JULIE ANN WELCH v. GERALD G. EDDS, M.D. AND GERALD G. EDDS, P.S.C., D/B/A AESTHETIC LASER AND COSMETIC SURGERY CENTER
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 2, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: FEBRUARY 10, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2004-CA-002255-MR
JULIE ANN WELCH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY M. GRIFFIN III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-01600
v.
GERALD G. EDDS, M.D. AND
GERALD G. EDDS, P.S.C., D/B/A
AESTHETIC LASER AND COSMETIC
SURGERY CENTER
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Julie Welch appeals from a summary judgment of
the Daviess Circuit Court, entered October 11, 2004, dismissing
on statute of limitations grounds her medical malpractice and
fraud claims against Gerald Edds, M.D., and his P.S.C., which
does business in Owensboro as the Aesthetic Laser and Cosmetic
Surgery Center.
Welch alleges that in July and August 1997,
Edds induced her to undergo liposuction and an abdominoplasty by
misrepresenting his credentials.
She also claims that his
negligent performance of those procedures resulted in her
disfigurement.
Welch ceased treating with Edds in June 1998,
but did not bring her complaint until December 2002.
She
contends, nevertheless, that the trial court erred by deeming
her complaint outside the one-year limitations period because
she did not “discover” her claim until some time in 2002 when
she first learned that Edds had misrepresented his credentials
and a medical expert first told her that Edds’s treatment of her
did not meet the standard of care.
Although we agree with the
trial court that Welch’s malpractice claim is time barred, her
misrepresentation claim is not.
Because that claim raises
issues not adequately briefed in or addressed by the trial
court, we must vacate and remand for additional proceedings.
According to Welch, when she contacted Edds in July
1997 to see if he could improve the contour of her abdomen so
that she would look better in her clothes, she asked him if he
was “a board-certified plastic surgeon,” and he stated that he
was, without qualification.
Because a friend had told her that
Edds was the president of the Board of Plastic Surgeons, she
asked him if that was correct.
that it was.
According to Welch, he told her
In fact Edds was a board-certified facial plastic
surgeon—certified in plastic surgery from the neck up—but was
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not board-certified in plastic surgery affecting other areas of
the body.
Nor was he the president of any board.
Edds
recommended liposuction1 and an abdominoplasty,2 and told Welch
that he had recently learned of an abdominoplasty technique
called a “horseshoe incision” which would result in an
inconspicuous scar.
Welch testified at her deposition that Edds
informed her that he had never performed the “horseshoe
incision” technique.
Welch also claims to have derived a false impression
of Edds’s credentials from various advertising brochures, which,
although they clearly state that Edds’s board certification was
in facial plastic surgery, occasionally refer to “plastic
surgery” or “plastic surgeon” without qualification.
Welch
maintains that in conjunction with Edds’s alleged verbal
assurance that he was a plastic surgeon and president of the
Board of Plastic Surgeons, those references reasonably
contributed to her belief that Edds was board certified to
perform her liposuction and abdominoplasty.
1
Liposuction is a “[m]ethod of removing unwanted subcutaneous
fat using percutaneously placed suction tubes.” Stedman’s
Medical Dictionary, 27th Edition, p. 1022 (2000).
2
Commonly referred to as a “tummy tuck,” abdominoplasty is “]a]n
operation performed on the abdominal wall for cosmetic
purposes.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 27th Edition, p. 2
(2000).
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Edds operated on Welch in August 1997.
A few months
later Welch complained to him that the abdominoplasty scar was
larger and more noticeable than he had predicted and that the
contouring of her abdomen was lumpy and uneven.
a revision surgery at no charge in April 1998.
surgery Welch was still unhappy.
Edds performed
Following that
She thought the scarring had
become worse, and her abdomen was still uneven and now had
hollow areas, divots, which, Welch believed, looked “scooped
out,” and horrible.
Her final visit to Edds was on June 3,
1998, when, she claims, his rough treatment caused her to lose
whatever lingering faith she had in his ability.
We agree with the trial court that it was at that
point that the limitations period commenced on Welch’s claim for
negligent treatment.
As the parties have noted, KRS 413.140
provides in pertinent part that
(1) The following actions shall be commenced
within (1) year after the cause of action
accrued: . . . (e) An action against a
physician, surgeon, dentist, or hospital
licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 216, for
negligence or malpractice.
(2) In respect to the action referred to in
paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this
section, the cause of action shall be deemed
to accrue at the time the injury is first
discovered or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have been discovered.
Under subsection (2)’s discovery rule, our Supreme Court has
explained, the limitations period commences when one knows, or
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in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that “(1)
he has been wronged; and, (2) by whom the wrong has been
committed.”3
Welch maintains that although she knew she had been
harmed (i.e. disfigured) in June 1998 when she ceased to rely on
Edds’s treatment, she did not know she had been injured or
wronged (i.e. that her legally protected interests had been
invaded) until November 2002 when a doctor first told her that
Edds’s treatment had been negligent.
The discovery rule,
however, generally does not require expert confirmation that one
has been wronged.
It requires rather that one be aware of facts
sufficient to put one on notice that one’s legal rights may have
been invaded and by whom.
