COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; JAMES W. HOLSINGER M.D., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE CABINET v. EPI CORPORATION
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APRIL 14, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000274-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES;
JAMES W. HOLSINGER M.D., IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE CABINET
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ANDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM F. STEWART, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00101
v.
EPI CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, MINTON, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
This matter is an appeal from the Anderson
Circuit Court of its granting of partial summary judgment to
Appellee, EPI Corporation (EPI), per order entered December 3,
2004.
The Appellant, Cabinet for Health and Family Services
(Cabinet), had previously been awarded a judgment by the
Administrative Hearings Branch of the Cabinet from which EPI
appealed to the Anderson Circuit Court.
The primary issue in this current appeal is recoupment
by the Cabinet for alleged overpayments of Medicaid benefits to
EPI’s long-term care facilities.
There is a long history of
disagreement between the parties spanning nearly three decades.
However, we direct our attention only to the cost years that are
the subject of this appeal before us, i.e. 1988 through 1996.
Each year, facilities participating in the Medicaid
program are required to submit cost reports to the Cabinet in a
timely manner per the Cabinet’s regulations.
Using these cost
reports, the Cabinet sets prospective reimbursement rates for a
facility that may or may not be adjusted at the end of the next
cost year depending upon whether the Cabinet determines the same
is appropriate.
Neither party disputes that EPI promptly filed
its cost reports for each cost year at issue.
For cost years 1988 through 1995, if a facility
disputed a proposed adjustment, it would first request a reevaluation by the Director, Division of Reimbursement Operations
(f/k/a/ Division of Reimbursement and Contracts).
907 KAR
1:036E, Section 5 (1988); 907 KAR 1:036E, Section 6 (1989); 907
KAR 1:036E, Section 6 (1990); 907 KAR 1:025, Section 6 (1991);
907 KAR 1:025, Section 6 (1992); 907 KAR 1:025E, Section 6
(1993); 907 KAR 1:025E, Section 6 (1994); and 907 KAR 1:025E,
Section 6 (1995).
The Director would review the proposed
adjustment and notify the facility of what action would be taken
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by the Cabinet within twenty days of the request.
Id.
If the
facility disagreed, it could then request a review by a standing
review panel.
Id.
The panel consisted of three members:
One
from the Division of Reimbursement Operations (f/k/a/ Division
of Reimbursement and Contracts), one from the Kentucky
Association of Health Care Facilities, and one from the
Department for Medicaid Services.
Id.
The panel would hold a
hearing within twenty days of receiving the request and issue a
binding decision within thirty days of said hearing.
Id.
For cost year 1996, the Cabinet adopted a new appeal
process.
If a facility disputed a proposed adjustment, it would
first request a program review meeting.
10 (1996).
907 KAR 1:671, Section
If the Cabinet determined such a meeting was
unnecessary, it would render a decision in lieu thereof.
Id.
However, if a program review meeting was held, the Cabinet had
thirty days to schedule said meeting and another thirty days to
render a decision following the meeting.
Id.
The program
review meeting would be conducted by the Director or his
designee rather than a three member panel described in the prior
regulations.
Id.
If the facility disagreed with the decision,
it could then request a full administrative hearing through the
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Office of the Commissioner.1
Id.
We now review the procedural
history in this matter.
On July 9, 2002, the Cabinet issued a decision letter
regarding all outstanding appeals by EPI for cost years 1988
through 1996.
EPI promptly appealed the decision letter and
requested a full administrative hearing.
The administrative
hearing was held on January 27, January 28, January 29, January
31, and February 12, 2003.
At the conclusion of the hearing,
each party was directed to provide its recommended findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and closing argument by late May 2003.
Following submission thereof, the Hearing Officer’s Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order was issued
February 9, 2004.
The Hearing Officer concluded the proposed
audit adjustments were not time-barred, because KRS 413.120(2),
a fifteen year statute of limitation for actions based on
written contracts, applied due to the provider agreements
between the parties.
