STACY DURHAM v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 27, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001921-MR
STACY DURHAM
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WOLFE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00027
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND HENRY, JUDGES; POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Stacy Durham appeals from a judgment of the
Wolfe Circuit Court entered on a conditional plea of guilty on
charges related to the manufacturing and trafficking of
methamphetamine.
Durham argued below that Count III of the
indictment should be dismissed because the evidence was
insufficient for a jury to conclude that he possessed all of the
1
Senior Judge John W. Potter, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine.
For the
reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment.
On December 11, 2001, Durham was arrested in Wolfe
County on charges arising from the possession, manufacturing and
sale of methamphetamine.
Police officers had received a tip
that Durham, who had an outstanding warrant for manufacturing
methamphetamine, was present at a hotel in Campton, Kentucky.
Officers located Durham there and searched his hotel room and
vehicle.
They discovered methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia,
and chemicals and hardware allegedly used for the manufacturing
of methamphetamine.
These items included Pyrex dishes, scales,
coffee filters, tubing, a double-necked beaker, muratic acid and
empty bottles of Red Devil lye.
On March 7, 2002, Durham was indicted by the Wolfe
County grand jury on one count each of first degree possession
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), first degree
trafficking in a controlled substance, manufacturing
methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
On
December 3, 2003, he filed a motion to dismiss the manufacturing
count, arguing that he did not possess all of the chemicals
necessary to produce methamphetamine.
Hearings on the motion were conducted, whereupon the
circuit court entered an order denying the motion to dismiss on
June 22, 2004.
The court found that the motion should be denied
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because a jury issue was created as to whether Durham possessed
all of the chemicals necessary to make methamphetamine.
On August 25, 2004, Durham entered a plea of guilty on
each of the four counts of the indictment.
The plea was
conditioned on Durham preserving the right to appeal from the
denial of his motion to dismiss the manufacturing count.
This
appeal followed.
Durham now argues that the circuit court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss Count III (manufacturing) of the
indictment.
Specifically, he maintains that the court
improperly failed to conclude that Kotila v. Commonwealth2
requires a finding that Durham possessed all of the chemicals
necessary to manufacture methamphetamine.
He also argues that
the statutory law requires a finding that the defendant produced
useable methamphetamine, as opposed to producing merely a nonuseable form of methamphetamine.
Lastly, Durham contends that
the Commonwealth should be barred from arguing that Durham’s
motion was a premature motion for a directed verdict that should
have be summarily dismissed as untimely.
Durham entered a
conditional plea and maintains that if the motion to dismiss is
found to be little more than an untimely motion for summary
judgment, the plea should be set aside and the matter returned
to circuit court.
2
114 S.W.3d 226 (Ky. 2003).
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Having closely examined the record including reviewing
the arguments presented at the motion hearing, the written
arguments and the law, we find no basis for reversing the order
denying Durham’s motion to dismiss Count III of the indictment.
While we have reviewed the Commonwealth’s argument that Durham’s
motion was premature and the appeal should be summarily
dismissed, we decline to dismiss the appeal on procedural
grounds.
Instead, we shall address the substantive issues
raised by Durham.
Durham’s first argument is that a conviction for
manufacturing methamphetamine must be based on a finding that a
useable rather than non-useable form of methamphetamine was
produced.
Durham contends that the chemicals found in his
possession could produce, at most, the non-usable liquid form of
methamphetamine chemically known as “methamphetamine HI”.
He
argues that methamphetamine HI must be chemically altered to
methamphetamine HCL (hydrochloride) to be useable.
Since, he
contends, he did not possess a sufficient array of chemicals to
produce methamphetamine HCL, a conviction for manufacturing
methamphetamine could not be sustained and Count III of the
indictment should have been dismissed.
However, a review of the documents filed and the
testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses present sufficient
evidence to support the court’s denial of Durham’s motion.
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Jennifer Wininger, a forensic drug chemist for the Kentucky
State Police, testified that she analyzed several exhibits
submitted from those recovered from Durham and found
pseudoephedrine, water, red phosphorous and iodine present.
These items, she testified, form methamphetamine.
As noted, she
agreed that these chemicals would produce only non-usable
methamphetamine, but methamphetamine all the same.
In addition,
Jack Reed, who works for the Kentucky State Police in the
Central Forensic Laboratory, tested evidence recovered from
Durham and identified the elements phosphorous, iodine, iron and
arsenic as being present.
Finally, the executed search warrant
and testimony from Detective Michael Martin of the Kentucky
State Police indicate that an empty jar of Red Devil lye and a
commercially produced bottle labeled MURIATIC ACID were found.
Although neither of these items had been tested prior to being
destroyed by the detectives, they had been photographed and
testimony as to their presence at the scene of Durham’s arrest
would have been admissible at trial.
At the time of his arrest, Durham was in possession of
methamphetamine.
He does not contest that charge.
He was also
in possession of ingredients to make non-useable
methamphetamine.
However, he argues that since the muriatic
acid and Red Devil lye were not tested, he could not be found
guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine.
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We disagree.
In the
recent cases of Johnson v. Commonwealth3 and Varble v.
Commonwealth,4 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that
sufficiency of the evidence is to be determined by the jury
following trial.
