TAJA DAVIDSON v. CASTNER-KNOTT DRY GOODS CO., INC.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
APRIL 28, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000259-MR
TAJA DAVIDSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-01309
v.
CASTNER-KNOTT DRY GOODS
CO., INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND HENRY, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
Taja Davidson appeals from a January 28, 2005
order of the Warren Circuit Court granting summary judgment to
Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., Inc. as to Davidson’s malicious
prosecution claim.
Upon review, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
On October 2, 1997, Davidson reported to the Nashville
Metropolitan Police Department that checks on her account at
First Union National Bank of Tennessee had been stolen, and that
her account there had been closed for approximately one year.
The report resulted from Davidson’s discovery that two of those
checks had been presented to a grocery store and a Wal-Mart in
Nashville.
On November 28, 1997, Castner-Knott accepted a check
in the amount of $349.79 drawn on Davidson’s First Union
account.
The check was dishonored by the bank and returned to
Castner-Knott marked “Account Closed.”
Subsequently, on or
about March 5, 1998, Timothy Bush – a loss prevention employee
at Castner-Knott – appeared at the Warren County Attorney’s
office and signed a criminal complaint against Davidson.
On
April 8, 1998, the Warren County Grand Jury reported a True Bill
against Davidson charging her with Theft by Deception over
$300.00,1 and a bench warrant was issued for her arrest.
On July 21, 2001, Davidson was a passenger in a car
that was stopped in Blue Ash, Ohio, for an alleged traffic
violation.
A record check disclosed the Warren County bench
warrant, and Davidson was arrested.
Several days later, she
appeared in court in Hamilton County, Ohio, where she waived
extradition before being taken to Warren County by sheriff’s
deputies.
She was subsequently arraigned and released from
custody on July 27, 2001, by Warren Circuit Court Judge Thomas
R. Lewis.
1
Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 514.040.
-2-
On August 29, 2001, the Commonwealth Attorney filed a
written motion to dismiss the indictment against Davidson
without prejudice.
On September 4, 2001, at the scheduled
pretrial conference, the Commonwealth Attorney told Judge Lewis
that he sought to dismiss the case due to (1) Davidson’s police
report indicating that her checks had been stolen, and (2) the
fact that Castner-Knott no longer did business in Warren County,
so the Commonwealth did not have a witness.
In response to the
Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss, counsel for Davidson moved the
court to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, citing the
Commonwealth’s inability to go forward with the case and the
injustice that had been caused to Davidson.
On September 5,
2001, the court entered an order dismissing the indictment
without prejudice, in accordance with the Commonwealth’s
request.
On August 30, 2002, Davidson filed suit against
Castner-Knott in Warren Circuit Court alleging malicious
prosecution and abuse of process.
On July 24, 2003, Castner-
Knott moved for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution
claim on the basis that Davidson could not prove that the
underlying criminal proceeding terminated in her favor, in part
because she allegedly agreed to the Commonwealth’s motion to
dismiss without prejudice.
On September 2, 2003, Judge Lewis
entered an order denying the motion.
-3-
Castner-Knott appealed the
denial to this court and then to the Kentucky Supreme Court, but
the appeal was rejected in both cases.
On September 29, 2004, following Judge Lewis’
retirement, Castner-Knott renewed its motion for summary
judgment.
It reiterated the arguments made in its previous
motion and additionally contended that Timothy Bush had probable
cause to swear out a complaint against Davidson.
Following an
October 26, 2004 hearing and extensive briefing, Judge John R.
Grise indicated that he would grant the motion at a December 16,
2004 pretrial conference.
A written order to this effect was
entered on January 28, 2005.
In this order, the trial court concluded that
“Castner-Knott is entitled to summary judgment because Ms.
Davidson has failed to show that the dismissal without prejudice
of the indictment constitutes a termination of criminal
proceedings in her favor.”
