JAMES ROCKY WRIGHT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 3, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000258-MR
JAMES ROCKY WRIGHT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE A.C. McKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-002347
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND McANULTY, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
James Rocky Wright (Wright) brings this
appeal of an opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court,
entered December 2, 2004, modifying an opinion and order,
entered September 17, 2004, denying his motion made pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 to vacate a
twenty-five year sentence.
Having concluded that a factual
finding relied upon by the trial court is clearly erroneous and
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
that the trial court has incorrectly applied the law, we vacate
the opinions and orders of the trial court, and upon remand for
resentencing, direct the trial court to vacate Wright’s twentyfive year sentence and provide him with the opportunity to enter
a guilty plea pursuant to the Commonwealth’s initial twenty-year
offer.
In October, 1999, Wright was arraigned on charges of
first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine)
with firearm, tampering with physical evidence, possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, and second-degree persistent
felony offender.2
Wright’s girlfriend retained William Butler,
Jr. to represent him.
Wright’s first and only contact with Mr.
Butler occurred on November 19, 1999, at a pre-trial conference.
At this pre-trial conference, the Commonwealth referenced in
open court an offer of a twenty-year sentence to wrap up
Indictment 99-CR-002347 and Indictment 99-CR-002815, the latter
indictment consisting of charges of possession of a handgun by a
convicted felon, tampering with physical evidence, carrying a
concealed deadly weapon, speeding, and possession of burglar’s
tools,3 upon which Wright was scheduled to be arraigned the
following week.
When the case came on for trial three months
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes 218A.1412, 218A.992, 524.100, 527.040, and
532.080; Indictment No. 99-CR-002347.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes 527.040, 524.100, 527.020, 189.394, and 511.050;
Indictment No. 99-CR-002815.
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later, Mr. Butler was allowed to withdraw as counsel on his
motion.
Between the November 19, 1999, pre-trial conference
where the plea was discussed and the trial date when Mr. Butler
withdrew as counsel, Wright never had any communication
regarding the plea offer with Mr. Butler, and Wright never told
Mr. Butler that he did not want to take the plea offer.
was also not told of any time deadline on the offer.
Wright
Wright’s
sole communication with Mr. Butler was in court at the November
19, 1999, pre-trial conference.
After Mr. Butler’s withdrawal, Mike Goodwin was
appointed to represent Wright.
At their first meeting, Wright
told Mr. Goodwin about the twenty-year plea offer to wrap up the
two indictments.
Mr. Goodwin told Wright that the current offer
was twenty-six years.
When the offer was later reduced to
twenty-five years (twenty years on Indictment 99-CR-002347, and
five years on 99-CR-002815, run consecutively), Wright accepted
it.
Less than three years later, Wright filed a pro se RCr
11.42 motion, requesting amendment of his sentence from twentyfive years to twenty, alleging that he was denied the
opportunity to accept the Commonwealth’s twenty-year offer due
to ineffective assistance by Mr. Butler, and forced to accept
the twenty-five year offer due to ineffective assistance by Mr.
Goodwin.
More specifically, he claimed that Mr. Butler was
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ineffective in failing to inform or discuss the twenty-year
offer with him, and that Mr. Goodwin was ineffective in failing
to investigate the twenty-year offer upon Wright’s informing him
of such.
Following appointment of counsel and an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied Wright’s motion.
In its opinion
and order denying the RCr 11.42 motion, and in its opinion and
order on Wright’s Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05
motion, the trial court made findings that 1) on November 19,
1999, the Commonwealth offered a term of twenty years to serve
on all of the indictments; 2) at that time, Wright made no
decision on the plea; 3) Mr. Butler later withdrew as counsel;
4) after Mr. Goodwin was appointed, Wright informed him of the
twenty-year offer; 5) Mr. Goodwin related an offer of twentyfive years; and 5) Wright did not want to go to trial.
The
trial court also made a finding that Wright failed to allege
with specificity facts demonstrating how Mr. Butler’s actions
with regard to the twenty-year plea offer rose to the level of
ineffectiveness.
