH 3, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000340-MR
JEFFREY WILLIAM ROBINSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CARTER FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KRISTI GOSSETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00111
v.
LAURA MICHELLE ROBINSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
Jeffrey and Laura Robinson were married in
October 1988.
They had two sons, ages twelve and thirteen at
the time of the parties’ separation in March 2004.
filed a petition for dissolution that same month.
Jeffrey
However, the
parties continued to live in the same residence until later that
summer.
Hearings were held in August and December 2004.
The
Carter Family Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Judgment on January 19, 2005.
Jeffrey appeals.
He
complains that the family court erred in its disposition of
several of the parties’ assets.
We affirm.
Jeffrey first questions the court’s ruling regarding a
rustic cabin located on the parties’ property.
The materials
for the cabin were located in an old barn on the farm, which
Jeffrey had purchased prior to the Robinsons’ marriage; Jeffrey
rebuilt the cabin himself.
Therefore, Jeffrey insists, the
trial court erred in its determination that the cabin was
marital property.
We disagree.
The disposition of property in a
dissolution of marriage action is governed by KRS 403.190.
That
statute acknowledges that property acquired during a marriage is
presumed to be marital property.
KRS 403.190(2).
However, it
excepts, as a general rule, the “increase in value of property
acquired before the marriage to the extent that such increase
did not result from the efforts of the parties during the
marriage.”
KRS 403.190(2)(e).
But here the family court found
that the parties’ joint efforts did increase the value of
Jeffrey’s nonmarital interest in the property.
It was not (nor
are we) persuaded by Jeffrey’s argument that his sweat equity
alone built that cabin.
908-909 (Ky. 2001).
See Travis v. Travis, 53 S.W.3d 904,
Laura’s contributions as the sole homemaker
of the family contributed to the increase in value as well.
403.190(1)(a); Goderwis v. Goderwis, 780 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Ky.
-2-
KRS
1989).
During the marriage, the cabin was built from the ground
up (albeit with timber from a pre-existing unusable structure)
on another site on the farm, near a pond which was added during
the marriage; electric service was added to the cabin, and it
was suitable for overnight visits by appellant and his sons.
Thus, the family court did not err in finding that Laura was
entitled to one half the value of the cabin.
Jeffrey’s next several assignments of error, which
concern the disposition of two years’ vacation pay (2004 and
2005), one year’s tax refund (2005), and the distribution
regarding his pension benefits, have one common theme, viz.,
that the monies were earned subsequent to the parties’
separation but prior to the dissolution.
Again we disagree.
KRS 403.190(3) allows for the division of these assets if earned
prior to a “decree of legal separation.”
No legal decree was
entered until the decree of dissolution in January 2005.
The
trial court did not err in allocating all contributions made
prior to the entry of the decree.
Jeffrey’s argues that the family court erred in
awarding Laura one half the 2003 vacation pay and tax refund.
He claims that the funds were no longer in existence, having
been wholly expended by the time of the decree.
court found otherwise:
The family
Since the parties were totally debt free
and since Jeffrey earned approximately $80,000 per year and was
-3-
claiming no extraordinary expenses, it was not convinced that
the funds were in fact exhausted.
The record supports this
finding, and we decline to disturb it.
Jeffrey lastly argues that the family court erred in
its award of attorney fees to Laura.
KRS 403.220 permits this
award absent an abuse of discretion, which Jeffrey fails to
demonstrate.
Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Ky.
2001).
The judgment of the Carter Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
W. Jeffrey Scott, PSC
Grayson, Kentucky
Rebecca K. Phillips
Grayson, Kentucky
-4-
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