DARRELL AND TERRY LEWIS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS THE NATURAL PARENTS AND NEXT FRIEND OF COURTNEY LEWIS, A MINOR v. C&C ENTERPRISES; CHARLES PAYNE; CINDY PAYNE; ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF LOUISVILLE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
JANUARY 13, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001936-MR
DARRELL AND TERRY LEWIS,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS THE
NATURAL PARENTS AND NEXT
FRIEND OF COURTNEY LEWIS,
A MINOR
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-003779
C&C ENTERPRISES;
CHARLES PAYNE; CINDY
PAYNE; ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHBISHOP OF LOUISVILLE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BARBER, MINTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Darrell and Terry Lewis, Individually, and as
the Natural Parents and Next Friend of Courtney Lewis, a minor,
appeal from a jury verdict adjudging C&C Enterprises, Charles
Payne, Cindy Payne, and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Louisville, not liable in connection with an accident involving
a carnival ride which occurred on the premises of St. Athanasius
Church in June 2000.
The appellants contend that the trial
court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury.
Because
the trial court properly determined that the issue of res ipsa
loquitur should not be presented to the jury; because the jury
instructions properly reflected the Archbishop’s duty to an
invitee; and because the remaining issues are moot, we affirm.
The St. Athanasius Summer Festival is an annual event
held on the grounds of St. Athanasius for the benefit of St.
Athanasius and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Louisville.
St.
Athanasius sponsors and conducts the Summer Festival with the
authority, consent and approval of the Archbishop.
The festival
is open to the general public, including parishioners and nonparishioners alike.
Fees are charged for many activities at the
festival, including fees for riding the various amusement rides
operated at the festival.
C&C Enterprises is a proprietorship in the business of
operating carnival rides at county fairs and at small venues
such as the St. Athanasius Summer Festival.
The business is
owned and operated by Charles Payne and Cindy Payne.
In 2000, as in prior years, St. Athanasius hired C&C
Enterprises to provide and operate the amusement rides at the
Summer Festival.
To this end, the parties entered into a
written contract which, among other things, provided for the
splitting of all income from ticket sales for the amusement
rides.
In June 2000, in preparation for the Summer Festival,
- 2 -
C&C set up several amusement rides to be operated at the
carnival, including an amusement ride called the Flying Comet.
The Flying Comet is an amusement ride consisting of a
central hub, to which are attached six “arms.”
Dangling from
the end of each arm is a cylindrical-shaped “tub” which
resembles a small ski-lift gondola.
Along the underside of each
arm, facing the tub, are decorative lights.
The patrons of the
ride sit in seats which are arranged around the passenger
compartment of the tub in a circular-fashion facing inward.
During the course of the ride the hub spins and the arms move up
and down.
In the meantime, at the center of each tub is a
steering-wheel style apparatus which the riders can turn to make
the tub spin around.
After the rides were set up, as a routine matter they
were inspected by the Kentucky Department of Agriculture.
In
the course of the inspection the inspector noted that one of the
passenger-carrying tubs, tub 5, on the Flying Comet had loose
aluminum sheet-metal on the underside of the tub.
The loose
metal was on the outside of the tub, and not within the
passenger compartment.
The inspector cited the ride as needing
to have the loose metal repaired, but approved the ride for
operations at the Summer Festival.
On June 2, 2000, Courtney Lewis, along with her
parents, Darrell and Terry Lewis, attended the Summer Festival.
- 3 -
The Lewis family members are parishioners of St. Athanasius
Church, and had supported the Summer Festival in past years by
participating in the festival as patrons and as booth workers.
The family was doing the same at the 2000 festival.
Courtney and two of her friends, Sarah Holland and
Emily Silverhorn, purchased tickets to ride the Flying Comet.
Courtney, Sarah, and Emily took their place in tub 5 of the
Flying Comet and the ride began.
According to Courtney, when
the ride was stopped to let off the riders in another tub, her
tub began to swing inward toward the supporting arm.
The tub
then made contact with the decorative lights lining the
underside of the arm, breaking several of the bulbs.
