RICHARD T. WINKLER v. KENTUCKY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AUTHORITY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 27, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000080-MR
RICHARD T. WINKLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-01637
v.
KENTUCKY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
FINANCE AUTHORITY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, HENRY, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal by Appellant, Richard T.
Winkler (Winkler), against Appellee, Kentucky Economic
Development Finance Authority (KEDFA), from the Franklin Circuit
Court’s granting of a summary judgment against Winkler on
November 8, 2004.
Following a review of the record, we affirm.
On May 10, 2000, Central Kentucky Coatings, Inc. (CKC)
received a loan from KEDFA in the amount of $100,000.00.
The
promissory note dated May 10, 2000 was signed by the borrower,
CKC,1 and two guarantors individually, Matthew T. Winkler and
Richard T. Winkler.
On the same date, a Guaranty Agreement was
signed by Matthew T. Winkler and Richard T. Winkler, in their
individual capacities, as well as, J. Don Goodin, on behalf of
KEDFA.
A third document was also signed that day, a loan
agreement.
Signing the loan agreement were J. Don Goodin, on
behalf of KEDFA; Matthew T. Winkler, CKC president; and Matthew
T. Winkler and Richard T. Winkler, as guarantors in their
individual capacities.
The note was secured by a security
interest in collateral, CKC’s equipment.2
KEDFA filed its
financing statement to perfect its security interest on
September 18, 2002.
According to the record, a federal tax lien was filed
September 11, 2001 against CKC.
The federal tax lien was filed
before KEDFA filed its financing statement.
federal tax lien took priority.
Therefore, the
CKC later filed bankruptcy and
was ultimately sold to pay its creditors.
Subsequently, on
December 23, 2003, KEDFA filed a complaint against Matthew T.
Winkler and Richard T. Winkler, individually, alleging that
payments had not been made in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the promissory note and guaranty agreement.
1
The signature was by Matthew T. Winkler, CKC president.
2
This was one of three methods of security established in the Loan Agreement.
-2-
KEDFA filed a motion for summary judgment against
Winkler May 10, 2004.3
Winkler responded June 2, 2004 and
claimed there were genuine issues of material fact in the matter
precluding a granting of summary judgment.4
KEDFA filed its
reply June 7, 2004 denying that any questions of material fact
existed.
Winkler then filed his “sur-reply” June 16, 2004.
Following a hearing October 26, 2004, the trial court granted
KEDFA’s motion for summary judgment.5
Winkler then filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate
pursuant to Ky CR 59.05 November 18, 2004.6
Response November 29, 2004.
KEDFA filed its
Following a hearing December 8,
2004, the trial court issued an order dated December 21, 2004
3
The motion did not seek summary judgment against Matthew T. Winkler.
4
Specifically, Winkler stated two questions of fact existed: (1) did Winkler
waive any and all defenses to the enforcement of the Guaranty and (2) was the
Guaranty Agreement breached by KEDFA’s actions in failing to record a UCC
statement.
5
The hearing was delayed, in part, due to a transfer of the matter from
Division II to Division I per order dated June 29, 2004. Also, according to
the two Entry of Appearances filed in the record, KEDFA replaced counsel in
August and again in September 2004.
6
Winkler had three primary arguments with several sub-arguments contained
therein. Winkler’s three primary arguments were as follows: (1) Whether or
not the UCC applies, the obligation of “Good Faith and Fair Dealing” implied
in all contracts in Kentucky prohibits enforcement of Winkler’s Guaranty
after KEDFA failed to perfect its interest in the Loan’s collateral; (2)
Kentucky’s high Summary Judgment standard combined with the factual
determination of “good faith” prohibits this case from being determined as a
matter of law; and (3) The UCC does not apply to the guaranty, and Kentucky’s
general contract law should apply to the Guaranty.
-3-
denying Winkler’s CR 59.05 motion.
Winkler then filed his
notice of appeal January 7, 2005.7
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court
grants a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial court
correctly found there was no genuine issues as to any material
fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699,
704 (Ky.App. 2004), (citing Palmer v. International Assoc. of
Machinists, 882 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Ky. 1994)).
The movant bears
the initial burden of convincing the court by evidence of record
that no genuine issue of fact is in dispute, and then the burden
shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present “at
least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine
issue of material fact for trial.”