Expert assistance may be required to
apprise one of the underlying facts concerning the harm and its
agent,4 but mere uncertainty about the legal significance of
those facts does not toll the limitations period.
Here, Welch
knew by June 1998 that the results of Edds’s treatment were
deeply dissatisfying.
Those results were sufficient to put her
on notice that Edds’s treatment may have been negligent, and
thus were also sufficient to start the limitations period on her
3
Wiseman v. Alliant Hospitals, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Ky.
2000).
4
Wiseman v. Alliant Hospitals, Inc., supra.
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negligence claim.
Her suit filed in December 2002 was thus
untimely and was properly dismissed.
Welch’s fraud claim is different.
She maintains that
Edds falsely represented to her that he was board-certified with
respect to the liposuction and abdominoplasty procedures and
that without those false representations she would not have
agreed to treatment.
The trial court ruled that this claim,
too, was untimely, but we disagree.
Kentucky, like many other states, has subsumed fraud
and deceit based claims relating to the adequacy of a
physician’s pre-treatment disclosures within the doctrine of
informed consent.5
That doctrine derives from both the patient’s
basic right to determine what is done to her body and the
physician’s fiduciary duty to make that right meaningful by
supplying the patient with enough information to enable her to
make informed decisions.6
Under the doctrine, the physician has
a duty “to disclose to a patient information that will enable
h[er] to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the
5
Holton v. Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975); KRS 304.40-320.
See, e.g. Howard v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New
Jersey, 800 A.2d 73, (N.J. 2002); Paulos v. Johnson, 597 N.W.2d
316 (Minn.App. 1999); Stone v. Foster, 164 Cal. Rptr. 901
(Cal.App. 1980); and see generally, Laurent B. Frantz, “Modern
Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician’s Duty to
Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment,” 88 ALR3rd 1008
(1978).
6
Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Cal. 1972); Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C.Cir. 1972).
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risks attendant upon each before subjecting that patient to a
course of treatment.”7
Unfortunately, the parties failed to
address the informed-consent doctrine in their presentations to
the trial court and thus provided that court with an inadequate
basis for its ruling on Edds’s summary judgment motion.
Although it is clear that the trial court erred by finding
Welch’s informed-consent claim untimely, whether the case she
has proffered is otherwise sufficient to withstand Edds’s motion
raises serious questions in need of additional proceedings.
With respect to the limitations issue, a lack-ofinformed-consent claim is still one against a physician sounding
in negligence or malpractice and thus is subject to the
limitations provisions of KRS 413.140.
Under the discovery
rule, the limitations period did not commence until Welch knew
or should have known of facts sufficient to put her on notice
that she may have been harmed by Edds’s inadequate disclosures.
In most cases where a patient is not informed of a risk of an
adverse outcome and that outcome occurs, the outcome itself will
put the patient on notice of her claim.
In this case, however,
Welch concedes that she was aware that her treatment involved a
certain risk of disfigurement, but she contends that Edds’s
7
Howard v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey,
800 A.2d 73, 78-79 (N.J. 2002) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
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misrepresentation of his certification had the effect of
understating that risk.
The bad result alone, she argues, did
not expose the understatement and thus was not enough to apprise
her that she had been inadequately informed.
Only the discovery
of Edds’s alleged falsehoods could do that.
We agree.
Although the trial court did not err by
finding that Edds’s advertising materials did not misrepresent
his credentials and background, that finding does not dispose of
Welch’s additional allegation that Edds assured her that he was
a board-certified plastic surgeon and president of the board of
plastic surgeons.
Welch claims to have relied on those
assurances and not to have learned until the summer of 2002 that
those assurances were false.
If that is the earliest she should
have discovered the alleged falsehoods, then her suit filed in
December 2002 was timely.
Because Welch was entitled to rely on
what Edd’s told her, we do not believe she should have
discovered the false statements any sooner.
Her claim based on
the lack of informed consent is thus not barred by the statute
of limitations.
Beyond this, however, we are not willing to go.
As
noted above, because the parties did not treat this as an
informed-consent case, they did not present the trial court with
the appropriate sources for determining whether Welch had raised
material issues of fact on all the elements of her cause of
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action.
They have raised the informed-consent issue on appeal,
but as a Court of review, we are generally unwilling to address
matters the trial court has not had an opportunity to rule upon.8
We are not willing to do so here, where the important and
complex issues are deserving of a fully developed record.
Accordingly, we vacate the October 11, 2004, summary judgment of
the Daviess Circuit Court, and remand for reconsideration of
Edds’s summary judgment motion in light of the law of informed
consent.
The parties should address what, in Kentucky, are the
elements of such a cause of action and whether Welch has
proffered sufficient evidence to meet them.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Grover Cox
Theodore L. Mussler, Jr. &
Associates
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen Gray
Dorsey, King, Gray, Norment &
Hopgood
Henderson, Kentucky
Frank Stainback
Sullivan, Mountjoy, Stainback &
Miller, P.S.C.
Owensboro, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Frank Stainback
Owensboro, Kentucky
8
Cabbage Patch Settlement House v. Wheatly, 987 S.W.2d 784 (Ky.
1999).
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