CAROLYN WHOBREY v. KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 3, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001876-MR
CAROLYN WHOBREY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-01514
v.
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Carolyn Whobrey has appealed from the August
30, 2004, opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit Court which
affirmed a decision of the Kentucky Retirement Systems denying
Whobrey disability retirement benefits.
Having concluded that
the circuit court’s decision affirming the Retirement Systems’s
denial of benefits was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
Whobrey was employed by Jefferson County Schools as a
bus driver.
Her membership in the Retirement Systems began on
September 1, 1980, and ended on February 11, 2002, her last day
of paid employment, with 226 months of accumulated service.
Whobrey’s job was classified as light-duty work1 and consisted of
driving a school bus,2 performing routine maintenance on the bus,
including lifting the bus hood which weighs approximately 50
pounds,3 operating a manual bus door, opening and closing
windows, sweeping the bus, and maintaining discipline.4
Whobrey
usually sat for six and one-half hours during an eight-hour work
day and did not have the ability to alternate between sitting
and standing.
Whobrey began to experience pain in her right shoulder
and arm in December 2000.
At that time, the regular bus she
drove developed mechanical problems, and while it was being
repaired, she was assigned a bus with a stiff steering
mechanism.
She advised her supervisor that she had to exert
extreme force to turn the steering wheel on that particular bus.
1
The work is primary sedentary. It requires the ability to communicate
effectively using speech, vision, and hearing. The work requires the use of
hands for simple grasping, pushing, and pulling of arm controls and fine
manipulations. The work requires the use of feet for repetitive movements.
The work requires bending, squatting, crawling, climbing, reaching, with the
ability to carry, push, or pull medium weights. The work requires activities
involving unprotected heights, being around moving machinery, exposure to
marked changes in temperature and humidity, driving automotive equipment, and
exposure to dust, fumes and gases.
2
Sometimes Whobrey was assigned to a bus with a manual transmission,
requiring her to shift gears with her right hand.
3
The Kentucky Department of Education, Kentucky Minimum Specifications for
School Buses was entered as an exhibit into the record and states that the
effort required to open the hood shall not exceed 25 pounds.
4
Whobrey did have an aide to assist her in this aspect of the bus route.
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Over the next five weeks, the pain intensified.
Whobrey was
assigned another bus, but she had the same problem steering.5
On February 22, 2001, Whobrey was treated for a right
shoulder, cervical, and trapezius strain at Occupational
Physicians and was taken off work.
She returned to work for a
few days, but was then taken off work again.
with Dr. Ellen Ballard on March 14, 2001.6
She began treating
Dr. Ballard examined
Whobrey and determined that she had a history of diffuse right
shoulder pain.
Dr. Ballard noted that upon palpation of the
right shoulder, she had decreased range of motion with abduction
and flexion, normal internal and external range of motion with
reports of pain.
She ordered an MRI scan, which revealed no
acute finding other than a small joint effusion and no rotary
cuff injury.
Following a recheck on March 22, 2001, and again
on April 5, 2001, Dr. Ballard stated Whobrey should not use her
right arm.
Dr. Ballard recommended physical therapy and
referred Whobrey to Dr. Martin Schiller, an orthopedic surgeon.
Dr. Schiller examined Whobrey and in his report dated
April 19, 2001, stated that in reviewing Whobrey’s cervical x5
In 1997 Whobrey was involved in a bus accident. She was treated for neck
and shoulder pain and received temporary total disability benefits while she
was off work. She returned to work without any problems. In 1999 while
driving a special needs bus, Whobrey sustained a right shoulder injury as she
was repositioning the seatbelt holding a wheelchair in place. She was
treated for the injury, but only missed a few days of work and did not
receive any disability benefits.
6
Dr. Ballard reviewed the records from Occupational Physicians. X-rays of
Whobrey’s cervical spine and right shoulder showed some mild degenerative
changes of the right AC joint, but no abnormalities.
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rays, he found they were normal and saw no evidence of a rotator
cuff tear.
Dr. Schiller diagnosed Whobrey with possible
subacromial bursistis and possible symptoms related to AC
degeneration, but his impression was that her problems were
psychosomatic.