First - relying primarily upon Van
Arsdale v. Caswell, 311 S.W.2d 404 (Ky. 1958) - the trial court
held that, although a dismissal without prejudice is not final
for purposes of the tort of malicious prosecution, Davidson
still could have appealed the dismissal without prejudice.
It
also noted that a formal objection to the dismissal without
prejudice is nowhere to be found in the record.
The trial court then disagreed with Davidson’s
argument that a dismissal without prejudice was a termination in
-4-
her favor, citing to a passage in 52 Am.Jur.2d Malicious
Prosecution § 40 (2000) that states: “Some types of terminations
that do not satisfy the requirement for a favorable termination
include ... the striking of the case from the criminal docket
with leave to reinstate.”
The court also cited to 52 Am.Jur.2d
Malicious Prosecution § 34 and Van Arsdale for the proposition
that “an indefinite continuance does not amount to an
abandonment of prosecution that would permit maintenance of a
malicious prosecution action.”
The court also found – pointing to § 660(c) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts while indicating that it has never
been adopted by a Kentucky appellate court - that Davidson was
not entitled to relief because her indictment was not withdrawn
because the Commonwealth thought she was innocent; instead, it
“was dismissed because attainment of evidence necessary to fully
prosecute her was not readily available.”
The court further
held – citing to this same provision - that Davidson’s
indictment “was not abandoned out of mercy requested or accepted
by the accused.”
In this context, the court concluded that the
Commonwealth had to believe that Davidson was guilty; otherwise,
it would not have dismissed her indictment without prejudice.
Consequently, the trial court held that “Davidson will
not be able to prove that the indictment that was dismissed
without prejudice constitutes a termination of proceedings in
-5-
her favor, even if the facts indicate that the Commonwealth will
more than likely never re-indict her.”
It continued: “From the
Kentucky case law cited above, there are no genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the ‘filing away’ of an indictment
constitutes nothing more than in [sic] indefinite continuance of
the state’s prerogative to bring charges against Ms. Davidson at
a later date.”
The court finally concluded: “A dismissal
without prejudice is neither final nor in Ms. Davidson’s favor.
Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Castner-Knott should be
granted.”
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Davidson first argues that Castner-Knott’s
renewed summary judgment motion and the trial court’s order
granting it violate the “law of the case” doctrine.
She
specifically contends that the original order from Judge Lewis
denying summary judgment was the “law of the case” pursuant to
CR2 54.02(1).
As a general rule, “[t]he doctrine of law of the case
establishes a presumption that a ruling made at one stage of a
lawsuit will be adhered to throughout the lawsuit.”
Hallahan v.
The Courier Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 705 n.4 (Ky.App. 2004).
However, a judge does have the discretionary authority to
reconsider a ruling.
Id.
“Generally, a judge may reexamine an
earlier ruling and rescind it if he has a reasonable conviction
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-6-
that it was wrong and it would not cause undue prejudice to the
party that benefited from it.”
Id.
Moreover, and of particular
relevance here, “[i]t is well established that a trial court may
reconsider and grant summary judgment to a party subsequent to
an earlier denial.”
Id.
We review a decision to reconsider under an abuse of
discretion standard.
Id.
“The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Sexton v.
Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272 (Ky. 2004); see also Kuprion v.
Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994).
After examining the
record and the arguments of both parties, we do not believe that
the trial court abused its discretion in deciding to reconsider
its previous ruling.
Judge Grise obviously felt that Judge
Lewis’ previous decision was wrong, and we do not believe that
Davidson has produced enough substantive evidence of undue
prejudice to merit a reversal on this ground.
Accordingly, we
turn to her remaining arguments.
Our standard of review as to cases where a summary
judgment has been granted is “whether the trial court correctly
found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact
and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”
CR 56.03.
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996);
Summary judgment “is proper only where the movant
-7-
shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any
circumstances.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Ky. 1991).
And, “[b]ecause summary
judgments involve no fact finding, this Court reviews them de
novo, in the sense that we owe no deference to the conclusions
of the trial court.”
Blevins v. Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698, 700
(Ky.App. 2000).
