DAVID LYNN SCHRECKER v. SHERRI PARKER SCHRECKER
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 17, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001804-MR
AND
NO. 2004-CA-001971-MR
DAVID LYNN SCHRECKER
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00568
SHERRI PARKER SCHRECKER
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
David Lynn Schrecker has appealed from the
Decree of Dissolution of Marriage entered on August 24, 2004, by
the Davies Circuit Court, which adopted the findings of fact and
conclusions of law entered on July 13, 2004, which adopted the
Report of the Circuit Commissioner entered on March 17, 2004.
Sherri Parker Schrecker has cross-appealed.
Having concluded
that the trial court abused its discretion under KRS1 403.190 in
determining the percentage of David’s non-marital interest in
the real estate, we must vacate the decree and remand this
matter so the trial court can recalculate the percentage of the
contributions and determine David’s non-marital interest in the
real estate before dividing the remaining marital interest and
assigning the marital debt attached thereto.
Having concluded
that the trial court did not err in its determination that the
entire value of David’s pre-marital stock in the company,
including the increase in value during the marriage, was his
non-marital property, we affirm that portion of the decree.2
David and Sherri were married on August 25, 1992.
children resulted from the marriage.
No
On April 26, 2002, Sherri
filed a petition to dissolve the marriage, and David filed a
response on May 24, 2002.
A two-day hearing was held before the
Commissioner on June 25, 2003, and July 30, 2003.
On March 17,
2004, the Commissioner entered his report recommending that the
equity in the real estate located at 212 Hubert Court,
Owensboro, Kentucky (the real estate) be set at $94,000.00; that
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
While we cannot say the findings of the trial court are necessarily
sufficient as required by Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01 as to
either issue reviewed by this Court, we are constrained by Cherry v. Cherry,
632 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982), from remanding either since neither party
moved the trial court for more specific findings on the issues raised. See
also Eiland v. Ferrell, 937 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Ky. 1997)(stating “[f]ailure to
bring such an omission to the attention of the trial court by means of a
written request will be fatal to an appeal” [citations omitted]).
-2-
53% of the equity, or $49,820.00, was marital property to be
divided equally between the parties, with the remaining equity
to be assigned as David’s non-marital property; and that David
pay the entire debt against the real estate.
The Commissioner
also recommended that David be awarded the entire value of the
stock that David owned in Schrecker Supply Company (the company)
prior to the marriage, as its increase in value was attributable
to economic growth, not the efforts of the parties during the
marriage.
Both parties filed exceptions to the Commissioner’s
report as to the respective issues that they raise on appeal.
The trial court overruled the exceptions and upheld the
Commissioner’s recommendations by order entered on July 13,
2004.
A decree of dissolution of marriage was entered on August
24, 2004, incorporating the Commissioner’s report.
This appeal
and cross-appeal followed.
The only issue David raises on appeal is whether the
trial court was clearly erroneous in dividing the equity in the
real estate.
Specifically, he contends the trial court erred by
failing to consider the marital mortgage debt in its
calculations and thus incorrectly established his non-marital
interest in the real estate’s equity.
He argues that his non-
marital contribution consisted of his equity in the home at the
time of the marriage and the increase in value of that interest
due strictly to economic growth.
He further argues that all the
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equity in the real estate on the date of divorce should have
been assigned to him as his non-marital property because the
equity in the real estate at the time of the divorce was less
than his original equity interest on the date of marriage.
While we do not completely agree with David’s argument, we do
agree that the trial court erred in its calculations as to the
non-marital and marital contributions in the property, resulting
in an incorrect division of the marital and non-marital interest
in the property.
David purchased the real estate on July 26, 1982, from
his mother Geraldine S. Schrecker, a widow, for $50,000.00 after
obtaining a loan from Cardinal Federal Savings Bank.
No
improvements were made to the property prior to the marriage.
On August 15, 1992, the date of the marriage, the loan balance
was $47,002.87.