Id. at 705, (citing
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d
7
Winkler raises eight primary arguments in his Appellate Brief, including one
with five sub-arguments, in support of his appeal as follows: (1) the
applicable standard of review is de novo; (2) in addition to the presumptions
in favor of Winkler under the summary judgment standard, any ambiguities in
the loan documents must be construed against KEDFA, the drafter of those
documents; (3) whether or not the UCC applies, the obligation of “good faith
and fair dealing” implied in all contracts in Kentucky prohibits enforcement
of Winkler’s guaranty after KEDFA failed to perfect its interest in the
loan’s collateral; (4) the determination of “good faith” under the UCC is an
issue of material fact in Kentucky; (5) Kentucky’s high summary judgment
standard combined with the factual issue of “good faith” prohibits this case
from being determined as a matter of law; (6) consent to impairment of
collateral under KRS 355.3-605 of Kentucky’s UCC must be explicit, and
Kentucky courts err on the side of the guarantor if there is any hint of
unclarity; (7) the UCC does not apply to the guaranty, and Kentucky’s general
contract law should apply to the guaranty; and (8) if perfection of KEDFA’s
security interest in CKC’s loan was not a material part of Winkler’s
guaranty, Winkler’s belief that perfection was part of the bargain is a
unilateral mistake prohibiting enforcement of the guaranty.
-4-
476, 482 (Ky. 1991)).
The party opposing summary judgment
cannot rely on their own claims or arguments without significant
evidence in order to prevent summary judgment.
138 S.W.3d at 705.
Hallahan, supra,
The court must view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve all doubts in his
favor.
Id., (citing Commonwealth v. Whitworth, 74 S.W.3d 695,
698 (Ky. 2002)).
In order for summary judgment to be proper, the movant
must show that the adverse party cannot prevail under any
circumstances.
Motorists Mutual Insurance Co., supra 149 S.W.3d
at 439, (citing Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d
255, 256 (Ky. 1985)).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits,8 if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”
Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Grange Mutual Casualty Co., 149 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Ky.App. 2004),
(citing Ky CR 56.03).
The focus should be on what is of record
rather than what might be presented at trial.
Hallahan, supra,
138 S.W.3d at 705, (citing Welch v. American Publishing Co. of
Kentucky, 3 S.W.3d 724, 730 (Ky. 1999)).
8
Further, an appellate
“Affidavits” in CR 56.03 includes any other pertinent materials which will
assist the court in adjudicating the merits of the motion. Conley v. Hall,
395 S.W.2d 575, 583 (Ky. 1965).
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court need not defer to the trial court’s decision on summary
judgment and will review the issue de novo because only legal
questions and no factual findings are involved.
Id.
We now
turn to the Opinion and Order granting the summary judgment.
The court states, in pertinent part, the following in
its Opinion and Order:
Examinations of the two instruments
pled in the complaint lead this Court to
conclude that Kentucky’s Uniform Commercial
Code is applicable.
It is undisputed that the Note dated
May 10, 2000,. . . is a negotiable
instrument and subject to the provision of
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
KRS 355.3-101, et seq. [Winkler] is
secondarily liable as an accommodation party
who “signs the instrument for the purpose of
incurring liability on the instrument
without being a direct beneficiary of the
value given for the instrument . . .” KRS
355.3-419(1).
The pertinent statute for instruments
signed for accommodation is KRS 355.3419(3), which provides in part:
A person signing an
instrument is presumed to be an
accommodation party and there is
notice that the instrument is
signed for accommodation if the
signature is . . . accompanied by
words indicating that the signer
is acting as surety of guarantor
with respect to the obligation of
another party to the
instrument. . . .
The question then follows whether the
provisions of KRS 355.3-419 apply only to
-6-
the Note or to the Guaranty as well? . . .
More particularly, “the UCC apply(ies) to
“guaranties appearing upon the face of the
commercial instrument or at least executed
in simultaneous contemplation.” (Citation
omitted.)
In the case before this Court, the Note
and Guaranty, executed contemporaneously by
[Winkler], relate specifically and
exclusively to the other. The words of
guaranty are in both instruments. The terms
are no different. . . . The fact the
Guaranty is on a separate sheet of paper is
obviously not a measure of whether the Code
is displaced.