“[T]here are six basic elements necessary to the
maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution, in response
to both criminal prosecutions and civil action.”
Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Ky. 1981).
Raine v.
They include: “(1) the
institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings,
either civil or criminal, or of administrative or disciplinary
proceedings, (2) by, or at the instance, of the plaintiff, (3)
the termination of such proceedings in defendant’s favor, (4)
malice in the institution of such proceeding, (5) want or lack
of probable cause for the proceeding, and (6) the suffering of
damage as a result of the proceeding.”
Id.
Historically, the
tort of malicious prosecution is one that has not been favored
in the law.
Prewitt v. Sexton, 777 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Ky. 1989);
Reid v. True, 302 S.W.2d 846, 847-48 (Ky. 1957).
Accordingly,
one claiming malicious prosecution must strictly comply with the
elements of the tort.
621 S.W.2d at 899.
See Prewitt, 777 S.W.2d at 895; Raine,
In reviewing the record here, we find that
-8-
the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment was
predicated entirely upon its conclusion that Davidson could not
satisfy the third prong of this test; that is, she could not
prove a termination of the proceedings in her favor.
Although we find the trial court’s order to be
somewhat unclear as to the issue, Castner-Knott submits, and we
agree, that the court concluded – relying on Van Arsdale v.
Caswell, supra – that dismissing a criminal complaint without
prejudice is the same as “filing away” a complaint.
Therefore,
such a dismissal “is not a final determination thereof but is an
indefinite continuance of the case which may be reinstated on
the docket upon reasonable notice at any time after such order
is entered.”
Van Arsdale, 311 S.W.2d at 408.
Consequently, the first question we must consider is
whether a dismissal without prejudice is the same as “filing
away” a complaint for the purposes of a malicious prosecution
claim.
After reviewing the applicable case law, we believe that
the answer is “No.”
Indeed, that law directly refutes the trial
court’s conclusion.
For example, in Hoskins v. Maricle, 150
S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004), our Supreme Court stated that the procedure
of “filing away” a complaint was commonly used when, after
issuance of an indictment, “the defendant cannot be found within
the jurisdiction, witnesses are unavailable, or it is deemed
appropriate to abate the prosecution conditioned upon the
-9-
defendant’s compliance with certain requirements.”
n.8.
Id. at 13
The Court then noted: “The practice is regarded not as a
dismissal, which would require a reindictment, but as an
indefinite continuance.”
Id., citing Commonwealth v. Bottoms,
105 Ky. 222, 48 S.W. 974, 975 (1899) (Italics added).
Indeed,
even Van Arsdale cites to case law pointing out this fact. Van
Arsdale, 311 S.W.2d at 407 (citing Jones v. Commonwealth, 114
Ky. 599, 71 S.W. 643 (1903), for the proposition that “a ‘filing
away’ order does not operate as a dismissal of the indictment
but is only an indefinite continuance.”).
Accordingly, there is
an obvious distinction between the dismissal of an indictment
and simply “filing it away.”
The latter is considered an
“indefinite continuance,” while the former is not.
The trial
court’s suggestion otherwise was in error.
With this point established, the question then becomes
whether a dismissal without prejudice can be considered a “final
termination” for purposes of malicious prosecution.
In
addressing this problem, we first note that our courts
established long ago that the termination of a prosecution “by
final trial, or dismissal by the prosecuting authorities or by
the prosecutor himself, and without the voluntary procurement of
the defendant in the prosecution” constitutes a final
termination for purposes of a malicious prosecution suit.
Davis
v. Brady, 218 Ky. 384, 291 S.W. 412, 413 (1927) (Italics added).
-10-
The point made by Castner-Knott here, however, is that a
dismissal without prejudice – unlike a dismissal with prejudice
– is not sufficiently final to meet this requirement.
Davidson,
of course, disagrees.
We believe that this question can be resolved by
reference to Commonwealth v. Sowell, 157 S.W.3d 616 (Ky. 2005).