He administered cortisone injections, but
Whobrey stated that she did not receive any benefit from the
injections.
Dissatisfied with her treatment, Whobrey began
treating with Dr. Eugene E. Jacob.
Dr. Jacob examined Whobrey
on June 21, 2001, and administered an injection into her right
shoulder, which seemed to temporarily relieve Whobrey’s pain.
His diagnosis of Whobrey was chronic impingement of the right
shoulder, i.e., a spur, which was pre-existing and aroused by
Whobrey’s work.
Dr. Jacob asked Whobrey to consider surgery and
kept her off work for two weeks.
He stated in his records that
if Whobrey refused surgery, she would have to return to work.
Dr. Jacob performed an orthoscopic subacromial
decompression on Whobrey’s right shoulder on September 25, 2001.
Following the surgery, Whobrey began physical therapy, but
continued to complain of pain in her right shoulder.
The report
of Frazier Rehab Institute notes that Whobrey attended 19 out of
20 prescribed physical therapy sessions, and she made some
progress, but still complained of pain.
On December 28, 2001,
an MRI was performed, post-surgery, which showed a small partial
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surface rotator cuff tear.
Dr. Jacob and his partner, Dr. Greg
Rennirt, who provided a second opinion, determined that Whobrey
had developed post-surgery adhesive capsolitis, or stiffness of
the shoulder, and recommended Whobrey undergo manipulation of
her right shoulder.
Whobrey opted not to undergo that procedure
because of fear of additional complications and uncertainty of
improvement.
Dr. Jacob assigned Whobrey a 12% permanent functional
impairment rating based on the 5th edition of the AMA Guides to
the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 10% of which he
attributed to physical restrictions and 2% to chronic pain.
He
further recommended that Whobrey not perform overhead work,
limited Whobrey to lifting five pounds, and stated that
consistent pushing or pulling activity would aggravate her
shoulder pain.
bus.
He concluded that Whobrey was unable to drive a
However, he concluded that she could perform work at waist
level.
In a utilization review report dated July 10, 2001,
Dr. Daniel Woolen opined for purposes of Whobrey’s workers’
compensation case that the chronic changes in her shoulder were
due to causes other than her employment.
He concluded that the
need for surgery was not related to her employment.
Whobrey filed her application for disability
retirement benefits on February 12, 2002, and alleged that she
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was no longer physically capable of performing her job duties.
Her reasons were stated as follows:
I am unable to drive, pre-trip my bus, push
or pull wheelchairs, hook-up wheel chairs,
pull open hood of bus. Climb up on hood to
take care of cleaning windshield when
needed. I am unable to help children off of
bus in an emergency situation. I am unable
to open a manual door. I am unable to do
these things because of injury and torn
rotator cuff on my right shoulder.
Whobrey was evaluated by Lance T. Chroghan, a physical
therapist on February 12, 2002.
He reported in a letter to Dr.
Jacob that Whobrey had a whole person impairment for the
shoulder of 10%, based on the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guides.
However, he noted that the rating was obtained “with active
shoulder motion against gravity.”
He stated that Whobrey
“limited her motion due to pain and thus above ROM measurements
do not reflect true full active motion” [emphasis original].
Whobrey was reevaluated by Dr. Ballard on April 8,
2002.
Dr. Ballard performed an examination and diagnosed right
shoulder pain, anxiety, shaking of the right upper extremity,
and a history of rheumatoid and osteoarthritis.
Dr. Ballard
stated in her report that she felt there was no permanent
impairment attributable to Whobrey’s injury and could not assign
a clear rating under the AMA Guides.
Dr. Ballard stated that
Whobrey did not “demonstrate the ability to return to work as a
bus driver at the Jefferson County Board of Education.”
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However, this opinion was not based on an injury-related
impairment, but rather “on her very subjective response to
today’s evaluation but also on her overall demeanor.”
Dr.
Ballard further opined that Whobrey appeared to have
psychological problems unrelated to the work incident.
In a medical report from Dr. Richard Edelson, a
psychologist, who performed a psychological evaluation on May
10, 2002, Dr. Edelson opined that Whobrey suffered from a pain
disorder associated with both psychological factors, impingement
syndrome, and adhesive capsolitis.
