WILLIAM J. TOLER AND FRANCES L. TOLER v. RAPID AMERICAN; ANCHOR PACKING; METROPOLITAN LIFE; CARDINAL INSULATION; AND GARLOCK, INC.
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 10, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002281-MR
WILLIAM J. TOLER
AND FRANCES L. TOLER
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-006260
v.
RAPID AMERICAN;
ANCHOR PACKING;
METROPOLITAN LIFE;
CARDINAL INSULATION;
AND GARLOCK, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
William and Frances Toler appeal from orders of
the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing their lawsuit for lack of
prosecution pursuant to CR1 77.02 and CR 41.02.
Upon review, we
vacate and remand for further proceedings.
On October 30, 1997, the Tolers filed a complaint
against a number of defendants alleging that William sustained
injuries – specifically asbestosis - due to his occupational
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
exposure to asbestos while employed as a pipefitter from 1962 to
1997.
Among those defendants is Cardinal Industrial Insulation
(hereinafter “Cardinal”), the party most particularly involved
in the events leading to this appeal.
The Tolers had difficulty
effectuating service upon Cardinal, due – in part – to
Cardinal’s refusal to accept service of process.
Cardinal
eventually answered the Tolers’ complaint in January 2002
following the filing of a motion for default judgment by the
Tolers.
This motion was ultimately denied in an order dated
December 20, 2001, and a trial scheduled for February 12, 2002
was continued by apparent agreement of the parties in an order
dated January 28, 2002.
On May 20, 2004, the trial court notified the Tolers
that their claims were set to be dismissed for lack of
prosecution pursuant to CR 77.02, as nothing had been filed in
the record since the original trial had been postponed more than
two years before.
Cardinal also filed its own motion to dismiss
for lack of prosecution pursuant to CR 41.02.
The Tolers argued
in response that the Asbestos Administrative Judge had failed to
reschedule the trial (as they claimed was required by the
Jefferson Circuit Court’s Asbestos Master Order), that their
pursuit of the case had been hindered by the bankruptcy and
dismissal of a number of the defendants, and that Cardinal had
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acted in bad faith in failing to accept service; they also filed
a contemporaneous motion to set a new trial date.
On August 16, 2004, the trial court entered an order
dismissing the Tolers’ action and denying their motion to set a
new trial date.
The Tolers subsequently filed a motion to
alter, amend, or vacate, but this motion was denied in an order
dated October 14, 2004.
In this order, the trial court set out
more particularly the reasons for its decision to dismiss.
Specifically, the court disagreed with the Tolers’ argument as
to the Asbestos Master Order and concluded that it “clearly
allows for the parties to file a motion to advance the
assignment of trial dates.”2
The court also noted that it was
“unaware of any attempts by plaintiffs to contact the asbestos
staff attorney or asbestos clerk to inquire why the case had not
been rescheduled for trial.”
The court also found that all
defendants who had filed for bankruptcy did so before the
agreement to postpone the trial, and that those defendants who
were dismissed from the action were dismissed prior to this same
2
Section II, A, 3 of the Order – to which both parties and the trial court
cited – reads as follows:
Order of Assignment. The Asbestos Administrative Judge shall
consider all appropriate factors when determining the assignment
of cases for trial. Generally, the oldest cases within their
disease classification will be given the earliest available trial
date, but other relevant factors such as occupation of the
plaintiff will also be considered. Motions to advance or delay
the assignment of particular cases will be heard by the Asbestos
Administrative Judge.
The trial court found that the last sentence of this provision allowed the
Tolers to file a motion for a trial date.
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agreement.
The trial court finally stated that while
“Cardinal’s refusal to accept service is the reason the trial
was not held as scheduled in February 2002 . . . it is
plaintiffs’ as well as defendants’ inaction for over two years
that caused this Court to dismiss the case.”
This appeal
followed.
On appeal, the Tolers again argue that their claims
were improperly dismissed by the trial court.
They submit that
they demonstrated good cause for delay as required by CR 77.02
by showing that they relied on the Jefferson Circuit Court’s
Asbestos Master Order in not moving for a trial date between
January 2002 and May 2004.
