ELLIOTT B. HENDERSON; GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY v. MARY HENSLEY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 6, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000056-MR
ELLIOTT B. HENDERSON; GOODYEAR
TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA HYLTON ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-01127
v.
MARY HENSLEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
This matter arises from an automobile
collision that occurred on January 20, 2000, in Richmond,
Kentucky.
Following trial in the Madison Circuit Court, the
jury returned a verdict awarding Appellee Mary Hensley
$204,014.14.
Appellants Elliott B. Henderson and his employer,
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear), argue that the
trial court erred in three respects:
1
(1) by directing a verdict
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
in Hensley’s favor on the issue of liability; (2) by refusing to
allow an instruction concerning negligence on the part of the
City of Richmond; and (3) by failing to reduce the final
judgment by $61,334.94 in conformance with Fratzke v. Murphy, 12
S.W.3d 269 (Ky. 2000).
For the following reasons, we affirm.
On January 20, 2000 at approximately 6:00 p.m.,
Hensley was driving her vehicle on Main Street in Richmond,
Kentucky when she entered the intersection of Main and Maple
Streets.
At this same instant, a second vehicle, owned by
Goodyear, and operated by Henderson2 also entered the
intersection.
injured.
The two vehicles collided and Hensley was
It is undisputed that Henderson drove into the
intersection without first stopping at a stop sign on Maple
Street.
Henderson contends that his view of the sign was
obstructed by vehicles illegally parked near the sign.
On October 7, 2002, approximately eleven months
following Hensley’s filing of her complaint and two years
following the accident, Henderson filed a motion with the trial
court seeking permission to file a third-party complaint against
the City of Richmond on the basis that the City allowed vehicles
to park illegally on Maple Street thus obscuring the stop sign
2
Though both Henderson and Goodyear are appellants herein, because the
liability of both is directly dependent on Henderson’s actions, they will
together be referred to herein simply as “Henderson.”
- 2 -
in question.
The trial court entered an order on December 6,
2002, denying the motion.
After numerous attempts at mediation,3 the matter
proceeded to trial on September 7 and 8, 2004.
At the close of
evidence, Henderson moved for a directed verdict, which the
trial court denied.
Conversely, Hensley also moved for a
directed verdict on the issue of liability, which was granted.
In Judge Adams’ handwritten minutes from the trial, she noted:
The defendant’s motion for directed verdict
– renewed and denied. The plaintiff’s
motion for directed verdict on issue of
liability granted – no evidence that the
plaintiff operating on superior roadway had
reasonable time and/or opportunity to avoid
collision with defendant’s vehicle sliding
through intersection from inferior roadway
posted with stop sign. The only evidence
offered by defense was the conclusory
opinion of reconstructionist T. Conklin that
he differed with plaintiff’s
reconstructionist report concluding that
plaintiff was not negligent in that she
could have swerved or turned onto Maple St.
– no evidence offered tending to prove
factually that the plaintiff had sufficient
time or actual opportunity, only
speculation.
R.A.,4 p. 644.
Additionally, in its September 27, 2004, Trial
Order, Verdict and Judgment, the trial court restated its
decision to grant the directed verdict:
Plaintiff’s counsel moved the Court for
a Directed Verdict on the issue of
liability as alleged in Plaintiff’s
3
4
The trial court’s record indicates at least five unsuccessful mediations.
Record on Appeal.
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complaint, and all amendments thereto.
The Court heard legal argument on this
matter, and subsequently granted
Plaintiff’s motion for a directed
verdict as to the Defendant’s liability
to the Plaintiff. The Court further
ruled that there had been no factual
testimony regarding any comparative
fault of the Plaintiff, and further
directed a verdict as to the
Plaintiff’s lack of comparative fault.
R.A., p. 647.
As a result of the court’s rulings, there was no
apportionment instruction as to either Hensley or the City of
Richmond.
Thus, the jury deliberated only the question of
damages and ultimately returned a verdict awarding Hensley
$204,014.14.