He explained that the pain
in her right shoulder and the changes in her life which occurred
because of her symptoms have “exacerbated” her depression, which
then “exacerbated” her pain, resulting in a “chronic pain trap”.7
He stated that Whobrey had a 10% functional impairment, with an
additional 3% impairment rating for pain.
Dr. David Shraberg performed an independent
psychiatric evaluation of Whobrey on June 24, 2002.
He stated
that both his testing and the testing performed by Dr. Edelson
revealed a tendency of Whobrey to somaticize, when her symptoms
were very mild.
It was Dr. Shraberg’s opinion that a number of
life issues caused Whobrey to complain of a painful shoulder to
allow her to rationalize her decision to retire.
7
He diagnosed
Dr. Edelson stated that Whobrey reported her pain as excruciating, but rated
it a “5” on a scale of 1 to 10 at its worst, with a normal rating being a
“4”.
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Whobrey with an adjustment disorder of adult life associated
with menopause and ulcerative colitis, and a personality
dysfunction, including avoidant personality with strong somatic
features, and symptom embroidering.
He opined that Whobrey did
not retain any permanent impairment due to her injury.
The Medical Review Board denied Whobrey’s application
for disability retirement benefits and she requested an
evidentiary hearing, which was held on April 29, 2003.
A
Hearing Officer recommended denial of Whobrey’s application for
disability retirement benefits.
The Retirement Systems agreed
with the Hearing Officer and issued its findings and order on
November 4, 2003, denying Whobrey’s application.
Whobrey sought
judicial review of the Retirement Systems’s decision.
In an
order and opinion entered on August 30, 2004, the Franklin
Circuit Court affirmed the Retirement Systems’s denial of
benefits.
This appeal followed.
Whobrey argues on appeal that (1) the decision of the
Retirement Systems denying her benefits was not supported by
substantial evidence on the record; and (2) that the decision
was arbitrary because the Retirement Systems did not give weight
to the findings of the Workers’ Compensation Board.8
The crux of
Whobrey’s arguments is that because the Workers’ Compensation
8
Whobrey states in her brief that she does not contest the medical findings
as set out in the Hearing Officer’s report.
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Board reviewed the evidence in the case9 and previously found
favorably for Whobrey, it is unreasonable that a different fact
finder of a different agency would make a different ruling based
on the same evidence.
In support of this position, Whobrey
argues that the standard to be met by a workers’ compensation
claimant for total disability10 is more stringent than that of a
claimant before the Retirement Systems.11
It is fundamental law “that administrative agencies
are creatures of statute and must find within the statute
warrant for the exercise of any authority which they claim”
[citation omitted].12
KRS 61.600(3)(a) requires that the
person seeking benefits must have been, since his or her last
day of paid employment, mentally or physically incapacitated to
9
Whobrey argues that with the exceptions of the physical therapy notes,
updated notes from Dr. Jacob, and her direct and cross examination, the
record is exactly the same for both agencies. However, we find the record
includes other evidence, including the opinions of the doctors on the Medical
Review Panel. Further, the Frazier Rehab Institute reports indicate that
Whobrey had a good prognosis and that all of her goals were achieved except
for her claims of pain.
10
The standard under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342 defining total
disability is the inability to return to any kind of work available that she
can perform.
11
Whobrey cites cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in support of this position. We do not find this argument
persuasive.
12
Department for Natural Resources & Environmental Protection v. Stearns Coal
& Lumber Co., 563 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Ky. 1978). See also Pearl v. Marshall,
491 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Ky. 1973) (stating that “findings of fact are essential
to support the orders of administrative agencies, at least where the order
issued by the agency rests upon a factual determination. . . . The goal of
the administrative process must be to insure uniformity of treatment by
administrative agencies to all persons who are similarly situated”).
