AND B.G. JESSUP BUILDERS, LLC; GARY JESSUP; BYRON JESSUP; AND WANDA JESSUP v. MICHAEL J. KRUSZEWSKI AND SANDRA K. KRUSZEWSKI
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RENDERED: MARCH 17, 2006; 10:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2004-CA-001898-MR
AND
NO. 2004-CA-001999-MR
B.G. JESSUP BUILDERS, LLC;
GARY JESSUP; BYRON JESSUP;
AND WANDA JESSUP
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-02985
MICHAEL J. KRUSZEWSKI
AND SANDRA K. KRUSZEWSKI
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION AND ORDER
(1) AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
(2) DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, HENRY, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
B.G. Jessup Builders, LLC, Gary Jessup, Byron L.
Jessup, and Wanda Jessup (collectively, Jessup Builders) appeal
from a judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court denying its claim
for damages against Michael J. Kruszewski and Sandra K.
Kruszewski (the Kruszewskis) for breach of a construction
contract.
The Kruszewskis cross-appeal from this judgment.
Jessup Builders contends that the trial court erred by finding
that both parties breached their obligations under the contract.
Jessup Builders asserts that the Kruszewskis breached the
contract, and therefore it was entitled to damages from them.
We find that the trial court’s findings and conclusions were
supported by substantial evidence and were not clearly
erroneous.
However, we agree with Jessup Builders that the
trial court’s findings did not support the award of damages to
the Kruszewskis beyond return of their down-payment.
Hence, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of a new
judgment.
On September 8, 2002, the Kruszewskis entered into a
“Construction and Purchase Agreement” with Jessup Builders.
The
Agreement provided that Jessup Builders would construct a home
for the Kruszewskis on a lot in the Beaumont subdivision in
Fayette County, Kentucky.
The Kruszewskis made a down-payment
of $113,850.00, and agreed to pay the balance of the $759,000.00
purchase price upon completion of the house.
Under the
Agreement’s “Addition Provisions” section, there was a reference
to an “Addendum to Contract Dated September 9, 2002 Between
Builder & Buyer.”
The parties agree that the addendum was to
incorporate the plans and specifications for construction of the
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house.
However, the addendum form was never completed or
executed by the parties.
Nevertheless, construction on the house began in the
fall of 2002 and continued until April of 2003.
The parties
reached an impasse during the spring of 2003 when Jessup
Builders informed the Kruszewskis that it could not proceed
further with construction unless the Kruszewskis executed change
orders and agreed to pay additional amounts.
Jessup Builders
contends that the Kruszewskis failed to make timely decisions
necessary to complete construction, and that the Kruszewskis’
choices of building materials and features substantially
increased the cost of construction.
The Kruszewskis took the
position that the items were included in the purchase price and
declined to execute the change orders.
Thereafter, Jessup
Builders ceased construction work on the house.
On July 18, 2003, after unsuccessful attempts at
mediation, the Kruszewskis brought this action against Jessup
Builders.
The Kruszewskis alleged that Jessup Builders had
breached the contract by ceasing construction, and sought
specific performance and other damages.
The Kruszewskis also
filed a lis pendens notice against the property.
Jessup
Builders denied the breach of contract in its answer, and also
asserted a counterclaim against the Kruszewskis for breach of
contract.
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The matter proceeded to a bench trial on December 17,
2004.
Jessup Builders initially argued that no valid and
enforceable contract existed because the parties failed to
execute the plans and specifications addendum.
In its findings
of fact, conclusions of law and order entered on March 3, 2004,
the trial court rejected this argument, finding,
The statute of frauds is satisfied by the
cumulative evidence of the existence of the
contract, including, but not limited to the
existence of a four (4) page signed writing
that reasonably specifies the parties’
mutual promises. The conduct of the
Defendants [Jessup Builders] from and after
the date of the making of the contract
estops Defendants from denying the existence
of the contract. The Court finds that
Defendants were the drafters of the contract
and failed in their obligation to complete
the preparation of the contract’s addendum.
