MICHAEL HOWARD ADDIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 3, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002505-MR
MICHAEL HOWARD ADDIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BALLARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. SHADOAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00033
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BARBER AND McANULTY, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Michael Howard Addis appeals the entry of
judgment and sentence upon a plea of guilty to counts involving
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia.
Addis contends that the guilty plea was not
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.
Because upon
entering his plea of guilty Addis waived his right to appeal his
judgment and sentence, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statute 21.580.
On April 3, 2004, Addis was arrested for driving under
the influence and operating on a suspended license.
In a search
of Addis’s vehicle incident to the arrest, police discovered two
crack cocaine pipes, one containing crack cocaine residue;
numerous marijuana “blunts”; hemostats; and a clear plastic bag
tied at the corners.
Addis told police that he was a marijuana
smoker, but that the items found in the vehicle were not his.
Addis claimed that his vehicle had broken down in a bad section
of Kalamazoo, Michigan, had been broken into and used by crack
cocaine users, and that that the crack pipes had been left in
the vehicle by them.
On May 25, 2004, the Ballard County Grand Jury
returned an indictment charging Addis with first-degree
possession of a controlled substance, KRS2 218A.1415, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, first offense, KRS 218A.500.
On May 21, 2004, Addis was arraigned, entered a plea
of not guilty, and was released on bond.
On July 2, 2004, Addis
failed to appear for a scheduled court appearance and a bench
warrant was issued.
Addis was subsequently arrested for first-
degree bail jumping, KRS 520.070, arraigned on the charge, and
entered a plea of not guilty.
On September 3, 2004, Addis and the Commonwealth
entered into a plea agreement under which in return for Addis’s
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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guilty plea the Commonwealth would drop the bail jumping charge
and recommend a two-year sentence on the cocaine possession
charge and a 12-month sentence on the paraphernalia charge.
The
agreement contained no recommendation by the Commonwealth
regarding probation.
In conjunction with the agreement, Addis
filed a motion to enter a guilty plea.
The plea, however, was
to be to be pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
91 S.Ct. 160, 12 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), on the basis that while
Addis maintained his innocence to the charges, he conceded that
the Commonwealth had enough evidence to convict him.
On September 3, 2004, the circuit court, after
engaging in a colloquy with Addis pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), to inquire
into whether Addis was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
entering into his plea, accepted the plea agreement.
On November 5, 2004, Addis appeared for sentencing,
and was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement.
aggressively requested probation.
Addis
However, ultimately, the
circuit court did not grant Addis probation.
Final Judgment and
Sentence in accordance with the plea agreement was entered on
November 12, 2004.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Addis requests that this Court vacate the
final judgment and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on
whether his plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and
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intelligently.
Addis does not specifically state the grounds
upon which he believes his plea defective; however, it appears
that Addis contends that he was under the impression that he
would receive probation (his conviction and sentence was
otherwise consistent with his plea agreement), and since he did
not, his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
entered.
As an initial matter, we note the somewhat unusual
procedural posture of this appeal, i.e., a direct appeal from a
guilty plea.
A guilty plea constitutes an admission of guilt to
a substantive crime and the waiver of various statutory and
constitutional rights.
See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S.
563, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989); Centers v.
Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51 (Ky.App. 1990).
In general, a valid
guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the
conviction unless they are preserved for appellate review either
by entering a conditional guilty plea or by moving to withdraw
the guilty plea.
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87
S.W.3d 8 (Ky. 2002); Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482 (Ky.
2001)(direct appeal from denial of a motion to withdraw guilty
plea); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Ky.
1994)(“The general rule is that pleading guilty unconditionally
waives all defenses except that the indictment did not charge an
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offense.”); and Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09
and 8.10.
In order to be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea
must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Boykin v. Alabama, supra.; Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); Woodall v. Commonwealth,
63 S.W.3d 104 (Ky. 2001).
In addition, RCr 8.08 requires a
trial court to determine at the time of the guilty plea “that
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of
the charge.”
See also Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 486; and Haight v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 760 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Ky. 1988).
The validity
of a guilty plea is determined from the totality of the
circumstances surrounding it.
See Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 749, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); and Kotas
v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1978).
Of course, a guilty plea is invalid if the defendant
does not understand the nature of the constitutional protections
that he is waiving or if he has such an incomplete understanding
of the charges against him that the plea cannot stand as an
admission of guilt.
Boykin, supra.
