DONATHAN MASON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 19, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002641-MR
DONATHAN MASON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00281
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Donathan Mason has appealed from a judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court entered on December 9, 2004, following
a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance in the first degree,1 fleeing and evading police in the
second degree,2 possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,3
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.140.
2
KRS 520.100.
3
KRS 527.040.
resisting arrest,4 and being a persistent felony offender in the
second degree.5
Having concluded that the trial court properly
denied Mason’s motion to suppress evidence, we affirm.
On January 9, 2004, Officer Jonathan Whitaker of the
Lexington-Fayette County Police Department observed a vehicle he
believed to be operating with only one headlight.6
Officer
Whitaker observed the vehicle as it met his patrol car.
officer then turned around and followed the vehicle.
The
Shortly
after Officer Whitaker began following the vehicle, it turned
into an apartment complex.
Officer Whitaker testified that he
then stopped near the complex to see if the vehicle returned to
the roadway.
A few minutes later, according to Officer
Whitaker, the vehicle left the apartment complex and returned to
the roadway.
Officer Whitaker then began to follow the vehicle
again, and testified that as the vehicle approached a stop sign
he activated the emergency lights on his patrol car to stop the
vehicle.
Officer Whitaker testified that he wanted to stop the
vehicle to advise the operator that the headlight was inoperable
and to see if there was anything else he needed to investigate.
4
KRS 520.090.
5
KRS 532.080(2).
6
Mason disputes that the vehicle’s headlight was not working. Rather, he
contends that the light was burning, but it was pointed upward as a result of
damage to the vehicle following an accident. Regardless, it is clear that
the headlight was not functioning properly.
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The vehicle, however, failed to stop after Officer Whitaker
turned on his emergency lights.
Officer Whitaker testified that
the vehicle was not speeding, but that it was not stopping
either.
The officer stated that he then notified dispatch that
he was following the vehicle and it was not stopping.
Officer Whitaker testified that he continued to follow
the vehicle with his emergency lights on as the vehicle
approached a stop sign.
The vehicle slowed down, but did not
stop at the stop sign and slowly made a left turn.
At this
point, Officer Whitaker activated his siren in addition to his
emergency lights.
Officer Whitaker continued to follow the
vehicle while notifying dispatch of his speed and location.
He
testified that the vehicle did not speed, but it did not stop.
Officer Whitaker was then ordered by a commanding officer
through dispatch to terminate the pursuit of the vehicle because
no serious violation was involved.
Officer Whitaker testified
that he then turned off his siren and emergency lights.
He did,
however, continue to follow the vehicle making sure that when
the vehicle stopped, he was going to be there.
Officer Whitaker testified that it had been the policy
of the police department that when ordered to terminate a
pursuit, the officer is to cease and desist all efforts to
overtake the vehicle or to capture the suspect.
Officer
Whitaker stated that he was not aware of this policy on January
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9, 2004, but instead believed the policy to be that the officer
should continue to observe the vehicle and suspect from a
distance, which is what he did.
Officer Whitaker testified that
after turning off his emergency equipment, he switched his radio
to channel two which enables car-to-car communications and
advised other officers in the area of the location of the
vehicle as he continued to follow it from a distance.
As the other officers took positions to watch for the
vehicle, Officer Whitaker observed it make a turn and slow down.
Officer Whitaker then sped up to the vehicle to see what it was
going to do.
When the officer observed the driver’s door open,
he “shot up” behind the car and Mason then exited the vehicle
and ran behind a house.
Officer Whitaker testified that he
exited his patrol car and began to run after Mason while yelling
for him to stop.
Officer Whitaker testified that he continued
to pursue Mason behind the house as the other officers arrived
and chased Mason back towards Officer Whitaker.
Officer
Whitaker testified that Mason resisted being arrested for three
to five minutes until he was handcuffed.
After being
handcuffed, Officer Whitaker testified that Mason’s person was
searched and the officers discovered a handgun and crack
cocaine.
Mason gave limited testimony at the suppression
hearing regarding the headlight on the vehicle he was operating.
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He testified that the light was operable, but that it did not
shine onto the roadway because it had been damaged in an
accident, but that it did shine upward.
This testimony was
corroborated by Mason’s father, who testified on his son’s
behalf.
Mason further admitted that he saw the emergency lights
on Officer Whitaker’s patrol car, but that he did not stop.
He
testified that Officer Whitaker was following him closely the
entire time the officer was behind him.
Mason moved the trial court to suppress the evidence
discovered during the search of his person following his seizure
after running from the vehicle.
He asserts that the seizure was
unlawful because Officer Whitaker violated the police department
policy after being ordered to terminate the pursuit of Mason for
the inoperable headlight.
The trial court denied Mason’s motion and found that
Officer Whitaker had a legal basis to stop Mason due to the
inoperable or faulty headlight.
When Mason failed to stop, he
committed the arrestable offense of fleeing and evading.
Further, the trial court found that when Mason ran from Officer
Whitaker after exiting the vehicle, he committed a second
arrestable offense of fleeing and evading.
As such, the trial
court found that the search of Mason’s person was proper because
it was incidental to his arrest.
In regard to Officer
Whitaker’s failure to follow the order to terminate the pursuit,
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the trial court ruled that the police department policy was not
a law or rule upon which Mason could rely as a defense to the
search.
Our review of a trial court’s decision on a
suppression motion following a hearing is twofold.
First, the
factual findings of the trial court are conclusive if they are
supported by substantial evidence, and, second, we review the
trial court’s decision de novo to determine whether it is
correct as a matter of law.7
Here, the trial court heard
testimony from Officer Whitaker as well as Mason and his father
and weighed the credibility of their testimony.
The court’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.
Since Mason was searched by Officer Whitaker without a
warrant, we must determine whether the search comes within one
of the recognized exceptions as set out in Baltimore v.
Commonwealth,8 as follows:
A warrantless search more extensive or
intrusive than a pat-down for weapons is
illegal unless it is supported by probable
cause or one of the other exceptions such as
consensual search, a plain view search, a
search incident to an arrest, a search based
on exigent circumstances or an inventory
search [footnote omitted].9
7
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky.App. 2001).
8
119 S.W.3d 532 (Ky.App. 2003).
9
Id. at 538.
-6-
We agree with the trial court that this search was proper as a
search incident to the arrest of Mason.
Officer Whitaker was clearly acting with a legal basis
when he decided to stop the vehicle Mason was operating because
it had a faulty headlight.
Although Officer Whitaker could have
followed the vehicle into the apartment complex parking lot, it
was certainly within his discretion to wait and see if the
vehicle reemerged.
Once Mason failed to stop his vehicle,
despite admitting that he saw the emergency lights, he committed
the offense of fleeing and evading a police officer, an
arrestable offense.
We agree with the trial court that Officer
Whitaker’s failing to follow the police department policy to
cease all efforts to capture Mason after the order to terminate
the pursuit does not provide Mason a defense to the subsequent
arrest and search.
Regardless, when Officer Whitaker approached the
vehicle after it finally stopped, Mason attempted to flee on
foot from the officer, thereby committing a second arrestable
offense.
Once Mason was apprehended, he was arrested for
fleeing and evading the police.
As a result of his arrest, he
was searched and the gun and drugs were discovered.
Therefore,
the search was incident to his arrest and the trial court
properly denied Mason’s motion to suppress.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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