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perform the job, or a job of like duties, from which he or she
received his or her last paid employment, and such proof must be
based on objective medical evidence.
incapacity must be deemed permanent.13
Furthermore, the
A claimant for disability
retirement benefits has the burden of proving she satisfies the
statutory criteria which entitles her to those benefits.14
When a claimant is unsuccessful in obtaining
administrative relief, the question on appeal is “whether the
evidence was so overwhelming, upon consideration of the entire
record, as to have compelled a finding in [appellant’s] favor,”15
and, whether the denial of the relief sought was arbitrary.16
“In determining whether an agency’s action
was arbitrary, the reviewing court should
look at three primary factors. The court
should first determine whether the agency
acted within the constraints of its
statutory powers or whether it exceeded
them. . . . Second, the court should
examine the agency’s procedures to see if a
party to be affected by an administrative
order was afforded his procedural due
process. The individual must have been
given an opportunity to be heard. Finally,
the reviewing court must determine whether
the agency’s action is supported by
substantial evidence. . . . If any of these
three tests are failed, the reviewing court
13
KRS 61.600(3)(c).
14
See Energy Regulatory Commission v. Kentucky Power Co., 605 S.W.2d 46, 50
(Ky.App. 1980).
15
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ky.App. 1984).
16
Bourbon County Board of Adjustment v. Currans, 873 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ky.App.
1994).
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may find that the agency’s action was
arbitrary.”17
“The test of substantiality of evidence is whether . . . it has
sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable men.”18
Finally, it must be determined “whether or
not the administrative agency has applied the correct rule of
law to the facts so found.”19
Our standard of review20 of a circuit court’s
17
Bowling v. Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d
406, 409 (Ky.App. 1995) (quoting Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet v.
Cornell, 796 s.W.2d 591, 594 (Ky.App. 1990)).
18
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972)
(citing Blankenship v. Lloyd Blankenship Coal Co., Inc., 463 S.W.2d 62 (Ky.
1970)).
19
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance
Commission, 437 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Ky. 1969) (citing Brown Hotel Co. v.
Edwards, 365 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1962)).
20
Pursuant to KRS 13B.150(1), “[r]eview of a final order shall be conducted
by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record[.]”
Moreover, KRS 13B.150(2) states as follows:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact. The court may affirm the final
order or it may reverse the final order, in whole or
in part, and remand the case for further proceedings
if it finds the agency’s final order is:
. . .
(b)
In excess of the statutory authority of
the agency;
(c)
Without support of substantial evidence
on the whole record;
(d)
Arbitrary, capricious, or characterized
by abuse of discretion; [or]
. . .
(g)
Deficient as otherwise provided by law.
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affirmance of an administrative decision is to determine whether
the circuit court’s findings upholding the Retirement Systems’s
decision are clearly erroneous.21
The circuit court’s role as an
appellate court is to review the administrative decision, not to
reinterpret or reconsider the merits of the claim,22 nor
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight
of the evidence.23
Although a reviewing court might have come to
a different conclusion had it heard the case de novo, such
disagreement does not deprive the agency’s decision of support
by substantial evidence.24
As long as there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the agency’s decision, the
court must defer to the agency, even if there is conflicting
evidence.25
An administrative agency, such as the Retirement
Systems, is “afforded great latitude” in evaluating evidence and
determining the credibility of witnesses.26
Further, “the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
21
Johnson v. Galen Health Care, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Ky.App. 2001); see
also Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01.
22
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. King, 657 S.W.2d 250, 251
(Ky.App. 1983); Kentucky Board of Nursing v. Ward, 890 S.W.2d 641, 642
(Ky.App. 1994).
23
Kentucky Board of Nursing, 890 S.W.2d at 642.
24
Bowling, 891 S.W.2d at 410.
25
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Ky.
1981).
26
Bowling, 891 S.W.2d at 409-10.
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evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding
from being supported by substantial evidence” [citations
omitted].27
Indeed, an administrative agency’s trier of facts
may hear all the evidence and choose the evidence that he
believes.28
When considering a claim, an administrative officer is
not required to provide a detailed analysis of the facts and the
law.29
However, he is required to set forth sufficient facts to
support conclusions that are reached, so the parties understand
the decision, and to permit a meaningful appellate review.30
Although a finding for which there is substantial evidence may
not normally be disturbed on appeal, the parties are “entitled
to at least a modicum of attention and consideration to their
individual case[,]”31 and to be certain that the decision was the
product of a correct understanding of the evidence.32
After
reviewing the entire record before us, we conclude that the
circuit court’s affirmance of the Retirement Systems’s decision
to deny Whobrey disability retirement benefits was not clearly
27
Fuller, 481 S.W.2d at 307.
