MARK JOSEPH LABER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 30, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-002642-MR
MARK JOSEPH LABER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-01547
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE.1
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Mark Joseph Laber appeals from his conviction
of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon.
Having
reviewed the record and the applicable law, we affirm.
This case arises from the seizure of a handgun from
appellant’s vehicle following a traffic stop.
hearing was held on May 6, 2004.
Trooper Trevor Harris, of the
Kentucky State Police, testified as follows.
1
A suppression
At approximately
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
12:45 a.m., on October 8, 2003, Harris had pulled into the Shell
station on Richmond Road near Man O’War, and saw an unmarked
Lexington police department vehicle in the nearby Wal-Mart
parking lot.
Believing it might be someone he knew, he pulled
up next to the unmarked car.
In the car were Detective Ramsey
and Detective Welch of the Lexington Police Department.
They
told Harris that they were watching a subject (appellant) who
was out on bond for a rape charge and who had been in the area
of the victim, and that the subject had been accused of using a
gun in the rape.
They pointed out appellant’s truck to Harris,
which was across the Wal-Mart parking lot towards the Shell.
Appellant briefly went into the Shell and returned to the truck.
He then began to pull onto the access road between Wal-Mart and
Richmond Road.
Harris testified that as appellant pulled onto
Richmond Road, he failed to use his turn signal.
Harris
testified that appellant then accelerated rapidly down Richmond
Road, looked like he was going to switch lanes, but did not, and
was “just kind of weaving across the road.”
conducted a traffic stop.
Harris then
Harris testified that he initiated
the stop based on appellant’s not using his turn signal and his
driving, in combination with what he had been told by the
detectives concerning the rape charge and that appellant had
been in the area where the victim lived.
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Detectives Ramsey and
Welch immediately joined Harris at the stop.
The videotape of
the stop was placed into evidence at the suppression hearing.
After stopping appellant, Harris told him to step out
of the truck.
Harris testified that when appellant opened the
door, he saw what appeared to be a holster on the bottom side of
the seat.
The videotape shows the following then occurred.
Harris asked, “What you got right there, partner, that ain’t a
gun is it?”
Appellant replied that he had a stun gun.
Harris
asked if appellant had any knives or guns on him (appellant
appears to indicate that he did not), and patted him down.
Harris told appellant that he was stopped for not using his
signal when he turned onto Richmond Road, and that he acted like
he was in a hurry to go somewhere.
he was heading to.
Harris asked appellant where
Appellant replied back to Wilmore.
Asked
what he was doing in Lexington, appellant said he was visiting.
Asked who he came to visit, appellant said his girlfriend, Susan
Ramsey.
When asked if he had been to her house tonight,
appellant said that he had been to her parking lot.
Asked if he
had any knives or guns in the truck, appellant said a stun gun.
Harris asked appellant if he had ever been arrested for
anything, and appellant said he had just got out of prison eight
months ago.
Harris asked appellant if he had ever been
convicted of a felony, and appellant replied affirmatively.
following exchange then occurred:
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The
Trooper Harris: So you know you can’t have
any kind of weapons, right?
Appellant:
I can’t have a stun gun?
. . . .
Harris: You say you don’t have any knives
or guns, or nothing illegal?
Appellant:
Harris:
there?
You got a problem if I look through
Appellant:
not mine.
Harris:
yours.
. . . it’s not mine.
OK, what kind of gun is it?
Appellant:
Harris:
There’s a gun in there but it’s
There’s a gun in there but it’s not
Appellant:
Harris:
I don’t have anything . . .
It’s a . . .
Where’s it at?
Appellant:
It’s in the glove box. . .
Harris: . . . I’m gonna put you in the back
of my car, for my safety. You’re not under
arrest right now . . .
. . . .
Appellant:
. . . Is there a problem?
Harris: Well the problem is you’re a
convicted felon and you’ve got a gun in your
car . . .
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Appellant: . . . But it doesn’t belong to
me . . . you can call2 Brian Begley.
Appellant was placed in the back of the police car.
Harris confirmed with dispatch that appellant was a convicted
felon (lifetime registered sex offender), and a handgun was
retrieved from the glove box.
Appellant was subsequently placed
under arrest.
Harris testified that after appellant had been placed
in the back of the police car, he learned from Detective Ramsey
that the alleged rape victim was Ramsey’s daughter, and that
Susan Ramsey was Detective Ramsey’s ex-wife.
At the suppression
hearing, Detective Ramsey was called by the defense and
testified that his daughter had called him earlier that evening
to say that appellant was in the parking lot of her apartment
complex.
Ramsey and Welch drove to the parking lot but did not
see appellant.
Ramsey testified that his ex-wife, whom
appellant was dating and with whom his daughter resides,
subsequently called to say appellant was at Wal-Mart.
Ramsey
admitted that he did not like appellant.
The trial court found there was no contradictory proof
rebutting Trooper Harris’s testimony that he observed a traffic
violation occurring in his presence, and therefore he was
authorized to initiate the stop.
The court found that Harris’s
2
We note that the words immediately preceding “Brian Begley” are difficult
to discern from the videotape. We will accept appellant’s version, which is
not disputed by the Commonwealth, that the words are “you can call”.
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questions to appellant were not incriminating by nature, and
were appropriate for an investigative stop.