The trial court found that the evidence supported both
parties’ claims of breach of contract, and that specific
performance by both parties would be the preferred remedy in
light of the facts and circumstances.
However, the court also
noted specific performance would only be an effective remedy if
the contract was reformed to include the plans and
specifications.
Consequently, the court ordered the parties to
complete the addendum setting forth the plans and specifications
for construction of the house.1
1
The trial court further found that the parties’ respective
claims alleging fraud were not supported by the evidence, and the
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Upon re-consideration, the trial court determined that
reformation of the contract was not an appropriate remedy.
As a
result, the court found that it could not order specific
performance, but the matter should proceed forward only on the
issue of damages.
Jessup Builders argued that the contract
provided only for the return of the Kruszewskis’ down-payment in
the event of a breach by Jessup Builders.
The Kruszewskis
contended that this provision was unconscionable and should not
be enforced.
Following an evidentiary hearing on the damages
issues, the trial court issued findings of fact, conclusions of
law and an order on June 3, 2004.
The court found that the
contract’s limitation on damages was not unconscionable.
However, the court also found that the Kruszewskis’ damages were
not limited to return of their down-payment.
The court
concluded that the Kruszewskis were entitled to recover interest
on the down-payment, as well as rents paid and storage and
inspection fees incurred as a result of Jessup Builders’ breach.
The court declined to award any additional damages to either
party, holding:
The Court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that each party, by its own breach,
is estopped to claim the other damages
court dismissed those claims.
ruling.
Neither party appeals from this
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sought. The complete and utter failure of
these parties to consummate the fulfillment
of this contract has been a mutual loss and
equitable expense to each. Both parties
have suffered financially and otherwise, one
no more than the other. The mutuality of
fault (breach) has occasioned their own
financial loss. They shall not be heard to
complain.
This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
Regarding the
appropriate standard of review, this Court stated in Bealert v.
Mitchell:2
[I]n any case that is tried without the
intervention of a jury, the findings of fact
of the trial court should not be reversed
unless they are determined to be clearly
erroneous. In making such consideration the
appellate court must keep in mind that the
trial court had the opportunity to hear the
evidence and observe the witnesses, so as to
judge their credibility, and therefore, is
in the best position to make findings of
fact. 7 W. Clay, Kentucky Practice, CR
52.01.3
On the other hand, the trial court’s conclusions of law,
including its interpretation of the written contract, are
subject to independent appellate determination.4
Jessup Builders does not challenge the court’s finding
that a valid and enforceable contract existed despite the
2
585 S.W.2d 417 (Ky.App. 1979).
3
Id. at 418
4
A&A Mechanical, Inc. v. Thermal Equipment Sales, Inc., 998
S.W.2d 505, 509 (Ky. App. 1999).
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parties’ failure to execute the addendum.
However, Jessup
Builders does object to the trial court’s finding that it had
the duty to complete the plans and specifications addendum, and
that its failure to do so constituted a breach of the contract.
Jessup Builders points out that the contract does not specify
any such duty on its part.
Rather, Jessup Builders argues that
the Kruszewskis’ failure to execute the addendum and their
subsequent failures to make timely decisions and sign the change
orders were the primary reasons for the collapse of the
agreement.
Consequently, Jessup Builders asserts that the
Kruszewskis, rather than it, breached the contract.
Although the contract clearly referred to the plans
and specifications addendum, that addendum was never completed
or executed by the parties.
This failure presents the central
issue in this case: which party had the primary duty to ensure
completion and execution of the addendum?
Jessup Builders
contends that the trial court found that the addendum was not an
essential part of the contract.
Therefore, according to Jessup
Builders, the trial court could not reasonably find that Jessup
Builders breached the contract by failing to complete the nonessential addendum.
But the trial court’s written findings do not state
that the addendum was not an essential part of the contract.
Rather, the court found that the written contract reasonably
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specified the parties’ mutual promises.
