RICHARD SAMUEL SWAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 1, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001798-MR
RICHARD SAMUEL SWAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OWEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00024
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING IN PART
AND
AFFIRMING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
Richard Swan appeals from a judgment entered
by the Owen Circuit Court after he and numerous codefendants
were found guilty of multiple drug-related offenses including,
in his case, engaging in organized crime, and trafficking in
five or more pounds of marijuana as a principal or accomplice.
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
For the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse as to the
trafficking charge but affirm in all other respects.
Briefly, this matter arose from the operations of an
alleged criminal drug syndicate in Owen County between January
and April 25, 2004.
Swan and the woman with whom he cohabited,
Linda Chadwell, were indicted on multiple charges.
Also
indicted were Chadwell’s parents, her sister and brother-in-law,
and several others.
Some of the codefendants entered guilty
pleas to the charges against them, while Swan and Chadwell were
tried jointly with Chadwell’s parents and sister.
According to
the detailed testimony, members of the alleged syndicate
imported massive quantities of marijuana from Mexico into the
United States and then to Owen County for distribution.
The
jury found Swan guilty of engaging in organized crime and
trafficking in five or more pounds of marijuana, first offense,
as a principal or accomplice.
He was sentenced to concurrent
terms of imprisonment which totaled fifteen years.
This appeal
followed.
First, Swan asserts that the trial court erred by
denying his motion for a directed verdict as to the charge of
trafficking in five or more pounds of marijuana as a principal
or accomplice.
We agree.
The Kentucky Supreme Court succinctly stated that when
a party makes a motion for a directed verdict,
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the trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror
to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the
jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).
50.01.
See CR
The test on appellate review is whether, “under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury
to find guilt[.]”
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187 (citing
Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983)).
Although
issues raised in a motion for a directed verdict may be
unpreserved where, as here, the grounds were no more specific
than that the evidence was insufficient to support the charges
against the defendant, the issues nevertheless may be reviewed
for palpable error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights,
and relief may be granted in order to prevent manifest
injustice.
RCr 10.26.
See, e.g., Potts v. Commonwealth, 172
S.W.3d 345, 347-48 (Ky. 2005); Pate v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d
593 (Ky. 2004).
Swan was indicted for trafficking pursuant to KRS
218A.1421 and KRS 502.020(1).
Under KRS 218A.1421(4), a first
offense of trafficking in five or more pounds of marijuana is a
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Class C felony.
“Traffic” is defined by KRS 218A.010(34)2 as
meaning “to manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell, transfer,
or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or
sell a controlled substance.”
KRS 502.020(1) addresses issues
of complicity, stating:
A person is guilty of an offense committed
by another person when, with the intention
of promoting or facilitating the commission
of the offense, he:
(a)
Solicits, commands, or engages in a
conspiracy with such other person to
commit the offense; or
(b)
Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such
person in planning or committing the
offense; or
(c)
Having a legal duty to prevent the
commission of the offense, fails to
make a proper effort to do so.
Here, as summarized in the jury instructions, the
Commonwealth claimed that the jurors could find that Swan was
guilty of marijuana trafficking under any one of three different
scenarios.
First, the jurors could find that Swan trafficked in
five or more pounds of marijuana on a day or days between April
3 and April 25, 2004.
Second, they could find Swan guilty of
complicity to trafficking in five or more pounds of marijuana
based on findings that his codefendant, Norman Dale Masden,
knowingly possessed five or more pounds of marijuana on a day or
2
Formerly numbered as KRS 218A.010(28).
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days between April 3 and April 25, 2004, with the intent of
selling or distributing it to another, that Swan “aided,
assisted or attempted to aid Norman Dale Masden in so doing by
among other things buying, selling and distributing said
marijuana,” and that Swan thereby intended that Masden would
“possess the marijuana with the intent of selling or
distributing it to another person.”
The jurors chose the third
option of “Trafficking in Marijuana – Five Pounds or More, First
Offense, Principal or Accomplice,” whereby they found that Swan
was guilty of one of the first two options without determining
whether he acted as a principal under the first option, or as an
accomplice to Masden under the second option.
