STEPHANIE J. BRADFORD v. JOHN D. DIGGS
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RENDERED: JULY 21, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-002305-MR
STEPHANIE J. BRADFORD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOAN L. BYER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-500047
v.
JOHN D. DIGGS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TAYLOR AND VANMETER, JUDGES; EMBERTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
Stephanie Bradford appeals from a
decree of dissolution of marriage alleging that the trial court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding
because neither party resided in this state for 180 days prior
to the filing of the petition for dissolution.
We find that
John D. Diggs, a member of the United States Army who at the
time the petition was filed was stationed in Korea, was a
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
resident of Kentucky and that the court had proper jurisdiction
to enter the decree under KRS 403.140.2
Stephanie and John were married on June 18, 2001, in
Las Vegas, Nevada and separated on June 10, 2003.
children born from the marriage.
There were no
At the time the petition was
filed on January 7, 2004, Stephanie was a resident of Hawaii and
John was stationed in Korea.
However, John’s parents were
Kentucky residents and he used their Kentucky address as his
home address.
Service was attempted by warning order attorney but
was returned “refused”.
Subsequently, John filed a written
deposition with the court stating that although stationed in
Korea, Kentucky had been his legal residence since August 1985,
and attached a statement from Captain Mason S. Weiss stating
that the Army recognized Kentucky as John’s “home of record.”
In June 2004, a decree of dissolution was entered and in that
decree the court specifically found that Kentucky had been the
residence of at least one of the parties in excess of 180 days
prior to the filing of the petition.
The decree dissolved the
marriage and provided that each party would retain any
personalty in their possession.
The parties did not own any
real property.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-2-
On August 11, 2004, Stephanie filed a motion to vacate
the decree asserting that because she was constructively served
through a warning order attorney, the court did not have
personal jurisdiction to divide the parties’ property.
She
conceded that assuming all other jurisdictional requirements
were met the court had authority to dissolve the marriage.
The
court agreed and set aside the decree; the court subsequently,
however, reinstated the decree dissolving the marriage and held
that all other issues would be resolved by a court having
jurisdiction over both parties.
The court only dissolved the marriage and made no
determination as to any remaining issues raised.
KRS 22A.020
provides that notwithstanding any other provision, there is no
appellate review of an order or decree of a circuit court
dissolving a marriage.
In Elswick v. Elswick3 the court held
that a decree dissolving a marriage will not be set aside unless
it is demonstrated that it is void.
And where jurisdictional
residence is raised, the appellate court defers strongly to the
lower court.
Where the question of jurisdiction in a
divorce action has been raised in the lower
court, and there is any evidence to show the
jurisdictional residence of the parties, the
lower court’s judgment granting a divorce
based on a determination that it has
jurisdiction is not void and cannot be
3
322 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1959); See also Clements v. Harris, 89 S.W.3d 403 (Ky.
2002).
-3-
questioned on appeal regardless of the fact
that the determination may be against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence and be
clearly erroneous.4
Although Stephanie failed to raise the issue of
jurisdiction over the action in the circuit court, John
submitted unrebutted evidence of his Kentucky residence.
Military personnel are required to be transient and, as a
consequence, often have no permanent home.
For purposes of
jurisdiction under KRS 403.140, the courts have recognized that
the nature of military service demands that those in the
military leave their native state involuntarily.
Unless an
individual in the military manifests an intent to do otherwise,
the individual will maintain residence from the state he has
left “since he has no choice as to where he goes, the time he
can remain, or when he shall return.”5
There was more than
sufficient evidence that when the decree was entered John
considered Kentucky to be his state of residence and intended to
return to this state either upon completion of his service or
when permitted to do so by the Army.
Stephanie’s allegation that John and his counsel
perpetrated a fraud on the court is specious.
4
Elswick, supra at 131.
5
Weintraub v. Murphy, 244 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Ky. 1951).
-4-
There is no
evidence that there was any false information given the court
and certainly nothing to suggest fraud.
The decree of dissolution is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephanie J. Bradford, Pro Se
Honolulu, Hawaii
Rocco J. Celebrezze
Jeffery L. Parrish
Celebrezze & Associates
Louisville, Kentucky
-5-
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