In addition to the general
validity of the guilty plea, the courts have recognized a few
issues that are not waived by even a voluntary, knowing and
intelligent plea.
For example, a defendant may challenge the
legality of the sentence imposed on a guilty plea by way of a
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direct appeal because that issue is considered “jurisdictional,”
and cannot be waived.
See Hughes, 875 S.W.2d at 100, and
Gaither v. Commonwealth, 963 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1998).
Similarly,
a defendant does not impliedly waive his Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel as to claims of ineffective
assistance affecting the validity of the plea.
See Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
We first address whether Addis, by pleading guilty,
waived his right to a direct appeal of his guilty plea. "Any right,
even a constitutional right, may be surrendered in a plea
agreement if that waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily."
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 704 (Ky. 2003); see also
Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 1187,
1192, 94 L.Ed.2d 405, 416 (1987) (holding that plea bargaining
does not violate the U.S. Constitution even if important
constitutional rights are waived).
It is likewise well
established that a plea agreement, and any waivers contained
therein, are binding upon a defendant.
includes waiver of the right to appeal.
Johnson, supra. This
Id.
In paragraph 5 of his Motion to Enter Guilty Plea
Addis stated that he understood that by entering a guilty plea
that he was waiving his right to appeal his case to a higher
court.
Moreover, at the September 3, 2004, plea agreement
hearing Addis was informed by the circuit court that by pleading
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guilty he was waiving his right to appeal his case to a higher
court and Addis stated that he understood this.
In addition,
Addis’s trial counsel advised the circuit court that she had
discussed with Addis the rights he would be waiving by pleading
guilty to the charges.
As such, we believe that Addis
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the final
judgment and sentence entered upon his plea.
A guilty plea is valid if it represents a voluntary
and intelligent choice by a competent and counseled defendant to
waive all trial-related constitutional rights. Boykin v.
Alabama, supra.
However, “[t]he trial court is in the best
position to determine if there was any reluctance,
misunderstanding, involuntariness, or incompetence to plead
guilty.”
Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky.App.
1990).
Addis has not raised the issue to the circuit court
that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently entered into, and the circuit court has
accordingly not had the opportunity to pass upon the issue.
Should Addis desire to challenge the validity of his plea based
upon his understanding at the time of the plea, the proper
procedure for doing so would be pursuant to an RCr 11.42 motion,
thereby presenting the circuit court with the opportunity to
first consider the issue.
However, until the circuit court has
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considered and rejected Addis’s argument, there is no error to
review.
Finally, we note that at the conclusion of the
sentencing hearing, the trial judge did tell Addis that he could
appeal the conviction within 30 days.
While this statement may
appear inconsistent with enforcement of a waiver of the right to
appeal, an overwhelming majority of courts have held that such a
statement does not negate the effect of a written waiver of
appeal. See United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Fisher, 232 F.3d 301 (2d Cir.2000);
United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867 (8th Cir.1998); United
States v. Ogden, 102 F.3d 887 (7th Cir.1996); and United States
v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566 (5th Cir.1992). Contra United States
v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914 (9th Cir.1995).
In United States v.
Fleming, 239 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a trial court's notification of a general
right to appeal at the sentencing hearing did not resurrect a
defendant's right to appeal that was knowingly and voluntarily
waived at the guilty plea hearing.
The court recognized that a
trial court has no authority to unilaterally amend a plea
agreement and that enforcing the waiver was not unjust or would
not offend a defendant's “reasonable expectations” as to his
ability to appeal.
It stated:
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We think, however, that a defendant who is
mistakenly notified of a right to appeal and
suffers confusion as to the status of his
appellate rights suffers a significantly
lesser injury than one who should be
notified of his right to appeal but is not
and consequently forfeits his appellate
rights. A defendant who receives an
extraneous notification suffers, at most,
the dashing of a momentary sense of false
hope. In assessing the gravity of this
injury, we consider the fact that the same
defendant, typically with the assistance of
counsel, has evaluated the potential
penalties under a plea agreement as compared
to his prospects at trial, and knowingly and
voluntarily pled guilty to a criminal
offense. Any confusion in regard to
appellate rights after sentencing is easily
clarified by defense counsel.
Id. at 765.
This approach is further supported by the fact that
Addis does not contend that he was misled by the trial court's
statement concerning an appeal at sentencing.
As a result, we
believe that Addis waived his right to direct appeal as part of
the plea agreement and his waiver should be enforced to preclude
review in this appeal.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Ballard
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Astrida L. Lemkins
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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