28
Bowling, 891 S.W.2d at 410.
29
Big Sandy Community Action Program v. Chaffins, 502 S.W.2d 526, 531 (Ky.
1973).
30
Shields v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 634 S.W.2d 440, 444
(Ky.App. 1982).
31
Id.; See also Kentland Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Yates, 743 S.W.2d 47, 49-50
(Ky.App. 1988).
32
See Cook v. Paducah Recapping Service, 694 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Ky. 1985).
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erroneous, as the Retirement Systems’s decision was based on
substantial evidence and was not arbitrary.
The Retirement Systems, in adopting the Hearing
Officer’s report, stated as follows:
The mechanism for the alleged injury
described by [Whobrey] is very unusual. It
is difficult to believe, as confirmed [by]
several of the physicians, that driving a
bus with stiff steering for five weeks would
cause the type of injury alleged. Many of
the physicians who have examined [Whobrey]
have found her complaints of pain in her
shoulder to be exaggerated and without
physical cause. The objective findings upon
physical examination are all essentially
normal, except for her continued complaints
of pain. Without objective medical proof,
[Whobrey] is not entitled to disability
retirement benefits.
The psychological evaluations in the
record indicate some type of mental
dysfunction, but there is no proof that
[Whobrey] is disabled by reason of any
mental condition.
In affirming this decision, the circuit court stated as
follows:
The Board determined from objective medical
evidence that Mrs. Whobrey’s condition did
not prevent her from returning to her
previous employment. Her job duties as a
school bus driver were classified as light
in nature and included driving the bus,
performing light maintenance needs, cleaning
of the bus and discipline of students.
Further, the Hearing Officer and Board
determined that Mrs. Whobrey had failed to
establish, based upon the objective medical
evidence, that she was permanently disabled
from returning to her job duties. The
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findings of the Board and its decision to
deny benefits were well within the limits of
K.R.S. § 61.600. Additionally, Whobrey was
afforded procedural due process. After her
initial application for benefits was denied
by the Medical Review Board, a formal
hearing was held as requested by Whobrey.
Petitioner Whobrey then filed exceptions and
requested oral argument based upon the
Hearing Officer’s Findings of Facts and
Recommended Order. Finally, upon entry of
the Final Order denying her benefits, Mrs.
Whobrey then appealed to this Court. Under
Kentucky law, the Board’s decision was not
arbitrary. The Board is not required to
afford weight or deference to the findings
of the Workers’ Compensation Opinion. The
Board properly acted within the confines of
its statutory authority and the decision was
based upon substantial evidence.
The first part of Whobrey’s argument is that that the
Hearing Officer’s conclusions were not supported by substantial
evidence because the conclusions were “inconsistent with her own
acknowledgement of the evidence.”
Whobrey argues that the
rulings of the Workers’ Compensation Board were acknowledged by
the Hearing Officer, but ignored and thus the Hearing Officer
did not consider the whole record.
However, the Hearing Officer
explicitly stated in her recommended order that she reviewed all
the documents in evidence and relied upon them in making her
decision.
While the Hearing Officer stated that she was not
bound by the factual and legal conclusions of the Workers’
Compensation Board, she clearly stated that she considered those
conclusions.
In her discretion, the Hearing Officer found the
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evidence presented regarding Whobrey’s ability to continue
working more compelling than the evidence regarding her alleged
disability.
Whobrey also argues that the Hearing Officer
improperly relied solely on evidence of record prior to
Whobrey’s surgery to determine that she was not disabled and
that because there was no post-surgery medical evidence contrary
to Dr. Jacob’s opinion, his conclusions were uncontradicted and
should have been accepted by the Retirement Systems.
First, we
do not find that the Retirement Systems only relied on medical
evidence of record prior to Whobrey’s surgery, and further we do
not find that it was improper for the Retirement Systems to rely
on the pre-surgery medical evidence in making its decision.
