JON BRUMFIELD v. CITY OF GRAYSON, KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 3, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2004-CA-001880-MR
JON BRUMFIELD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00290
v.
CITY OF GRAYSON, KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Jon Brumfield appeals from a summary judgment of
the Carter Circuit Court, entered August 19, 2004, dismissing
his claims for wrongful termination, retaliatory discharge, and
discrimination.
Brumfield alleges that the City of Grayson
wrongfully terminated him from his position as police officer in
violation of his statutory and constitutional rights to due
process; discriminated against him in violation of KRS 344.040,
a section of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act; and retaliated
against him in violation of KRS 342.197 for having filed a
workers’ compensation claim.
Convinced that Brumfield’s
termination was not illegal for any of these alleged reasons, we
affirm.
As the parties note, this Court reviews summary
judgments by asking, as did the trial court, whether “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”1
Although reasonable doubts must
be resolved in his or her favor,2 the “party opposing a properly
supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat it without
presenting at least some affirmative evidence showing that there
is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.”3
Construed favorably to Brumfield, the record indicates
that he began working as an officer for the Grayson police force
in November 1999.
In October 2000, he suffered a work-related
back injury, which rendered him temporarily totally disabled.
1
CR 56.03.
2
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d
476 (Ky. 1991).
3
Id. at 482.
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His ensuing workers’ compensation claim was settled upon terms
that do not appear in the record in December 2001 or January
2002.
In the meantime, near the beginning of October 2001, he
was released to return to work with restrictions.
Although the
record does not specify the restrictions, apparently they
precluded Brumfield’s wearing the patrolman’s heavy bullet-proof
vest and gun belt, his sitting for extended periods in the
patrol car, and his attempting to restrain a recalcitrant
arrestee.
Brumfield does not dispute that these are essential
functions of a patrolman’s job or that his restrictions thus
disqualified him for that position.
On December 15, 2001, Brumfield received a letter from
his health insurer informing him that as of November 30, 2001,
the City of Grayson had terminated his health insurance.
When
the then Chief of Police, Greg Wilburn, could not or would not
explain the City’s action, Brumfield’s attorney attended the
June 4, 2002, meeting of the Grayson City Council and asked the
Mayor, George Waggoner, if Brumfield was not still an employee
of the City entitled to health insurance.
The minutes from the
meeting appear in the record and provide in part as follows:
Chief Wilburn [apparently present at the meeting and
speaking] informed Mr. Rowady [Brumfield’s attorney]
that as long as he [Brumfield] was on W/C, he could
draw his incentive pay from the State. Once W/C quit
paying, he would need to submit a form to the State
that he was terminating his Police Officer
certification. That was when he was terminated on his
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insurance. We [unspecified speaker, possibly the
Mayor or possibly Chief Wilburn] were basically told
that we risk losing incentive pay for all officers.
He turned in all his things and his Doctor advised him
that he could not take a hit to his back. Would be at
risk. When we do [sic] these things we officially
terminated him.
Based on this evidence, Brumfield claims that the Mayor
acknowledged having unilaterally terminated Brumfield because
Brumfield’s injured back rendered him both unfit for duty and an
unacceptable insurance risk.
In August 2003, Brumfield brought the present action
seeking damages.
He claims first that his termination without
notice and a hearing violated his due process rights under the
Grayson City Ordinances and under Section 2 of the Constitution
of Kentucky, which, like the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution, prohibits governmental actions that arbitrarily
deprive one of a protected liberty or property interest.4
Although Brumfield has failed to specify the ordinance
or ordinances upon which he purports to rely, the City has
referred us to the City of Grayson Police Department General
Order G-4, and Brumfield has not contested that reference.
As
the City notes, General Order G-4, which announces a policy “to
investigate all complaints of alleged officer misconduct, and to
equitably determine whether the allegations are valid or invalid
4
Kentucky Milk Marketing & Antimonopoly Commission v. Kroger
Company, 691 S.W.3d 893 (Ky. 1985); Shelton v. Brown, 71
F.Supp.2d 708 (W.D.Ky. 1998).
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and to take appropriate action,” is a local version of KRS
15.520, the Police Officer’s Bill of Rights.
Like that statute,
it provides that police officers are entitled to notice and a
hearing before being disciplined or discharged for misconduct.
On its face, the General Order, like the statute, does not apply
to discharges for other reasons, such as Brumfield’s discharge
for incapacity.5
Brumfield also does not contest the City’s assertion
that at the time of Brumfield’s discharge, Grayson, a fourth
class city, had not adopted the civil service provisions of KRS
95.761 – 95-765.
Grayson police officers such as Brumfield
were, therefore, apart from misconduct cases, at-will employees
subject to summary dismissal by the mayor.6
Because Brumfield’s
discharge thus did not implicate any provision giving Brumfield
a property interest in his job, his discharge cannot be deemed
arbitrary for the purposes of Section 2 of our Constitution.
Brumfield next contends that he was wrongfully
terminated in retaliation for having pursued workers’
compensation benefits.
As he correctly notes, KRS 342.197
prohibits such retaliation.
That statute provides in part that
“[n]o employee shall be harassed, coerced, discharged, or
discriminated against in any manner whatsoever for filing and
5
McCloud v. Whitt, 639 S.W.2d 375 (Ky.App. 1982).