In challenging the entry of a guilty plea, the
defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must first
prove that counsel's performance was deficient in that,
considering all the circumstances, he made errors so serious
that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
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defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
See Taylor v. Commonwealth,
724 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Ky.App. 1986) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984)).
Second, the defendant must prove that he was
prejudiced by the deficiency in that there exists a reasonable
probability that but for those errors he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
See Taylor,
724 S.W.2d at 226 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106
S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)).
“A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Although the
test has two parts, a court deciding an ineffective assistance
claim need not address both parts if the defendant makes an
insufficient showing on one part.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
697.
When the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing,
as was the case here, RCr 11.42(6) requires the trial court to
make findings on the material issues of fact, which we review
under a clearly erroneous standard.
CR 52.01.
Factual findings
are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial
evidence, the test of which is whether when taken alone, or in
the light of all the evidence, it has sufficient probative value
to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.
See
generally Black Motor Co. v. Greene, 385 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky.
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1965); Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d
298, 308 (Ky. 1972).
In reviewing the trial court's factual
findings, the trial court is in the best position to judge the
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony.
See CR 52.01; McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d
694, 698 (Ky. 1986).
We review de novo, however, the trial
court's legal conclusion on the issues of deficient performance
and actual prejudice.
See McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302,
1310-1311 (6th Cir. 1996).
Wright alleged in his RCr 11.42 motion that he “was
denied any opportunity to accept (the) twenty year plea
agreement due to Defense Counsel’s (Bill Butler) seriously
deficient representation” in that Mr. Butler “did not discuss
(the plea) with Defendant Wright before the pre-trial hearing
. . . and did not discuss the Commonwealth’s offer after the
hearing.”
Wright was the only person to testify at the
evidentiary hearing.
As such, his testimony is unrefuted that
he would have taken the twenty-year offer if he had had any
opportunity to discuss the plea with Mr. Butler, but the only
time he had any communication with Mr. Butler was at the
November 19, 1999, pre-trial conference.
Despite this evidence
of record, the trial court denied Wright’s motion on a finding
that Wright failed to allege with specificity facts
demonstrating how Mr. Butler’s actions with regard to the
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twenty-year plea offer rose to the level of ineffectiveness.
This finding by the trial court is not supported by substantial
evidence.
As such, it is clearly erroneous.
Following from the trial court’s erroneous finding of
fact, we review de novo the trial court's legal conclusion that
Mr. Butler’s performance was not deficient and that Wright was
not actually prejudiced.
In Osborne v. Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d
860, 863 (Ky.App. 1998), the defendant was convicted in a jury
trial and sentenced to five years, enhanced to twenty years as a
first degree persistent felony offender (PFO I), despite
Commonwealth offers on a guilty plea of five years and seven
years, with the PFO I count dismissed.
On his RCr 11.42 motion,
the Osborne defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
for failing to, among other issues, properly represent him
during the various plea negotiations and follow his instructions
to negotiate a plea agreement.
The court stated:
Regardless of the fact Osborne may have
received a fair trial, it is possible he may
have suffered prejudice by virtue of counsel
having rendered ineffective assistance
during the pretrial proceedings, i.e.
failure to act upon his desire to enter into
a plea bargain arrangement with the
Commonwealth. See United States v. Day, 969
F.2d 39, 46 (3rd Cir. 1992). Although not
controlling in Kentucky, we are compelled by
the rationale of Day in that “the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel guarantees more than the Fifth
Amendment right to a fair trial.” Id. at
45.
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“The burden of proof [is] upon the
appellant to show that he was not adequately
represented by appointed counsel.” Jordan
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 878, 879
(1969). In order to establish counsel's
assistance was so prejudicially ineffective
as to require reversal, the appellant needs
to satisfy a two-part test: (1) “ ‘that
counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness ···
[and, (2) ] there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the results of the
proceeding would have been different.’ ”
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct.