The trial court found the value of the real
estate on the date of marriage to be $132,500.003 with a debt of
$47,500.00, which would indicate that the equity in the property
on that date, or David’s non-marital contribution on the date of
marriage, was approximately $85,000.00.
After the parties
married, the mortgage was paid down with marital funds from
$47,002.87 to $37,665.91 as of August 2000 when they refinanced
3
Both parties offered expert testimony as to the value of the real estate on
the date of marriage. David offered a value of $132,500.00, and Sherri
offered a value of $110,000.00. The trial court mistakenly stated that the
parties agreed on the value as $132,500.00.
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the loan.
During this period, there were no improvements made
to the real estate.4
At the time of refinancing in August 2000, the parties
borrowed $111,000.00 from National City Mortgage Company.
The
money was disbursed as follows:
$37,665.91 paid off Cardinal mortgage
$71,942.525 deposited in parties account at
National City Bank
$
391.57 paid closing cost (approximate)
$110,000.00
Total
From August 2000 through December 2000, the parties made various
improvements on the real estate, including an in-ground pool.
Of the $71,942.52 deposited in the parties’ checking account
with NCB, the trial court found $44,500.00 was used for
improvements on the property.
David presented evidence that the
value of the real estate at the end of December 2000, after the
improvements were made, was $212,500.00.
any evidence on this issue.
Sherri did not offer
There were no further improvements
on the property between December 2000 and the date of the
divorce.
Both parties presented testimony as to the value of
the real estate and the debts against the real estate at the
4
David presented testimony from an expert that the value of the real estate
in August 2000 was $168,000.00, a difference of $35,500.00 from the value on
the date of marriage. Sherri presented no evidence as to its value on this
date. However, we do not find this value significant in the final
calculations of the marital and non-marital contributions of the parties.
5
Approximately $4,000.00 of this money remained in the checking account at
NCB as of the date of the hearing.
-5-
time of hearing.
David’s expert testified that the value of the
real estate as of that date was $210,000.00 and Sherri’s expert
testified that the value was $214,000.00.
The trial court found
the value on the date of the hearing to be $210,000.00.
David
presented proof that the balance of the debt to NCMC as of that
date was $109,194.09.
David also submitted proof of a second
mortgage on the parties’ real estate through NCB obtained on or
about October 30, 2001.
This mortgage was a revolving line of
credit in the amount of $50,000.00 which had an outstanding
balance on the date of the hearing of $8,342.67.
David
testified that this money was used for various marital purposes,
but not for improvements to the real estate.
Sherri disputed
the balance on the equity line and offered proof that the
balance of this loan was $6,471.48, a difference of $1,871.19.
The trial court found the balance on the two mortgages to be
approximately $116,000.00 as of the date of the hearing.
The findings of the Commissioner, as adopted by the
trial court, stated, in part, as follows:
REAL PROPERTY: The residential property
located at 212 Hubert Court has both nonmarital and marital qualities. There is no
question that David owned this property for
ten (10) years prior to the marriage. The
parties agreed that at the time of their
marriage the property had a value of
$132,500.00.6 It had a mortgage of
approximately $47,500.00 on it. The non6
This is incorrect since Sherri’s expert valued the property at $110,000.00.
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marital equity at the time of marriage was
therefore $85,000.00.
During the marriage, payments were made
on the original mortgage to the point it was
reduced to $37,665.91 when the property was
refinanced for $111,000.00. The replacement
mortgage has been reduced to approximately
$108,500.00. During the marriage, the
principal on the two (2) mortgages have been
reduced by at least $12,000.00. There have
also been substantial improvements made on
this property. The costs of their
improvements are at least $44,500.00. While
these funds may have been all borrowed
funds, they have increased the value of the
property. Its present value is found to be
$210,000.00.
