COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. DEANNA GAYLE WOOTEN
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 13, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002334-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN W. MCNEILL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00001-002
DEANNA GAYLE WOOTEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from
orders of the Bracken Circuit Court that ultimately led to the
court determining Deanna Gayle Wooten to be incompetent to stand
trial on two counts of first-degree criminal abuse.
We affirm.
The indictment alleged that between February 2002 and
November 2002, Wooten permitted her live-in boyfriend to
physically abuse her two young children.
Wooten was arraigned
in January 2003, and the court entered an Order for Reciprocal
Discovery in March 2003.
At a status hearing on July 10, 2003,
Wooten’s attorney requested the court to order Wooten to be
evaluated by Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) to
determine her competency to stand trial.
The court granted the
motion and directed Wooten’s attorney to draft an order.
No
such order appears in the record, and it is apparent that no
order was tendered to the court for entry.
At some point thereafter, Wooten’s attorney filed an
ex parte motion under seal requesting state funding for a mental
health expert.
Wooten stated in the motion that it was filed
pursuant to KRS 1 31.185 and KRS 31.200, 2 and she moved therein
that the court authorize funding so she could engage the
services of Dr. Peggy Pack “for mental evaluations for purposes
of possible guilt and innocence defenses and mitigation.”
Wooten further noted in her motion that she was requesting a
hearing only if the court was inclined to deny the motion.
On September 20, 2003, the court entered a sealed
order directing Wooten to provide authority for allowing the ex
parte request.
Wooten’s attorney filed a response citing KRS
31.185(2) as authority for the court to grant the motion.
Although no hearing was held on the record to support the
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
KRS 31.200 was repealed effective July 15, 2002.
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granting of the motion, the court entered an ex parte order in
March 2004 authorizing the funding of the expert witness.
At a status conference in June 2004, Wooten’s attorney
revealed the existence of the sealed order.
On July 22, 2004,
Wooten’s attorney provided a copy of Dr. Pack’s report to the
Commonwealth and gave notice of its intent to introduce evidence
of Wooten’s mental retardation at the time of the offense.
Dr.
Pack’s report addressed the competency issue but did not state
an opinion as to whether Wooten was or was not competent to
stand trial.
Eight days later, the Commonwealth made a motion
that Wooten be required to submit to a mental examination at
KCPC and that Dr. Pack be required to provide a more specific
report.
The court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to have
Wooten examined at KCPC, but it denied the Commonwealth’s motion
for a more specific report.
Wooten was examined by Dr. Barbara
Jefferson, a contract-provider for KCPC who worked at
Comprehend, Inc.
A competency hearing was held on October 18,
2004, and the court heard testimony from Dr. Jefferson and Dr.
Pack.
Dr. Jefferson testified that Wooten was competent to
stand trial.
Dr. Pack, while initially declining to state her
opinion as to Wooten’s competency, eventually testified that
Pack was “at that marginal line” of competency.
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Both Dr.
Jefferson and Dr. Pack testified that Wooten was mildly mentally
retarded.
In an order entered on October 19, 2004, the court
determined Wooten to be incompetent to stand trial.
The court
reasoned as follows:
The court finds the defendant, Deanna
Gayle Wooten, incompetent to stand trial.
While the defendant has the capacity to
understand the nature and consequences of
the proceedings if the proceedings are
carefully explained in the simplest terms,
she, by virtue of limited ability to process
new information, does not have the ability
to assist her counsel at trial in her own
defense. Defense counsel may have the
luxury of explaining in detail the
preliminary steps and procedures leading up
to trial, but in the trial itself, if the
defendant cannot mentally process and
respond to the testimony and other trial
events, it is clear that she cannot
effectively or rationally assist her counsel
during the most important phase of the
prosecution. For these reasons, the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial.
In support of its ruling, the court first noted that
both expert witnesses agreed that Wooten was a very slow learner
and that it was virtually impossible for her to process
“courtroom language” or other legal concepts without a tedious,
lengthy, and patient explanation of every event.
The court also
noted Dr. Pack’s testimony that Wooten would not understand the
trial proceedings and would not be of any assistance whatsoever
to her attorney during the trial.
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The court further noted Dr.
Jefferson’s testimony that Wooten’s attorney would be required
to explain to Wooten at length, “in simplistic terms,”
everything that happened in the courtroom during the trial.
Further, the court noted that both expert witnesses were of the
opinion that Wooten had not understood the competency hearing
“and would only understand it if it were carefully explained in
simple words and in measured doses.”
Following the entry of the order, the Commonwealth
filed its appeal herein.