This Court is satisfied [Winkler’s]
Guaranty is not separate or independent from
the Note executed by [Winkler], but
ancillary, and is so interrelated to it,
that is must be construed under KRS 355.3101 et seq.
. . .
KRS 355.3-605(5),(7) relating to
the discharge of indorsers and
accommodation parties, provides:
. . . Under subsection (5) or (6)
of this section, impairing value
of an interest in collateral
includes; (a) Failure to obtain or
maintain perfection or recordation
of the interest in collateral;
Notwithstanding this protection
for an accommodation party, Kentucky
Uniform Commercial Code allows the
waiver of the defense of impaired
collateral by a guarantor’s advanced
written consent.
. . .
The Note and Guaranty recite that
[Winkler] specifically and
-7-
unambiguously consented in advance to
[KEDFA’s] failure to perfect its
security interest in the borrower’s
collateral.
The consent in the Note is as
follows:
The holder of this Note may,
with or without notice to any
party, and without affecting the
obligations of any . . .
accommodation party . . . to this
Note, and without limitation, (4)
change, exchange or release any
property in which the Authority
has any interest securing this
Note, and (5) suspend the right to
enforce against any such
collateral.
The consent in the Guaranty is found in
paragraph 7:
This is a guarantee of payment and
not merely a guarantee of collection.
The Guarantors expressly waive any
right to require that any action be
brought against or to require that
resort be had to any collateral
security or to any other guarantee
before a demand for payment is made by
the Authority upon the Guarantors.
Under the Note and Guaranty, [KEDFA]
had “full freedom of action” with respect to
the collateral. (Citation omitted.)
[Winkler’s] consent excused [KEDFA’s]
obligation to do anything with the
collateral for [Winkler’s] benefit and
operated as a waiver of [Winkler’s] right to
claim discharge under impairment of
collateral provision of KRS 353.3-605.
[Winkler] is therefore liable under the Note
and Guaranty.
-8-
We agree with the circuit court that the UCC is
applicable to the guaranty agreement as well as the promissory
note.
Provisions of the UCC apply to guaranties appearing upon
the face of the commercial instrument or, at least, executed in
simultaneous contemplation.
Tresslar Co., Inc. v. Fritts, 665
S.W.2d 314, 316 (Ky.App. 1984).
The promissory note, guaranty
agreement, and the loan agreement were each executed on the same
date.
Both Matthew T. Winkler and Richard T. Winkler signed
each document in their individual capacity as a guaranty.
We
further agree that each of the guarantors were accommodation
parties as defined by KRS 355.3-419(3).
This appeal is determinative upon whether Winkler, as
guarantor, waived his right to discharge based upon KRS 355.3605(5)-(7)(a).9
Specifically, did the documents executed May 10,
2000 constitute a waiver by Winkler, as guarantor, precluding a
9
KRS 355.3-605(5)-(7)(a) states in pertinent part:
(5) If the obligation of a party to pay an instrument is secured by an
interest in collateral and a person entitled to enforce the instrument
impairs the value of the interest in collateral, the obligation of an
indorser or accommodation party having a right of recourse against the
obligator is discharged to the extent of the impairment.
. . .
(6)
If the obligation of a party is secured by an interest in
collateral not provided by an accommodation party and a person entitled to
enforce the instrument impairs the value of the interest in collateral, the
obligation of any party who is jointly and severally liable with respect to
the secured obligation is discharged to the extent the impairment causes the
party asserting discharge to pay more than that party would have been obliged
to pay, taking into account rights of contribution, if impairment had not
occurred.
. . .
(7)
Under subsection (5) or (6) of this section, impairing value of
an interest in collateral includes: (a) Failure to obtain or maintain
perfection or recordation of the interest in collateral;
-9-
claim of collateral value impairment?
Whether the terms of the
contracts are ambiguous will determine how our analysis will
proceed.
If an ambiguity exists, a court will gather, if
possible, the intention of the parties from the contract as a
whole, and in doing so will consider the subject matter of the
contract, the situation of the parties, and the conditions under
which the contract was written.
Frear v. P.T.A. Industries,
Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Ky. 2003), (citing Whitlow v. Whitlow,
267 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Ky. 1954)).
In the absence of ambiguity, a
written instrument will be enforced strictly according to its
terms.
