MILTON ORR KENNEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 3, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-002238-MR
MILTON ORR KENNEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL F. ISAACS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 89-CR-00084
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Milton Orr Kenney, pro se, appeals
the denial of his motion to modify and correct his sentence
pursuant to CR 60.02.
We affirm.
In February, 1990, following a jury trial, Kenney was
convicted, in 89-CR-084, of two counts of trafficking in a
controlled substance (Class C felonies).
The jury also found
Kenney to be a first-degree persistent felony offender.
The
jury fixed a sentence of ten years on each count, enhanced to
twenty years each for the PFO I.
The jury recommended the
sentences to run concurrently, for a total of twenty years’
imprisonment.
At Kenney’s March 13, 1990, sentencing hearing,
the trial court determined that, because Kenney committed the
offenses in 89-CR-084 while on parole, Devore v. Commonwealth,
662 S.W.2d 829 (Ky. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 836, 105 S.
Ct. 132, 83 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1984), required the sentences imposed
in 89-CR-084 to be run consecutively with one another.
In a
judgment and sentence dated March 13, 1990, and entered on March
19, 1990, Kenney was sentenced to the two twenty-year terms, to
be served consecutively, for a total of forty years’
imprisonment.
The judgment was affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme
Court in an unpublished opinion (90-SC-241-MR) rendered November
21, 1991, which became final on December 12, 1991.
On March 2, 1993, Kenney, pro se, filed a motion to
vacate sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42, on grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
On June 16, 1993, Kenney, pro se, filed
a “Motion to Correct Sentence Pursuant to KRS 532.110(1)(c)”, on
grounds that the forty-year sentence imposed in 89-CR-084
exceeded the maximum aggregate term of twenty years authorized
by KRS 532.110(1)(c) and KRS 532.080.
The trial court denied
both motions in orders entered October 19, 1993.
Kenney
appealed from the denial of the RCr 11.42 motion, but did not
appeal the denial of the motion to correct sentence.
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On November 18, 1993, Kenney, by counsel, filed a
motion for relief pursuant to CR 60.02(f), again on grounds that
the forty-year sentence imposed in 89-CR-084 exceeded the
maximum aggregate term of twenty years authorized by KRS
532.110(1)(c) and KRS 532.080(6)(b).1
In an order entered March
21, 1994, the trial court denied the motion pursuant to Devore.
In an unpublished opinion, consolidated appeals 93-CA-2779-MR
and 94-CA-781-MR, which became final on February 15, 1996, a
panel of this Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the RCr
ll.42 motion and the CR 60.02 motion.
As to the CR 60.02
motion, this Court held the trial court was correct that,
because Kenney committed the offenses in 89-CR-084 while on
parole, per Devore, the sentences were required to be run
consecutively with each other pursuant to KRS 533.060(2)
1
KRS 532.110(1)(c) provides that “[t]he aggregate of consecutive
indeterminate terms shall not exceed in maximum length the longest extended
term which would be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime
for which any of the sentences is imposed.”
KRS 532.080, the persistent felony offender statute, provides, in
pertinent part:
(6)
A person who is found to be a persistent felony
offender in the first degree shall be sentenced
to imprisonment as follows:
. . .
(b)
If the offense for which he presently stands
convicted is a Class C or Class D felony, a
persistent felony offender in the first
degree shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment, the
maximum of which shall not be less than ten
(10) years nor more than twenty (20) years.
-3-
and the maximum sentence provision of KRS 532.110(1)(c) did not
apply.
On January 8, 2004, Kenney, pro se, filed a second
motion for relief pursuant to CR 60.02.
In this motion, Kenney
again raised the issue that his forty-year sentence in 89-CR-084
exceeded the maximum penalty authorized by KRS 532.110(1)(c) and
KRS 532.080(6)(b).
On May 3, 2004, the pro se motion was
supplemented by counsel.
The supplement raised, for the first
time, the issue that the jury was improperly instructed as to
concurrent/consecutive sentencing.
Counsel argued that the
trial court’s interpretation of the law as requiring consecutive
sentences, per Devore, did not match the instructions tendered
to the jury, which specifically gave the jury the option of
recommending either concurrent or consecutive sentencing.