The record shows that there was overwhelming evidence
that some of Swan’s codefendants engaged in a drug trafficking
conspiracy.
However, a search of Swan and Chadwell’s residence
revealed no evidence of drug trafficking, and the investigating
law enforcement officers indicated at trial that Swan’s
codefendants never implicated him during questioning.
Indeed,
the record shows that the statements made against Swan at trial
were limited to the following:
•
Codefendant Scott Sizemore replied “yes” when he was
asked by the Commonwealth whether Swan and Chadwell
sold marijuana for Chadwell’s father, Lee Roy
Brewer.
Although Sizemore and Swan had smoked
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marijuana together, and they had discussed the
smoking and selling of marijuana, Sizemore had never
seen Swan sell marijuana.
Swan had called Lee Roy
from Sizemore’s phone, allegedly when he wanted to
pick up additional marijuana.
•
Masden testified that he worked with Lee Roy, who
would tell him when Swan and Chadwell, or some other
person(s), needed marijuana.
He had delivered
marijuana to Swan at Chadwell’s home, but he had
never received any payment from Swan.
While the
drug investigation was underway, Masden called Lee
Roy’s home and was told by Swan to “stay away.”
At
trial Masden viewed a notebook that allegedly
recorded deliveries of marijuana, and he claimed
that certain initials identified Swan and Chadwell.
Masden stated that he had personally delivered
marijuana to Swan at Chadwell’s residence perhaps
three times, and he had left marijuana outside the
residence once.
He delivered one pound each time
except for once when he took two pounds.
Masden
denied that he had dropped off six pounds of
marijuana to Swan during a certain period of time.
Masden confirmed that Swan was never involved in
transporting marijuana from Mexico, in removing it
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from gas tanks in which it was transported, or in
counting money used to purchase it in Mexico.
It certainly could be inferred from the evidence that
Swan was aware that his codefendants were involved in organized
crime and in the trafficking of large amounts of marijuana.
Moreover, there was evidence that Swan obtained marijuana from
Lee Roy, that on several occasions one or two pounds of
marijuana were delivered to Swan and Chadwell’s home by Masden
at Lee Roy’s direction, and that the couple’s initials were on a
list of alleged marijuana deliveries.
However, there was no
evidence to show that Swan ever possessed or exercised control
over five or more pounds of marijuana at any one time, and there
certainly was no evidence that he possessed or exercised control
over such a quantity of marijuana at any time between April 3
and April 25, 2004.
Further, there was no evidence that Swan
obtained any marijuana from Masden between April 3 and April 25,
or that he otherwise took any action during that time to aid,
assist or attempt to aid Masden in the trafficking of marijuana.
It follows, therefore, that it was clearly unreasonable for the
jury to find that Swan was guilty of the trafficking charge
against him.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.
Even if Swan’s motion for a directed verdict was
insufficient, his trafficking conviction must be reversed in
order to avoid manifest injustice because the Commonwealth
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failed to prove the elements of the charge against him.
10.26.
See Potts, 172 S.W.3d at 347-48.
RCr
Given this outcome, we
need not address Swan’s arguments on appeal regarding the
court’s marijuana trafficking instruction, or regarding its
failure to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense.
Next, Swan contends that the trial court erred by
denying his motion for a directed verdict as to the charge of
engaging in organized crime.
Even if we assume without deciding
that this issue was properly preserved for review, we must
conclude that Swan is not entitled to relief.
KRS 506.120(1) prohibits “engaging in organized
crime,” which occurs when “[a] person, with the purpose to
establish or maintain a criminal syndicate or to facilitate any
of its activities,” engages in certain activities including:
(a)
Organize or participate in organizing a
criminal syndicate or any of its
activities;
(b)
Provide material aid to a criminal
syndicate or any of its activities,
whether such aid is in the form of
money or other property, or credit;
(c)
Manage, supervise, or direct any of the
activities of a criminal syndicate, at
any level of responsibility;
. . . ;
(e)
Commit, or conspire to commit, or act
as an accomplice in the commission of,
any offense of a type in which a
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criminal syndicate engages on a
continuing basis[.]
