MARC H. JONES v. WENDY LEIGH JACOBS JONES
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RENDERED: APRIL 7, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-000022-MR
MARC H. JONES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE MARGARET RYAN HUDDLESTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-01364
WENDY LEIGH JACOBS JONES
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TACKETT, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE: Marc Jones appeals from a judgment of the Warren
Family Court ordering him to pay maintenance and child support
and to file taxes for the years 1999 through 2003 as “married,
filing separately” and pay any tax liability that results.
Marc
argues that the trial court erred in requiring him to pay his
ex-wife $1,500.00 per month for five years because the lifestyle
enjoyed by the parties was largely subsidized by his parents and
because his ex-wife has the ability to quickly complete a
college degree and support herself.
He further contends that
the amount of child support was incorrectly calculated.
Finally, he argues that it was improper to require him to file
back taxes as “married, filing separately” because that would
result in a higher tax liability than filing jointly with his
ex-wife.
We disagree and affirm the trial court’s decision.
Prior to her marriage, Wendy Jones spent five years in
the Air Force and came within nine credit hours of earning her
college degree.
She married Marc on September 11, 1992, and the
marriage lasted twelve years.
After their first child was born,
Marc and Wendy moved into a duplex owned by his parents.
They
paid rent the first six months, but continued to live in the
duplex for about four years.
In 1997, Marc and Wendy moved into
a farmhouse, also owned by his parents.
Marc’s father helped
the couple build a deck and make cosmetic changes to the home.
Marc worked outside the home, sometimes as many as four jobs at
once, while Wendy stayed home to care for their two children.
Except for a brief stint where she kept other children in their
home, Wendy did not earn money during the marriage.
Marc’s income fluctuated dramatically with his highest
and lowest yearly salaries being $212,871.00 and $13,055.00
respectively.
Nevertheless, the couple enjoyed a very
comfortable lifestyle.
a horse trailer.
They owned two show horses, a truck, and
Their sons attended private school, and Wendy
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had several cosmetic procedures.
The parties separated in April
2003 and, during their separation, Marc bought Wendy a new truck
which cost approximately $30,000.00.
Wendy asked for and
received temporary maintenance in the amount of $3,200.00 per
month.
Prior to entering a decree of dissolution, the trial
court held a hearing and heard evidence from both parties and
their witnesses.
The final decree was entered on September 24, 2004.
The trial court restored each party’s non-marital property,
divided up marital property and marital debt, granted Marc and
Wendy joint custody of their minor sons (aged eleven and seven),
set child support and maintenance obligations, and ordered Marc
to file taxes and pay any liability for the years 1999 through
2003.
Marc filed a motion to alter or amend the trial court’s
order which was denied.
This appeal followed.
Marc presents three grounds for invalidating the trial
court’s award of maintenance to Wendy.
First, he argues that he
should not be required to pay maintenance because the standard
of living established during the marriage largely resulted from
his parents’ generosity to the couple.
In addition, he claims
that Wendy is better able to earn an income than he is because
she lacks only nine hours to complete her college degree.
Finally, he argues that her maintenance should be reduced due to
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marital fault.
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 403.200 outlines
the following conditions governing maintenance awards:
(1)
In a proceeding for dissolution of
marriage or legal separation, or a
proceeding for maintenance following
dissolution of a marriage by a court
which lacked personal jurisdiction over
the absent spouse, the court may grant
a maintenance order for either spouse
only if it finds that the spouse
seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property,
including marital property
apportioned to him, to provide for
his reasonable needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself
through appropriate employment or
is the custodian of a child whose
condition or circumstances make it
appropriate that the custodian not
be required to seek employment
outside the home.
(2)
The maintenance order shall be in such
amounts and for such periods of
time as the court deems just, and after
considering all relevant factors
including:
(a) The financial resources of the
party seeking maintenance,
including marital property
apportioned to him, and his
ability to meet his needs
independently, including the
extent to which a provision for
support of a child living with the
party includes a sum for that
party as custodian;
(b) The time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training
to enable the party seeking
maintenance to find appropriate
employment;
(c) The standard of living established
during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
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(e)
(f)
The age, and the physical and
emotional condition of the spouse
seeking maintenance; and
The ability of the spouse from
whom maintenance is sought to meet
his needs while meeting those of
the spouse seeking maintenance.
The standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion.
At the time of this action, Wendy was forty years old
and had been out of the work force for over a decade.
submitted monthly expenses totaling over $9,000.00.
She had
The trial
court found that many of these expenses were extravagant;
nevertheless, the order also stated that Wendy did not have
enough marital property to support her reasonable needs.
Because she was able-bodied and her children were not infants,
the trial court determined that Wendy was able to work outside
the home; however, her lack of employment experience and job
skills left her unable to support herself.
Having established
that Wendy met the requirements of KRS 403.200(1) to receive an
award of maintenance, the trial court proceeded to consider the
factors under KRS 403.200(2) in setting the amount and duration
of the award.
Wendy was awarded $1,500.00 per month for five years
with the award terminating in the event that she remarried.
This sum was less than half the amount that Marc had been paying
in temporary maintenance.