Subsequently, Henderson filed a motion seeking to set
aside the verdict on the grounds that the trial court erred by:
(1) granting Hensley a directed verdict; (2) not instructing the
jury with respect to negligence committed by the City of
Richmond; and (3) not reducing the damage award by $61,344.94
because the past medical expense and pain and suffering awards
did not comport with Hensley’s final timely-filed interrogatory
responses.
In its December 7, 2004 order denying the motion,
the trial court stated in pertinent part:
The Court finds that there was no
prejudicial error that would necessitate
vacating or altering the findings of the
jury. Counsel conducted multiple mediations
and exchanged and disclosed changing amounts
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of claims made at same, as well as in pretrial conferences with the judge present.
Any claims of surprise are without merit.
The Defendant’s motions are overruled.
R.A., p.715.
This appeal followed.5
We turn first to Henderson’s contention that the trial
court committed reversible error in granting Hensley’s motion
for a directed verdict.
Though characterized as a single issue,
the directed verdict actually encompasses two distinct rulings.
First, the court held that Henderson was negligent as a matter
of law because of his failure to stop at the stop sign on Maple
Street.
The court also ruled, however, that Hensley did not
breach her own duty of care applicable to operators of motor
vehicles, thus precluding the jury from apportioning liability
to her.
The standard for our review of a directed verdict
granted by a trial court was recently fully described in Gibbs
v. Wickersham, 133 S.W.3d 494, 495-96 (Ky. App. 2004).
The standard of review for an appeal of a
directed verdict is firmly entrenched in our
law. A trial judge cannot enter a directed
verdict unless there is a complete absence
of proof on a material issue or there are
no disputed issues of fact upon which
reasonable minds could differ. . . . Where
there is conflicting evidence, it is the
responsibility of the jury to determine and
5
Hensley has filed a motion to strike Henderson’s appellate brief because of
his failure to include citations to the record. Though we are not granting
the well-taken motion, counsel for Henderson is directed to review CR
76.12(4)(c)(iv) and CR 76.12(8)(a), the latter allowing for a brief to be
stricken for noncompliance with the requirements of CR 76.
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resolve such conflicts. . . . A motion for
directed verdict admits the truth of all
evidence favorable to the party against whom
the motion is made. . . . Upon such
motion, the court may not consider the
credibility of the evidence or the weight it
should be given, this being a function
reserved for the trier of fact. . . . The
trial court must favor the party against
whom the motion is made, complete with all
inferences reasonably drawn from the
evidence. The trial court then must
determine whether the evidence favorable to
the party against whom the motion is made is
of such substance that a verdict rendered
thereon would be “palpably or flagrantly”
against the evidence so as “to indicate that
it was reached as a result of passion or
prejudice.” In such a case, a directed
verdict should be given. Otherwise, the
motion should be denied.
. . .
It is well-argued and documented that a
motion for a directed verdict raises only
questions of law as to whether there is any
evidence to support a verdict. . . . While
it is the jury’s province to weigh evidence,
the court will direct a verdict where there
is no evidence of probative value to support
the opposite result and the jury may not be
permitted to reach a verdict based on mere
speculation or conjecture.
Henderson argues his failure to stop at the Maple
Street stop sign did not justify the directed verdict against
him.
However, KRS 189.330(4) requires motor vehicle operators
to stop at a stop sign and “[a]fter having stopped . . . [to]
yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or
approaching on another roadway . . . .”
Despite his violation
of this statute (which was the basis for the directed verdict
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entered against him), Henderson contends that his failure to
stop prior to the collision was not attributable to his own
negligence, but rather to his inability to see the sign due to
illegally parked vehicles.
Kentucky law, however, does not
excuse the failure to stop under such conditions.
In Walton v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 655 S.W.2d 11, 14
(Ky. App. 1982), this Court affirmed a finding of negligence
against a driver who, with no prior knowledge of the area in
question, failed to stop at the location of a missing stop sign:
Although this appears to be a question of
first impression in this jurisdiction, the
general rule is that a superior street or
thoroughfare does not lose its superior
status by reason of a stop or yield sign
being misplaced or obscured on an inferior,
intersecting street. The policy underlying
such a rule is that a motorist proceeding
along a through street or highway protected
by stop signs is entitled to assume that the
driver of the vehicle on an intersecting
street will obey the law and stop or yield
the right-of-way. . . .
