DEVIN NEWSOME v. KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; CHARLES VANCE, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A VANCE FURNITURE; JANET VANCE, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A VANCE FURNITURE; AND FLOYD GREENE INSURANCE COMPANY and CHARLES VANCE, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A VANCE FURNITURE; AND JANET VANCE, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A VANCE FURNITURE v. KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; FLOYD GREENE INSURANCE COMPANY; AND DEVIN
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002664-MR
DEVIN NEWSOME
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00307
KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY; CHARLES VANCE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A VANCE
FURNITURE; JANET VANCE, INDIVIDUALLY
AND D/B/A VANCE FURNITURE; AND
FLOYD GREENE INSURANCE COMPANY
AND
NO. 2005-CA-000046-MR
CHARLES VANCE, INDIVIDUALLY
AND D/B/A VANCE FURNITURE;
AND JANET VANCE, INDIVIDUALLY
AND D/B/A VANCE FURNITURE
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00307
KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY; FLOYD GREENE
INSURANCE COMPANY; AND DEVIN
NEWSOME
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GUIDUGLI, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Devin Newsome, Charles Vance and Janet Vance,
d/b/a Vance Furniture, have appealed from a declaratory judgment
entered by the Floyd Circuit Court, which concluded that
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance did not owe coverage to
the Vances or Vance Furniture for a cause of action asserted
against them by Newsome.
Having concluded that the trial court
did not err as a matter of law by determining that Newsome’s
accident was not covered under any of the Vances’ insurance
policies held with Kentucky Farm Bureau, we affirm.
The pertinent facts of this case are not in dispute.
When Newsome was seventeen years old and still in high school,
he worked part time for the Vances conducting odd jobs at their
farm, house, and business, Vance Furniture.
Before the accident
occurred, Newsome usually worked for the Vances on Saturdays for
$5.00 per hour.
On Christmas Eve of 1999, the Vances asked
Newsome to deliver furniture to a customer.
After making the
delivery, Newsome pulled out onto the road and heard a “real big
popping noise.”
Shortly thereafter, the steering malfunctioned
and Newsome lost control of the vehicle, causing him to hit a
second motor vehicle.
As a result, Newsome suffered numerous
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injuries, including a broken jaw, hip, and leg, as well as
injuries to his face, ear, and back.
Although Newsome helped other store employees deliver
furniture on previous occasions, this was the first time he ever
made a delivery by himself.
Additionally, the vehicle he was
driving at the time of the accident had previously been wrecked
and rebuilt.
Furthermore, Newsome’s accident was the first time
the business used this vehicle since its first wreck.
At the time of the accident, the Vances did not have
any workers’ compensation coverage for Newsome or any of its
employees.
The Vances alleged that they never carried workers’
compensation because they considered the people who worked for
their business to be “contractors.”
Although the Vances did not
have workers’ compensation coverage, they did have 12 insurance
policies in effect at the time of the accident.
Floyd Greene, a
Kentucky Farm Bureau agent, sold these insurance policies to the
Vances, as well as other insurance policies over a twenty-year
period to cover their home, vehicles, and business.
Additionally, the Vances had an umbrella policy in effect at the
time of the accident to provide coverage that exceeded the
coverage amount under their other insurance policies.
However,
each policy provided an exclusion from coverage under either a
business pursuits or an employment exclusion.
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After the accident, Newsome filed suit against the
Vances, d/b/a Vance Furniture, in the Floyd Circuit Court for
negligently furnishing him with a motor vehicle that was
severely damaged in a previous accident.
The Appellee, Kentucky
Farm Bureau, provided the Vances with counsel in defense of
Newsome’s complaint.
The court granted Kentucky Farm Bureau
leave to intervene in this action to determine whether it was
required to continue to provide counsel for the Vances and to
pay any judgment which might be rendered against them on behalf
of Newsome.
Therefore, Kentucky Farm Bureau petitioned for a
Declaratory Judgment and named both the Vances and Newsome as
defendants.