EPI promptly filed its exceptions to the
Hearing Officer’s recommendations.
However, the Cabinet issued
a final order affirming the Hearing Officer’s Findings of Facts,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order in its entirety.
EPI
then appealed to the Anderson Circuit Court.
A motion for partial summary judgment was filed by EPI
on July 26, 2004, arguing that the Cabinet was barred by the
1
The administrative hearings were to proceed in accordance with KRS Chapter
13B.
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statute of limitations from pursuing recoupment against them.
The Cabinet also filed a motion for partial summary judgment
arguing its actions were not barred by the statute of
limitations and it acted accordingly.
On December 3, 2004, the
circuit court entered an order for partial summary judgment on
behalf of EPI.
The Cabinet filed a motion to alter, amend, or
vacate the partial summary judgment order, but was ultimately
denied by the trial court on January 7, 2005.
The Cabinet now
appeals to our court.
The Cabinet has two primary arguments.
First, the
proper venue for the first level of the appellate process should
have been Franklin Circuit Court rather than the Anderson
Circuit Court.2
Second, the Cabinet was not barred by a statute
of limitation in recoupment of overpaid Medicaid benefits for
any of the cost years at issue (i.e. 1988-1996).
We review the
Cabinet’s first argument.
The Cabinet argues that Franklin Circuit Court was the
proper venue for EPI’s appeal, because EPI had two prior matters
before the Franklin Circuit Court.
One was protesting the
Cabinet’s recoupment efforts for years prior to those at issue
here and the other action tried to enjoin the Cabinet’s
administrative procedures on the audits in the fiscal years in
2
The Cabinet did file a Motion to Transfer on June 1, 2004, but it was not
granted.
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question.
Neither of the two prior Franklin Circuit Court cases
are appeals of the Cabinet’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Final Order related to the audit adjustments for cost
years 1988 through 1996.3
We are not persuaded by the Cabinet’s
argument.
Kentucky Revised Statute 13B.140(1) states, in
pertinent part, “If venue for appeal is not stated in the
enabling statutes, a party may appeal to Franklin Circuit Court
or the Circuit Court of the county in which the appealing party
resides or operates a place of business.”
The Cabinet admits
that its enabling statutes do not contain a statement regarding
venue for appeal and that one of EPI’s nursing facilities is
located in Anderson County.
Also, absent compelling or unusual
circumstances, which we do not believe are applicable in the
instant case, a court is duty bound to hear cases within its
vested jurisdiction.
Roos v. Kentucky Education Association,
580 S.W.2d 508, 509 (Ky.App. 1979).
Therefore, we believe the
Anderson Circuit Court was a proper venue for the first level of
appellate review.
The Cabinet’s second argument is that the incorrect
statute of limitation was applied by the Anderson Circuit Court.
3
One appeal was related to an issue in the 1980s. The other was related to
the same fiscal years that are subject of this appeal as well as prior years,
but it was a request to enjoin the Cabinet from proceeding with recoupment.
EPI was granted partial summary judgment in relation to all cost years prior
to 1988.
-6-
The Anderson Circuit Court found the appropriate statutes of
limitations were KRS 413.120(2) and 42 CFR §405.1885.4
The
former imposes a five-year statute of limitation on an action
upon a liability created by statute, when no other time is fixed
by the statute creating the liability.
The latter imposes a
three-year statute of limitation in which to reopen a
determination of an intermediary or a decision by a hearing
officer or panel of hearing officers, by the Board, or the
Secretary.
The Court of Appeals is authorized to review issues of
law involving an administrative agency on a de novo basis.
Liquor Outlet, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 141 S.W.
3d 378, 381 (Ky.App. 2004), (citing Aubrey v. Office of the
Attorney General, 994 S.W.2d 516 (Ky.App. 1998)).