Although there are holdings in other
jurisdictions to the effect that absence of
a stop or yield sign relieves the driver of
a vehicle on a secondary road of the duty to
yield the right-of-way, Kentucky does not
appear to be adopting such position. . . .
Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was
correct in that the appellant had the duty
to yield the right-of-way to the appellee.
Therefore, even taking Henderson at his word that he was unable
to see the stop sign until he was approximately fifteen feet
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from it and then did all that he could in an attempt to stop, we
must agree with the trial court that Henderson was negligent
when he failed to stop before entering the intersection.
Thus,
the trial court did not err when it directed a verdict as to
Henderson’s liability.
We next turn to the failure of the trial court to
allow an apportionment instruction regarding Hensley’s
negligence, if any.
Henderson argues that he was entitled to
such an instruction given Hensley’s alleged failure to attempt
to avoid the collision.
It is true that a “driver approaching
an intersection with the right-of-way has no absolute right to
proceed so unconditional that she can ignore duties of
reasonable lookout, sounding a horn when necessary, and avoiding
collision when there is reasonable opportunity to do so.”
Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Ky. 1993).
In other
words, “the duty to yield is not absolute, since the failure to
so yield does not absolve the favored driver of his duty to
exercise reasonable care to avoid collision.”
Barnett, 470 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Ky. 1971).
Bailey v.
Indeed, “[w]hether
that carelessness [of the motorist on the inferior road] is the
only proximate cause depends on whether the other driver had
reasonable time and opportunity to avoid the collision after he
is able to apprehend the negligence of the first motorist.”
Browning v. Callison, 437 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Ky. 1969) quoting
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Tilford v. Garth, 405 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1966).
Thus, even though
Hensley had the right-of-way, if by the exercise of ordinary
care she should have realized that Henderson was not going to
yield, then she had a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid
the collision.
Covington v. Friend Tractor and Motor Co., Inc.,
547 S.W.2d 771 (Ky. App. 1977).
It does not necessarily follow, however, that
Henderson was entitled to an apportionment instruction as to
Hensley.
Rather, in order for such an instruction to be given,
there must have been at least some evidence of record from which
a jury could reasonably infer that Hensley failed in her duty.
See, e.g., Mahan v. Able, 251 S.W.2d 994 (Ky. 1952).
Having
examined closely the record before us, we agree with the trial
court that no such evidence was introduced at trial that could
have supported a finding of negligence on Hensley’s part.
Of
the three pieces of evidence cited by Henderson to support an
apportionment instruction, not one addresses the question of
whether Hensley had a “reasonable opportunity” to avoid the
collision.
First, Hensley herself testified that she briefly saw
Henderson’s truck approaching the stop sign on Maple Street
although she had no idea of the distance between the two
vehicles.
According to Hensley, even though it seemed that
Henderson’s truck was moving quickly, she had no reason to
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believe that Henderson could not or would not stop at the stop
sign.
She further testified that because she then looked
straight ahead, she did not see Henderson’s truck again until
the moment of impact, leaving her with no time to take any
evasive action.6
The second piece of evidence is the written report of
Henderson’s expert witness, Thomas J. Conklin.7
Conklin stated
on page 8 of his report that “[t]he damage to the front left
side of the Pontiac, which was fairly uniform across the entire
damaged area, and the lack of skid marks prior to the collision
indicated that Hensley made no attempt to avoid the collision.”
This conclusion, however, does nothing to support Henderson’s
argument.
Assuming that Conklin is correct in his conclusion
that Hensley “made no attempt to avoid the collision,” his
report is silent as to whether she had the opportunity to do
anything.
His report neither contradicts nor casts doubt on
Hensley’s testimony that she had no time to take evasive action.
The last possible source for the requisite evidence is
Conklin’s testimony.
At trial, after testifying about the
conclusions contained in his own report,8 Conklin was asked to
6
Conversely, Henderson testified concerning his inability to see the stop
sign and said nothing whatsoever with respect to Hensley’s actions or
inactions prior to the collision. Statements to the contrary in Henderson’s
brief are totally without support in the record.