They further argue that dismissal
pursuant to CR 41.02 was also improper as they were fully
prepared for trial before the original trial date was postponed
as a result of the service issues with Cardinal.
Given that the trial court’s dismissal of the Tolers’
action here was pursuant to both CR 77.02 and CR 41.02 and gives
no indication that it was without prejudice, it effectively
operates as a dismissal with prejudice and we shall consider it
accordingly.
See CR 41.02(3); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 869 S.W.2d
35, 38 (Ky. 1994).
Dismissals for lack of prosecution pursuant
to CR 41.02 and CR 77.02 are reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard.
See Midwest Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Wireman, 54 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Ky.App. 2001); Wright v.
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Transportation Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Ky.App. 1995).
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s
decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles.”
Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272
(Ky. 2004) (citations omitted); see also Kuprion v. Fitzgerald,
888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994).
“The power of dismissal for
want of prosecution is an inherent power in the courts and
necessary to preserve the judicial process.”
Nall v. Woolfolk,
451 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Ky. 1970).
However, with this said, dismissal of a case pursuant
to CR 41.02 or CR 77.02 “should be resorted to only in the most
extreme cases” and we must “carefully scrutinize the trial
court’s exercise of discretion in doing so.”
689 S.W.2d 363, 364-65 (Ky.App. 1985).
Polk v. Wimsatt,
The rule permitting a
court to involuntarily dismiss an action “envisions a
consciousness and intentional failure to comply with the
provisions thereof.”
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Carrier,
426 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Ky. 1968).
Since the result is harsh, “the
propriety of the invocation of the Rule must be examined in
regard to the conduct of the party against whom it is invoked.”
Id. at 941.
Moreover, it is incumbent on the trial court to
consider each case “in light of the particular circumstances
involved; length of time alone is not the test of diligence.”
Gill v. Gill, 455 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ky. 1970).
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In addition, the
court should determine whether less drastic measures would
remedy the situation, especially where there is no prejudice to
the party requesting dismissal.
See Polk, 689 S.W.2d at 364-65.
Further factors relevant to whether the court should
dismiss an action with prejudice can be found in Ward v.
Housman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.App. 1991).
In Ward, this Court
adopted the guidelines set forth in Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747
F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1984) for determining whether a case should be
dismissed for dilatory conduct under Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure – the counterpart to our CR 41.02(1).
We specifically held that the following factors should be
considered: (1) the extent of the party’s personal
responsibility; (2) the history of dilatoriness; (3) whether the
attorney’s conduct was willful and in bad faith; (4) the
meritoriousness of the claim; (5) prejudice to the other party;
and (6) the availability of alternative sanctions.
Ward, 809
S.W.2d at 719.
As the trial court’s decision to dismiss here appears
to have been based almost exclusively on the Tolers’ inaction
from January 2002 to May 2004, we believe that the Ward factors
are particularly relevant.
Accordingly, we find ourselves
hesitant to affirm or reverse the trial court because the record
is unclear as to whether the Ward factors were properly
considered or even considered at all.
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It instead reflects that
the court’s decision was based almost exclusively upon the fact
that there was a two-and-a-half-year lack of activity.
While
such a fact must certainly be considered in determining whether
to dismiss a case for lack of prosecution, it is not the only
fact to be examined.
See Gill, 455 S.W.2d at 546.
The responsibility to make such findings as are set
forth in Ward before dismissing a case with prejudice falls
solely upon the trial court.
Accordingly, even though we
understand and sympathize with the court’s desire to move the
cases on its docket along in a timely and expeditious manner, we
find ourselves compelled to vacate its orders as to dismissal
here and to remand this action for further consideration in
light of Ward.
In doing so, we express no view as to whether
dismissal with prejudice will ultimately be merited.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
Kenneth L. Sales
Joseph D. Satterley
D. Matthew Kannady
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
CARDINAL INDUSTRIAL INSULATION
COMPANY, INC.:
Armer H. Mahan, Jr.
Joseph P. Hummel
Louisville, Kentucky
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