TIMOTHY GOLDEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 23, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002325-MR
TIMOTHY GOLDEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00050
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND McANULTY, JUDGES; POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Timothy Goldey (Goldey), appeals the
Montgomery Circuit Court judgment against him.
We affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
On October 21, 2002, Goldey obtained thirty-day
prescriptions for Diazepam and Hydrocodone from Dr. Hazeltine in
1
Senior Judge John W. Potter, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section (110)(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
Paintsville, Kentucky.
On October 28, 2002, Goldey obtained
thirty-day prescriptions for the same drugs from Dr. Ward, in
Mt. Sterling, Kentucky.
Dr. Ward worked at Medical Associates,
a small medical clinic in Mt. Sterling.
On July 8, 2003, Goldey
got a thirty-day prescription for Diazepam from Dr. Ward in Mt.
Sterling.
On July 22, 2003, Goldey returned to Medical
Associates, but was unable to see Dr. Ward.
Instead, he saw Dr.
Doyle, another doctor in the same small practice.
Goldey got a
thirty-day prescription for Diazepam from Dr. Doyle in Mt.
Sterling.
In September, 2003, a nurse at Medical Associates in
Mt. Sterling, where Dr. Doyle and Dr. Ward worked, contacted the
Mt. Sterling Police Department to obtain a report on Goldey’s
medications.
Goldey was charged with three counts of obtaining a
prescription controlled substance by deception.
The first two
counts dealt with obtaining two prescriptions from Dr. Ward less
than a month after similar prescriptions were obtained from Dr.
Hazeltine.
The third count was for obtaining a prescription
from Dr. Doyle nine months after getting a similar prescription
from Dr. Ward.
medication.
Each prescription was for a one month supply of
After a jury trial Goldey was found guilty of the
first two counts, not guilty as to the third count and sentenced
to ten years’ imprisonment.
Goldey contends that the trial
court made three erroneous rulings that prevented the jury from
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accurately understanding Goldey’s credibility and the
credibility of the accusing doctors.
He argues that these
rulings so prejudiced his defense that he should be entitled to
a new trial.
Goldey suffered repeated serious injuries to his
shoulder in a work-related accident, and later in an automobile
collision.
He had multiple surgeries for his injury.
was permanently impaired as a result of this injury.
Goldey
He
testified that he continues to suffer pain as a result of the
injury and impairment.
cope with the pain.
Goldey takes prescription medication to
The record shows that he has participated
in ongoing treatment of his injuries, including physical
therapy.
Goldey’s regular physician, Dr. Hazeltine, is located
in Eastern Kentucky.
While in central Kentucky Goldey sought
medical treatment in Montgomery County from Dr. Robertson Ward.
He testified that he informed Dr. Ward that he was under medical
care, gave the doctor the name of his regular physician, and
disclosed the medications he was taking at that time.
received new prescriptions from Dr. Ward.
Goldey
Goldey saw Dr. Ward
again a year later and received a new prescription from Dr.
Ward.
Several weeks later Goldey saw Dr. John Doyle who worked
at the same medical clinic as Dr. Ward.
additional medication.
Dr. Doyle gave Goldey
Goldey later returned to Dr. Ward, who
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informed Goldey that he could no longer treat him, but gave him
a ten-day course of pain medications.
After Goldey received his final prescriptions from Dr.
Ward, a nurse at the medical clinic where Dr. Ward and Dr. Doyle
worked requested a Kentucky All Schedule Prescription and
Electronic Reporting system (KASPER) report on Goldey.
request was made on behalf of Dr. Ward.
The
The report allegedly
showed that Goldey had simultaneous prescriptions from Dr. Ward,
Dr. Doyle and Dr. Hazeltine for pain medication.
A police
investigation then took place.
Dr. Ward signed pre-written forms titled affidavits,
which contained “yes” and “no” blocks for checkmarks.
The forms
contained statements such that he (Dr. Ward) was unaware that
Goldey was being treated by any other physician at the time he
prescribed medication to him, and that he believed Goldey had
withheld information regarding other treatment and other
medications in order to obtain a prescription.
a similar affidavit.
Dr. Doyle signed
The Mt. Sterling Police Department
provided Dr. Ward with a pre-printed affidavit on which the
physician could check “yes” or “no” as to whether the patient
informed him that he was taking other medications, and whether
the doctor would have prescribed medication had he known of
other prescriptions.
