CHRIS SEARCY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 20, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-001819-MR
CHRIS SEARCY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MERCER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 01-CR-00037
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM AND McANULTY, JUDGES; PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE:
Christopher Searcy appeals from a
judgment of conviction entered by the Mercer Circuit Court in
which he was found guilty of one count of theft by deception
over $300.00.
There being no reversible error, we affirm.
According to the proof for the Commonwealth, in early
2001, Christopher Searcy, who lived in Harrodsburg, Kentucky,
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
devised a plan to stage the theft of his truck so he could
collect the insurance proceeds.
Searcy recruited his old
friend, Steve Caldwell, to help him.
Brown to help him.
Caldwell asked Dwayne
Brown agreed to help stage the theft, and,
in order to dispose of the truck, Brown contacted his former
father-in-law, Tommy Evans, and asked Evans if he would be
interested receiving a stolen vehicle.
Since Brown’s request
provoked Evans’s suspicions, he contacted Detective Monte Owens
of the Kentucky State Police.
Detective Owens asked Evans to
play along with the scheme and to tape any conversations Evans
might have with Brown.
On the night of March 20, 2001, Caldwell drove Brown
to Searcy’s home in Harrodsburg.
Searcy’s truck was supposed to
have been parked in front of his house, but, when Brown and
Caldwell arrived, it was not there.
Wondering what to do next,
Brown and Caldwell went to a local convenience store where, by
chance, they ran into Searcy.
Brown and Caldwell then followed
Searcy to a side street near his home.
Searcy walked home
leaving his truck with the keys in the ignition.
Brown drove Searcy’s truck to Stanford, Kentucky.
At that time,
Caldwell
followed Brown to Stanford where Brown gave the truck to Evans.
Evans then relinquished the vehicle to Detective Owens.
The
next day, Searcy contacted the Harrodsburg Police Department and
reported his truck stolen.
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Afterwards, Detective Owens arrested Brown.
Brown
gave a statement to the detective confessing his participation
in the insurance fraud scheme and implicating Searcy.
In this
first statement, Brown told the detective that Searcy had
contacted him about staging the theft of his truck, and he
claimed that he and Searcy had met several times to finalize the
plan.
Brown told the detective that a third person was also
involved but refused to disclose this person’s name.
This third
person was, of course, Caldwell.
On May 16, 2001, a Mercer County Grand Jury indicted
Searcy on one count of theft by deception over $300.00.
While
preparing for Searcy’s upcoming trial, the prosecutor who
handled the case interviewed Brown.
During the interview, Brown
told the prosecutor that he never actually spoke with Searcy.
Instead, Caldwell had contacted and solicited Brown’s help.
This second statement clearly contained facts that were
inconsistent with Brown’s first statement.
Even though the
prosecutor was aware of these inconsistencies, he did not inform
Searcy’s defense attorney about the inconsistencies between
Brown’s first statement and his second statement.
proceeded to trial on October 27, 2003.
The case
At trial, the
inconsistencies between Brown’s statements came to light.
In
addition, the prosecutor called Caldwell as a rebuttal witness,
but Caldwell asserted his Fifth Amendment right not to
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incriminate himself and refused to testify.
While Caldwell was
still on the stand and before the jury, the prosecutor offered
“use immunity” to Caldwell.
That is the prosecutor offered to
forego prosecuting Caldwell in exchange for Caldwell’s testimony
against Searcy.
Caldwell then testified corroborating Brown’s
second statement and implicating Searcy.
The case was submitted
to the jury which was unable to reach a verdict, resulting in a
mistrial.
The trial court then scheduled a new trial.
In the
interim, Searcy moved the trial court to compel the prosecutor
to produce his notes regarding his interview with Brown.
trial court denied Searcy’s discovery request.
The
Searcy’s second
trial began on April 28, 2004, and, after two days of trial, the
jury convicted him of theft by deception over $300.00.
The
trial court sentenced Searcy to serve two years in prison, but,
after serving thirty-nine days, the trial court placed Searcy on
probation.
Now, Searcy appeals to this Court seeking reversal
of his conviction.
PROSECUTOR’S NOTES
On appeal, Searcy argues that the Commonwealth
withheld exculpatory evidence, namely the prosecutor’s notes
regarding his interview with Brown.
According to Searcy, the
inconsistencies between Brown’s first statement and his second
statement were so great that his second statement constituted a
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renunciation of his first statement.
Searcy argues that Brown’s
second statement was exculpatory and contends that the contents
of the prosecutor’s notes might contain additional exculpatory
evidence.
Citing Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554 (Ky.
2003) and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 708, 94 S. Ct. 3090,
41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974), Searcy argues that the prosecutor’s
notes were not protected by the attorney-client privilege since
Brown was not the prosecutor’s client and Brown’s statement was
not confidential.
Furthermore, Searcy insists that prior to the
second trial he needed the notes in order to effectively crossexamine Brown.
Thus, Searcy reasons that the prosecutor should
have produced his notes.