Courtney’s
left-middle finger was partially amputated, and her index finger
was severely cut.
Fortunately, doctors were able to reattach Courtney’s
partially amputated finger, and she has substantially recovered
from her injuries.
On June 1, 2001, Darrell and Terry Lewis, Individually
and as the Natural Parent and Next Friend of Courtney Lewis,
filed a Complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court in connection with
the accident naming as defendants C&C Enterprises, Charles
Payne, Cindy Payne, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Louisville,
- 4 -
and Jessup Amusements, Inc., the owner of the Flying Comet. 1
The
Complaint alleged counts of negligence against the defendants
and sought compensatory and punitive damages.
On January 22, 2003, the trial court entered an order
granting the Archbishop summary judgment on the issue of whether
there was an agency relationship between the Archbishop and C&C
Enterprises, determining that there was not.
The trial court
determined that the Archbishop did not exercise the requisite
degree of control over C&C Enterprises’ operations of the
amusement rides so as to make it vicariously liable for C&C’s
negligence as a principal of C&C Enterprises.
On July 1, 2003, the trial court granted the
Archbishop summary judgment on the issue of whether it was
engaged in a joint venture with C&C Enterprises at the time of
Courtney’s accident, determining that he was not, and could not
be held vicariously liable for the negligence of C&C Enterprises
as a joint venturer.
The trial court held the Archbishop in the
case, however, on the issue of whether the Archbishop had
independently breached its duty of care owed to Courtney.
The case was heard before a jury on August 10 and 11,
2004.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of all defendants.
1
The trial court entered
On February 13, 2003, the trial court granted summary judgment to Jessup
Amusements, Inc., and dismissed the Lewis’ claim against this defendant.
The appellants do not challenge the dismissal of their claim against Jessup
Amusements.
- 5 -
judgment on the jury verdict on August 17, 2004.
The
appellants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or,
in the alternative, for a new trial, were denied.
This appeal
followed.
First, the appellants contend that the trial court
erred by failing to give an instruction on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
The appellants tendered a jury instruction providing
as follows:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in
situations where the proximate cause of
injury cannot be determined absolutely. For
res ipsa loquitur to apply:
(1)
The accident must be of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone’s negligence.
(2)
It must be caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant; and
(3)
It must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the plaintiff.
Do you find that Courtney Lewis’ injuries
would not have occurred absent someone’s
negligence, that the ride known as the
Flying Comet was, for the purposes of
assembly, maintenance, and operation, within
the exclusive control of C&C Enterprises and
Courtney Lewis was not injured due to any
voluntary action on her part?
Yes
______
No
______
- 6 -
Res ipsa loquitur is a "Latin phrase, which means
nothing more than the thing speaks for itself," and is simply
"[o]ne type of circumstantial evidence."
Torts, Sec. 39 (5th ed. 1984).
Prosser and Keeton on
It is an evidentiary doctrine
which allows a jury to infer negligence on the part of the
defendant.
If the inference is forceful enough it can create a
rebuttable presumption of negligence, possibly resulting in a
directed verdict.
Sadr v. Hager Beauty School, Inc., 723 S.W.2d
886, 887 (Ky.App. 1987) (citing
Bowers v. Schenley Distillers,
Inc., 469 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1971);
Bell & Koch, Inc. v. Stanley,
375 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1964).
Invocation of the doctrine requires
a showing that (1) the defendant had full control of the
instrumentality which caused the injury; (2) the accident could
not have happened if those having control had not been
negligent; and (3) the plaintiff's injury resulted from the
accident.
Id.
The doctrine does not apply if it is shown that
the injury may have been due to some voluntary action on the
plaintiff's part.
Id. (citing Schmidt v. Fontaine Ferry
Enterprises, 319 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1958).
Negligence cannot be inferred simply from an
undesirable result.
(Ky. 1992).
Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 655
"A res ipsa loquitur case is ordinarily merely one
kind of case of circumstantial evidence, in which the jury may
reasonably infer both negligence and causation from the mere
- 7 -
occurrence of the event and the defendant's relation to it."
Id. at 656, quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section
328D, comment 6, p. 157, (1965).