KRS 506.120(3) defines a “criminal syndicate” as “five (5) or
more persons collaborating to promote or engage” in certain
named activities “on a continuing basis,” including the illegal
trafficking of controlled substances in violation of KRS Chapter
218A.
Here, there was evidence to show that Lee Roy was a
principal organizer and manager of a criminal syndicate, and
that Swan obtained marijuana from Lee Roy on several occasions
in order to traffic it.
Given our review of the evidence as a
whole, we cannot say that it was clearly unreasonable for the
jury to find that Swan engaged in organized crime, in violation
of KRS 506.120(1)(e), by acting as an accomplice in the
trafficking of marijuana and thereby facilitating the activities
of the criminal syndicate.
Hence, Swan was not entitled to a
directed verdict as to this charge.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.
Swan alternatively contends that even if the evidence
was sufficient to support a conviction pursuant to KRS
506.120(1)(e), he is entitled to relief because the court
improperly instructed the jury as to the organized crime charge.
Again, this issue was not preserved for appellate review.
Although the record shows and the Commonwealth
admitted during closing argument that there was no evidence that
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Swan violated KRS 506.120(1)(a) or (c) by organizing, managing,
supervising or directing the criminal syndicate, the jury was
instructed on those alternate theories of the case, as well as
pursuant to KRS 506.120(1)(b) and (e).
However, even if the
instruction was erroneous in that “it cannot be ascertained from
the verdict form or otherwise from the record that all of the
jurors voted to convict” Swan “on a theory supported by the
evidence[,]” Burnett v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Ky.
2000), after consideration of the record as a whole we cannot
say that Swan’s rights were substantially affected or that there
is any likely possibility that the result would have been
different absent the error.
RCr 9.54 and 10.26.
Hence, he is
not entitled to relief.
Next, Swan contends that the trial court erred by
failing to conduct a more extensive inquiry and by failing to
appoint new counsel after Swan refused to sign an attorney
conflict of interest waiver form.
We disagree.
Shortly before trial, Swan announced that he would not
sign a form waiving a possible conflict of interest between his
attorney and Chadwell’s attorney.
During the hearing which was
conducted on this issue a week before trial, Swan’s attorney
testified that he rented office space from Chadwell’s attorney,
that they shared a copying machine and a phone system, and that
they recently had taken out a yellow pages phone ad together.
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They had shared some pretrial discovery materials in this matter
in order to save costs, but they kept separate files and
separate bank accounts.
The attorney confirmed that he and
Chadwell’s attorney had never discussed their clients’ cases
“beyond those things that co-counsel normally discuss.”
Chadwell’s attorney subsequently testified in a similar manner.
The court declined to find that there was any conflict which
required waiver.
Contrary to Swan’s contention, we cannot say that the
trial court erred by finding that there was no conflict of
interest between the two attorneys who shared office space and a
telephone ad.
Both attorneys testified regarding their separate
practices, and there was nothing to indicate that they
impermissibly shared information or that any conflict arose
between the parties beyond that which necessarily related to
their sometimes antagonistic defenses at trial.
As in Kirkland
v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Ky. 2001), Swan has not
demonstrated that there was any actual conflict of interest or
that any prejudice occurred.
He is not entitled to relief on
this ground.
Finally, Swan contends that the trial court erred by
admitting certain alleged hearsay statements against him, as
well as by admitting the calendar and the notebook which were
kept by Masden and Sims.
However, Swan admits that he did not
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object to the admission of the calendar below, and our review of
the record fails to show that any palpable error resulted from
its admission.
RCr 10.26.
Moreover, even if Swan objected on
hearsay grounds, it does not appear that he timely and
specifically objected to the admission of the statements and the
notebook under the hearsay exception for statements made “by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.”
KRE 801A(b)(5).
In any event, given the
extensive evidence of a drug conspiracy involving multiple
parties including Swan, Masden, Sims and Lee Roy, as well as the
testimony regarding the notebook’s use during and in furtherance
of the conspiracy, we cannot say that the court erred by
admitting evidence of either the statements or the notebook.
The court’s judgment is reversed as to the trafficking
charge.
It is affirmed in all other respects.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy G. Arnold
Rebecca Hobbs
Assistant Public Advocates
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Clint E. Watson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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