GRW KENTUCKY, INC. v. DJSJ, INC., F/K/A WISE INDUSTRIES, INC.; DOUGLAS WISE; JERI M. WISE; STEPHANIE WISE; THE JERI M. WISE IRREVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT NO. 1; JERI M. WISE 1998 QUALIFIED ANNUITY TRUST AGREEMENT, INC.
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RENDERED:
APRIL 28, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2005-CA-000047-MR
GRW KENTUCKY, INC.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-01084
v.
DJSJ, INC., F/K/A WISE INDUSTRIES, INC.;
DOUGLAS WISE; JERI M. WISE;
STEPHANIE WISE; THE JERI M. WISE
IRREVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT NO. 1;
JERI M. WISE 1998 QUALIFIED ANNUITY
TRUST AGREEMENT, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
GRW Kentucky, Inc. (GRW) appeals from a summary
judgment by the Franklin Circuit Court dismissing its claims
against DJSJ, Inc.
GRW contends that the trial court erred by
finding that its claims against DJSJ were barred by the doctrine
of res judicata.
We agree with the trial court that GRW’s
current claims arise from the same indivisible contract as was
litigated in GRW’s prior action against DJSJ.
Hence, we affirm.
On September 16, 1997, GRW entered into a written
agreement with Wise Industries, Inc.
Under the terms of the
contract, GRW would serve as a representative to certain of
Wise’s customers, including the Budd Company and Dana
Corporation.
In exchange, Wise would pay GRW a four-percent
commission on all parts which Wise sold to the named companies,
for as long as the contracted parts were sold to those
companies.
In addition, the contract also provided that Wise
would pay GRW $10,000.00 per month for consulting services
provided by Grant Wilson of GRW.
Within a short time, Wise began to fall behind on its
payments under the contract and a dispute arose concerning
Wilson’s performance of the consulting services.
to enforce the contract.1
January of 2000.
GRW filed suit
The matter came to a jury trial in
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of GRW, awarding GRW $950,000.00 in
sales commissions due under the contract.
However, the jury
also found that Wise had properly discharged Wilson on the
consulting agreement, and awarded GRW no damages for that claim.
In its judgment confirming the jury verdict, the trial court
1
GRW Kentucky, Inc., et al. v. Douglas Wise, et al., No. 97-CI01830 (Franklin Circuit Court).
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awarded pre-judgment interest to GRW on the sales commissions,
calculating interest as follows:
The full amount of the judgment, nine
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($950,000.00)
is to be divided by twenty-seven (27)
months, being the number of months from and
including October 1997 through and including
December, 1999, which was the period of time
about which the jury heard evidence and upon
which the damage award was made. The
quotient, thirty five thousand one hundred
and eighty-five dollars ($35,185.00) shall
be considered the amount of the monthly
commission, said amount first becoming due
on November 15, 1997, with the last monthly
amount being due on January 15, 2000. The
amount of each monthly commission shall bear
pre-judgement [sic] interest at the legal
rate of (8%) percent compounded annually
from the date each payment was due.
Subsequently, GRW filed a motion for additur judgment,
seeking to recover additional commissions earned for the months
of January and February 2000.
The trial court denied the motion
and designated its prior judgment as final and appealable and
this Court later affirmed the judgment on appeal.2
Following the
first judgment, GRW filed this action seeking to recover
commissions which it claimed were earned after January of 2000.
Wise, now DJSJ, filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
that GRW’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
2
Wise Industries, Inc., et al. v. GRW Kentucky, Inc., et al.,
NOS. 2000-CA-001080-MR & 2000-CA-001177-MR (Not-to-be-published
opinion rendered October 5, 2001).
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The trial court agreed and dismissed GRW’s complaint.
This
appeal followed.
The parties agree on the applicable law.
The doctrine
of res judicata precludes further litigation of issues that were
decided on the merits in a prior final judgment.
In order for
the doctrine to apply, there must be identity of the parties,
identity of the causes of action, and the prior action must have
been resolved on the merits.3
Furthermore, res judicata applies
not only to claims which were litigated in the prior action, but
also to claims that properly belonged in the subject matter of
the prior litigation.4
The parties agree that the current action and the
prior action share the same parties, involve the same contract
and that the prior action was resolved on the merits.
But GRW
argues that res judicata does not apply because the sales
representation and commission contract is divisible.
Where the
contract is one calling for continuous or successive promises by
the promisor, all breaches to the date of suit must be included;
but those thereafter occurring may be claimed in a later suit.5
3
Slone v. R & S Mining, Inc., 74 S.W.3d 259, 261 (Ky. 2002); See
also Newman v. Newman, 451 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky. 1970).
4
Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Board, 983 S.W.2d 459,
465 (Ky. 1998); Combs v. Prestonsburg Water Co., 260 Ky. 169, 84
S.W.2d 15 (1935).
5
Overstreet v. Greenwell, 441 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Ky. 1969).
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GRW asserts that DJSJ is liable for payment of commissions for
each month it sells parts to the named companies.
Consequently,
GRW contends that it could not have brought claims for the
commissions earned after January 2000 in the prior action
because those claims had not yet accrued.
By contrast, DJSJ argues that the commission contract
is indivisible.
DJSJ asserts that its obligation to pay
commissions is not severable from the consulting provisions of
the contract.
Since the jury in the prior action determined
that Wise properly terminated the consulting contract, DJSJ
contends that GRW is barred from raising any claims for future
commissions.
The trial court took the position that the contract
was to be regarded as a single transaction for purposes of claim
preclusion.
We agree.
In support of its position, GRW relies
heavily on the language of the judgment in the prior action, in
which the trial court apportioned the $950,000.00 over the
twenty-seven months between the date of the contract and the
date of the trial.
GRW argues that the judgment demonstrates
that each month’s commissions were separate and distinct
obligations.
However, the trial court used this method to
facilitate its calculation of pre-judgment interest.
Indeed,
the court did not calculate interest based upon the actual
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commissions earned for each month, but upon the average of the
entire judgment divided over the twenty-seven month term.
The
prior judgment does not compel a conclusion that the contract’s
obligations were distinct for each month.
In fact, the language used in the jury instruction in
the prior action leads to the opposite conclusion.
The jury
concluded that under the September 16, 1997, contract, GRW would
serve as sales representative and that Wise would pay GRW “a
four (4%) percent sales commission on all sales contracts with
Dana Corporation and with the Budd Company for as long as the
contracted parts are sold to those companies . . . .”
added).
(Emphasis
The instruction does not characterize the sales
representation and commissions as a series of discrete
transactions, but as a single transaction.
The instruction is
consistent with the language of the agreement, which provides
for an indefinite, rather than a fixed term.
Consequently, we
agree with the trial court that the prior action determined
Wise’s liability for the entire sales and representation
contract.
Therefore, GRW was required to bring its claim for
loss of future commissions in that action, and it is barred from
doing so now.
Accordingly, the summary judgment of the Franklin
Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William C. Hurt
Hurt, Crosbie & May, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
Bruce F. Clark
R. Benjamin Crittenden
Stites & Harbison, PLLC
Frankfort, Kentucky
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