According to the Restatement,
Section 328D(1), several conditions must be met before the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be applied:
It may be inferred that harm suffered by the
plaintiff is caused by negligence of the
defendant when [:]
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of
negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the
conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by
the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the
scope of the defendant's duty to the
plaintiff. (Emphasis added.)
However, even if we agreed with the appellants that
this was a case for application of the res ipsa loquitar
doctrine, they would not be entitled to have a res ipsa loquitur
instruction submitted to the jury.
As noted, the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine is an evidentiary doctrine which allows a jury
to infer negligence on the part of the defendant.
Beauty School, Inc., supra.
Sadr v. Hager
The doctrine merely creates a
rebuttable presumption of negligence when the elements for
application of the doctrine are met.
On occasion, the
rebuttable presumption may be strong enough to require a
- 8 -
directed verdict.
Id.
However, instructions on res ipsa
loquitur should not be submitted to a jury.
The Kentucky
Supreme Court succinctly stated the applicable rule in Meyers v.
Chapman Printing Co., Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1992).
In that
case, the Court recognized that:
In Kentucky, the burden of proof is always
on the party who would lose if no evidence
was presented. CR 43.01(2). In Kentucky
jury instructions do not include evidentiary
presumptions. Such presumptions alter the
burden of going forward with the evidence,
and thus may result in a directed verdict in
the absence of countervailing evidence, but
the jury instructions should be framed only
to state what the jury must believe from the
evidence in order to return a verdict in
favor of the party who bears the burden of
proof.
Id. at 824.
Clearly, this principle applies to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
The appellants could request the application of
the doctrine to avoid a directed verdict or to win a directed
verdict, 2 but the trial court properly refused to give the res
ipsa loquitur instruction tendered by the appellants.
See also
Conley's Adm'r v. Ward, 291 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1955).
2
The appellants do not argue that they were entitled to a directed verdict
based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. They argue only that the trial
court erred by failing to give their tendered instruction. Accordingly, it
is not necessary that we undertake a detailed application of the doctrine to
the facts of this case.
- 9 -
Next, the appellants contend that the trial court
erred by giving an improper instruction concerning the duties
the Archbishop owed to Courtney.
A person is an invitee if “(1) he enters by
invitation, express or implied, (2) his entry is connected with
the owner's business or with an activity the owner conducts or
permits to be conducted on his land and (3) there is mutuality
of benefit or benefit to the owner.”
Johnson v. Lone Star
Steakhouse & Saloon of Kentucky, Inc., 997 S.W.2d 490, 491-92
(Ky.App. 1999) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 827 (6th ed.
1990)).
“[T]he invitee is placed upon a higher footing than a
licensee.”
Id. [footnote omitted].
of Torts, § 61 (5th ed. 1984).
Prosser and Keaton, The Law
Because Courtney was at the
Summer Festival at the invitation of the Archbishop, her entry
onto the premises was in connection with the activity being
conducted by the Archbishop on the premises, i.e., the Summer
Festival; and because there was a mutuality of benefit in
connection with Courtney’s entry onto the premises, Courtney was
an invitee at the time of the Flying Comet accident.
“[T]he owner or possessor of property owes an invitee
or business visitor the active, positive duty of keeping those
parts of the premises to which the invitee or visitor is
invited, or may reasonably be expected to use, in a condition
reasonably safe for use in a manner consistent with the purpose
- 10 -
of the invitation.
If the possessor knows or by the exercise of
ordinary care or reasonable diligence could discover a natural
or artificial condition which, if known, he should realize
involves an unreasonable risk to the invitee or business visitor
and does not remedy the condition or serve fair warning of
peril, the possessor is negligent.”
Ferrell v. Hellems, 408
S.W.2d 459, 463 (Ky. 1966) (citing of City of Madisonville v.
Poole, 249 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1952).