Id., (citing O’Bryan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 413
S.W.2d 891, 893 (Ky. 1966)).
In such cases, a court will
interpret the contract’s terms by assigning the language its
ordinary meaning and without resort to extrinsic evidence.
Id.,
(citing Hoheimer v. Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Ky. 2000)).
We turn now to the documents executed in relation to the loan to
CKC.
We agree with the circuit court that language was
included in the promissory note which constituted such a waiver.
The relevant paragraphs of the promissory note are as follows:
This Note is secured by a first
security interest on the Collateral as set
forth in the Security Agreement between
[CKC], as Debtor, and [KEDFA]; and, by a
Guaranty Agreement.
-10-
. . .
The holder of this Note may, with or
without notice to any party, and without
affecting the obligations of any . . .
guarantor, . . ., accommodation party or any
other party to this Note, and without
limitation, . . . (4) change, exchange or
release any property in which [KEDFA] has
any interest securing this Note, and (5)
suspend the right to enforce against any
such collateral.
We also agree with the circuit court that language was
included in the guaranty agreement which constituted such a
waiver.
The relevant paragraphs of the guaranty agreement are
as follows:
7.
This is a guarantee of payment and
not merely a guarantee of collection.
The Guarantors [i.e. Winkler]10
expressly waive any right to require
that any action be brought against or
to require that resort be had to any
collateral security or to any other
guarantee before a demand for payment
is made by the Authority upon
[Winkler].
8.
If [CKC] shall fail to make a payment
of principal and/or interest on the Loan
when and as the same becomes due, whether by
acceleration, or otherwise, under the terms
of the Loan Documents, [KEDFA] may
immediately send a notice of default and
demand for payment to [Winkler]. . . Without
the necessity for any further notice or
action by [KEDFA] other than such written
10
All references in the Guaranty Agreement and Loan Agreement state
Guarantors meaning Matthew T. Winkler and Richard T. Winkler; however, for
purposes of clarity in this opinion, any reference to Guarantors in the
Guaranty Agreement and Loan Agreement shall be substituted with Winkler.
-11-
notice and demand of performance, [Winkler]
shall, within twenty (20) days from the date
of receipt of said notice and demand pay in
one installment all amount of principal of
and accrued interest due on the Loan then
outstanding and any other charges or costs
then applicable, or any other amount
acceptable to [KEDFA].
9.
The obligations of [Winkler] under
this Guaranty are absolute and
unconditional, joint and several. The
obligations of [Winkler] shall not be
affected, impaired, modified, released
or limited by any occurrence or
condition whatsoever without
limitation, by and of the following,
whether or not with notice to or the
consent of [Winkler]:
. . .
G.
The taking or the omission of taking of
any action, or the assertion or exercise by
[KEDFA] of any rights or remedies under the
Loan Documents11 or this Guaranty or delay in
or failure to assert or otherwise exercise
any of such rights or remedies;
H.
Any failure, omission, delay or lack on
the part of [KEDFA] to enforce, assert or
exercise any rights, power or remedy
conferred on [KEDFA] in the Loan Documents
or this Guaranty, or any other act or acts
on the part of [KEDFA].
I.
The voluntary or involuntary
liquidation, dissolution, sale or other
disposition of all or substantially all of
the assets, marshaling of assets and
liabilities, receivership, insolvency, or
bankruptcy, assignment for the benefit of
creditors, or re-adjustment or, or other
similar proceedings affecting [Winkler],
11
The term “Loan Documents” is defined in the Guaranty Agreement as the Loan
Agreement, Promissory Note, and Security Agreement.
-12-
[CKC], or [KEDFA], or any of the assets of
any of them, or any allegation or contest of
the validity of this Guaranty, the Loan
Documents in any such proceeding;
. . .
11. No act of commission or omission of any
kind or at any time upon the part of
[KEDFA], in respect to any matter
whatsoever, shall in any way affect or
impair the rights of [KEDFA] to enforce any
right, power of benefit of [KEDFA] under
this Guaranty, or not setoff, claim,
reduction or diminution of any obligations,
or any defense of any kind or nature which
[CKC] has or may have against [KEDFA] shall
be available to [Winkler] in any suit or
action brought by [KEDFA] to enforce any
right, power or benefit under this Guaranty.
