JAMES PAUL NEVITT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
APRIL 28, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001784-MR
JAMES PAUL NEVITT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WALLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00138
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
James Paul Nevitt was found guilty by a
Bullitt Circuit Court jury of six counts of sodomy and two
counts of sexual abuse.
He was sentenced to serve three years’
imprisonment for each of the six counts of sodomy and ninety
days in the county jail for each of the counts of sexual abuse.
He appeals his conviction.
Finding no error, we affirm.
On August 7, 2001, Nevitt was accused of molesting
M.C., a minor (fifteen years of age), who was periodically left
in his care.1
Authorities began a formal investigation, and on
the morning of August 10, 2001, Detective Rick Melton of the
Kentucky State Police and Mary Ellen Murray of the Cabinet for
Families and Children visited Nevitt’s home.
Detective Melton
and Murray introduced themselves and were invited inside.
Nevitt was immediately advised of the nature of the
allegations made against him.
Detective Melton indicated to
Nevitt that M.C.’s allegations were sufficient to justify
charging him but that no charges had yet been filed.
Nevitt that he was not under arrest.
He assured
Detective Melton said that
he “may have” told Nevitt that “he could cooperate . . . or he
could be having lunch down at the jail.”
Nevitt and his wife,
Wilma, agreed to be interviewed about M.C.’s allegations.
Nevitt initially denied that anything of a sexual
nature had ever occurred with M.C.
When Melton told Nevitt that
he believed M.C.’s accusations, Nevitt admitted that he had
sodomized and sexually abused M.C. on numerous occasions.
He
emphasized, however, that the sexual contact had been
consensual.
Nevitt also volunteered that he had sexual
intercourse with his stepdaughter several times while she was a
minor and also admitted to having had sexual contact with
another minor, a friend of M.C..
When Nevitt asked whether he
1
According to the testimony of Kentucky State Police Detective Rick Melton,
Nevitt explained to police that M.C. is his godchild and may be his
biological daughter.
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needed an attorney, Detective Melton told him that that decision
was his alone.
The interview proceeded for approximately thirty-five
minutes before Detective Melton asked permission from Nevitt to
record the remainder of the conversation.
incriminating statements.
Nevitt repeated his
He never asked to terminate the
interview, and he indicated unequivocally that his confession
had been freely and voluntarily given.
At no point during the
interview was Nevitt advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.E.2d 694 (1966).
Detective Melton completed his investigation by
interviewing M.C. again and by contacting the other victims
identified by Nevitt.
On August 16, 2001, Nevitt was arrested
and charged with multiple counts of sodomy, attempted rape, and
sexual abuse.
He was indicted by a Bullitt County grand jury on
October 31, 2001.
One year later, on October 31, 2002, Nevitt filed a
motion to suppress his confession, arguing that he had not been
properly advised of his constitutional rights before making the
incriminating statements to Detective Melton and to Murray.
Ruling that Nevitt’s statements had not been made during a
custodial interrogation, the trial court denied the motion by
determining that Miranda did not apply.
convicted.
This appeal followed.
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Nevitt was tried and
Nevitt first contends that the trial court erred by
failing to suppress the incriminating statements that he made to
Detective Melton and to Murray.
Nevitt claims that he was
essentially in custody during the August 10 interview and that
he accordingly was entitled to Miranda warnings.
Since the
warnings had not been given before the interview, he argues that
his confession should have been excluded from evidence.
We
disagree.
The holding of Miranda is expressly limited to
custodial interrogations, and “the threshold issue in this case
(and in any case involving a perceived violation of Miranda
rights) is whether the defendant was subject to a custodial
interrogation at the time he claims he was denied any of his
Miranda rights.”
Jackson v. Commonwealth,
S.W.3d
(Ky.
2006)(Rendered March 23, 2006); Miranda, supra, at 444, 86 S.Ct.
at 1612.
Therefore, only statements made during custodial
interrogations are subject to suppression pursuant to Miranda.
Jackson, supra.
The warnings required by Miranda are triggered only
because of the potential of a custodial environment to
“undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”
Miranda
supra, at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624; see Callihan v. Commonwealth,
142 S.W.3d 123 (Ky. 2004), citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
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412, 420, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986).
