FRANCES ELAINE HUGHES AND ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS OF KENTUCKY, INC. v. ROBERT A. LAMPMAN AND COTTON STATES MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 27, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002600-MR
FRANCES ELAINE HUGHES AND
ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS OF KENTUCKY, INC.
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY L. WILLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-007640
ROBERT A. LAMPMAN AND COTTON
STATES MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Following an adverse jury verdict, Frances
Elaine Hughes and her health insurance provider, Anthem Health
Plans of Kentucky, Inc., bring this appeal from a judgment of
the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing Hughes’s complaint
against the appellees, Robert A. Lampman and Cotton States
Mutual Insurance Company (“Cotton States”), Hughes’s
underinsured motorist (“UIM”) insurance carrier.
The jury found
that Lampman was not negligent when he struck Hughes with his
vehicle.
We conclude that the trial court erred by withholding
from the jury the fact that Cotton States was a party defendant
in the case.
Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
In October 2000, as Hughes attempted to cross
Bardstown Road in Louisville on foot, she was struck by a car
driven by Lampman.
In November 2001, Hughes filed a personal
injury action against Lampman and Cotton States, her UIM
carrier.
Lampman’s insurance carrier eventually tendered to
Hughes the full amount of its policy’s liability limits, and
Cotton States substituted its payment for the offered settlement
pursuant to the procedure set forth in Coots v. Allstates Ins.
Co., 853 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1993).
Since Cotton States retained
its subrogation rights against Lampman, he remained a party
defendant along with Cotton States.
In a brief filed December 30, 2002, Hughes contended
that Cotton States should be identified at trial as a defendant
in the action.
Cotton States vigorously disagreed.
In an order
entered August 15, 2003, the trial court ruled that Cotton
States need not actively participate in the trial of the action
and that no reference would be made to underinsured motorist
insurance coverage or to the defendant, Cotton States, during
the trial.
Following the presentation of the evidence during a
trial conducted on November 9, 2004, the jury found that Lampman
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was not negligent.
The trial court then entered a trial verdict
and judgment on November 22, 2004, dismissing Hughes’s claims
against Lampman and Cotton States.
This appeal followed.
The single issue raised on appeal is whether the trial
court erred by not permitting the jury to know that Cotton
States was a party defendant to the action.
Based upon the
recent decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Earle v.
Cobb, 156 S.W.3d 257 (Ky. 2004), we must conclude that the trial
court erroneously excluded this information from the jury.
Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for
a new trial.
Rendered within weeks after a verdict was reached in
the case before us, Earle dictates that the plaintiff’s UIM
carrier should have been identified at trial as a party
defendant by virtue of its contractual relationship with the
plaintiff.
Id. at 258.
If a case is practiced at trial to
represent that the only parties are the plaintiff and an alleged
tortfeasor, Earle holds that the result is “fundamentally
misleading to the jury and it deprives a plaintiff of the right
to try her case against the party she chooses.”
Id.
“One
cannot be a party for purposes of motion and discovery, and
later strategically conceal its identity at trial.”
Id., citing
King v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 850 A.2d 428, 434-436
(Md. App. 2004).
“When only the tortfeasor is identified, a
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fictitious presence appears at trial instead of the bona fide
party.”
Earle at 260.
The Supreme Court concluded that the
“failure to identify to the jury a named party defendant at
trial. . . is . . . reversible error.”
Id. at 261.
As Cotton
States forthrightly and candidly acknowledges in its brief, we
are required to follow that decision and remand this matter for
a new trial.
While Lampman argues that the trial court’s error is
harmless in view of the jury’s ultimate finding, we are not
persuaded that the error is susceptible of such an analysis.
In
considering the parties’ arguments in Earle, the Supreme Court
of Kentucky was persuaded by the decision of the Supreme Court
of Florida in Medina v. Peralta, 724 So.2d 1188 (1999).
The
Medina Court held that the trial court’s error (in withholding
full information from the jury) amounted to deception and
constituted a complete miscarriage of justice, emphasizing that
the error was not subject to review through a harmless error
analysis.
Medina at 1189-90.
We agree.
Earle has explicitly
condemned as manifestly unjust the subterfuge or legal fiction
of disguising the alleged tortfeasor as the only real party with
potential liability to the plaintiff at a trial against the
plaintiff’s UIM carrier.
Consequently, the error cannot be
dismissed as merely harmless.
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The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
reversed, and this matter is remanded for a new trial.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
While I am not unmindful of
our obligation to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, I am also obligated to not remain silent when I
disagree with those decisions or their application.
The
introduction of the existence of insurance in this, and any,
case, especially during the liability portion of a trial, can do
nothing but encourage prejudice against the defendant.
The
existence of insurance coverage has absolutely nothing to do
with whether an automobile driver was negligent in a particular
case.
I agree with Justice Cooper’s dissent in Earle.
If Earle must apply, however, any error was harmless.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT HUGHES:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LAMPMAN:
Ronald P. Hillerich
Louisville, Kentucky
Donald Killian Brown
Jeri Barclay Poppe
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE COTTON
STATES MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY:
Armer H. Mahan, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
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