In
reviewing the record, it appears that the Hearing Officer relied
on other evidence to make her determination, including the
reports of the Medical Review Board and the IME reports of Dr.
Ballard, physical therapist Chroghan, and Dr. Shaberg, which
were all prepared post-surgery.
Further, if the medical
evidence prior to surgery indicated that surgery was
unnecessary, and questioned Whobrey’s truthfulness regarding her
complaints of pain, it was still relevant.
While Dr. Jacob’s
records do indicate that Whobrey has a condition regarding her
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shoulder,33 there was substantial evidence of record indicating
Whobrey’s condition was not totally and permanently disabling
and justifying the Retirement Systems’s denial of disability
retirement benefits.
In the second part of Whobrey’s argument, she states
as follows: “The exclusion of the workers’ comp award from
consideration renders the agency action as arbitrary under all
three prongs: (1) by failure to follow the statute and consider
the record as a whole; (2) by denial of due process by excluding
consideration of relevant evidence, per its regulation; and (3)
by taking action not based on substantial evidence.”34
We have
33
It could further be argued that Dr. Jacob’s records contradict themselves.
Notations in Dr. Jacobs’s August 20, 2001, letter indicate that Whobrey had
only a mild impingement and in his notes on June 21, 2001, he indicates that
if she does not wish to have surgery, she should return to work. This seems
to conflict with his statements as to her need for surgery.
34
Whobrey concludes her argument by stating:
The question before [the Retirement Systems] was
whether Whobrey suffered from a disabling condition
which prevented her from returning to work. It does
not matter that she became disabled as a result of
her surgical intervention. It was not Whobrey’s
burden to demonstrate that she was initially
disabled, or that the evidence of her disability
prior to surgery was sufficient to meet the
[Retirement Systems’s] standard. Even if it is
assumed that Whobrey received misguided medical
treatment, and undertook surgery for a condition
which existed only in her head, the proper measure of
her evidence must be based upon the final results of
her surgical treatment and the disability arising
from the pain, limitation and problems she
experienced.
While because of her years of service, it was irrelevant under the statute if
her condition was pre-existing, we disagree with this argument because the
statute states that she must be disabled from the date of her last day of
work.
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already held that the Retirement Systems considered the record
of evidence as a whole and that the Retirement Systems’s opinion
was based on substantial evidence, in accordance with the
appropriate statute.
Whobrey’s argument that she was denied due
process because the Retirement Systems did not follow certain
regulations is no more persuasive.
Whobrey argues in her brief
the following:
The Hearing Officer took no notice of the
findings of the Workers’ Compensation Board,
its reasoning or its holdings. She engaged
in no analysis to distinguish its findings.
She treated it as though it did not exist.
In doing so, she violated the necessary due
process requirements of the Board’s enabling
legislation and regulations.
The regulation referred to is 105 KAR 1:210 Section
(10), which states as follows:
(1)
The hearing officer may allow the
applicant to introduce, among other
evidence, the determination of Workers’
Compensation or Social Security
Administration awarding disability
benefits to the applicant.
(2)
The hearing officer shall consider only
objective medical records contained
within the determination and shall not
consider vocational factors or be bound
by factual or legal findings of other
state or federal agencies.
This regulation specifically states that the Retirement
Systems’s consideration of a workers’ compensation award is
permissive, but that the Retirement Systems is not bound by the
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findings of other state agencies.
The Hearing Officer can only
consider objective medical evidence, which she did.
We do not
see any way that the Retirement Systems violated this
regulation.
None of the cases cited in Whobrey’s brief support
her claim.
We have reviewed the entire record and all medical
evidence filed in Whobrey’s claim, and although Whobrey
continues to argue that “on the record as a whole, there was
substantial evidence of objective findings, which led to surgery
. . . which resulted in a severely disabling chronic pain
condition[,]” we conclude that there was also substantial
evidence to support the Retirement Systems’s denial of
disability retirement benefits and it was not an arbitrary
decision.
Accordingly, we cannot say the circuit court was
clearly erroneous in upholding the agency’s decision.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Franklin
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Don Meade
Louisville, Kentucky
Katherine Rupinen
Frankfort, Kentucky
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