Determining
whether an action is time-barred due to an applicable statute of
limitation is a question of law.
Lipsteuer v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Ky. 2000).
In
particular, an interpretation of a statute is a question of law
and a reviewing court is not bound by the agency’s
interpretation of that statute.
Liquor Outlet, supra, (citing
Halls Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, 16 S.W.3d 327 (Ky.App.
2000)).
However, an administrative agency’s interpretation of
4
EPI argued this statute was applicable only to the Cabinet’s audits of 19901992. It argued that it was barred because audits were not initiated by the
Cabinet within three years of receipt of EPI’s cost reports.
-7-
its own regulation is entitled to substantial deference.
Cabinet for Health Services v. Family Home Health Care, Inc., 98
S.W.3d 524, 527 (Ky.App. 2003), (citing Camera Center, Inc. v.
Revenue Cabinet, 34 S.W.3d 39 (Ky. 2000)).
A reviewing court is
not free to substitute its judgment as to the proper
interpretation of the agency’s regulations as long as that
interpretation is compatible and consistent with the statute
under which it was promulgated and is not otherwise defective as
arbitrary or capricious.
Id., (citing City of Louisville by
Kuster v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Ky. 1990)).
Unfortunately, there are no state statutes dealing with
recoupment of Medicaid funds.
As such, we turn to the state
regulations for guidance regarding recoupment of overpayments in
the Medicaid system.
An agency must be bound by the regulations it
promulgates.
Hagan v. Farris, 807 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. 1991),
(citing Shearer v. Dailey, 226 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1950)).
The
regulations adopted by an agency have the force and effect of
law.
Id., (citing Linkous v. Darch, 323 S.W.2d 850 (Ky. 1959)).
An agency’s interpretation of a regulation is valid only if the
interpretation complies with the actual language of the
regulation.
Id., (citing Fluor Constructors, Inc. v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 861 F.2d 936
(6th Cir. 1988)).
Further, KRS 13A.130 prohibits an
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administrative body from modifying an administrative regulation
through internal policy or another form of action.
Id.
For cost years 1988 through 1995, the following
regulatory language was applicable:
Section 2.
Recoupment of Overpayments.
When it is determined that a provider
has been overpaid, a letter shall5 be mailed
to the provider requesting payment in full
within thirty (30) days. If a provider
demonstrates to the program within the
thirty (30) day time limit that full payment
would create an undue hardship, a payment
plan not to exceed six (6) months from the
notification date shall6 be established. If
the full payment or payment plan request is
not received within thirty (30) days of
notification, the amount due shall7 be
deducted from current payments until the
full amount is recouped. Once the payment
plan has been established and a payment is
not received by the agreed to date, the
amount shall8 be deducted from current
payments.
Section 3.
Exceptional Hardship Circumstances.
When it is determined that a recoupment of an
overpayment in accordance with Section 2 of this
regulation would result in an exceptional
hardship for the provider and have the direct or
indirect effect of reducing the availability of
services to program recipients . . ., the program
may provide for a reasonable extension of the
5
Prior to 1992, “will” was used in the regulation rather than “shall.”
6
Prior to 1992, “will” was used in the regulation rather than “shall.”
7
Prior to 1992, “will” was used in the regulation rather than “shall.”
8
Prior to 1992, “will” was used in the regulation rather than “shall.”
-9-
time period for recoupment. The time period for
recoupment shall9 not exceed twelve (12) months
from the date the overpayment is established, and
shall10 be accomplished within twenty-one (21)
months from the end of the provider’s cost
reporting period . . .11 (Emphasis added.) 907 KAR
1:110(1988-1995).
Based on the plain language of these regulations, it is clear
that time was of the essence for the Cabinet to seek recoupment
from providers given an overpayment of Medicaid funds.
Even in
exceptional hardship circumstances, the most gracious time
period for recoupment given by the Cabinet was twelve months
from the date the overpayment was established and within twentyone months from the end of the provider’s cost reporting period.