David has attached three (3) different
work sheets as exhibits to his Brief. In
these work sheets, his claim on non-marital
contributions range from $85,035.00 to
$62,535.00. The average is $74,785.00. On
these same charts, he states marital
contributions range from $94,834.00 to
$72,334.00 or an average of $83,584.00.
Using David’s charts, he acknowledges that
marital contributions equal 53%. This is
considerably higher than the 39.2% claimed
by Sherri as [David’s] marital
contributions. In division of marital/nonmarital contributions to this property, the
Commissioner accepts the percentages set
forth by David or 53% is marital and 47% is
non-marital [citation to record omitted].
David’s argument that there is no
marital equity in this property and Sherri
should leave this marriage without getting
anything from the residence is not accepted.
David acknowledged that Sherri has earned in
excess of $50,000.00 a year during this
marriage. They have made substantial
improvements in this home. Its value has
increased from $132,500.00 to $210,000.00.
While his non-marital equity may be reduced
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from [the] $85,000.00 figure, this reduction
is at least in part due to borrowing money
on this property for other uses. The same
would be true if he had remained single and
borrowed the money on this home for other
uses. David’s percentage of non-marital[ ]
interest protects his interest by the
percentage he contributed alone to this
(non-marital) property. It is found that
the equity in the home is [ ] $94,000.00.
$210,000.00 - 116,000.00 (present lien) =
$94,000.00[.] Fifty three (53%) or
$49,820.00 is marital property to be
divided. This property is awarded to David.
He shall be solely responsible for the debts
on said property and hold Sherri harmless
from said debts. He shall pay Sherri her
share or one-half (1/2) of the marital
equity ($24,910.00) within ninety (90) days
of the decree.
KRS 403.190 governs the division of property in a
divorce action.
Under the statute, the trial court must first
separate the parties’ marital estate by assigning to each party
his or her non-marital property.
“This court cannot disturb the
findings of a trial court in a case involving dissolution of
marriage unless those findings are clearly erroneous” [citations
omitted].7
“The trial court’s judgment and valuations in a
divorce will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is contrary to
the weight of the evidence.”8
Under CR 52.01, this Court’s
review of the trial court’s decision “is limited to reversing
7
Cochran v. Cochran, 746 S.W.2d 568, 569-70 (Ky.App. 1988); Johnson v.
Johnson, 564 S.W.2d 221, 222-23 (Ky.App. 1978).
8
Underwood v. Underwood, 836 S.W.2d 439, 444 (Ky.App. 1992) (citing Heller v.
Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Ky.App. 1984)).
-8-
only clearly erroneous findings, keeping in mind that the trial
court had an opportunity to hear evidence and observe witnesses
so as to judge credibility” [citations omitted].9
The division and valuation of property is “within the
sound discretion of the trial court.”10
“Disagreeing with the
findings is not sufficient to find the findings as clearly
erroneous.”11
However, the trial court’s decision must be guided
by certain statutory requirements that create evidentiary
presumptions.
KRS 403.190(3) provides that “all property
acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a decree
of legal separation is presumed to be marital property. . . .”
This presumption has been held to include the increase or
appreciation in property.12
The presumption may be overcome with
respect to a particular item by showing there is persuasive
evidence that a party owned the item prior to marriage, received
it by gift or bequest, or obtained it in exchange for separate
property,13 and with respect to any appreciation, was not due to
the efforts of the parties.14
9
Chalupa v. Chalupa, 830 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ky.App. 1992).
10
Cochran 746 S.W.2d at 570.
11
Chalupa, 830 S.W.2d at 393.
12
See Travis v. Travis, 59 S.W.3d 904, 908 (Ky. 2000).
13
KRS 403.190(2)(a) through (c).
14
KRS 403.190(3).
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A trial court must determine the proportional
contribution each party made in acquiring the asset.
This
analysis as mandated by Brandenberg v. Brandenberg,15 enables the
trial court to value the property set apart to each spouse prior
to undertaking an equitable division of the marital estate
pursuant to KRS 403.190.
