RILEY PARTIN v. BYRD PARTIN; WHITLEY COUNTY, KENTUCKY; AND LUCILLE PARTIN
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RENDERED: MAY 12, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001879-MR
RILEY PARTIN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL E. BRADEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00161
v.
BYRD PARTIN; WHITLEY COUNTY,
KENTUCKY; AND LUCILLE PARTIN
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GUIDUGLI AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Riley Partin brings this appeal from a July 26,
2004, “agreed judgment” entered in accordance with the parties’
settlement of a dispute concerning a right-of-way to a cemetery.
We reverse and remand.
The genesis of this appeal has its origins in a
dispute concerning a right-of-way to a cemetery.
Appellant is
the owner of property upon which a road and cemetery are
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
located.
Appellant maintained the road leading to the cemetery
was a private road upon which a right-of-way easement provided
ingress and egress to the cemetery.
Conversely, appellees claim
the road was a public and/or county road and not a private road.
A civil action ensued concerning the nature of the
roadway.
Eventually, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement.
The settlement agreement was recited for the court,
and this recitation appears in the transcript of record.
On
July 26, 2004, the circuit court entered a judgment purporting
to reflect the parties’ settlement agreement.
Believing that
the judgment did not reflect the agreement, appellant filed a
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment.
This motion was
denied by a subsequent order of the circuit court, thus
precipitating this appeal.
It is well-established that a settlement agreement is
a contract and contract law governs its interpretation.
v. P.T.A. Industries, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2003).
Frear
The
interpretation and construction of a contract is a matter of law
for the court, and our review proceeds de novo. City of
Worthington Hills v. Worthington Fire Protection District, 140
S.W.3d 584 (Ky.App. 2004).
Appellant contends that two provisions of the circuit
court’s judgment do not reflect the parties’ actual settlement
agreement.
The two provisions are as follows:
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IT IS AGREED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED the
Plaintiff, Riley Partin, shall cause to be
conveyed by Quitclaim Deed to the Fuston
Cemetery Association, Inc., the Fuston
Cemetery and the adjoining parking area as
set forth on his plat map made a part hereof
and attached as Exhibit “A”.
. . . .
IT IS AGREED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
in the event the Plaintiff, Riley Partin,
desires to relocate said roadway to said
cemetery from the Laurel Fork Road he may do
so by constructing a shorter road that is
suitable, comparable, and acceptable to the
Whitley County Fiscal Court and said Whitley
County Fiscal Court shall adopt said new
road as a county road and shall abandon the
current county road to said cemetery which
shall revert to the Plaintiff Riley Partin
in fee.
In the judgment, the circuit court ordered appellant
to quitclaim the cemetery and an adjoining parking area to the
Fuston Cemetery Association.
Appellant claims that he did agree
to quitclaim the cemetery but did not agree to quitclaim the
adjoining parking area.
In their brief, appellees concede:
With regard to the “parking area” Appellees
agree that the parking area was not
discussed nor was there any agreement that
the parking area would be deeded by Riley to
the County. In fact, the parking area in
reality is nothing more that[sic] the end of
the old county road, in front of the
cemetery.
Appellees’ Brief at 15.
Having reviewed the transcript of the proceedings, we
agree that the parties never mentioned the parking area and that
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appellant did not agree to deed a parking area to the Fuston
Cemetery Association.
As such, we must conclude the circuit
court committed error by requiring appellant to deed the parking
area to the Fuston Cemetery Association.
The parties simply
never agreed to such a condition, and it was error for the
circuit court to impose such a condition upon appellant.
As to the remaining disputed provision of the
judgment, appellant asserts the circuit court erred by requiring
him to construct a new roadway that was “suitable, comparable,
and acceptable to the Whitley County Fiscal Court . . . .”
Appellant maintains that he simply agreed to construct a new
roadway but never agreed to construct a roadway that would be
“suitable, comparable, and acceptable” to the fiscal court.
While the parties never explicitly agreed to such
terms, appellees argue that such terms were implicit to the
parties’ agreement.
In order for the new roadway to be adopted
by the county, appellees argue that the road must impliedly be
of a character acceptable to the fiscal court.
The record reveals the following exchange took place
between the parties concerning the new road:
Now, if Mr. Partin desires to relocate
the road where it’s a shorter route to the
cemetery he will do that at his expense and
at that point the county agrees in this to
close the existing road, county road, and
adopt this new Fuston Cemetery Road.
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. . . .
MR. SMITH: That road will be
constructed at his expense and the county
will adopt it as a county road. The gate
will be open, and the association can change
this, but we’re proposing the gate be opened
from seven in the morning until dark, eight
in the morning till dark. It’s, you know,
just so it’s daylight hours.
Considering the entire transcript of the proceedings
and the more relevant portions delineated above, we believe it
was the parties intent that the new roadway be similar to and
comparable with the condition of the old roadway which it was
replacing.
We do not believe the new roadway must be “suitable,
comparable, and acceptable” to the Whitley County Fiscal Court;
such terms are simply outside the parties’ expressed or
reasonably implied intent.
Rather, we simply interpret the
parties’ agreement to mean that the new roadway must be similar
to and comparable with the old roadway.
This interpretation is
consistent with the parties’ express intent that the new roadway
would serve as a replacement for the old roadway.
See Cantrell
Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381 (Ky.App.
2002).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Whitley
Circuit Court is reversed and this cause remanded for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
W. Henry Lawson
Pikeville, Kentucky
Marcia A. Smith
David O. Smith
Corbin, Kentucky
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