The Commonwealth appealed from the
orders of the court granting Wooten’s ex parte motion for
funding to hire Dr. Pack, the order denying the Commonwealth’s
motion to require Dr. Pack to give a more specific expert
opinion in her report, and the court’s order determining Wooten
to be incompetent to stand trial.
We will address the three
arguments made by the Commonwealth in its brief in the order in
which they are presented.
The Commonwealth’s first argument is that the court
abused its discretion by entering an ex parte order, without a
hearing, that provided Wooten with funding to retain a private
expert on the issue of competency to stand trial.
31.185(1) to support its argument.
It cites KRS
The statute states as
follows:
Any defending attorney operating under the
provisions of this chapter is entitled to
use the same state facilities for the
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evaluation of evidence as are available to
the attorney representing the Commonwealth.
If he or she considers their use
impractical, the court concerned may
authorize the use of private facilities to
be paid for on court order from the special
account of the Finance and Administration
Cabinet.
KRS 31.185(1).
The Commonwealth asserts that the court abused its
discretion in granting the order because Wooten did not
demonstrate the need for the use of a private expert witness
rather than use of the state facilities and because the court
did not hold a hearing on the motion as required by KRS
31.185(2).
Further, the Commonwealth contends that Wooten
improperly utilized KRS 31.185 as a means for obtaining funds
for a private expert witness on the issue of competency because
KRS 504.100, not KRS 31.185, governs the procedure for
competency determinations.
That statute provides that:
If upon arraignment, or during any stage of
the proceedings, the court has reasonable
grounds to believe the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial, the court shall
appoint at least one (1) psychologist or
psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on
the defendant’s mental condition.
KRS 504.100(1).
Before addressing the Commonwealth’s arguments, we
must examine the actions by Wooten’s attorney in the context of
KRS 31.185 and KRS 504.100.
It is important to begin by noting,
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as did the Kentucky Supreme Court, that “[c]ompetency to stand
trial is not to be confused with the defense of mental illness
or insanity.”
2003).
See Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 162 (Ky.
“Competency to stand trial pertains to the defendant’s
mental state at the time of trial, whereas an insanity defense
concerns the defendant’s mental state at the time of the
commission of the crime.”
Id.
The Bishop court further noted
that “[a] defendant may be sane at the time of the offense but
incompetent to stand trial; or he may be insane or mentally ill
at the time of the offense, yet competent to stand trial.”
Id.
As we have noted above, KRS 504.100 addresses the procedure to
be employed when the court has reasonable grounds to believe the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial.
KRS 31.185 addresses
ex parte requests by defendants for funds for the use of private
facilities for the evaluation of evidence where the use of state
facilities may be considered impractical.
On its face, Wooten’s ex parte motion for private
expert witness funding was not improper.
It cited KRS 31.185,
and it requested the funding of a private expert witness “for
mental evaluations for purposes of possible guilt and innocence
defenses and mitigation.”
However, Wooten’s attorney directed
Dr. Pack to first examine the issue of competency.
In fact, Dr.
Pack’s initial report primarily addressed only that issue.
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As we have noted, competency determinations are
governed by KRS 504.100, not KRS 31.185.
Under KRS 504.100(1),
the court shall appoint at least one psychologist or
psychiatrist to examine the defendant to determine competency.
The appointed examiner “is working for the court, not
necessarily the defense or the Commonwealth.”
Bishop, 118
S.W.3d at 163, citing Binion v. Commonwealth, 891 S.W.2d 383
(Ky. 1995).
Nothing in the statute authorizes independent
evaluations by either the Commonwealth or the defendant. 3
In
short, Wooten was not entitled to funding for a private expert
witness on the issue of competency to stand trial.
Furthermore, we agree with the Commonwealth that the
court abused its discretion by granting Wooten’s motion even if
it was otherwise appropriate under KRS 31.185.
Wooten was
required to show that the use of a private expert witness was
“reasonably necessary.”
See KRS 31.110; Hicks v. Commonwealth,
670 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Ky. 1984).
In addition, Wooten had to show
that state facilities were unavailable or that the use of those
See KRS 31.185; Binion, 891
facilities would be impractical.
S.W.2d at 385.
She failed to make the required showing in
either her motion or in her response to the court’s order
requiring her to show authorization for its granting of the
3
In the Bishop case, our supreme court held that the Commonwealth does not
have the right to obtain an independent competency evaluation of the
defendant. Id. at 165.
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motion.
Further, no hearing was held where Wooten’s attorney
could have attempted to establish that funding was “reasonably
necessary.”