This Court in reviewing the trial
court’s determination of the non-marital and marital interest in
the real estate will first consider, in determining the equity
in the real estate, whether the trial court has correctly valued
all components of the property, including the present value of
the real estate, values of marital and non-marital contributions
made by the parties through reduction in mortgage principal and
improvements, and the current debt owed on the real estate and
its characterization as marital or non-marital.
Then, this
Court will determine whether the trial court has used these
values to correctly calculate the respective contributions of
the parties, both marital and non-marital, to the equity in the
real estate and their respective portions of the equity.
Under
our standard of appellate review, we conclude that the trial
court’s valuations of the real estate on the date of marriage
and the date of the hearing were supported by substantial
15
617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky.App. 1981).
-10-
evidence and, thus, not clearly erroneous.16
However, we do
conclude that the trial court erred in its calculation of the
percentage of interest of David’s non-marital contribution and
the parties’ marital contribution.
The first step in the calculation is to establish the
non-marital contribution.
It is undisputed that David owned the
real estate prior to the marriage, and he has thus rebutted the
presumption of KRS 403.190 that the equity in the real estate is
entirely marital property.
The trial court did not err in
determining that the value of the real estate on the date of
marriage was $132,500.00, and that the non-marital contribution
on the date of marriage was $85,000.00, as both values were
supported by substantial evidence.
In determining the amount of the marital contribution,
the trial court found that David and Sherri jointly reduced the
mortgage indebtedness by approximately $12,000.00 and, as stated
previously, made improvements to the property during their
marriage at a cost of $44,500.00.
The trial court found the
marital contribution was approximately $56,500.00.
16
Thus, the
We conclude that the trial court erroneously considered the costs of the
improvements on the real estate in determining the parties’ marital
contribution rather than the value of the cost of the improvements. In the
property division context, “property” means equity. Robinson v. Robinson,
569 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Ky.App. 1978). The value of the improvements to the
real estate, therefore would be limited to their effect on equity of the real
estate. 15 Graham & Keller, Kentucky Practice, §15.62 (1997). However, this
issue is not raised by the parties and we will not address it further. Thus,
the values placed by the trial court on the improvements during the marriage
were not clearly erroneous.
-11-
two equitable contributions, the reduction in the mortgage
balance ($97,000.00) and the cost of the improvements
($44,500.00), totaled $141,500.00.
Once the trial court made
its findings as to the marital and non-marital contributions, it
was required to apply the Brandenburg formula.
However, we
conclude the trial court erred by adopting the percentages as
proposed by David of 47% non-marital and 53% marital, as these
percentages did not accurately reflect the proportional
contributions of the parties on the values of their
contributions to the equity as found by the trial court.17
Our
computations indicate that, based on the totals of the nonmarital and marital contributions, as determined by the trial
court, the non-marital percentage should be 60% and the marital
percentage should be 40%.18
The trial court then determined the overall equity in
the property, which represents the equity in the property at the
time of distribution,19 was $94,000.00.
Once the equity
17
It appears the trial court accepted David’s calculations on page 2 of his
Exhibit 1 where he included as part of the total marital contribution the
$37,666.00 payoff of the first mortgage when funds were borrowed on August
29, 2000. This is clearly erroneous since the payoff of $37,666.00 through
the refinancing of the mortgage did not constitute a marital contribution but
rather a re-characterization of a non-marital debt to a marital debt.
18
Based on simple arithmetic, the trial court should have calculated the
percentages as follows: $85,000.00 (non-marital contribution) + $56,500.00
(marital contribution) = $141,500.00 (total contribution). $85,000.00/
$141,500.00 = 60% and $56,500.00/$141,500.00 = 40%.
19
Brandenburg 617 S.W.2d at 872. The following indicates the meaning of the
letters used in the formula: nmc=non-marital contribution; mc=marital
contribution; e=equity; n-m p=non-marital property; and mp=marital property.