366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984)). Accord Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
702 S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986).
The first prong of this test is merely
a reiteration of the standard of attorney
competence as previously pronounced by the
United States Supreme Court. Hill, 474 U.S.
at 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366. The second prong,
however, is gleaned as a “prejudice”
requirement, focusing “on whether counsel's
constitutionally ineffective performance
affected the outcome of the plea process.”
Id. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. We are mindful
that the aforementioned test is generally
applicable under circumstances where a
defendant asserts he or she was wrongfully
induced by counsel to enter into a guilty
plea. The matter now before us is quite the
converse situation, in that Osborne's claim
arises upon the allegation that counsel
denied him the ability to enter into a
guilty plea, thus causing him to be
prejudiced through the imposition of a
longer term of incarceration.
Nonetheless, we believe the test as
adopted in Hill to be equally applicable in
both scenarios. The same inquiry as to
whether a defendant would or would not have
insisted on going to trial is relevant in
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the context of one who had entered into a
plea arrangement as well as one who had
declined the offer. The bottom line remains
what risks were attendant to trial versus
the benefits to be gained vis-à-vis a plea
bargain, and counsel's conduct with respect
to communicating these factors to the
defendant.
Following from the reasoning in Osborne, it is clear from our de
novo review that Wright has met the burden of establishing that
Mr. Butler rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, given
unrefuted evidence that Mr. Butler never communicated to Wright
regarding the plea offer (his representation thus falling below
an objective standard of reasonableness), and given unrefuted
evidence that had Mr. Butler discussed the plea with Wright,
Wright would have accepted the twenty-year offer (said
communication failure by Mr. Butler thus affecting the outcome
of the plea process).
Given our conclusion that Mr. Butler rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel, the entry of Wright’s twentyfive year guilty plea was involuntary.
See Rigdon v.
Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288-89 (Ky.App. 2004).
We
therefore vacate the trial court’s opinions and orders denying
Wright’s RCr 11.42 motion, and upon remand direct the trial
court to vacate Wright’s twenty-five year sentence.
Wright’s requested remedy with regard to his RCr 11.42
motion and this appeal is that he be allowed to accept the
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initial twenty-year plea offer and enter a guilty plea pursuant
to that offer.
As to this remedy, Osborne provides assistance:
Remedies for ineffective assistance of
counsel “ ‘should be tailored to the injury
suffered from the constitutional violation
and should not unnecessarily infringe on
competing interests.’ ” Turner v.
Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1207 (6th
Cir.1988), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1050, 112
S.Ct. 915, 116 L.Ed.2d 815 (1992) (quoting
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,
364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981)).
As in Turner, Osborne does not complain of
inadequate representation at trial, rather
ineffective assistance with respect to being
denied the opportunity to seize upon the
Commonwealth's plea offers. “Consequently,
‘[o]ne more fair trial, or even a series of
them, would not necessarily revive the lost
chance.’ ” Turner, 858 F.2d at 1208.
Alteration in original (quoting State v.
Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Iowa 1986)).
“Indeed, the only way to neutralize the
constitutional deprivation suffered by [a
defendant] would seem to be to provide [the
defendant] with an opportunity to consider
the [Commonwealth's initial] plea offer with
the effective assistance of counsel.”
Turner, 858 F.2d at 1208.
Wright has already had an evidentiary hearing herein where it is
undisputed that the Commonwealth offered a twenty-year sentence
to wrap up this indictment and 99-CR-002815.
In accordance with
Workman v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 206, 207 (Ky. 1979),
overruled on other grounds by Morton v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d
218 (Ky. 1991), we conclude that Wright’s remedy is vacation of
the twenty-five year sentence and the opportunity to enter a
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guilty plea pursuant to the Commonwealth’s initial twenty-year
offer.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinions and orders of
the Jefferson Circuit Court are vacated.
Upon remand, the trial
court is directed to vacate Wright’s twenty-five year sentence
and provide him with the opportunity to enter a guilty plea
pursuant to the Commonwealth’s initial twenty-year offer.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph Ray Myers
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kevin R. Branscum
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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