Dr. Ward checked “no,” the patient did not
inform him of other medications, and “no” that he would not have
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prescribed the medication had he known.
Dr. Doyle filled out
the same pre-printed “affidavit” with blanks to check for “yes”
or “no” regarding whether Goldey had informed him that he was
taking other medication.
Dr. Doyle checked “no.”
The form also
had a blank for the doctor to check “yes” or “no” as to whether
he would have provided the prescription had he known that Goldey
was seeing another physician.
The forms contain no particulars relating to the
circumstances in this case.
In particular, the forms failed to
note that the other medication prescribed to Goldey was
prescribed by Dr. Doyle’s associate, Dr. Ward, and that this
information was or should have been in Goldey’s file when he met
with Dr. Ward.
The doctors worked in the same practice, shared
the same central office, the same filing system, and the same
patient charts.
Any information Dr. Ward had placed in Goldey’s
chart should have been available to Dr. Doyle when he used the
same chart to meet with Goldey.
It would have been impossible
for the doctor to properly treat Goldey in the absence of his
patient file.
Goldey was indicted on three counts of obtaining a
prescription controlled substance by deception in violation of
KRS 218A.140.
The jury found Goldey guilty on two counts, both
dealing with obtaining prescriptions by deception from Dr. Ward.
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Goldey claims reversible error occurred because he was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses regarding the
charges against him and the criminal investigation.
Goldey
asserted during trial at a bench conference that he had reason
to believe that the Medical Associates Clinic closed due to an
ongoing criminal investigation against the physicians.
Goldey
showed the court that the physicians at Medical Associates were
in practice together.
The physicians shared patients, and each
patient had only one chart.
When Dr. Ward treated Goldey, he
used the same chart, records and billing system as that used by
Dr. Doyle.
The court had judicial knowledge that the clinic
closed because of bankruptcy.
The court held that a suspected
criminal investigation was not relevant to Goldey’s defense.
The Commonwealth argues that Goldey’s questions were
speculative, and that the trial court correctly sustained the
Commonwealth’s objection.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution require that a
criminal defendant be granted the right to confront the
witnesses against him.
A defendant must be afforded “a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”
Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636
(1986).
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Goldey requested that he be allowed to question the
witnesses regarding a possible existence of bias.
Goldey
contends that one or both of the physicians who provided
evidence against him was facing criminal charges.
Goldey
intimates that these charges might have related to improper
prescription of medication.
At trial counsel for Goldey asked
the nurse about the reason for the medical clinic closing.
The
Commonwealth made an objection which was sustained by the trial
court.
Goldey then asked Dr. Doyle if he was under
investigation by a law enforcement authority.
The Commonwealth
objected, and the trial court sustained that objection.
Goldey
then asked Dr. Ward whether Dr. Doyle was prohibited from
writing prescriptions for certain types of pain relief
medication.
objection.
Again, the court sustained the Commonwealth’s
Goldey contends that he was attempting to show that
the clinic and Dr. Doyle were under investigation for improperly
prescribing medication, that Dr. Doyle was forced to leave the
practice, and that the practice later closed down, in part,
because of the investigation, and lastly, that one or both of
the physicians had a motive to cooperate with the investigating
authorities.
Goldey contends that he had the right to inform the
jury about the criminal charges pending against one or both of
the physicians, and to show the jury that the witness “thereby
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possesses a motive to lie in order to curry favorable treatment
from the prosecution.”
139, 145 (Ky. 1978).
Williams v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d
Defense counsel argued at trial that the
evidence he was attempting to get in was relevant because “it
gives [the doctor] a motive to sort of turn in some people so he
doesn’t get, doesn’t become the focus of the investigation.”
The law requires that the defendant be permitted to present the
jury with “a reasonably complete picture of the witness’
veracity, bias and motivation.”
S.W.3d 332, 336 (Ky. 2004).
Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151
In cases where the witness may be
influenced by a desire to seek favorable treatment or leniency,
potential motives of the witness for testifying should be
admitted.
2002).
Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Ky.
The defendant must show a connection between the
testimony offered against him, and the evidence he is seeking to
have admitted.
Id., 80 S.W.3d at 411.
Admissibility of evidence tending to prove the
bias of a witness is a matter of relevancy.
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50-52, 105
S.Ct. 465, 468-69, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). “Any
proof that tends to expose a motivation to slant
testimony one way or another satisfies the
requirement of relevancy. The range of
possibilities is unlimited...." Robert G.