To the extent that the
plans and specifications which were to be set forth in the
addendum were essential to performance of the contract, the
trial court found that Jessup Builders was estopped from denying
the existence of an enforceable contract due to its conduct from
and after the date of the making of the contract.5
Generally, ambiguities in contracts are construed
against the drafter.6
Since Jessup Builders prepared the
contract and since Jessup Builders was the party charged with
building the house, the trial court concluded that Jessup
Builders had the duty to complete the addendum.
Given the
unique circumstances of this case, we agree.
However, both parties’ failure to execute the addendum
precipitated the ultimate collapse of the agreement.
The
agreement specifically referenced the “addendum to contract
stated September 9, 2002 between builder and buyer”.
This
additional provision to the agreement was initialed by both
parties, but Jessup Builders provided the Kruszewskis with only
an uncompleted and unexecuted copy of the addendum.
While
Jessup Builders had the duty to ensure that the addendum was
5
See Stewart v. Siddens, 687 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Ky.App. 1984).
6
Friction Materials Co., Inc. v. Stinson, 833 S.W.2d 388, 391
(Ky.App. 1992); citing Warfield Natural Gas Company v. Clark's
Adm'x, 257 Ky. 724, 734, 79 S.W.2d 21 (1934).
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executed before it began construction, the omission of the
addendum should have been equally obvious to the Kruszewskis.
Moreover, the parties’ failure to execute the addendum
did not entitle the Kruszewskis to insist that Jessup Builders
include more expensive features in the house.
Furthermore, the
Kruszewskis’ refusal in April 2003 to make timely decisions
about features or to agree to the plans and specifications
addendum made it impossible for Jessup Builders to perform its
obligations under the contract.
Hence, both parties were
responsible for the collapse of the agreement and both breached
their obligations under the contract.
This conclusion complicates the determination of
damages.
The trial court declined to award any damages to
Jessup Builders and only limited damages to the Kruszewskis.
For the most part, we agree with this determination.
Jessup
Builders notes that Section 14 of the agreement allows it to
recover consequential damages, including attorney fees, in the
event of the buyer’s default.
With the termination of the
contract, Jessup Builders was entitled to retain the lot and the
uncompleted house.
Jessup Builders can mitigate its other
damages by completing the house and selling it to another buyer.
Most of Jessup Builders’ other consequential damages were caused
as much by its own breach as by the Kruszewskis.
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Likewise, the trial court limited the Kruszewskis’
damages to return of their down-payment, as provided by the
Section 14 of the contract.
In their cross-appeal, the
Kruszewskis urge that the contract’s limitation of their damages
is unconscionable.
Jessup Builders has moved to strike the portion of the
Kruszewskis’ brief which raises this argument, arguing that the
Kruszewskis failed to specifically identify this issue in their
pre-hearing statement.
CR 76.03(8) clearly provides that a
party is limited on appeal to issues identified in the prehearing statement.7
However, the crux of the rule is to ensure
that the appellate court and the opposing party are aware of the
issues raised on appeal.
Therefore, substantial compliance is
sufficient.8
In this case, the Kruszewskis’ pre-hearing statement
identified two issues, including, “[w]hether the Fayette Circuit
Court erred in failing to award the Kruszewskis additional
damages as a result of the Defendants’ breach of the above
referenced contract.”
Although the issue of unconscionability
is not specifically listed, the trial court’s decision to limit
7
See also Osborne v. Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Ky. 2000); and
Cabinet for Human Resources v. Kentucky State Personnel Board,
846 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Ky.App. 1992).
8
Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 196-97 (Ky.
1994).
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the Kruszewskis’ damages includes its ruling that Section 14 of
the contract is not unconscionable.
Consequently, we find that
the Kruszewskis have substantially complied with CR 76.03(8),
and Jessup Builders will not be unfairly prejudiced by our
consideration of the issue.
Furthermore, the trial court correctly found that the
limitation of damages provision was valid and enforceable as
applied to the facts of this case.
A fundamental rule of contract law holds
that, absent fraud in the inducement, a
written agreement duly executed by the party
to be held, who had an opportunity to read
it, will be enforced according to its terms.