According to Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
7.24(2):
On motion of a defendant the court may order
the attorney for the Commonwealth to permit
the defendant to inspect and copy or
photograph books, papers, documents or
tangible objects, or copies or portions
thereof, that are in the possession, custody
or control of the Commonwealth, upon a
showing that the items sought may be
material to the preparation of the defense
and that the request is reasonable. This
provision authorizes pretrial discovery and
inspection of official police reports, but
not of memoranda, or other documents made by
police officers and agents of the
Commonwealth in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of the case, or
of statements made to them by witnesses or
by prospective witnesses (other than the
defendant). (Emphasis added.)
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And, according to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, RCr 7.24(2)
applies not only to a police officer’s notes but also to a
prosecutor’s notes. Hillard v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 758, 766
(Ky. 2005); See also Cavender v. Miller, 984 S.W.2d 848 (Ky.
1998) and Moore v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 426 (Ky. 1982).
Thus, Searcy was not entitled to the prosecutor’s notes since,
pursuant to RCr 7.24(2), they were not discoverable.
Therefore,
the trial court did not err in denying Searcy’s request for
them.
USE IMMUNITY FOR CALDWELL
At the first trial as mentioned above, the
Commonwealth called Caldwell as a rebuttal witness, and, while
on the stand, Caldwell asserted his Fifth Amendment rights.
Citing Varble v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 246 (Ky. 2004), Searcy
avers that it is prohibited for a party to call a witness
knowing that the witness will invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.
Searcy insists that the prosecutor knew that Caldwell would
assert his Fifth Amendment rights if called to testify.
Furthermore, citing Commonwealth v. Blincoe, 34 S.W.3d 822 (Ky.
App. 2000), Searcy argues that, during the first trial after the
prosecutor offered use immunity to Caldwell, the trial court
compelled Caldwell to testify and that such compelled testimony
is prohibited.
Searcy insists that the Commonwealth’s
prosecutorial misconduct regarding Caldwell’s testimony was so
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egregious that the trial court should have been barred his
second trial.
The alleged errors regarding Caldwell’s testimony
occurred during the first trial.
These alleged errors, if they
were errors in the first place, were cured by the mistrial.
Thus, these alleged errors are not properly before this Court.
INVESTIGATIVE HEARSAY
During the second trial, Searcy argues that Detective
Owens was allowed to testify in detail about his investigation
and about what individuals told him during the investigation.
Searcy objected to this “investigative” hearsay but the trial
court overruled Searcy’s objection.
According to Searcy, by
overruling his objection, the trial court allowed Detective
Owens to later answer this question posed by the prosecutor,
“During this first statement did Dwayne Brown tell you that
Chris Searcy participated or was an active participant in the
taking of the truck?”
Detective Owens answered, “Yes.”
Searcy
argues that this question and the subsequent answer bolstered
Brown’s testimony before he testified.
While we agree with Searcy that Detective Owens’s
testimony was inadmissible hearsay, we conclude it was harmless
error.
Brown testified later and his testimony was consistent
with Detective Owens’s testimony.
Moreover, Caldwell testified
and his testimony corroborated Brown’s testimony.
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Thus, we
conclude that Searcy was not prejudiced by Detective Owens’s
hearsay. See RCr 9.24 and Preston v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d
398, 404 (Ky.1966).
PRIOR BAD ACTS
Finally, Searcy argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor attempted
to introduce evidence of inadmissible prior acts.
Prior to the
trial, the trial court prohibited the Commonwealth from
referring to an investigative file generated by Searcy’s
insurance company.
This file contained information regarding a
prior theft of one of Searcy’s vehicles.
During the testimony
of the Harrodsburg Police officer who initially investigated
Searcy’s theft report, the prosecutor asked this question, “Did
he (Searcy) indicate to you that he had been involved, that he
had other vehicles stolen?”
Before the officer could answer,
Searcy objected and moved for a mistrial.
The trial court
sustained the objection, denied the mistrial and admonished the
jury to disregard the question.
Searcy insists the trial court
erred by not granting a mistrial.
We agree with Searcy that the prosecutor acted
inappropriately when he tried to solicit evidence of prior acts
from the witness.
However, Searcy timely objected.
The trial
court sustained the objection, and the witness never answered
the question.
More importantly, the trial court admonished the
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jury to disregard the prosecutor’s question.
It is presumed
that when a jury is admonished, the jurors will heed the
admonition. Boone v. Commonwealth, 155 S.W.3d 727, 729-730 (Ky.
App. 2004).
However,
[t]here are only two circumstances in which
the presumptive efficacy of an admonition
falters: (1) when there is an overwhelming
probability that the jury will be unable to
follow the court’s admonition and there is a
strong likelihood that the effect of the
inadmissible evidence would be devastating
to the defendant; or (2) when the question
was asked without a factual basis and was
“inflammatory” or “highly prejudicial.” Id.
at 730.
In the present case, neither of these exceptions applies; thus,
the admonition cured the error.
The judgment of conviction entered by the Mercer
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
Richard Clay
Clay & Clay
Danville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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