ERIC GARDNER v. WALTER \"WALLY\" SKIBA, INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE LEXINGTON- FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT; PAM MILLER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT; AND TERESA ISAACS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY COUNTY GOVERNMENT
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RENDERED: MARCH 10, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
MODIFIED: MAY 26, 2006
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY KY. SUPREME COURT: DECEMBER 13, 2006
(2006-SC-000549-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000133-MR
ERIC GARDNER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-02744
v.
WALTER "WALLY" SKIBA, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR
OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE LEXINGTONFAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT; PAM
MILLER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE LEXINGTON-FAYETTE
URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT; AND TERESA ISAACS,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS MAYOR OF THE LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Eric Gardner has appealed from a summary
judgment entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on November 8,
2004, which dismissed his complaint against the appellees on the
basis of res judicata.
Having concluded that the judgment
relied upon as the basis for applying res judicata to Gardner’s
claims having been reversed by this Court was no longer binding,
we reverse the summary judgment and remand this matter for
further proceedings.
In this action, which was filed in the Fayette Circuit
Court on July 6, 2004, Gardner alleged he was damaged by the
appellees’ conduct in violation of various statutes and he
sought recovery under KRS1 446.070.
Specifically, Gardner
alleged that Walter “Wally” Skiba tampered with physical
evidence and public records and committed official misconduct in
filling the civil service position of Public Service Supervisor
(PSS).
Gardner further alleged that former Lexington Mayor Pam
Miller and Mayor Teresa Isaacs, the current mayor, condoned and
facilitated Skiba’s wrongful conduct.
In 1998 Gardner filed three lawsuits against the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) and various
government employees alleging claims of racial and religious
discrimination and appealing various actions taken against him
by the LFUCG Civil Service Commission (hereinafter referred to
as the “1998 litigation”).
In these three lawsuits, Gardner
alleged, inter alia, that he had been discriminated against in
the filling of the PSS position.
More specifically, Gardner
alleged that he was unlawfully denied promotion to the PSS
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes
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position when Skiba effected an “acting” appointment of an
unqualified candidate despite Gardner’s presence at the top of a
promotion list for the position.
Gardner’s three lawsuits were
consolidated for the purposes of trial.
Prior to the original trial date for the 1998
litigation, Gardner learned that Skiba allegedly had altered
physical evidence concerning the PSS position and allegedly had
directed a subordinate employee to shred documents pertaining to
the filling of that position.
Gardner sought and received a
continuance of the trial date so he could pursue discovery
concerning Skiba’s alleged wrongful conduct.
Gardner did not
move to amend his complaints in the 1998 litigation to assert
any claim against Skiba or the other appellees as a result of
the alleged wrongful conduct of alteration and destruction of
documents.
The 1998 litigation was tried before a jury in the
Fayette Circuit Court during the week of February 24, 2003, and
the jury returned a verdict in favor of LFUCG in regard to all
claims asserted by Gardner.
The trial court entered a judgment
on July 11, 2003, confirming the jury’s verdict, which Gardner
appealed to this Court.
On January 21, 2005, in an unpublished
Opinion, this Court reversed the 2003 judgment and remanded the
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1998 litigation to the Fayette Circuit Court for a new trial.2
Prior to the rendering of this Court’s Opinion in
Gardner’s appeal of the 1998 litigation, Gardner filed the
present action against the appellees.
The appellees filed
answers to the complaint and asserted the defense of res
judicata as a bar to the action.
The appellees then moved for
summary judgment on the basis of their res judicata defense on
October 14, 2004, and a hearing was held in the Fayette Circuit
Court on October 24, 2004.
Essentially, the appellees asserted
that the allegations contained in Gardner’s complaint arose from
the same occurrence as the allegations asserted in the 1998
litigation and Gardner was precluded by the doctrine of res
judicata from asserting in a subsequent lawsuit a new theory of
recovery based on the same underlying facts as the 1998
litigation.3
Gardner asserted in the Fayette Circuit Court, as he
does here, that res judicata was not a bar to the present suit
because the causes of action asserted in the 1998 litigation did
not have the same identity of claims or parties as the present
action.4
Additionally, he claims the trial court’s summary
judgment was not supported by the record.