However, under the trial court’s interpretation of the law,
absolutely no jury recommendation of concurrent sentencing could
be followed.
As such, counsel argued, the instructions were
clearly improper, incorrect, and misleading.
Counsel requested
that the court grant Kenney relief by reducing the sentence to
the twenty-year sentence intended by the jury.
In an order entered August 31, 2004, the trial court
denied this second CR 60.02 motion.
As to the argument that the
forty-year term imposed in 89-CR-084 exceeded the maximum
penalty allowed under KRS 532.110(1)(c) and 532.080(6)(b), the
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trial court concluded that it was bound by the February 15,
1996, opinion of the Court of Appeals.
As to the issue of the
erroneous jury instruction, the trial court found that this
issue could have been raised previously, was raised too late,
and a different sentencing outcome was only speculative.
Therefore, the trial court concluded the extraordinary relief of
CR 60.02(f) was not warranted.
From the trial court’s August
31, 2004, order denying the motion, Kenney appeals, pro se, to
this Court.
As to Kenney’s argument that his forty-year sentence
exceeds the maximum sentence allowed under KRS 532.110(1)(c) and
KRS 532.080(6)(b), we agree with the trial court that the
decision of the Court of Appeals in 93-CA-2779-MR and 94-CA-781MR, is binding on this issue and precludes further review.
However, Kenney’s argument of improper jury
instructions has merit.
The jury was instructed to fix a term
of 10-20 years on each count.
The jury also received
(erroneous) instructions that it could select to run Kenney’s
terms concurrently or consecutively with one another.
Under
these instructions, the jury recommended twenty years on each
count, to run concurrently, for a total of twenty years
imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing the trial court
acknowledged having given the (erroneous) concurrent/consecutive
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option to the jury, but that Devore required consecutive
sentencing.
The trial court stated:
The Court recalls at the trial of this
action, or this case, that it submitted the
question as to whether or not the sentences
should be run consecutively or concurrently
to the jury out of caution. The court has
reviewed the Devore case and does believe
that it compels a running of these sentences
consecutively. The Court believes that it
is obligated to follow the law in this case
and will rule that Devore compels a
consecutive service of these sentences.
At the hearing, defense counsel requested that, if the trial
court felt compelled to follow Devore, that each count be
reduced to ten years, which would run consecutively for a total
of twenty years, in accordance with the jury’s intent.
The
request was denied, and the twenty-year terms were run
consecutively for a total of forty years.
In Stoker v. Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1992),
our Supreme Court rejected the contention that errors in jury
instructions as to concurrent or consecutive sentencing are
harmless because the trial court makes the ultimate decision.
This holding was recently and strongly reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in Lawson v. Commonwealth, 85 S.W.3d 571, 581 (Ky. 2002).
“[A] jury’s recommendation as to concurrent or consecutive
sentencing is far from meaningless or pro forma, and [] the
jury’s recommendation in this regard has ‘significance, meaning,
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and importance.’”
Id., quoting Dotson v. Commonwealth, 740
S.W.2d 930, 931 (Ky. 1987).
This Court is faced with a legal dilemma.
The jury
instructions were clearly erroneous in instructing the jury that
it could recommend that the sentences run consecutive or
concurrent, where Devore mandates consecutive.
Lawson and
Stoker instruct us that this error is not harmless, and on
appeal, the remedy would be to remand for a jury to resentence.
However, we have a conflicting rule, which we are compelled to
follow, which is that CR 60.02 is for relief that is not
available on direct appeal or in an RCr 11.42 motion.
Gross v.
Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983); McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S.
1130, 117 S. Ct. 2535, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1035 (1997).
The error in
the jury instructions raised by Kenney in this CR 60.02 motion
was an issue which was known at the time of trial, and could
have and should have been raised in his direct appeal.
Gross, 648 S.W.2d 853.
See
Additionally, this was Kenney’s second
CR 60.02 motion, in addition to the RCr 11.42 and previous
motion to correct sentence, and this was the first time the
error was ever raised.
Accordingly, we cannot say the trial
court erred in denying the motion.
For the aforementioned reasons, the order of the
Bourbon Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Milton O. Kenney, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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