In short, while Wooten’s ex parte motion was not
improper on its face because it related solely to mental
evaluations concerning her criminal responsibility, we agree
with the Commonwealth that the court abused its discretion by
entering the order without first being presented with evidence
so as to determine whether a private expert witness was
“reasonably necessary” and whether state facilities were
unavailable or impractical.
Such evidence could have been
provided with the motion or presented during an ex parte hearing
if so requested by the defendant.
See KRS 31.185(2).
Wooten
did neither.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the error was harmless.
See RCr 4 9.24.
Ultimately, the court appointed KCPC to examine
Wooten in accordance with KRS 504.100(1).
At the competency
hearing, the court heard the KCPC expert witness as well as Dr.
Pack.
Because the statute allows the court to appoint “at least
one (1) psychologist or psychiatrist to examine” the defendant,
we conclude the court had the authority to hear and consider Dr.
Pack’s testimony although it may have been obtained through an
improper application of the statutes.
4
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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As for any remedy for the court’s abuse of discretion,
the Commonwealth argues in its brief that “the order should be
vacated and the case should be remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.”
to what remedy it seeks.
The Commonwealth is not clear as
We believe it would defy common sense
to remand the case for a new hearing with Dr. Pack’s testimony
to be excluded.
There was evidence from Dr. Pack, upon which
the court relied, that indicated Wooten was incompetent to stand
trial.
If the court believed Wooten to be incompetent to stand
trial based on this evidence, the remedy should not be to vacate
the order and remand the case so the court can declare Wooten
competent to stand trial even though it believes her to be
incompetent.
In short, because the court granted the
Commonwealth’s request for the KCPC appointment under KRS
504.100(1), we conclude that error in allowing the defendant to
introduce testimony from an expert witness whose public funding
was improperly obtained was harmless.
The Commonwealth’s second argument is that the circuit
court erred by failing to grant its motion to require Dr. Pack
to provide a more specific report.
Dr. Pack’s report did not
give an opinion regarding Wooten’s competency.
The
Commonwealth’s motion alternatively asked for exclusion of any
testimony or opinion from Dr. Pack if she was not going to give
a more specific opinion.
The Commonwealth contends that Dr.
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Pack’s testimony at the competency hearing that Wooten was
“marginally competent” was not known by the Commonwealth prior
to the hearing and that such testimony should have been excluded
if the court was not going to order her to give a more specific
opinion in her report.
The Commonwealth had an opportunity to cross-examine
Dr. Pack at the competency hearing.
She initially continued to
testify that it was for the court, not her, to determine
competency.
In responding to a request from the court to
clarify her opinion, she stated that Wooten was “marginally
competent.”
The only perceivable change from her report to her
testimony leaned in the Commonwealth’s favor.
Because the
statutes do not require the evaluation report to be as specific
as the Commonwealth would have liked it, we find no error or
abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s
motion.
Even if error or abuse of discretion existed, it would
have been harmless because the Commonwealth was not prejudiced
by any slight variance between Dr. Pack’s report and her
testimony.
The Commonwealth’s final argument is that the court
erred in determining that Wooten was not competent to stand
trial.
“’Incompetency to stand trial’ means, as a result of
mental condition, lack of capacity to appreciate the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against one or to participate
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rationally in one’s own defense.”
KRS 504.060(4).
In further
defining competency, the Kentucky Supreme Court in the Bishop
case referred to Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680,
125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993).
Bishop, 118 S.W.3d at 162.
Therein our
supreme court noted that “the United States Supreme Court held
that a defendant is competent if he can ‘consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has ‘a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.’”
Id. at 162-63.
The Bishop court further noted
that the U.S. Supreme Court in the Godinez case held that a
competent defendant is one who “can make a ‘reasoned choice’
among the alternatives available to him when confronted with
such crucial questions as whether he should testify, waive a
jury trial, cross-examine witnesses, put on a defense, etc."
Id. at 163, citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397-98.
The court in this case cited the testimony of the
expert witnesses that Wooten was a slow learner and that it was
“virtually impossible for her to process sophisticated language
(e.g. courtroom language) or concepts without tedious, lengthy
and patient explanation of every event.”
The court also relied
on the testimony of Dr. Pack that Wooten would not understand
the actual trial proceedings and would be of no assistance
whatsoever to her counsel during the trial.
Further, the court
noted that even Dr. Jefferson acknowledged that Wooten’s
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attorney would have to explain everything at length to her in
simplistic terms.
“The trial court has a broad discretion in determining
whether a defendant has the ability to participate rationally in
his defense.”
(Ky. 1982).
Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.2d 744, 748
Based on the evidence before it, we conclude the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Wooten was not competent to stand trial.
The order of the Bracken Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Damon Preston
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Matthew R. Krygiel
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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