DAVID LEE ROBINSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 9, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000327-MR
DAVID LEE ROBINSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 00-CR-00105
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND HENRY, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
David Lee Robinson appeals from an August 12,
2004 order of the Hardin Circuit Court amending his 3-year
sentence to run consecutively, rather than concurrently, with a
prior 30-year sentence obtained in the Grayson Circuit Court.
Robinson specifically challenges the jurisdiction of the circuit
court to enter the order, asserting that the amendment of his
sentence was barred pursuant to CR1 59.05.
Upon review, we
affirm.
On November 26, 2003, Robinson appeared in open court
and pled guilty to a variety of charges for which he was
indicted on April 28, 2000, including possession of controlled
substances, possession of marijuana, possession of drug
paraphernalia, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and driving
under the influence.
On April 12, 2004, following a guilty
plea, the circuit court entered a judgment and sentence order
convicting him on those charges and sentencing him to a total of
3 years’ imprisonment.
Of particular note here, the judgment
and sentence further provided that this sentence would run
concurrently with a 30-year sentence imposed on December 16,
2003, in another criminal action in which Robinson was involved
in Grayson County for offenses committed while he was released
on bond and awaiting trial in the Hardin County action.
On July 21, 2004, the Kentucky Department of
Corrections sent a letter to the circuit court asking for
clarification on whether Robinson was in possession of a handgun
at the time he committed the offenses in question and requesting
an amended judgment if that was indeed the case.
Subsequently,
on August 12, 2004, the circuit court entered an amended
judgment and sentence noting that Robinson was, in fact, in
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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possession of a handgun.
However, the court also amended the
judgment to reflect that Robinson’s sentence was to run
consecutively to the 30-year sentence imposed in the Grayson
County action, resulting in a total sentence of 33 years.
On December 28, 2004, Robinson filed a pro se pleading
styled as a “Motion to Amend Sentence,” contending that the
amended judgment entered by the circuit court on August 12, 2004
was void, as the court lost jurisdiction over the case 10 days
after the original judgment and sentence was entered.
He
consequently asked the court to amend his sentence from 33 years
to 30, consistent with the original judgment and sentence.
The
Commonwealth filed a response indicating its position that the
amended judgment was justified because the two sentences were
required to run consecutively pursuant to KRS2 533.060(3).
On
January 24, 2005, the circuit court entered an order denying
Robinson’s motion.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Robinson again argues that the amended
judgment entered by the circuit court was void because the court
lost jurisdiction over the case 10 days after the original
judgment and sentence were entered.
Our case law does provide
as a general rule that trial courts lose control over a judgment
after the passage of the 10-day limitation contained in CR
59.05.
2
See Silverburg v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Ky.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3-
1979); McMurray v. Commonwealth, 682 S.W.2d 794, 795 (Ky.App.
1985); CR 59.05.
criminal actions.
This principle holds true in both civil and
See McMurray, 682 S.W.2d at 795; RCr3 1.10;
RCr 13.04; CR 59.05.
With this said, however, this limitation does not
apply when a sentence entered by a circuit court is unlawful.
In Neace v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 319 (Ky. 1998), our Supreme
Court expressly held that when an “unlawful sentence is
recommended by the jury or an unlawful sentence is imposed
following a guilty plea, the result is the same.
In either
instance the sentence must be corrected to conform to the law.”
Id. at 322.
In reaching this holding, the Court cited with
approval the holding of this court in Skiles v. Commonwealth,
757 S.W.2d 212 (Ky.App. 1988), that “a trial court which has
imposed an unlawful sentence can correct that sentence at any
time.”
Id. at 215 (Emphasis added).
As the Commonwealth points out, KRS 533.060(3)
provides that “[w]hen a person commits an offense while awaiting
trial for another offense, and is subsequently convicted or
enters a plea of guilty to the offense committed while awaiting
trial, the sentence imposed for the offense committed while
awaiting trial shall not run concurrently with confinement for
the offense for which the person is awaiting trial.” (Emphasis
3
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-4-
added).
Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute,
the circuit court here was prohibited as a matter of law from
running Robinson’s 3-year sentence concurrently with the 30-year
sentence obtained in Grayson County in its original judgment and
sentence order.
It therefore had the authority under Neace and
Skiles to amend said order to re-sentence Robinson in compliance
with the statute.
We note that Robinson has cited to a number of cases
in which Kentucky appellate courts have held that a trial court
lacked jurisdiction to amend a final judgment and sentence order
after the passage of the CR 59.05 10-day limitation.
See Viers
v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 527 (Ky. 2001); Cardwell v.
Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 672 (Ky. 2000); Commonwealth v. Gross,
936 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1996); Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207
(Ky. 1994); Silverburg, supra; McMurray, supra.
These cases are
distinguishable and consequently inapplicable here, however,
because the initial sentences imposed therein were not contrary
to law.
Accordingly, we hold that because concurrent
sentencing here was contrary to the provisions of KRS
533.060(3), the circuit court did not err in amending its
original judgment and sentence order to impose a lawful
sentence.
The order of the Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard Edwin Neal
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Frankfort, Kentucky
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