In Sowell, our Supreme Court reiterated its long-held position
that a dismissal without prejudice is a final and appealable
order.
Id. at 617, citing Wood v. Downing’s Admr., 110 Ky. 656,
62 S.W. 487, 488 (1901); C.I.T. Corp. v. Teague, 293 Ky. 521,
169 S.W.2d 593, 593 (1943); Grubbs v. Slater & Gilroy, Inc., 267
S.W.2d 754, 755 (Ky. 1954).
Citing in particular to Wood v.
Downing’s Admr., the Court noted that an order dismissing
without prejudice “fixed absolutely and finally the rights of
the parties in this suit in relation to the subject matter of
the litigation, and put an end to the suit.
appealable order.”
488.
It was a final
Id., citing Wood, 110 Ky. 656, 62 S.W. at
Moreover, “[n]otwithstanding the ‘without prejudice’
language, an order of dismissal adjudicates all rights.
remains to be done.”
Nothing
Id.
Castner-Knott argues, however, that Sowell supports
the idea that a dismissal without prejudice does not constitute
a “final termination” because it “does not bar another
indictment or prosecution.”
Id. at 619.
-11-
However, upon much
consideration, we do not believe that such a bar is necessary
for “finality” in malicious prosecution cases, as our law in
this area only requires that a particular proceeding be
terminated in a claimant’s favor.
As our Supreme Court further
provided in Sowell, again citing Commonwealth v. Smith:
When an indictment is dismissed, unless the
matter be then referred to the grand jury,
it is a final order in that case. After the
term at which the order is entered, the
court has not the power to set it aside.
Should the court or the prosecution desire
to retain control of the case after the
term, it may be done by an order filing the
indictment away, to be redocketed on motion
of the commonwealth. But, without such
reservation, an unconditional dismissal is
an end of that case. If, therefore, the
commonwealth desires to reinstate the
prosecution, it may do so by procuring
another indictment, or by warrant of arrest
sworn out before an examining magistrate,
and then proceed as in other original
prosecutions.
Id. at 618-19, citing Smith, 140 Ky. 580, 131 S.W. at 392
(Italics added).
While Sowell was not rendered in the context of a
malicious prosecution case, we believe that its conclusions
support our position that a dismissal of a case – whether it be
with or without prejudice - constitutes a “final termination”
for purposes of the tort.3
Once a case is dismissed without
3
Moreover, as can be seen in the passage above, the case provides further
support for our position that a dismissal without prejudice is not the same
as the “filing away” of a complaint.
-12-
prejudice, the proceedings in which it occurred are final and
concluded as a matter of law.
In order for the case to be
prosecuted again, an entirely new set of proceedings must be
instituted and the prosecuting party must “proceed as in other
original prosecutions.”
Id. at 619.
For additional support of
this stance, we cite to the seminal malicious prosecution case
of Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal.2d 146, 114 P.2d 335 (Cal. 1941),
which provides, in relevant part:
In stating the requirement of termination,
courts often say that the proceeding must be
“finally” terminated. Such a statement is
entirely accurate if the ordinary reasonable
meaning of the words is taken. The
proceeding must be finally terminated; that
is, the particular criminal proceeding
commencing, for example, by complaint and
arrest, must have passed through some such
stage as preliminary hearing and dismissal,
or trial and acquittal or abandonment by the
prosecuting authorities. When this has
occurred, that proceeding is finally
terminated. If the termination was such as
not to constitute a bar to a new
prosecution, the accused may be charged and
tried again for the same offense; but this
will be a new proceeding, with a new court
number, new pleadings, new judge and jury,
and a new judgment.
...
In other words, whether the proceeding is
dropped by the magistrate or in the superior
court, it is sufficient that the particular
proceeding is terminated. It is immaterial
whether the termination is a bar to any
further prosecution for the same offense, or
whether the accused may be charged and tried
anew. Only if the new proceeding is already
-13-
instituted can the accused be precluded from
suing for malicious prosecution. This view
is supported by the great weight of
authority.