In Varble, the court held:
In Kotila v. Commonwealth, Ky., 114
S.W.3d 226 (2003), we held that the language
“the chemicals or equipment” permits a
conviction only if the defendant possesses
“all of the chemicals or all of the
equipment necessary to manufacture
methamphetamine.” Id. at 237. Appellant
argues that because the search of his
premises on November 12, 1999, did not
reveal any quantity of anhydrous ammonia or
any coffee filters, Kotila precluded his
conviction. We disagree. The indictment
charged Appellant with possessing the
necessary chemicals or equipment “on or
about November 12, 1999.” Testimony that
the odor of anhydrous ammonia was emanating
from the two air tanks and that the
discoloration of the brass fittings was
likely caused by exposure to anhydrous
ammonia was circumstantial evidence that
Appellant had, in fact, possessed anhydrous
ammonia in the recent past. United States
v. Morrison, 207 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir.
2000)(odor of anhydrous ammonia emanating
from cooler found in defendant’s residence
was circumstantial evidence that defendant
had used anhydrous ammonia to manufacture
methamphetamine). Appellant’s argument is
akin to claiming that his possession of
twenty-two Sudafed blister packs would not
support his conviction because the blister
packs were empty. He was found in
possession of all of the other chemicals
necessary to manufacture methamphetamine,
and it was for the jury to decide whether he
3
134 S.W.3d 563 (Ky. 2004).
4
125 S.W.3d 246 (Ky. 2004).
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possessed those same chemicals at the same
time that he possessed the anhydrous ammonia
(and the Sudafed). The requirement is that
the chemicals or equipment be possessed
simultaneously, not that they be possessed
at the time of the arrest. In a felony
case, the failure to prove the specific date
of the offense is of no consequence unless
time is a material element of the offense.5
And in Johnson, our Supreme Court stated:
A necessary inference from proof of actual
manufacture is that, at some point in time,
he must have had possession of both all the
equipment and all the ingredients necessary
to manufacture methamphetamine. In other
words, just as you can’t make an omelet
without breaking some eggs, you can’t make
methamphetamine without having possession of
the necessary chemicals and equipment. Nor,
as demonstrated in the next section, is it
likely that someone would inadvertently
combine the chemicals and use the equipment
to manufacture methamphetamine by accident.
Thus, intent to manufacture can be inferred
from the act of manufacturing as well.
Therefore, we hold that there was sufficient
evidence to convict Johnson under both
versions of the manufacturing instruction.
There was no error.6
In the more recent case of Robinson v. Commonwealth,7
the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated:
First, with respect to the
Manufacturing Methamphetamine charge, KRS
218A.1432 (in effect at that time)
enumerated two avenues of proving the crime.
[KRS] 218A.1432(1)(a) provided “a person is
guilty . . . . when he knowingly and
5
Varble, 125 S.W.3d at 254.
6
Johnson, 134 S.W.3d at 568.
7
___ S.W.3d ___, slip op. 7-8 (Ky. 2005).
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unlawfully manufactures methamphetamine;”.
Section (1)(b) provided “a person is guilty
. . . . when he knowingly and unlawfully
possesses the chemicals or equipment for the
manufacture of methamphetamine with the
intent to manufacture methamphetamine.”
According to the evidence, numerous
items commonly associated with the
manufacture of methamphetamine were found in
the Clemons house, where the Appellant was a
resident; certain items, though not all,
contained evidence of methamphetamine
residue which, according to the testimony,
was a common occurrence in the manufacture
of methamphetamine. Additionally, a
quantity of methamphetamine was found in the
Appellant’s bedroom and in other parts of
the house. The trial court correctly
determined, based upon the evidence, that
the Commonwealth had met [its] burden of
proof as to KRS 218A.1432(1)(a).
Moving on to KRS 218A.1432(1)(b), the
Commonwealth, through its uncontraverted
expert witness, Jennifer Winnegar, presented
evidence that the chemicals necessary to
manufacture methamphetamine a controlled
substance were Lithium (or various other
metals), anhydrous ammonia, and
pseudoephedrine or ephedrine. She further
testified that the only equipment necessary
for the commission of the crime was a glass
jar, like the glass pickle jar found at the
Clemons house, in which to contain the
necessary chemicals. Again, neither the
Appellant nor his co-defendant Clemons
presented any evidence to the contrary.
In a close reading of KRS 218A.1432 and
218A.1431, there is no requirement that the
methamphetamine be in a “usable” form in
order to [] establish a crime. In fact,
[KRS] 218A.1431 defines “Methamphetamine” as
any substance that contains any quantity of
methamphetamine, including its salts,
isomers, and salts of isomers. Considering
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the evidence and testimony on this issue,
the trial court, again, correctly determined
that the Commonwealth had met its burden of
proof as to KRS 218A.1432(1)(b).
Based upon the record, the hearings and the
depositions of the several witnesses, we believe sufficient
evidence existed for the trial court to deny Durham’s motions to
dismiss the manufacturing charge.
Further, based upon the
recent case law as set forth above, we believe there existed
sufficient evidence upon which to base Durham’s conviction for
manufacturing methamphetamine.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Judgment and
Sentence on plea of guilty entered by the Wolfe Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher A. Bates
Paul J. Hershberg
Louisville, KY
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
Christopher A. Bates
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Ken W. Riggs
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