The court
characterized appellant’s response to Harris’s request to search
as “nonresponsive”, but found that his statement that he had a
gun in the truck established probable cause to believe a felony
offense was being committed, and therefore, a warrantless search
of the vehicle was proper.
Accordingly, the trial court denied
the suppression motion.
A jury trial was held on October 18, 2004.
Appellant’s defense at trial was that the gun found in his truck
was not his, but belonged to his employer, Brian Begley.
Appellant was found guilty of possession of a handgun by a
convicted felon, and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.3
This
appeal followed.
Appellant raises two arguments on appeal, first that
reversible error occurred when the prosecutor made improper
statements in his closing argument, and second, that the
evidence taken from his truck should have been suppressed as the
search violated the Fourth Amendment.
We shall address the
suppression issue first.4
3
Appellant was also found guilty of failure to notify Department of
Transportation of address change, and failure to signal, which are not at
issue on appeal.
4
The Commonwealth argues that the suppression issue is unpreserved, as the
record does not contain a written motion. In light of the fact that a
suppression hearing was held, and the trial court ruled on the motion to
suppress, we conclude the issue was sufficiently preserved for review.
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Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence from the traffic stop, as he did not
voluntarily consent to the search of his truck.
Appellant
contends that any alleged consent was the product of coercion,
resulting from the fact that he was surrounded by police
officers, in particular, Detective Ramsey, who had animosity
towards him for dating his ex-wife and allegedly raping his
daughter.
Our standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a
suppression motion is as follows.
“First, the factual findings
of the court are conclusive if they are supported by substantial
evidence.
The second prong involves a de novo review to
determine whether the court’s decision is correct as a matter of
law.”
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky.App.
2000) (citations omitted).
The facts of this case are not in dispute.
Accordingly, our review becomes whether the search of the glove
compartment was lawful.
Appellant concedes that the traffic
stop, even if pretextual, was proper under Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996),
and that, per Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S. Ct.
330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977), Harris’s request that he step out
of the vehicle did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.
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As appellant exited the vehicle, Trooper Harris
immediately noticed a holster, and appellant admitted he had a
stun gun.
At this point, we believe a search of the passenger
compartment already would have been lawful based on Trooper
Harris’s observation and appellant’s admission that he had a
stun gun.
“[A] police officer may conduct an area search of the
passenger compartment of an automobile to recover weapons, as
long as they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable
belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.”
Docksteader
v. Commonwealth, 802 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Ky.App. 1991), citing
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3482, 77
L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1221 (1983).
Trooper Harris then started asking appellant a few
questions.
“‘Questions that hold potential for detecting crime,
yet create little or no inconvenience, do not turn reasonable
detention into unreasonable detention.’”
Commonwealth v.
Erickson, 132 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Ky.App. 2004), quoting United
States v. Burton, 334 F.3d 514, 518 (6th Cir. 2003).
Having told
Harris that he was a convicted felon, appellant’s admission that
there was a gun in the truck gave Trooper Harris probable cause
to believe that evidence of a crime, possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, was contained in the truck.
The “automobile” exception to the warrant
requirement . . . allows officers to search
a legitimately stopped automobile where
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probable cause exists that contraband or
evidence of a crime is in the vehicle.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800-01,
102 S.Ct. 2157, 2159-61, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 578
(1982) (citations omitted); Estep [v.
Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Ky.
1983)]. The search may be as thorough as a
magistrate could authorize via a search
warrant, including all compartments of the
automobile and all containers in the
automobile which might contain the object of
the search. Ross, 456 U.S. at 823-24, 102
S.Ct. at 2172-73, 72 L.Ed.2d, at 593; Estep,
663 S.W.2d, at 215.
Clark v. Commonwealth, 868 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Ky.App. 1993).
Trooper Harris was therefore permitted to search all
compartments of or containers in the truck which may have
contained the gun.
Id.
Appellant’s consent was not necessary.
Accordingly, we conclude the search was lawful, and that the
trial court, therefore, properly denied appellant’s motion to
suppress.
Appellant additionally argues that reversible error
occurred when the prosecutor made allegedly improper statements
of personal opinion regarding the credibility of witnesses.
Appellant concedes these alleged errors are unpreserved, but
requests this court review for palpable error under RCr 10.26.
A palpable error is one which affects the
substantial rights of a party and relief may
be granted for palpable errors only upon a
determination that a manifest injustice has
resulted from the error. This means, upon
consideration of the whole case, the
reviewing court must conclude that a
substantial possibility exists that the
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result would have been different in order to
grant relief.
Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Ky. 1996).
It was
undisputed at trial that appellant was a convicted felon, and
that a gun was found in the glove compartment of his truck,
which he was driving.
If there was error in any of the
prosecutor’s statements regarding the credibility of the
witnesses at issue, it did not rise to the level of palpable
error because these witnesses were testifying as to ownership of
the firearm, whereas KRS 527.040 prohibits the mere possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Appellant also claims reversible error occurred when
the prosecutor referred to evidence outside the record in his
closing argument, that he had a “secret tape” that would prove
defense witness Brian Begley was lying.
unpreserved, and without merit.
a “secret tape”.
This argument is also
The prosecutor did not refer to
The videotape referred to was that of Begley’s
prior testimony, which had been referred to previously by the
prosecutor on cross-examination, but not shown to the jury.
The
videotape was referred to in the closing argument in the context
of the rules of evidence regarding prior inconsistent
statements.
Again, no palpable error occurred.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
James Havey
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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