Jaffe, 18 Cal.2d at 152; 156-57 (Italics in original); see also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 659 and cmts. b & e (1977).
We do note that an exception to the general rule set
forth here shall be necessary when new proceedings for the same
offense have been properly instituted and have not been
terminated in favor of the accused.
See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 660(d); Jaffe, 18 Cal.2d at 156.
However, as no new
proceedings have been instituted in this case and – as discussed
below – it appears that they never will be, this exception is
not applicable here.
Consequently, we find that a dismissal
without prejudice is a “final termination” for purposes of a
malicious prosecution suit.
With this said, the third prong of our malicious
prosecution test also requires that the termination be favorable
to the accused.
Raine, 621 S.W.2d at 899.
In Alcorn v. Gordon,
762 S.W.2d 809 (Ky.App. 1988), a panel of this court cited to
Comment a to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660 for the
proposition that “[p]roceedings are ‘terminated in favor of the
accused’ as that phrase is used in § 653 and throughout this
Topic, only when their final disposition is such as to indicate
the innocence of the accused.”
Id. at 811-12.
-14-
Further citing
to Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d 747, 159 Cal.Rptr. 693, 602
P.2d 393 (1979), we elaborated on this principle, stating:
It is apparent “favorable” termination does
not occur merely because a party complained
against has prevailed in an underlying
action. While the fact he has prevailed is
an ingredient of a favorable termination,
such termination must further reflect on his
innocence of the alleged wrongful conduct.
If the termination does not relate to the
merits - reflecting on neither innocence of
nor responsibility for the alleged
misconduct - the termination is not
favorable in the sense it would support a
subsequent action for malicious prosecution.
Id. at 812, citing Lackner, 159 Cal.Rptr. at 695, 602 P.2d at
395 (Italics added).
We therefore concluded that “dismissal of
a suit for technical or procedural reasons that do not reflect
on the merits of the case is not a favorable termination of the
action.”
Id.
Accordingly, the next question that arises for our
consideration is whether the indictment against Davidson was
dismissed for reasons reflecting on the merits of the case.
As
noted above, the trial court concluded that the indictment was
not withdrawn because the Commonwealth thought Davidson was
innocent; instead, it “was dismissed because attainment of
evidence necessary to fully prosecute her was not readily
available.”
While this appears to at least be part of the
rationale for dismissal, the record also reflects that the
Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss was motivated by the discovery
-15-
that Davidson reported to the police that her checks had been
stolen almost two months before the incident at the heart of
this matter occurred.
For example, the Commonwealth Attorney indicated at a
March 31, 2003, discovery hearing in this case that Davidson’s
report was the reason that the Commonwealth moved for dismissal,
and that the dismissal was the end of the prosecution as far as
he was concerned.
The record also contains video of the
September 4, 2001, hearing at which the Commonwealth Attorney
moved to dismiss the indictment due, in part, to the discovery
of the police report filed by Davidson.
Although we are hesitant to rule as a matter of law
that the termination of Davidson’s indictment was on the merits
from the record that stands before us, we believe that the
record clearly indicates that summary judgment as to this issue
was inappropriate, particularly as we must consider all facts in
a light most favorable to Davidson.
We also note that if
further discovery – for example, a sworn deposition of the
Commonwealth Attorney who originally handled Davidson’s
indictment – supports the current record’s strong suggestion
that the Commonwealth’s prosecution was abandoned, even in part,
because of Davidson’s report of stolen checks, the dismissal
must be considered favorable to Davidson.
While reaching such a
conclusion requires further factual development, the
-16-
determination of whether a termination is sufficiently favorable
ultimately rests with the trial court as a matter of law, absent
a factual dispute relative to the circumstances of the
dismissal.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 673(1)(b) & cmt.
e.; Sierra Club Foundation v. Graham, 72 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1149,
85 Cal.Rptr.2d 726 (1999); Hewitt v. Rice, 119 P.3d 541, 544
(Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Palmer Development Corp. v. Gordon, 723
A.2d 881, 883 (Me. 1999); Cowan v. Gamble, 247 S.W.2d 779, 780
(Mo. 1952); Ash v. Ash, 651 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ohio 1995);
Chittenden Trust Co. v. Marshall, 507 A.2d 965, 970 (Vt. 1986).