6
KRS 83A.080; McCloud v. Whitt, supra.
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pursuing a lawful claim under this chapter [KRS Chapter 342].”
It is also true that “[o]ne of the primary purposes of [Chapter
342] shall be restoration of the injured employee to gainful
employment, and preference shall be given to returning the
employee to employment with the same employer or to the same or
similar employment.”7
Nevertheless, the law recognizes that
injured employees will sometimes be rendered incapable of
returning to their former jobs, and when that is the case,
although they may be entitled to rehabilitation and to enhanced
disability benefits,8 they are lawfully subject to discharge.9
A
discharge may not be deemed retaliatory unless the employee
proves that the workers’ compensation claim was a “substantial
and motivating factor but for which the employee would not have
been discharged.”10
We agree with Brumfield that under KRS 342.197 an
employer may not discharge an injured employee with a
meritorious workers’ compensation claim solely because retaining
him or her would adversely affect the employer’s insurance
7
KRS 342.710(1).
8
KRS 342.710 and KRS 342.730(1)(c).
9
Daniels v. R.E. Michel Company, Inc., 941 F.Supp. 629 (E.D.Ky.
1996).
10
First Property Management Corporation v. Zarebidaki, 867
S.W.2d 185, 188 (Ky. 1994).
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rates.
Although our Supreme Court has held that a subsequent
employer may discharge for this reason,11 permitting discharge by
the present employer, at least absent a showing of extreme and
ruinous rate increases, would essentially negate the statute,
since an insurance claim and the employee’s altered health
status will typically affect the rates.12
Here, however, we agree with the trial court that
Brumfield has failed to raise a material dispute that but for
the mayor’s allegedly improper insurance motive he would not
have been discharged.
It is clear rather that even aside from
the City’s financial concerns, Brumfield was discharged because
he could no longer perform the essential functions of his job.
Because this is a legitimate reason for discharge independent of
Brumfield’s having pursued his workers’ compensation benefits,
his claim for retaliation damages must fail.
Finally, Brumfield contends that, even if he could not
return to his patrolman duties, the City discriminated against
him in violation of section 344.040 of the Kentucky Civil Rights
Act when it failed to accommodate his actual or perceived
disability by assigning him to another job within his work
11
Nelson Steel Corporation v. McDaniel, 898 S.W.2d 66 (Ky.
1995).
12
Cf. Bruner v. GC-GW, Inc., 880 So.2d 1244 (Fla.App. 2004)
(holding that even subsequent employers may not discharge for
that reason).
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restrictions.
KRS 344.040 provides in pertinent part that “[i]t
is an unlawful practice for an employer: (1) . . . to discharge
any individual, . . . because the person is a qualified
individual with a disability.”
As Brumfield notes, under this
statute covered employers are obliged to make reasonable
accommodations to retain employees with qualifying
disabilities.13
Reasonable accommodations include “job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, [and]
reassignment to a vacant position.”14
Employers are not
required, however, “to keep an employee on staff indefinitely in
the hope that some position may become available some time in
the future.”15
Nor are they required “to create new positions
for disabled employees.”16
Even assuming that Brumfield is
disabled for the purposes of the statute, moreover, in an
accommodation case it was his burden to “propos[e] an
accommodation and show[] that that accommodation is objectively
13
Noel v. Elk Brand Manufacturing Company, 53 S.W.3d 95 (Ky.App.
2000).
14
Id. at 103 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted.).
15
Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corporation, 90 F.3d 1173,
1187 (6th Cir. 1996).
16
Id.
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reasonable . . . in the sense both of efficacious and of
proportional to costs.”17
He has not met that burden.
According to Brumfield’s deposition, some time after
Brumfield’s termination Chief Wilburn suggested that it might be
possible to return him to a clerical position or to a position
as a detective.
Brumfield claims that the City discriminated
against him when it ultimately failed to provide him with one of
those jobs.
He has not, however, offered any proof that there
were particular positions available for which he was qualified
both physically and otherwise and which thus could form the
basis for an objectively reasonable accommodation.
Nor has he
met his burden of coming forward with affirmative evidence to
dispute the City’s proof that on the small Grayson Police
Department there are no officer desk jobs and that detectives
must regularly serve as patrolmen, a job function Brumfield
cannot perform even if he were otherwise qualified to be a
detective.
The trial court did not err, therefore, by ruling
that as a matter of law Brumfield’s proposed accommodation was
not objectively reasonable and that therefore his discharge from
the Grayson police force did not constitute disability
discrimination as outlawed by KRS 344.040.
17
Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corporation, 90 F.3d at
1183; Noel v. Elk Brand Manufacturing Company, supra.
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In sum, as an at-will employee Brumfield was not
entitled to a hearing prior to being discharged; the City was
not required under the workers’ compensation act to retain him
in a job he could no longer perform; and the Civil Rights Act
does not require the City to accommodate Brumfield’s disability
where accommodation, as here, is not reasonably feasible.
Summary judgment for the City was thus appropriate.
Accordingly, we affirm the August 19, 2004, judgment of the
Carter Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward E. Dove
Lexington, Kentucky
Spencer D. Noe
Donald M. Wakefield
Bowles Rice McDavid Graff &
Love, LLP
Lexington, Kentucky
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