On November 8, 2004,
2
Gardner v. Lee, 2003-CA-002230-MR.
3
See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 456, 201 S.W.2d 7 (1947).
4
See Newman v. Newman, 451 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1970).
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the trial court entered an order sustaining the appellees’
motion for summary judgment and dismissed Gardner’s complaint.
Gardner moved the trial court to reconsider its order, and his
motion was denied by an order entered on December 29, 2004.
This appeal followed.
The doctrine of res judicata precludes a party from
relitigating causes of action and facts or issues after a final
judgment on the merits has been issued in a prior action.5
“The
doctrine of res judicata is formed by two subparts: 1) claim
preclusion and 2) issue preclusion.”6
Claim preclusion bars a
party from bringing a new lawsuit on a previously adjudicated
cause of action, whereas “[i]ssue preclusion bars the parties
from relitigating any issue actually litigated and finally
decided in an earlier action.
The issues in the former and
latter actions must be identical.
The key inquiry in deciding
whether the lawsuits concern the same controversy is whether
they both arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts.”7
For both claim preclusion and issue preclusion to
apply there must be a final judgment on the merits.
However, as
noted above, in this case the final judgment entered in the 1998
litigation against Gardner was reversed by this Court on January
5
Yeoman v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1998).
6
Id. at 464-65.
7
Id. at 465.
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21, 2005.
A judgment that is reversed on direct appeal is
treated as though it never existed.8
Thus, the reversal of the
judgment from the 1998 litigation and the remand of that matter
for a new trial prevent the judgment from having preclusive
affect in the present action, and it cannot be the basis for
barring this action.
The appellees assert that even after the reversal of
the judgment in the 1998 litigation Gardner is still barred from
bringing this action because he has impermissibly split his
cause of action.9
The rule against splitting causes of action in
different lawsuits is a subsidiary of the doctrine of res
judicata.10
It is against the policy of the law to
permit a plaintiff to split his cause of
action and institute two or more actions for
different parts thereof, and it is a wellestablished principle that where a plaintiff
has filed suit and had trial upon a cause of
action, the judgment rendered therein is a
bar to another proceeding based upon the
same cause of action[.]11
However, “the rule does not require distinct causes of action,
that is to say, distinct matters each of which would authorize by
itself independent relief, to be presented in a single suit,
8
Clay v. Clay, 707 S.W.2d 352 (Ky.App. 1986).
9
Travelers Indemnity, 201 S.W.2d at 9.
10
Egbert v. Curtis, 695 S.W.2d 123 (Ky.App. 1985).
11
Cassidy v. Berkovitz, 169 Ky. 785, 185 S.W. 129, 130 (1916).
-6-
though they exist at the same time and might be considered
together” [citation omitted].12
As our Supreme Court stated in
Watts, by and through Watts v. K, S & H:13
Theoretically, all of these claims
could have been litigated in the same
action, along with others that the fertile
imagination of experience might devise.
. . . A broad reading of that part of
Egbert which states that ‘res judicata (is)
applicable not only to the issues disposed
of in the first action, but to every point
which properly belonged to the subject of
the litigation in the first action and which
in the exercise of reasonable diligence
might have been brought forward at the
time,’ would foreclose all possible or
potential claims against any known potential
defendant not brought within the first
litigation. Egbert, supra, at 124. The
rule is simply not that broad, nor is it
that simple to apply.
The Court then held that the rule against splitting a cause of
action did not bar a subsequent dram shop claim even though the
plaintiffs had previously prosecuted a negligence action, where
both claims arose from a single automobile accident.
Our courts have generally barred separate suits
brought for separate items of damages arising from a single
cause of action.14
However, the rule is not a bar where a
12
National Bond & Investment Co. v. Withorn, 281 Ky. 318, 136 S.W.2d 40, 42
(1940) (quoting McDonald v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States, 269 Ky. 549, 108 S.W.2d 184, 185 (1937)).