-12-
available for distribution was determined, it appears the trial
court correctly used the formula set out in Brandenburg as
follows:20
nmc x e = n-m p
tc
mc x e = mp
tc
The trial court found that the total marital portion was
$49,820.00, and ordered that David pay Sherri one-half of this
amount or $24,910.00 and that he be responsible for the entire
debt.
Since we conclude that the percentage of contribution was
miscalculated by the trial court, we must vacate its judgment
and remand this matter for the trial court to use the above
formula with the proper percentages of marital and non-marital
contributions.
David contends that because the debt against the real
estate at the time of divorce, totaling approximately
$116,000.00, substantially outweighed the marital contribution
totaling $56,500.00, all the equity in the real estate should be
his non-marital property.
However, this approach does not
properly account for the marital contributions to the mortgage
principal reduction and the home improvements.
Since the
mortgage was reduced during the parties’ marriage from 1992 to
2004, some of the equity in the real estate during that period
20
Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 873.
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was attributable to their marital contributions.
The fact that
the parties encumbered the property in 2000 does not wipe out
the marital contribution made to that point.
Obviously, if the
mortgage balance had not been reduced prior to the refinancing,
then a greater amount would have been required to payoff the
mortgage.
On remand, the trial court is directed to recalculate
the division of the real estate equity based on the correct
percentages of the non-marital and marital contributions.
Then
the trial court shall determine whether it is equitable to
assign all of the marital debt on the real estate to David and
still give Sherri a portion of the marital equity, when the
marital debt clearly outweighs the marital equity.
We are
unsure of the reasoning behind the trial court’s division of the
marital real estate interest and debt.
From the wording of the
Commissioner’s findings, it appears that there could be some
belief that David is in no different position than if the
parties had not refinanced his non-marital debt on the real
estate and made it marital debt.
This is clearly not the law of
Kentucky and the debt is clearly marital.
However, as stated
previously, we are constrained from remanding for more specific
findings as to this issue since it was not raised by David on
appeal.
However, we would strongly caution the trial court that
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this would not be an equitable ground for making such division
of the parties’ marital assets and debts.
In her cross-appeal, Sherri contends the trial court
erred by assigning the entire value of David’s pre-marital
company stock to David after finding that the increase in the
value of the stock during the marriage was solely attributable
to economic growth.
Both parties offered expert testimony as to
the value of the stock at the time of marriage and the date of
divorce.
While the values varied between the two experts, both
agreed that the stock had increased considerably in value since
the parties’ marriage.
Sherri argues that the trial court was
clearly erroneous in finding that the increase in the value of
the stock was not the result of the efforts of the parties, and
that the increase was merely due to economic growth.
The trial court adopted the recommendations of the
Commissioner as follows:
SCHRECKER SUPPLY COMPANY: This is family
owned business which David inherited onethird of the stock. The stock is nonmarital. David has worked in the business
during the marriage and is an officer in the
cooperation. The value of the share has
increased although there is a dispute
between the parties as to its increase.
David states it had increased $31,800 while
Sherri states his stocks have increased to
$87,189 during this marriage. The question
is not the increase in its value of the
stock but whether the increase is the result
of the efforts of the parties as opposed to
the mere economic growth of the cooperation.
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While David worked in the business during
the marriage, he was compensated by both a
salary and bonuses for his efforts. There
is no evidence that his or the couples’
efforts did anything to increase the value
of these stocks during the marriage. Based
on the evidence, any increase in the value
of the stock is found to be due to economic
growth. It is non-marital and awarded
solely to David [emphasis added].
David’s father, Albert Shrecker, founded the company
in 1947, and the company was incorporated in 1971.
Upon
Albert’s death in 1979, David and his siblings, Terry Shrecker
and Connie Shrecker, each became owners of 1/3 of the company’s
capital stock.21
The three shareholders are officers of the
company and all three share in the company’s tax loss carryover.