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook §
4.15, at 183 (3d ed.1993).
The interest of a witness, either friendly or
unfriendly, in the prosecution or in a party is
not collateral and may always be proved to enable
the jury to estimate credibility. It may be
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proved by the witness' own testimony upon crossexamination or by independent evidence. Parsley
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 284, 285 (1957)
(citations omitted).
Miller Ex. Rel. Monticello Baking Company v. Marymount Medical
Center, 125 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Ky. 2004).
In delineating the boundaries of the trial court's
discretion in limiting cross-examination, this Court has
explained:
“So long as a reasonably complete picture of the
witness' veracity, bias and motivation is developed, the judge
enjoys power and discretion to set appropriate boundaries."
Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky.1997), citing
United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 254 (1st Cir.1990).
Court of Appeals has likewise observed:
“In weighing the
testimony the jury should be in possession of all facts
calculated to exert influence on a witness."
Spears v.
Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky.App. 1977).
The Kentucky Supreme Court held, in Caudill v.
Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003), that:
“So long as a reasonably complete picture of the
witness' veracity, bias and motivation is
developed, the judge enjoys power and discretion
to set appropriate boundaries." Commonwealth v.
Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1997) (quoting
United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 254 (1st
Cir.1990)).
[A] connection must be established between the
cross-examination proposed to be undertaken and
the facts in evidence. A defendant is not at
liberty to present unsupported theories in the
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The
guise of cross-examination and invite the jury to
speculate as to some cause other than one
supported by the evidence. Maddox, at 721.
Id., 120 S.W.3d at 640, finding that permitting the defendant to
establish that the witness was a convicted felon who was hoping
for leniency from the parole board, and who had cooperated with
the police in the past and received a benefit from that
cooperation, was sufficient to protect the defendant’s rights.
The Commonwealth argues that no error could have
occurred in the exclusion of Goldey’s line of questioning
because Goldey was convicted of obtaining the prescriptions from
Dr. Ward, not the prescriptions from Dr. Doyle, and it was Dr.
Doyle whom Goldey was attempting to cross-examine regarding
bias.
A relevant issue may have existed regarding the potential
for bias.
As the Commonwealth points out, however, Goldey
failed to preserve this error through avowal, or an offer of
evidence supporting his contention that circumstances showing
bias existed.
KRE 103 requires preservation of error and
presentation of enough evidence to allow this Court to review
the claim of alleged error.
481, 482 (Ky. 2003).
capable of review.
(Ky. 2000).
Hart v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d
This Court must have before it a record
Commonwealth v. Ferrell, 17 S.W.3d 520, 525
Due to the lack of such a record, and recognizing
the principle laid out in Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d
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718, 721 (Ky. 1997) that the trial court has broad discretion to
control cross-examination, we find no reversible error in the
limits imposed by the court.
The Commonwealth also asserts that a witness cannot be
impeached by evidence of “particular wrongful acts,” citing
Barth v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 390, 401 (Ky. 2001).
The
Commonwealth, however, overlooks the fact that Goldey was not
attempting to impeach the witness because he improperly
prescribed medications, but rather to show that the witness had
a motive for pointing the finger of blame at Goldey in order to
cooperate with investigating authorities.
This argument must
fail.
Goldey claims reversible error occurred when the
Commonwealth forced him to characterize Dr. Ward’s testimony as
a lie.
The Commonwealth asked Goldey whether Dr. Ward had lied
in testifying that Goldey did not inform him about his previous
prescriptions for pain medication.
but that objection was overruled.
Defense counsel objected,
Goldey contends that Kentucky
law holds that a defendant should not be required to
characterize the testimony of another witness as a lie.
v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.2d 324, 329 (Ky. 1928).
The following discussion took place:
Prosecutor: When Dr. Ward testified that
you had not told him about Dr. Hazeltine in
Paintsville he was lying?
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Howard
Defense counsel:
argumentative.
Judge:
Object.
I think that’s
Overruled.
Goldey: I still don’t understand.
you restate it?
Could
Prosecutor: When Dr. Ward on that stand,
with you sitting in this chair, testified
you did not tell him that you had a
prescription from Dr. Hazeltine, is it your
testimony that that is not correct, you did
tell him? Yes or no.