The trial court’s order listed each
factor found in KRS 403.200(2) and explained how those factors
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impacted its decision.
Marc argues that the trial court gave
insufficient weight to subsection (2)(b) which considers the
amount of time necessary for Wendy to earn a degree and support
herself.
The trial court found that Wendy could complete her
degree in electrical engineering technology in approximately one
year.
The remaining years of maintenance represent a period of
time when she would be establishing herself professionally, as
opposed to Marc who has years of experience in his chosen
career.
Marc also contends that the trial court gave too much
weight to the couple’s marital standard of living because their
lifestyle was heavily subsidized by his parents.
He argues that
the trial court’s order would require his parents to support his
ex-wife in order to prevent him from being jailed for contempt
for failure to pay maintenance.
We disagree.
During the last
five years of their marriage, Marc’s income fluctuated wildly;
nevertheless, he stated that he should be able to earn between
fifty and sixty thousand dollars a year.
The trial court, after
finding Marc to be underemployed, agreed with this assessment
and imputed him with additional income.
Based on what Marc
should have been earning, he would have an income of $4,167.00
per month, and the expenses he submitted totaled only $1,760.00.
Deducting his child support, left Marc with $1,626.00, and his
maintenance obligation was set at $1,500.00.
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Thus, the trial
court found that Marc was able to meet his own needs while
paying maintenance to Wendy.
KRS 403.200(2)(f).
Marc has
failed to show that the amount or duration of the maintenance
awarded to his ex-wife after a twelve-year marriage was an abuse
of the trial court’s discretion.
He makes one last argument
relating to maintenance: that the award should be reduced due to
marital fault because of Wendy’s alleged failure to allow
marital relations for months at a time and her failure to do his
laundry.
We find this argument to be thoroughly meritless and
decline to consider it in any more detail.
Marc next argues that the trial court erred with
regard to the amount of child support he was ordered to pay.
Since both parents were found to be underemployed, the trial
court imputed additional income to the parties.
Due to her lack
of job experience, Wendy was imputed minimum wage earnings.
To
arrive at a figure for Marc, the trial court averaged the
salaries he had earned for the previous five years and imputed
an income of $63,783.00.
The income used to arrive at that
figure was as follows:
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
$ 27,191.00
$ 70,913.00
$212,871.00
$ 48,791.00
$ 13,055.00
Marc now argues that it was error for the trial court to include
his income from 2001 since it over inflated his imputed income.
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Accepting his argument would have reduced his imputed income to
$34,000.00.
Wendy points out that excluding the years 1999 and
2003, when her ex-husband earned comparatively little, would
increase his imputed to $110,858.00 with a monthly income of
$9,238.19, which more closely matched the parties’ household
expenses.
The imputed income of $63,783.00 is close to the
$60,000.00 figure which was accepted as reasonable by Marc in
his testimony.
Thus, he fails to prove it was error for the
trial court to use the average of his previous five years’
earnings to determine an imputed income.
Finally, Marc argues that the trial court erred by
requiring him to file taxes for the years 1999 through 2003 as
“married, filing separately.”
In support of this position, he
presented testimony from an accountant that filing separately
would increase his liability by thirty percent over filing
jointly.
While acknowledging that possibility, the trial court
noted filing jointly would impose joint liability on Wendy to
pay the back taxes.
Wendy stated that she knew little about
their financial affairs and was unaware that her husband had not
filed their taxes for five years.
Since Marc was the only
member of the household earning an income during that time, we
disagree with his assertion that Wendy should be jointly liable
for his failure to file taxes.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Warren
Family Court is affirmed.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART, AND
FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
I concur with the majority opinion
except as pertains to the filing of taxes for tax years 1999
through 2003, to which I respectfully dissent.
I believe the
family court should have ordered the filing of the tax returns
in the manner that would have resulted in the least amount of
tax owed by the parties, regardless of the IRS liability issue.
Under KRS 403.190(3) the income earned is clearly marital
property.
Accordingly, since both parties benefited from this
income, the tax liability is a marital debt.
Gipson v. Gipson,
702 S.W.2d 54 (Ky.App. 1985).
Once the tax debt was determined, the family court
should have allocated the payment obligation between the parties
like any other marital debt.
The family court ignored the fact
that the tax debt was marital.
Instead, the controlling factor
cited in the family court’s findings on this issue was whether
appellee would have personal liability to the IRS.
I believe
the family court clearly abused its discretion in this regard.
See Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513 (Ky. 2001).
Appellee benefited from the marital income when earned
and thus, should not be immune from being responsible for her
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joint liability for the tax to the IRS, assuming filing jointly
resulted in the least amount of tax owed.
Even if filing
separately had resulted in less tax owed, the debt is still
marital in my opinion.
Therefore, the fact that appellee may have been
jointly liable for payment of the tax with the petitioner to the
IRS should not be relevant in determining how the returns should
be filed and in allocating tax liability as a marital debt.
The
family court’s finding is both unreasonable and unfair under the
circumstances in my opinion.
See Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d
777 (Ky.App. 2002).
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dixie R. Satterfield
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Steven O. Thornton
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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