Terry is the president and general manager of the company
and is responsible for hiring, firing, and supervising the
employees and in turn receives a higher salary.
While David is
vice-president of the company, he has no management
responsibilities.22
David presented testimony that after
employee bonuses are paid, Terry and the company’s CPA, Jeff
Ebelhar, determine what bonuses, if any, are paid to the
21
Sherri attempted to refute David’s claim that the original value of the
stock was non-marital by attempting to demonstrate that he did not inherit
the stock. However, regardless of how it came into his possession, David had
owned the stock for 28 years and clearly owned the stock prior to the
marriage and, thus, it was clearly his non-marital property under KRS
403.190.
22
David’s responsibilities include preparing bid packages and working with
various customers. He managed the store the company owned in Bowling Green
from 1990 until 1993 when it closed. Two other employees have the same
responsibilities as David.
-16-
shareholders.
Terry testified that there was very little
turnover of the employees and that it takes all the employees to
operate the business.
If David died or retired, business would
go forward.
The trial court framed the issue in terms of whether
the increase in the value of the stock was the result of the
joint efforts of the parties during the marriage and found the
increase in value of the stock was due solely to economic
growth.
Sherri’s expert testified that the increase in the
value of the stock was due to income earned during the marriage
retained by the company and reinvested in additional inventory,
company assets, and debt reduction.
David argues that the
corporation’s income is not the income of the shareholders and
that because the company stock is not publicly traded the only
way it can increase in value is through retention of the
shareholder’s income.
The trial court found that while David worked in the
business during the marriage, he was compensated by a salary and
bonuses for his efforts and that rather than these efforts,
economic growth caused the increase in the value of the stock,
as there was no evidence that the parties’ efforts did anything
to increase the value of the stock during the marriage.
As stated previously, the trial court’s factual
findings cannot be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous,
-17-
and its decision will not be overturned unless it is an abuse of
discretion.
Neither occurred in the case before us.
Under KRS 403.190(2), marital property includes all
property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage,
except the increase in value of property acquired before the
marriage to the extent that such increase did not result from
the efforts of the parties during the marriage. Only when the
increase in value is a result of the joint efforts of the
parties can the increase in value of nonmarital property be
considered marital.23
In Goderwis, the husband had built a
business during the marriage which was the couple's principal
source of income, while the wife contributed as a homemaker.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the increased value of
the business was marital.
However, in this case, neither David
nor Sherri contributed to the increased value of the company’s
stocks.
Sherri appears to be confusing income from non-marital
property with increases in value of non-marital property.
An
attempt to equate these two concepts was rejected by our Supreme
Court in Mercer v. Mercer,24 which clearly differentiated income
derived from non-marital property from mere increases in the
value of non-marital property:
23
Goderwis v. Goderwis, 780 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Ky. 1989).
24
836 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Ky. 1992).
-18-
The case of Daniels v. Daniels,
Ky.App., 726 S.W.2d 705 (1986), is not
applicable in this situation either in its
facts or in its rationale. In Daniels,
supra, there was no finding by the trial
court that the increase in the value of the
stocks was the result of the joint efforts
of the parties. Daniels involved an
increase in the value of stocks purchased by
the husband with nonmarital funds. That
increase in value was not income. The stocks
were the same stocks but they simply were
worth more in value because of change in
economic conditions. The increase in value
could not be realized or used as income
until the stocks were sold. Here the
interest income was liquid and could have
been used by the parties at any time.25
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate that portion of
the Daviess Circuit Court’s order calculating the marital and
non-marital contributions and ultimate shares of equity in the
real estate and remand for a new calculation by using the
correct percentages in the same formula.
In the cross-appeal,
we affirm the trial court’s characterization of the entire value
of the stock in the company as David’s non-marital property.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
Phillip G. Abshier
Owensboro, Kentucky
Joseph R. Flaherty
Owensboro, Kentucky
25
Income from non-marital property is non-marital.
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KRS 403.190(2)(a).
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