Goldey: Actually, I had told Dr. Ward that
I was seeing Dr. Hazeltine. That was my
doctor, and if he needed medical records he
could send for ‘em, and the medication I was
on was Norco and Valium for muscle relaxer
and pain medication. As far as getting into
the days, how much, how much medication I
had taken yesterday or the day before, the
doctor never asked me that. The doctor
asked me, are you currently on any
medication and are you currently taking
medication, or that, that’s what the doctor
asked.
Prosecutor: Then it’s your testimony that
you told Dr. Ward you were currently taking
Diazepam and Hydrocodone?
Goldey:
Yes.
Prosecutor: So when Dr. Ward testified that
you did not tell him that he was lying?
Defense counsel:
Objection.
Goldey: I don’t. You know, I’m, I’m, I
can’t call anybody a liar.
Prosecutor:
Goldey:
Answer the question, yes or no.
I, I, yes, I did tell Ward.
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Prosecutor:
to say.
Okay, that is what I needed you
Goldey claims that the Commonwealth improperly forced
him to characterize Dr. Ward as a liar.
The law provides that
“A witness’s opinion about the truth of the testimony of another
witness is not permitted. . . .”
S.W.2d 579, 583 (Ky. 1997).
Moss v. Commonwealth, 949
The Commonwealth contends that the
prosecutor did not force Goldey to characterize Dr. Ward’s
testimony as a lie.
This argument is refuted by the fact that
the prosecutor asked repeatedly whether Goldey had told Dr. Ward
about his prior medical treatment, and whether the doctor’s
denial of receipt of that information was a lie.
Goldey did
state that he had informed Dr. Ward about the treatment by Dr.
Hazeltine, which led, using the argument posed by the
prosecutor, to the conclusion that Goldey contended that Dr.
Ward was lying.
Semantics cannot confuse testimony of record.
The prosecutor did force Goldey to argue that Dr. Ward was a
liar.
The law does permit a prosecutor latitude in
conducting a cross-examination.
A prosecutor may characterize a
defendant’s arguments, and show the jury the difference between
both versions of the facts provided.
S.W.3d 827, 836 (Ky. 2004).
Soto v. Commonwealth, 139
Having said this, we conclude that
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the prosecutor’s conduct did not rise to the level required for
reversible error.
Goldey argues that the trial court ruled improperly
when it prohibited him from showing that the number of pills he
obtained was consistent with reasonable treatment of his injury
and related pain.
Goldey attempted to argue that he received an
average of 3 pain pills per day for a twelve-month period, which
was a reasonable number to have been prescribed.
The
Commonwealth objected and the trial court sustained the
objection on the grounds that Goldey did not have the
prescriptions to support his statement.
Goldey contends that
the trial court improperly determined the credibility of that
evidence.
A trial court is not permitted to review the
credibility of evidence, or the weight it should be given.
Gibbs v. Wickersham, 133 S.W.3d 494, 495 (Ky.App. 2004).
review is the province of the jury.
Id.
Such a
Goldey did not provide
the court with any evidence supporting his contention that three
pills a day was a reasonable amount or that he had no additional
prescriptions which would have affected the total number of
pills he had in a year.
In the absence of such evidence, we
cannot say there was reversible error in the trial court’s
ruling.
The trial court’s rulings and the judgment are
affirmed.
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McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURRING.
I concur.
However,
I do so only because Goldey failed to properly preserve any
potential error in restricting his cross-examination of the
clinic’s personnel.
Evidence that the clinic or any doctor
associated with it were under investigation would have been
extremely relevant as to the doctors’ motives for testifying as
they did, and therefore, admissible.
Unfortunately this Court
does not know what the answers would have been.
It is
skeptical, in any event, that the answers would have helped
Goldey because, if so, the Commonwealth would have been
obligated to disclose such exculpatory evidence under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
Of particular interest, although not at issue before
us, is the fact that Goldey was charged with and convicted of
two counts of Obtaining a Controlled Substance by Deception, one
for the diazepam and one for the hydrocodone, both prescribed by
Dr. Ward on October 28, 2002, for which he received consecutive
five-year sentences.
As a single transaction that occurred in
the same time and place, this appears contrary to the analysis
in Commonwealth v. Grubb, 862 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Ky. 1993),
wherein the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded, in a prosecution
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for trafficking in percodan and dilaudid, that “(a) single sales
transaction between the same principals at the same time and
place which violates a single statutory provision does not
justify conviction or a sentence for separate crimes, even
though more than one item of a controlled substance (of the same
schedule) is involved.”
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel N. Potter
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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