The instruction given by the trial court concerning
the liability of the Archbishop stated as follows:
You will find for the Plaintiff’s against
the Defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Louisville if you are satisfied from the
evidence as follows:
(1)
The Plaintiff, Courtney Lewis’ injuries
were caused by a discoverable defect in
the Flying Comet;
(2)
That by reason of that defect in the
Flying Comet, the Defendant, Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Louisville’s
premises were not in a reasonably safe
condition for the use of its invitees,
including Plaintiff, Courtney Lewis;
AND
(3)
The Defendant, Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Louisville, knew of, or
by exercise of ordinary care[ 3 ] should
have discovered, the defect in the
Flying Comet in sufficient time before
the Plaintiff was injured to correct
it.
3
Ordinary care was defined elsewhere in the instructions as “such care as the
jury would expect an ordinarily prudent church contracting with carnival ride
operators to exercise under similar circumstances.”
- 11 -
Otherwise, you will find for the Defendant,
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Louisville.
Do you find for the Plaintiff, Courtney
Lewis?
Yes ______
No _______
We believe that the instruction presented to the jury
by the trial court accurately reflects the duty of a premises
owner, as stated in Ferrell v. Hellems, to an invitee.
A
comparison of the statement of the duties contained therein with
the trial court’s instruction readily demonstrates this.
The appellants’ argument in opposition to the
instruction is a little difficult to decipher.
In their brief,
the appellants state as follows:
The Church, as possessor of land, owed
Courtney Lewis, an invitee, the duty to
discover dangerous conditions on the land.
The Church failed in this duty, as there
clearly existed a condition dangerous enough
to result in laceration and near amputation
to two of her fingers, with no evidence she
contributed to her own injuries.
The Church contends that it exercised
reasonable care to discover dangerous
conditions on the land. The Church fails to
recognize, however, that a dangerous
condition was present and was identified to
C&C Enterprises by the DOA inspector. This
information was readily available to the
Church before Courtney was injured. Through
the exercise of reasonable care, the Church
could have discovered that a dangerous
condition was present and in fact had the
duty to discover that dangerous condition.
- 12 -
As stated in Ferrell, the Archbishop had a duty to
exercise ordinary care to discover unreasonable risks of danger
and either remedy the condition or warn Courtney.
This issue
was squarely presented to the jury in the trial court’s
instruction.
The appellants appear to argue for application of
strict liability, but that is not the rule.
“The occupier is
not an insurer of the safety of invitees, and his duty is only
to exercise reasonable care for their protection.
But the
obligation of reasonable care is a full one, applicable in all
respects, and extending to everything that threatens the invitee
with an unreasonable risk of harm.”
Bartley v. Educational
Training Systems, Inc., 134 S.W.3d 612 (Ky. 2004).
(citing
William Prosser and W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts,
§ 61 (5th ed. 1984).
The appellants also cite to the Department of
Agriculture inspection, which identified a problem with loose
sheet metal on the underside of the tub 5.
The appellants were
free to argue the defect in tub 5 in favor of liability;
however, given Courtney’s own testimony, it appears that this
defect was not a substantial factor in causing her injury.
The
mere fact that the Archbishop did not shut down the ride based
upon the Department of Agriculture inspection report does not
demonstrate that the trial court’s instruction was erroneous.
- 13 -
In summary, the instruction presented by the trial
court accurately reflected the Archbishop’s duties to Courtney
in this case, and we are not persuaded that any shortcomings in
the instruction resulted in reversible error.
Finally, the appellants contend that the trial court
erred by failing to submit the issue of joint venture to the
jury and by finding that C&C Enterprises was not the agent of
the church.
These issues are relevant only regarding the matter of
whether the Archbishop may be held vicariously liable for the
negligence of C&C Enterprises.
Because the jury held that C&C
Enterprises was not liable for Courtney’s injuries, and because
this opinion upholds that verdict, the issues of joint venture
and agency are moot.
We accordingly will not address those
issues on the merits.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
- 14 -
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
Michael T. Burns
Gregory L. Smith
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES Charles
Payne; Cindy Payne; and C&C
Enterprises:
John W. Tullis
Owensboro, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELEE ROMAN
CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
LOUISVILLE:
John G. Crutchfield
Michael P. Reilly
Louisville, Kentucky
- 15 -
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.