13
957 S.W.2d 233, 238 (Ky. 1997).
14
See Kirchner v. Riherd, 702 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1986) (noting that plaintiff may
not seek recovery for property damage in one suit and personal injuries in
another arising from a single automobile accident); Travelers Indemnity, 201
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plaintiff asserts a separate and distinct cause of action in a
subsequent action based on the same transaction or facts as a
prior action.15
Thus, we conclude that Gardner has asserted
separate and distinct causes of action in the 1998 litigation
and the present action and has not improperly split a single
cause of action.
The 1998 litigation sought recovery for
alleged racial and religious discrimination in failing to
promote Gardner.
The case at bar, on the other hand, alleges
that appellees committed various statutory violations and
thereby damaged Gardner.
The present case does not, however,
concern a claim regarding the failure to promote Gardner to the
PSS position.
Finally, the appellees assert that the continued
litigation of this action is barred because Gardner is
prohibited from amending his complaint in the 1998 litigation
upon remand of that matter for a new trial or from consolidating
this action with the 1998 litigation.
They argue that a party
who successfully obtains a new trial following an appeal is not
S.W.2d at 7; Cassidy, 185 S.W. at 129; and Pilcher v. Ligon, 91 Ky. 228, 15
S.W. 513 (1891).
15
See Watts, 957 S.W.2d at 238; Arnold v. K-Mart Corp., 747 S.W.2d 130
(Ky.App. 1988) (noting that prior suit for back pay not a bar to subsequent
suit for wrongful termination); Newman v. Newman, 451 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1970)
(noting that prior action to determine validity of a deed not a bar to
subsequent suit for adverse possession); Hays v. Sturgill, 302 Ky. 31, 193
S.W.2d 648 (1946) (noting that prior suit to construe a deed not a bar to
subsequent claim deed was invalid due to undue influence and mental
incapacity); and National Bond, 136 S.W.2d at 42 (noting that action for
damage to automobile and action for false arrest between the same parties not
required to be in same lawsuit).
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permitted to assert new issues upon retrial of the remanded
action unless those issues could not, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, have been raised previously.16
The rule in Schrodt’s Ex’r is based upon Section 134
of the now superceded Civil Code of Procedure which permitted
the amending of pleadings for limited circumstances such as to
add or strike a party, to correct a mistake, or to assert
additional allegations material to the case.
Section 134 is
similar to the current CR17 15 which pertains to amended and
supplemental pleadings.
CR 15.01 provides that after the filing
of a responsive pleading, a party may only amend a pleading with
leave of the court or by the written consent of the adverse
party.
However, leave to amend shall be freely given and the
trial court has broad discretion in allowing the amendment of
pleadings.18
Because Gardner has not attempted to amend his
pleadings in the 1998 litigation to assert therein the causes of
action asserted in the present action, whether he should be
permitted to do so is not properly before us, and cannot be
relied upon as a basis to bar the present action.
The trial court in granting the appellees’ summary
judgment motion found “that Gardner’s complaint is barred by the
16
Schrodt’s Ex’r v. Schrodt, 189 Ky. 457, 225 S.W. 151 (Ky. 1920).
17
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
18
M.A. Walker Co., Inc. v. PBK Bank, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 70 (Ky.App. 2002).
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Final Judgment in [the 1998 litigation] under the doctrine of
res judicata.”
However, the reversal of that final judgment
precludes it from having res judicata affect on the matters
asserted in the present action.
Whether Gardner should be
allowed to amend his complaints in the 1998 litigation to assert
the claims in the present action or whether the matters should
be consolidated have not been properly addressed by the trial
court, thus they are not ripe for our review.
In light of our
reversal of the judgment on the issue of res judicata, upon
remand the trial court may address these other issues.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court and remand this matter for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
William C. Jacobs
Lexington, Kentucky
Terry Sellars
Leslye Bowman
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Terry Sellars
Lexington, Kentucky
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