7
Conklin’s report was introduced into the trial record as Defendant’s Exhibit
No. 2.
8
At no time during his testimony concerning his own report did Conklin
contend that Hensley had time to take evasive maneuvers but did not do so.
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name the three things about which he most disagreed with
Hensley’s expert witness, Dennis L. McWilliams.
The first item
noted by Conklin was McWilliams’s conclusion that Hensley had no
time to react prior to the collision.
Conklin did not state the
basis for his disagreement other than he believed Hensley had
time to brake or turn onto Maple Street.
Notably, Conklin’s own
detailed report is silent as to whether Hensley had time to take
either action.
Moreover, he offered no facts upon which this
trial testimony rested.
In fact, at no point in the trial was
any evidence introduced even suggesting the distance between the
two vehicles when Hensley first noticed Henderson’s truck.
Without such a foundation, we are of the opinion that the trial
court was correct that Conklin’s statement was merely
conclusory.
See Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11
S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000) (court not required to admit opinion
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of an expert witness).
As such, there was no basis upon
which the jury could render an apportionment verdict that was
anything other than speculative.
Gibbs v. Wickersham, supra at
496(court should direct a verdict rather than allow jury to
reach verdict based on mere speculation or conjecture).
Next we turn to Henderson’s contention that the trial
court erred when it failed to include an apportionment
instruction as to the City of Richmond.
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The allocation of fault
among parties is governed by KRS 411.182.
This statute states,
in pertinent part:
(1)
In all tort actions, including products
liability actions, involving fault of
more than one (1) party to the action,
including third-party defendants and
persons who have been released under
subsection (4) of this section, the
court, unless otherwise agreed by all
parties, shall instruct the jury to
answer interrogatories or, if there is
no jury, shall make findings
indicating:
(a)
The amount of damages each claimant
would be entitled to recover if
contributory fault is disregarded; and
(b)
The percentage of the total fault of
all the parties to each claim that is
allocated to each claimant, defendant,
third-party defendant, and person who
has been released from liability under
subsection (4) of this section.
. . .
(4)
A release, covenant not to sue, or
similar agreement entered into by a
claimant and a person liable, shall
discharge that person from all
liability for contribution, but it
shall not be considered to discharge
any other persons liable upon the same
claim unless it so provides. However,
the claim of the releasing person
against other persons shall be reduced
by the amount of the released persons’
equitable share of the obligation,
determined in accordance with the
provisions of this section.
Our examination of the record indicates that the City
of Richmond was never a party to this action and never entered
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into any settlement or other agreement releasing it from
liability with respect to this incident.
Therefore, a simple
reading of KRS 411.182 leads us to the conclusion that Henderson
was not entitled to an apportionment instruction as to the City
of Richmond.
Further, we find no error in the trial court’s denial
of Henderson’s motion seeking to add the City of Richmond as a
third-party defendant.
Pursuant to CR 14.01, a court has
discretion in allowing or rejecting a third-party complaint.
See, e.g., Commonwealth, Dep’t of Highways v. Louisville Gas &
Electric Co., 346 S.W.2d 536 (Ky. 1961); Gray v. Bailey, 299
S.W.2d 126 (Ky. 1957);
American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Fryer, 692 S.W.2d 278 (Ky.
App. 1984).
In the matter sub
judice, Henderson’s grounds for attempting to assert a claim
against the City of Richmond (i.e., the allegedly obstructed
view of the Maple Street stop sign caused by illegally parked
cars) were obviously known to him as of the day of the accident.
Despite this, he failed to make any attempt to assert his thirdparty claim until nearly two years after the accident and only
three months prior to the scheduled trial date.
Because of
this, it is probable that Henderson’s claim was barred by the
statute of limitations at the time he moved to assert it.
See
KRS 413.140(1)(providing one year limitation period for personal
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injury actions).
In any event, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by denying Henderson’s request.
Finally, Henderson argues that the trial court erred
by not reducing the final judgment amount of $204,014.14 by
$61,334.94.