Subsequently, Newsome amended his complaint and
asserted three additional claims. First, Newsome alleged that
the Vances were negligent in failing to obtain workers’
compensation coverage.
Additionally, Newsome added Floyd Greene
Insurance, Inc., as a defendant and alleged that Greene failed
to advise the Vances to purchase workers’ compensation coverage.
Finally, Newsome added claims against Greene and Kentucky Farm
Bureau based on bad faith, violations of the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act, and violations of the Kentucky Insurance Fraud
Act.
The Vances, d/b/a Vance Furniture, filed identical claims
against Greene and Kentucky Farm Bureau.
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In concluding that the exclusions in the insurance
policies were permissible and unambiguous, the Floyd Circuit
Court entered a Declaratory Judgment stating that Kentucky Farm
Bureau owed no coverage to the Vances or Vance Furniture for
Newsome’s cause of action.
Additionally, because the trial
court found that Kentucky Farm Bureau had no obligation to
provide coverage, it dismissed the additional claims against
Kentucky Farm Bureau based on bad faith, violations of the
Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, and violations of the Kentucky
Insurance Fraud Act.
Furthermore, the trial court entered a
subsequent order dated December 7, 2004, amending the
Declaratory Judgment to provide that Newsome was still entitled
to pursue his personal injury claim against the Vances, as well
as his workers’ compensation claim.
These appeals followed.
Because the interpretation of an insurance contract is
a question of law, the de novo standard of review should be
applied.
MGA Ins. Co., Inc. v. Glass, 131 S.W.3d 775, 777 (Ky.
App. 2004).
Furthermore, the terms used in an insurance policy
“must be interpreted according to the usage of the average man
and as they would be read and understood by him in light of the
prevailing rule that uncertainties and ambiguities must be
resolved in favor of the insured.”
Fryman v. Pilot Life
Insurance Co., 704 S.W.2d 205, 206 (Ky. 1986).
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The Appellants, Newsome and the Vances, d/b/a Vance
Furniture, first contend that Newsome was not an employee of
Vance Furniture and should not be excluded from coverage under
the Vances’ insurance policies.
The Vances had a personal
automobile policy on the vehicle Newsome was driving during the
accident.
However, an exclusion in the policy stated that “[w]e
do not provide liability coverage for any insured for bodily
injury to any employee of that insured during the course of
employment.”
However, the Appellants contend that Newsome was
not an employee and thus does not fall under this exclusion.
Because Newsome worked only one day a week and did various jobs
for the Vances, the Appellants claim that Newsome was an
independent contractor.
We disagree.
As provided in Ratliff v. Redmon, 396 S.W.2d 320, 32425 (Ky. 1965), the nine factors to consider when determining
whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor include:
(a) the extent of control which, by the
agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is
engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference
to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
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(d) the skill required in the particular
occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and
the place of work for the person doing the
work;
(f) the length of time for which the person
is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the
time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the
regular business of the employer; and
(i) whether or not the parties believe they
are creating the relationship of master and
servant.
Applying the factors provided in Ratliff, it is clear
that Newsome does not qualify as an independent contractor.
While all the factors should be considered, the predominate
factor to be considered is the Vances’ right to control the
details of Newsome’s work.
Id. at 327.
Because the Vances
clearly controlled the details of Newsome’s work, we conclude
that Newsome was an employee and not an independent contractor.
However, applying the other factors, it is also clear that
Newsome was not an independent contractor because Newsome was
not engaged in a distinct occupation; the type of work done by
Newsome usually required direction from the Vances; the odd jobs
Newsome did required no particular skill; the Vances provided
the instrumentalities, tools, and place of work for Newsome; and
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Newsome was paid by the hour.
Therefore, the trial court
correctly concluded that Newsome was the Vances’ employee.
The Appellants also contend that the various insurance
policies should be construed under the “reasonable expectations”
doctrine to provide coverage for Newsome’s accident.