Id.
The record reflects that the Cabinet did not recoup any
funds for cost years 1988 through 1995 within twenty-one months
from the end of the provider’s cost reporting period.
Therefore, it is now barred from recouping said funds in
accordance with its own regulation.
The Cabinet may feel this is a harsh result, but we
cannot attribute a different meaning to a regulation that is
clear on its face.
One could presume such a result is a reason
why this regulation was modified in 1996.
9
10
Prior to 1992, “will” was used in the regulation rather than “shall.”
Prior to 1992, “must” was used in the regulation rather than “shall.”
11
The remainder of the regulation was applicable only to providers who were
not reimbursed on the basis of cost reports.
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We also note that these regulations were first
included in EPI’s appellate brief to which the Cabinet argued
they could not be brought up at this point in the appellate
process.
We disagree.
Applicable legal authority is not
evidence and can be resorted to at any stage of the proceedings
whether cited by the litigants or simply applied, sua sponte, by
the adjudicator(s).
Burton v. Foster Wheeler Corporation, 72
S.W.3d 925, 930 (Ky. 2002), (citing First National Bank of
Louisville v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 517 S.W.2d
226, 230 (Ky. 1974)).
In 1996, the regulatory language no longer contained
the requirement that the time period for recoupment shall not
exceed twelve months from the date the overpayment is
established and shall be accomplished within twenty-one months
from the end of the provider’s cost reporting period.12
KAR 1:671, Section 2 (1996).
See 907
The new regulation also required a
facility to pay the proposed adjustments even if that facility
pursued appeals.
Id.
Because there was no longer a statute of
limitation applicable to the recoupment of Medicaid overpayments
contained in the regulations, we must determine which statute of
limitation applied to cost year 1996.
The Hearing Officer concluded that the appropriate
statute of limitation applicable to all cost years at issue was
12
There was also no state statute addressing the appropriate statute of
limitation for Medicaid recoupment.
-11-
KRS 413.090(2), which allows fifteen years to commence an action
based upon a written contract.
However, the Anderson Circuit
Court concluded that the appropriate statute of limitation
applicable to all cost years at issue was KRS 413.120(2), which
imposes a five-year statute of limitation on all actions upon a
liability created by statute when no other time is fixed by the
statute creating the liability.
The underlying theory of law asserted in a petition
determines what statute of limitations should apply.
Raymer, 139 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Ky. 2004).
Million v.
We believe this same
reasoning is appropriate for matters originating in the
administrative system.
Following a review of the voluminous
record, the Cabinet consistently primarily relied upon
violations of either federal or state Medicaid and Medicare
regulations in seeking to recoup alleged Medicaid overpayments.
As such, we believe this entire action does not sound in
contract as argued by the Cabinet.
An action13 upon a liability created by statute, when
no other time is fixed by the statute creating the liability,
shall be commenced within five years after the cause of action
accrued.
KRS 413.120(2).14
Also, this limitation applies to
actions brought by or in the name of the Commonwealth the same
13
There shall be one form of action to be known as “civil action.”
14
This section of the present statute reads the same as it did in 1996.
-12-
Ky. CR 2.
as to actions by private persons, except where a different time
is prescribed by statute.
KRS 413.150.15
An action shall be
deemed to commence on the date of the first summons or process
issued in good faith from the court having jurisdiction of the
cause of action.
KRS 413.250,16 see also Ky. CR 3.
We believe
the law is clear that in actions undertaken by a state agency on
behalf of the Commonwealth, the applicable statute of
limitations to said actions shall be five years, unless there is
a different time prescribed by statute.
There are no state
statutes or regulations that apply a specific statute of
limitation to Medicaid recoupment for the 1996 cost year.
The Cabinet was given the authority to establish and
implement all regulations for the Medicaid program.
194.050(1) (1996).
