S.K.; M.M.F.; and B.D.T. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
MAY 26, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
NO.
NO.
2004-CA-002595-DG
AND
2004-CA-002596-DG
AND
2004-CA-002597-DG
S.K.; M.M.F.; and B.D.T.
v.
APPELLANTS
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY GRIFFIN, III, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 04-XX-00006, 04-XX-00007, AND 04-XX-00008
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KNOPF AND TACKETT, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In separate proceedings before the juvenile
division of the Daviess District Court, S.K., B.D.T., and M.M.F.
(movants) were each determined to have committed a public
offense that caused substantial damage: property damage or
medical expenses in excess of a thousand dollars.
1
In each case
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
the movant was ordered to make restitution to the victim, and in
each case when the movant turned eighteen a portion, at least,
of the restitution remained outstanding.
The Commonwealth
subsequently moved the juvenile court to hold the movants in
contempt.
The cases were consolidated, and by order entered
March 8, 2004, the Daviess District Court ruled that its subject
matter jurisdiction in each case had lapsed when the movant
turned eighteen and thus that it no longer had authority to
enforce the restitution orders.
The Commonwealth appealed to
the Daviess Circuit Court, which, by order entered November 18,
2004, reversed.
It reasoned that the juvenile court’s inherent
authority to vindicate its orders and KRS 413.090, which
provides for a fifteen-year statute of limitations on actions
arising from judgments or decrees, implied continuing authority
in the juvenile court to enforce its restitution orders even
after the offender had turned eighteen.
This Court granted the
movants’ motion for discretionary review, and we now reverse.
As the parties note, whether a juvenile court retains
jurisdiction over adults to enforce restitution orders is a
matter of first impression in Kentucky.
Sister states
confronting the issue have reached contrary results depending on
the specific statutory language at issue.2
2
In Kentucky, the
In the Interest of Timothy C.M., 560 S.E.2d 452 (S.C.App. 2002)
(jurisdiction retained); Cesaire v. State, 811 So.2d 816 (Fla.App. 2002)
-2-
Unified Juvenile Code, KRS Chapters 600 to 645, and KRS 24A.130
confer upon the district court exclusive but limited juvenile
jurisdiction “in all cases relating to minors.”3
With a handful
of enumerated exceptions, none of which applies to restitution
orders,4 KRS 610.010(13) confers upon the juvenile court
“continuing jurisdiction over a child pursuant to subsection (1)
of this section, [the section conferring jurisdiction over
public offenses such as those committed by the movants] to
review dispositional orders . . . until the child . . . reaches
the age of eighteen (18) years.”
Both this Court and our
Supreme Court have narrowly construed the juvenile court’s
authority, carefully limiting it to that expressly conferred by
the General Assembly.5
Given this precedent and the clear
statement in KRS 610.010(13) that as a general rule juvenile
court jurisdiction does not extend to adults, we are convinced
the circuit court erred when it inferred such an extension with
respect to outstanding restitution orders.
To be sure, KRS 600.060 provides that the Juvenile
Code was not intended to limit the district court’s inherent
(jurisdiction lapsed); Summerville v. Summerville, 384 N.W.2d 152 (Mich.App.
1986) (jurisdiction retained); MacKillop v. Foster, 683 P.2d 146 (Ore.App.
1984) (jurisdiction lapsed).
3
KRS 24A.130.
4
KRS 610.120(3).
5
Commonwealth v. W.E.B., 985 S.W.2d 344 (Ky. 1998); Jefferson County
Department for Human Services v. Carter, 795 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1990); D.R.T., a
Child v. Commonwealth, 111 S.W.3d 392 (Ky.App. 2002).
-3-
contempt authority, and KRS 610.010(10) expressly provides that
“[n]othing in this chapter shall prevent the district court from
holding a child in contempt of court to enforce valid court
orders previously issued by the court.”
Our Supreme Court
recently underscored the force of the juvenile court’s contempt
authority, moreover, by holding that contempt was a valid
sanction for a probation violation and that a juvenile could be
detained for contempt beyond the dispositional maximums.6
However, both the statutes and our Supreme Court refer to
sanctioning a child for the child’s contempt; they neither state
nor imply that the juvenile court’s contempt authority extends
to adults.
A court’s inherent contempt authority, after all,
does not confer jurisdiction.
It merely arms the court to
defend and carry out the jurisdiction it otherwise possesses.
Where, as here, that jurisdiction does not extend to adults,
neither does the court’s contempt authority.
Nor, of course, do the statutes of limitation confer
jurisdiction.
KRS 413.090, limiting actions on judgments and
decrees to fifteen years, does not mean that judgments must
remain enforceable for fifteen years, but only that they do not
remain enforceable beyond that period.
Nothing about the
limitations statute prevents a juvenile court judgment from
lapsing for lack of jurisdiction or implies that the General
6
A.W., a child under Eighteen v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 4 (Ky. 2005).
-4-
Assembly meant, although it failed to say, that restitution
orders were to be excepted from the general rule that juvenile
court dispositions lapse when the offender turns eighteen.
Finally, we are not unmindful of the substantial
public policy arguments the Commonwealth advances in favor of
extending the juvenile court’s authority to adult restitution
obligors.
The law generally favors attempts to make victims
whole; adults are generally better able than juveniles to meet
financial obligations; and, more importantly, by allowing the
movants to escape their restitution obligation simply by waiting
the system out, other similarly situated juveniles are apt to be
encouraged to disobey restitution orders.7
Although we
acknowledge the force of these arguments, the fact remains that
it is the General Assembly, not the courts, that determines
public policy in this area, and the General Assembly has not
fashioned a restitution exception to the general rule
terminating juvenile court jurisdiction at eighteen.
Such an
exception, moreover, would need to incorporate concerns, among
others, about the obligor’s ability to pay, about the fact that
contempt is generally not available as a means to enforce money
judgments;8 and about the fact that in Kentucky imprisonment for
7
Cf. In the Interest of C.L.D., a child, v. Beauchamp, 464 So.2d 1264
(Fla.App. 1985) (noting similar policy arguments).
8
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Markarian, 114 F.3d 346 (1st Cir. 1997); Hale
v. Peddle, 648 A.2d 830 (Ver. 1993).
-5-
debt is constitutionally limited.9
The General Assembly is in a
far better position than the court to weigh these many factors
and to determine how best to balance the interests in victim
restitution and juvenile rehabilitation.
In sum, as a general rule, KRS 610.010(13) limits
juvenile court jurisdiction to minors.
Neither the court’s
contempt power nor the limitations period for an action on a
judgment implies an exception to that rule for restitution
obligors.
The circuit court erred by ruling otherwise.
Accordingly, we reverse the November 18, 2004, opinion of the
Daviess Circuit Court and remand for reinstatement of the March
8, 2004, judgment of the Daviess District Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Timothy G. Arnold
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Daniel M. Burlew, II
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Owensboro, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel M. Burlew, II
Owensboro, Kentucky
9
Ky. Const. § 18.
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.