The Vances
claim that the doctrine of reasonable expectations should apply
because Greene continually told Mrs. Vance not to worry about
their coverage under the policies and that “you know I’ve got it
fixed if anything ever happened.”
Therefore, the Appellants
contend that the doctrine of reasonable expectations should
apply because the Vances reasonably expected that Newsome’s
accident would be covered under their various insurance
policies.
We disagree.
In Brown v. Indiana Insurance Company, 184 S.W.3d 528,
540 (Ky. 2005), the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that the
doctrine of reasonable expectations applies only when the terms
of the policy are ambiguous. Specifically, the Supreme Court
stated that:
the insured is entitled to all the coverage
he may reasonably expect to be provided
under the policy. Only an unequivocally
conspicuous, plain and clear manifestation
of the company’s intent to exclude coverage
will defeat that expectation. The doctrine
of reasonable expectations is used in
conjunction with the principle that
ambiguities should be resolved against the
drafter in order to circumvent the
-8-
technical, legalistic and complex contract
terms which limit benefits to the insured.
Id.
The Appellants contend that the exclusion provisions
under the personal automobile policy and the homeowner’s policy
are ambiguous, and thus the doctrine of reasonable expectations
should apply.
Specifically, the exclusion under the personal
automobile policy does not apply to “domestic employees.”
Because the term “domestic employee” is not defined in the
policy, the Appellants contend that it is ambiguous.
Additionally, under the homeowner’s policy, the exclusion for
injuries that arise out of the “insured’s business” does not
apply to “residence employees.”
Although the term “residence
employee” is defined under the homeowner’s policy, the
Appellants contend that it also is ambiguous. 1
Although the term “domestic” is not defined, we
conclude that the terms “domestic employee” and “residence
employee” in the policies are not ambiguous.
Furthermore, it is
clear that Newsome was neither a “domestic” nor a “residence”
employee.
1
While Newsome did perform odd jobs around the Vance’s
A “residence employee” is defined under the homeowner’s
policy as:
(a)
an employee of an insured whose duties are related to the
maintenance or use of the residence premises, including
household or domestic services; or
(b)
one who performs similar duties elsewhere not related to
the “business” of an “insured.”
-9-
farm and house, he was delivering furniture for Vance Furniture
at the time of the accident.
Because delivering furniture is
not work that is done in a residence or related to a domestic
service, Newsome was neither a “domestic” nor a “residence”
employee at the time of the accident.
The lower court therefore
correctly determined that Newsome was working as an employee of
Vance Furniture at the time he delivered the furniture.
Thus,
the exclusions provided in both insurance policies apply to
Newsome.
Furthermore, the Vances contend that Newsome is
excluded under KRS § 342.650(2) from being covered under
Kentucky’s Workers’ Compensation Act and should therefore be
covered under the Vances’ insurance policies. 2
After reviewing
the facts of this case, we conclude that Newsome does not fall
under this provision and thus KRS § 342.650(2) is inapplicable.
Finally, the Appellants contend that Kentucky Farm
Bureau is vicariously liable for the acts of its agent, Greene,
for failing to provide the Vances with coverage for Newsome’s
accident and that Kentucky Farm Bureau should be estopped from
denying coverage based on the alleged statements Greene made to
2
KRS § 342.650(2) states that the following employees are exempt from
coverage:
Any person employed, for not exceeding twenty (20) consecutive
work days, to do maintenance, repair, remodeling, or similar work
in or about the private home of the employer, or if the employer
has no other employees subject to this chapter, in or about the
premises where that employer carries on his trade, business, or
profession.
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the Vances about their coverage under the insurance policies.
However, because these issues were not raised in the declaratory
action, they are not properly before this court on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Floyd Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
2004-CA-002664-MR
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE, KENTUCKY
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY:
C. Graham Martin
Salyersville, Kentucky
Ralph T. McDermott
Ashland, Kentucky
Winter R. Huff
Somerset, Kentucky
2005-CA-000046-MR
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
John C. Collins
Salyersville, Kentucky
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