. . . The doctrine of unconscionability has
developed as a narrow exception to this
fundamental rule. The doctrine
is used by the courts to
police the excesses of certain
parties who abuse their right to
contract freely. It is directed
against one-sided, oppressive and
unfairly surprising contracts, and
not against the consequences per
se of uneven bargaining power or
even a simple old-fashioned bad
bargain. . . .
An unconscionable contract has been
characterized as "one which no man in his
senses, not under delusion, would make, on
the one hand, and which no fair and honest
man would accept, on the other." . . .
Unconscionability determinations being
inherently fact-sensitive, courts must
address such claims on a case-by-case basis.9
. . .
9
Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 34142 (Ky. App. 2001).
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Contrary to the Kruszewski’s argument, Section 14 is
reasonably clear in its terms and it is not hidden within the
text of the contract.
We agree that the provision is weighted
more heavily in Jessup Builders’ favor than in the Kruszewskis’.
Under different circumstances, we might agree that the provision
could be manifestly unfair to the Kruszewskis.
In this case,
however, the trial court ruled that both Jessup Builders and the
Kruszewskis are estopped to claim additional consequential
damages due to their own conduct causing the failure to
consummate the contract.
Consequently, the operation of the
limitation-of-damages provision in this case is not
unconscionable.
Jessup Builders also contends that the trial court
erred by awarding the Kruszewskis additional damages beyond
return of the down-payment.
In addition to return of the down-
payment, the trial court awarded the Kruszewskis $10,484.50
interest on the down-payment through June 23, 2004, $19,306.00
for rent and storage fees which they incurred from June 21, 2003
through May 1, 2004, and $1,102.00 in inspection fees.
With respect to the inspection fees, we find no error.
Jessup Builders asserts that the trial court awarded the
Kruszewskis costs for their expert witnesses, but the record
proves otherwise.
In its initial order, the trial court found
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that reformation of the contract and specific performance were
appropriate remedies to enable both parties to complete the
contract.
To that end, the court granted the Kruszewskis the
right to inspect the property to determine what work remained to
be completed.
Subsequently, the court determined that reformation
and specific performance were no longer feasible remedies.
Nevertheless, the Kruszewskis had incurred the inspection fees
in an effort to carry out the court’s order.
The trial court
did not abuse its discretion by allocating those costs to Jessup
Builders.
We agree with Jessup Builders, however, that the trial
court erred by awarding interest and rental and storage fees to
the Kruszewskis.
As previously noted, the trial court found
that both Jessup Builders and the Kruszewskis were estopped to
claim consequential damages due to their mutual failures to
consummate the contract.
The Kruszewskis incurred these damages
primarily due to their own failure to take reasonable steps
which would have allowed Jessup Builders to complete its
obligations under the contract.
We conclude that the trial
court erred by awarding these additional amounts to the
Kruszewskis.
Furthermore, pre-judgment interest is required only
when damages are liquidated.
Otherwise, pre-judgment interest
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may be awarded as consequential damages.10
In this case, the
Kruszewskis were seeking specific performance under the
contract.
Because the trial court determined that they were
only entitled to damages under the contract, their right to
return of the deposit did not accrue until the entry of the
judgment.
Since the trial court concluded that consequential
damages were not appropriate based upon the parties’ mutual
breaches, we find the court erred by awarding pre-judgment
interest on the down-payment.
Accordingly, the June 28, 2004, judgment of Fayette
Circuit Court is reversed insofar as it awarded the Kruszewskis
interest on the down-payment, and rent and storage fees, and
this matter is remanded for entry of a new judgment excluding
those amounts.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion by Jessup
Builders to strike portions of the Kruszewskis’ brief is DENIED.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: March 17, 2006
/s/ Wm. L. Knopf
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
10
Nucor Corp. v. General Electric Co., 812 S.W.2d 136, 142 (Ky.
1991).
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS/CROSS
APPELLEES B.G. JESSUP
BUILDERS, LLC, ET AL.:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS MICHAEL J.
KRUSZEWSKI, ET AL.:
Glenn Acree
Acree Law Office
Lexington, Kentucky
Stephen G. Amato
Douglas T. Logsdon
Brendan R. Yates
McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie &
Kirkland, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
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