The parties also engage in some debate over the
specific applicability of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
660(a) in this case.
This provision provides that “[a]
termination of criminal proceedings in favor of the accused
other than by acquittal is not a sufficient termination to meet
the requirements of a cause of action for malicious prosecution
if ... the charge is withdrawn or the prosecution abandoned
pursuant to an agreement of compromise with the accused[.]”
Castner-Knott contends that Davidson “effectively
compromised the criminal charge against her by agreeing to a
dismissal without prejudice.”
While the record contains
absolutely nothing indicating that Davidson agreed to such a
dismissal (indeed, as the trial court acknowledged, it appears
that she made no efforts to bargain with the Commonwealth in
-17-
exchange for a dismissal and instead strenuously argued for a
dismissal with prejudice), Castner-Knott argues that she
“compromised” by failing to demand a trial or to file an appeal
of the trial court’s decision.
position.
We simply do not agree with this
The language of Restatement (Second) of Torts §
660(a) clearly anticipates an actual agreement of compromise
between the prosecutor and the accused leading, in turn, to an
abandonment or dismissal of the prosecution.
The record does
not suggest that this occurred here, so Castner-Knott’s argument
in this respect must be rejected.
We also fail to see how any
of the other subsections of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660
could be applicable here, so we decline to comment on them any
further.
The parties finally raise the issue of whether
probable cause existed for charges to be brought against
Davidson.
While this question is obviously one of importance in
a malicious prosecution case, we note that the trial court did
not address it in its decision to grant Castner-Knott summary
judgment. Accordingly, we must decline to consider it here.
See
Gailor v. Alsabi, 990 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Ky. 1999) (“We will not
address issues raised but not decided by the Court below.”);
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky.
1989) (“The Court of Appeals is without authority to review
issues not raised in or decided by the trial court.”).
-18-
With this said, as this case is to be remanded, we
believe it will be of some benefit to the trial court if we
clear up one possible misconception raised by the parties’
briefs.
Castner-Knott argues that the Warren County grand
jury’s finding of probable cause to issue an indictment defeats
Davidson’s claim as a matter of law.
However, Kentucky courts
have expressed the role of a grand jury indictment as to the
element of probable cause in malicious prosecution cases many
times: “When a grand jury, upon other testimony than that of the
prosecutor alone, find an indictment to be a true bill, the
presumption is prima facie that, as they, on their oaths, have
said that the person indicted is guilty, the prosecutor had
reasonable grounds for the prosecution.”
Conder v. Morrison,
275 Ky. 360, 121 S.W.2d 930, 931 (1938); see also Schott v.
Indiana Life Insurance Co., 160 Ky. 533, 535, 169 S.W. 1023
(1914); Garrard v. Willet, 27 Ky. (4 J.J. Marsh.) 628, 630
(1830).
Consequently, while a grand jury indictment raises a
presumption of probable cause, this presumption can be rebutted
by the plaintiff.
Condor, 121 S.W.2d at 931-32.
Accordingly, we reverse the Warren Circuit Court’s
entry of summary judgment against Taja Davidson and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
-19-
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURRING:
I would go a step
beyond the well-reasoned majority opinion and would hold that
the favorable termination of Davidson’s indictment was indeed on
the merits - - or at the very least should have been so
considered based on the record.
It is abundantly clear that
Davidson reported the theft of her checks to the police well
before the check was written to Castner-Knott.
It appears
conclusive that summary judgment was properly granted in her
favor and that the second summary judgment against her (the
subject matter of this appeal) was erroneously entered as a
matter of law.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND BRIEF
FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT AND BRIEF
FOR APPELLEE:
John William Stewart
Louisville, Kentucky
Robert E. Stopher
Louisville, Kentucky
-20-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.