This Guaranty shall be construed as a waiver
by [Winkler] of any rights or claims [he]
may have against [KEDFA] under this Guaranty
or otherwise; it is the intention of this
Agreement and the guarantee of payment
provided for herein that [Winkler] shall be
unconditionally, absolutely, jointly and
severally obligated to perform fully all of
the obligations, agreements, and covenants
hereunder and pursuant to the Loan Documents
for the benefit of [KEDFA].
We further believe that the loan agreement supports
that no genuine issues of material fact existed in this matter.
The relevant paragraphs of the loan agreement are as follows:
SECTION 3
Security
The Note and the Loan evidenced thereby are
and shall be secured by and entitled to the
benefits of all of the following:
3.1 Security Interest in Collateral.
The note evidencing the Loan will be secured
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by a first lien on the Collateral, pursuant
to the Security Agreement.
3.2 Guaranty. The Note and the Loan
shall be further secured by the personal
guaranty of the Guarantors, as set forth in
the Guaranty.
3.3 Life Insurance. The Note and the
Loan shall be further secured by a
collateral assignment of a life insurance
policy or policies on the life of one or
more owners in an aggregate amount equal to
the amount of the loan.
. . .
SECTION 7
Remedies Upon Default
. . .
7.2 Rights Under Security Instruments.
If any Event of Default shall occur, [KEDFA]
shall also have the rights and remedies
granted it under any and all of the Loan
Documents and Security Instruments securing
or intended to secure the Loan and the Note.
7.3 Exercise of Remedies. The rights
and remedies of [KEDFA] shall be deemed to
be cumulative and shall be in addition to
all those rights and remedies afforded to
[KEDFA] at law or in equity. Any exercise
of any rights or remedies shall not be
deemed to be an election of that right or
remedy to the exclusion of any other right
or remedy.
SECTION 8
Conditions Precedent
. . .
8.4 Recordings. The Security
Agreement, Financing Statement and any other
documents or instruments as [KEDFA] may
-14-
request have been executed and delivered by
[CKC] to be filed or recorded in such public
offices as [KEDFA] may request to secure the
Loan. (Emphasis added.)
. . .
SECTION 12
Guaranty of the Guarantors
12.1 Obligations. To induce [KEDFA] to
enter into this Loan Agreement, [Winkler]
[has] entered into the Guaranty. . .and
thereby absolutely and unconditionally,
jointly and severally guarantee to [KEDFA]
(1) the full, prompt and unconditional
performance of each and every covenant,
agreement, warranty, representation and
obligation of [CKC] under the Loan
Documents; and, (2) the full, prompt and
unconditional payment when due of all sums
due or to become due to [KEDFA] under the
Loan Documents in accordance with their
respective terms. The liability of
[Winkler] hereunder shall not be affected by
any release, extension, renewal,
modification, compromise, settlement or
variation of any term of this Loan
Agreement, the Note or of any guaranteed
obligation, regardless of whether such
action involves [CKC] or another
Guarantor. . .
. . .
SECTION 14
Miscellaneous Provisions
. . .
14.5 Waivers by [CKC] and [Winkler].
[CKC] and [Winkler] hereby waive, to the
extent permitted by applicable law, (a) all
presentments, demands for performance,
notices of nonperformance, protests, notices
of protest and notices of dishonor in
connection with the Note; (b) any
-15-
requirement of diligence or promptness on
the part of [KEDFA] in enforcement of its
rights under the provisions of the Loan
Documents or the Security Instruments; and
(c) any requirement of marshaling assets or
proceeding against persons or assets in any
particular order.
Based upon the foregoing, we believe no genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether Winkler waived his right
to claim impairment of collateral upon KEDFA following their
failure to perfect its security interest prior to the federal
tax lien attaching.
The language in the documents executed May
10, 2000, is clear and unambiguous and, as such, shall be
enforced strictly according to its terms.
While we sympathize
with Winkler’s situation, the terms of the documents plainly
result in him being liable to KEDFA.
The granting of the
summary judgment to KEDFA by the circuit court was appropriate
in that no genuine issues of material fact remained.
we affirm Franklin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brendan J. Shevlin
David M. Andrews
Lexington, Kentucky
Debra H. Dawahare
Jonathon Melton
Lexington, Kentucky
-16-
Therefore,
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