See KRS
In 1996, it removed the twenty-one month
recoupment limitation and did not replace it with a new
limitation.
The Cabinet chose to remain silent on the issue.
Therefore, we believe the five-year statute of limitation
established in KRS 413.120(2) is applicable to the Cabinet’s
recoupment of alleged Medicaid overpayments for cost year 1996.
Neither party disputes that EPI’s cost reports for
1996 were timely received.
15
16
According to the Cabinet’s brief,
The present statute reads the same as it did in 1996.
The present statute reads the same as it did in 1996.
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EPI was notified of the audit adjustments for the 1996 cost
report year in 2000.
Specifically, the Cabinet’s brief states
that EPI was notified of audit adjustments to its Glasgow Health
Care facility in March 2000; its Briarwood facility in October
2000; and all remaining EPI facilities in June 2000.
EPI does
not deny being notified of the proposed audit adjustments in
2000 in its brief.
Also, the record contained letters from EPI
to the Cabinet which support the Cabinet’s dates.
They are as
follows:
1.
Two letters dated April 25, 2000, where EPI
appealed the proposed audit adjustments to
Glasgow and Heritage Hall. These letters stated
EPI received the Cabinet’s transmittal letter
dated March 31, 2000.
2.
Eleven letters dated July 19, 2000, where EPI
appealed the proposed audit adjustments to
Colonial Health & Rehabilitation Center, Green
Valley Health & Rehabilitation Center, Jackson
Manor, Richmond Health & Rehabilitation ComplexKenwood, Richmond Health & Rehabilitation
Complex-Madison, McCreary Health & Rehabilitation
Center, Monroe Health Care Facility, North Hardin
Health & Rehabilitation Center, Professional Care
Health & Rehabilitation Center, Summit Manor
Nursing Home, and Tanbark Health Care. These
letters stated EPI received the Cabinet’s
transmittal letter dated June 30, 2000.
3.
Letter dated November 29, 2000, where EPI
appealed the proposed audit adjustments to
Briarwood. The letter stated EPI received the
Cabinet’s transmittal letter dated October 31,
2000.
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Two questions then arise: 1) when did the Cabinet’s cause of
action accrue and 2) what would be the action by the Cabinet to
determine compliance with the five-year statute of limitation
thereto.
We examine first when the Cabinet’s cause of action
accrued.
A cause of action accrues when a state agency first
has the right to institute an action of any kind, administrative
or judicial.
Commonwealth, Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet v. Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association,
972 S.W.2d 276, 282 (Ky.App. 1997).
We believe the cause of
action accrued in the instant matter when EPI submitted its cost
report to the Cabinet for cost year 1996.
Upon submission, the
Cabinet could then determine the amount of any Medicaid
overpayments, if any.
The Cabinet controls if and when an audit
of a cost year will occur.
Their delay in commencing with an
audit should not extend their ability to collect overpayments.
EPI states in its brief that the audit for cost year
1996 was completed on May 15, 1998.
dispute this date.
The Cabinet does not
Also, EPI was notified of the proposed audit
adjustments in 2000.
The completion of the audit and subsequent
notification of proposed adjustments were clearly within the
five-year statute of limitation.
However, neither of these acts
are an “action” as contemplated in KRS 413.150.
As such, we
must now determine what was the action of the Cabinet in
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determining whether the Cabinet’s recoupment efforts were timebarred?
As discussed earlier, beginning with the 1996
regulations, the Cabinet required a provider to prepay it for a
proposed audit adjustment regardless if the provider disputed
the adjustment and pursued an administrative appeal.
If a
provider failed to make a payment or took no action toward
repayment, the Cabinet recouped the monies from future Medicaid
payments.
907 KAR 1:671, Section 2(8).
If the provider had
insufficient funds available for recoupment through the payment
in the first payment cycle following the due date, the Cabinet
could refer the account for collection.
Id.