The jury awarded damages as follows:
Past medical expenses
$ 18,644.94
Future medical expenses
$
Past physical and mental
pain and suffering
$ 22,464.00
Future physical and mental
pain and suffering
$100,000.00
Past lost wages
$ 13,000.00
Future lost wages
$ 46,573.20
3,332.00
According to Henderson, on September 23, 2002, he propounded
interrogatories to Hensley which included a request that she
provide an itemized list of the damages she was seeking.
On
November 20, 2002, Hensley responded by claiming itemized
damages which totaled $335,960.00.
Subsequently, on August 23,
2004, Hensley amended her response to this interrogatory to
reflect total damages of $806,200.00.
At a meeting to discuss
jury instructions held during trial in Judge Adams’ chambers,
Hensley’s counsel agreed that she would not seek total damages
in excess of $285,000.00.
When informed that this gross amount
was substantially less than the amount initially claimed by
Hensley in her original interrogatory response, Henderson
- 14 -
withdrew any objection he had to the damage amount being claimed
at trial.
Despite Henderson’s withdrawal of his objection, he
now contends that even though the total damages sought by
Hensley at trial were less than the amount disclosed in her
initial discovery response, the damage award must be reduced
because she sought higher damage amounts in certain categories
of damages than was initially claimed.
Specifically, Henderson
states that Hensley improperly sought $18,644.94 in past medical
expenses as compared to the $6,200.00 claimed in her 2002
interrogatory answers and $100,000.00 in pain and suffering as
opposed to $51,100.00 stated in the same answers.
However,
Henderson did not raise this issue in the trial court, and,
thus, he did not properly preserve it for appeal.
It is well-
established that “[t]he Court of Appeals is without authority to
review issues not raised in or decided by the trial court.”
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky.
1989).
Moreover, we are under no obligation to scour the record
on appeal to ensure that an issue has been preserved.
See
Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Ky. 2003);
and CR 76.12(4)(d)(iii) and (iv).
Though the matter of damages
was argued off the record, the Supplemental Record on Appeal
(S.R.A.) establishes what transpired in Judge Adams’ chambers.
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According to both an affidavit prepared by Hensley’s counsel9 and
the trial court’s Order Supplementing the Record,10 Henderson
expressly waived any objection to the amount of damages being
sought by Hensley because the total amount was significantly
less than that originally sought by her.
Henderson’s failure to
contest these supplements to the record concerning the
unrecorded in-chambers meeting lends further credence to our
conclusion.
As a result, we find that Henderson waived any
argument he may have had on appeal respecting damages.
Additionally, even if Henderson had properly preserved
this issue, he would still not be entitled to relief.
As noted,
Henderson’s claim concerns not the total damage amount sought by
Hensley, but rather the specific itemized amounts comprising
that total.
In support of his argument, Henderson relies on the
Kentucky Supreme Court’s decisions in Fratzke v. Murphy, 12
S.W.3d 269 (Ky. 2000) and LaFleur v. Shoney’s, Inc., 83 S.W.3d
474 (Ky. 2002).
In short, these decisions stand for the
proposition that pursuant to CR 8.01, a party seeking damages is
limited to the amounts disclosed in compliance with the
controlling scheduling orders.
However, in Thompson v. Sherwin
Williams Co., Inc., 113 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Ky. 2003), our Supreme
Court clarified its earlier decisions by stating “the purpose
and the only requirement of CR 8.01(2) is that information be
9
10
S.R.A., pp. 14-16.
S.R.A., pp. 28-30.
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furnished as to the ‘amount claimed’ in unliquidated damages,
not an itemization of each category of unliquidated damages for
which that amount is claimed.”
Thus, despite the fact Hensley
may have changed the damage amounts sought within certain
itemized categories,11 because the total amount sought at trial
and the amount that was ultimately awarded by the jury were
substantially below the amount initially disclosed by her, the
court did not err when it refused to reduce the jury’s verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Madison
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Daniel Farrell
Farrell, Kibbey & Apple
Lexington, Kentucky
Yvette Hourigan Thomas
Lexington, Kentucky
11
Hensley’s point that past medical expenses will necessarily increase and
future medical expenses decrease as a case proceeds from the discovery stage
to trial is well-taken. She is further correct that Henderson waived any
objection to this particular portion of the award when he stipulated
Hensley’s past medical bills at trial.
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