We believe the
filing of a collection suit in a court of law to recoup the
alleged Medicaid overpayments would be the action to determine
whether the Cabinet adhered to the five-year statute of
limitation.
According to the record, the Cabinet enforced its new
regulation and required EPI to promptly pay back alleged
overpayments for cost year 1996.
This occurred shortly after
EPI was notified of the audit adjustments, which was within five
years of EPI’s submission of its cost report for cost year 1996.
When EPI paid the alleged overpayments, the Cabinet lost its
ability to pursue collection in the court system (i.e. its
action), because it became moot.
In effect, the Cabinet had
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already gotten from EPI what a judgment from a court of law
could have granted.
If the Cabinet had been forced into a
collection suit against EPI or if the recoupment was past the
five year limit, we may have reached a different result.
However, EPI complied with the regulations.
Therefore, we do
not believe the Cabinet’s recoupment of alleged Medicaid
overpayments for cost year 1996 was time-barred.
On a final note, we would like to comment on the
Hearing Officer’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommended Order.
At the close of the administrative hearing
on February 12, 2003, the parties were given until late May to
offer their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
along with their closing arguments.
documents on May 27, 2003.
Each party filed said
The Hearing Officer did not issue
his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order
until February 9, 2004.
This was more than eight months
following the submission of the case for a decision.
The
Hearing Officer’s recommendation was to comply with KRS 13B.110.
907 KAR 1:671, Section 10(3)(f)(1996).
Kentucky Revised Statute
13B.110(1)17 allows a hearing officer sixty days to render a
recommended order, including findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
17
The longest extension given to a Hearing Officer from this
The current statute reads the same as it did in 1996.
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requirement is 30 days.
KRS 13B.110(3).
Clearly, the Hearing
Officer failed in complying with his timeliness requirement.
Also, when the Hearing Officer did render his Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order it was nearly
verbatim of the Cabinet’s eighty-one page proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
The appellate courts of this state
have universally condemned the practice of adopting findings of
fact and conclusions of law prepared by counsel.
Callahan v.
Callahan, 579 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Ky.App. 1979); see also G.R.M. v.
W.M.S., 618 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Ky.App. 1981).
While we
acknowledge that administrative hearing officers are not bound
by Ky. CR 52.01, Board of Adjustments of the City of Richmond v.
Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1978); see also Ky. CR 1, we believe
the same basic principle should apply that it is inappropriate
for administrative hearing officers to delegate such an
important part of his authority to a party in a matter before
him.18
It is critical to parties to be assured that the decision
making process is completely under the control of the hearing
officer.
It is equally important for the appellate courts to be
18
The statute applicable to administrative hearings is KRS 13B.110(1),
which states, in pertinent part,
[T]he hearing officer shall complete and submit
to the agency head, no later than sixty (60)
days after receiving a copy of the official
record of the proceeding, a written recommended
order which shall include his findings of fact,
conclusion of law, and recommended disposition
of the hearing. . . . (Emphasis added.)
-18-
similarly confident if they become involved.
While our ultimate
decision was not based on these issues, we wanted each party to
be aware of our feelings on this matter.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the portion of the
Anderson Circuit Court’s judgment that the Cabinet’s recoupment
of Medicaid overpayments for cost years 1988 through 1995 were
time-barred and the judgment of the Administrative Hearing
Branch that recoupment for cost year 1996 was not time-barred,
but for different reasons.
We reverse the portion of the
Anderson Circuit Court’s judgment that 1996 was time-barred and
the judgment of the Administrative Hearing Branch that cost
years 1988 through 1995 were not time-barred.
We remand to the
Administrative Hearing Branch to enter a judgment consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Alea Amber Arnett
Johann F. Herklotz
Ann Truitt Hunsaker
Frankfort, Kentucky
Frank F. Chuppe
Stephen R. Price
Virginia H. Snell
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Alea Amber Arnett
Frankfort, Kentucky
Frank Chuppe
Louisville, Kentucky
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