Kentucky
historically and consistently has adhered to the custodial
interrogation requirement.
Farler v. Commonwealth, 991 S.W.2d
141 (Ky.App. 1999); Little v. Commonwealth, 991 S.W.2d 441
(Ky.App. 1999); Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407 (Ky.
2004); Callihan v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 123 (Ky. 2004).
Absent an abuse of discretion, we may not overturn on
appeal the determination of the trial court that Nevitt was not
in custody during the August 10 interview and that he was not,
therefore, entitled to Miranda warnings.
RCr2 9.78.
The trial
court’s findings are conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence.
Id.
The undisputed testimony presented at the suppression
hearing indicated that Detective Melton informed Nevitt that he
was not currently under arrest but that the matter was being
fully investigated pursuant to the serious allegations made
against him.
While the meeting was undoubtedly uncomfortable
for Nevitt, nothing about the environment suggests that Nevitt
thought (or that a reasonable person in his situation should
have thought) that he was in custody.
Of particular interest is Detective Melton’s comment
that Nevitt could have “lunch down at the jail” if he so chose.
Since Nevitt was being interviewed in his own home, we are not
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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persuaded that this comment (though questionable) converted the
interview into a custodial interrogation.
Arguably, the comment
confirmed the fact that Nevitt was not presently in custody.
Despite the obviously intimidating nature of the
questions, Nevitt’s responses appear to have been given freely
and voluntarily.
He remained in his own home and was subject
only to preliminary investigative questioning.
He was at
liberty to terminate the interview at any time and to ask Melton
and Murray to leave his home.
Since he was not under custodial
interrogation, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings prior to
making his confession to Detective Melton.
The trial court did
not err by refusing to suppress the incriminating statements.
Nevitt next argues that his convictions must be
reversed because the Commonwealth failed to introduce evidence
sufficient to identify the separate offenses charged.
He
contends that the number of offenses upon which the trial court
instructed the jury was dependent upon the number of counts
alleged in the indictment rather than upon the evidence.
He
claims that the indictment was based solely upon a mathematical
extrapolation from M.C.’s vague recounting of the facts
underlying her allegations.
Nevitt argues that there “was never
any evidence presented about any individual, identifiable, act
of sodomy or rape.”
Appellant’s Brief at 15.
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We disagree.
We have carefully reviewed the evidence presented at
trial in its entirety.
M.C. never wavered in her testimony.
She gave a graphic, credible account of the acts that Nevitt had
perpetrated against her.
She testified that Nevitt had
“performed oral sex on me and had me perform oral sex on him,
and he had anal sex with me or attempted to have anal sex with
me, and he fondled me.”
She explained specifically that Nevitt
had performed oral sex on her “[f]ive or six times”; that he had
had her perform oral sex on him perhaps three times; that he had
attempted to have sexual intercourse with her “three times at
the most.”
M.C. indicated that Nevitt had fondled her breasts
on numerous occasions.
She described the abuse as having
occurred in Nevitt’s home -- mostly in his bedroom but perhaps
more than once in a guestroom upstairs.
While M.C. was unable
to provide specific dates for the abuse, she indicated that it
had occurred intermittently over a ten-month period beginning in
September 2000 and ending in July 2001.
During a portion of Detective Melton’s testimony, the
Commonwealth played Nevitt’s taped statement for the jury.
Nevitt admitted that during 2001, he had kissed M.C.’s breasts;
that he had performed oral sex on her “[a]bout three or four
times;” that he had had her perform oral sex on him “[t]wice
maximum;” and that he had sexually abused her by having her lie
upon him and “rub around” while they were both naked.
-7-
In his
taped statement, Nevitt admitted that he had also taken M.C. out
in his truck, had stopped, and “kissed on” her; and that on
another occasion, he “rubbed on” her while he was driving her
home.
Finally, he admitted to having taken photographs of her
while her breasts were partially out of her blouse.
Nevitt
denied having had sexual intercourse with M.C. by offering as a
defense that he had not been able to maintain an erection.
Drawing all inferences in favor of the Commonwealth,
the evidence presented to the jury appears to have been more
than sufficient to induce reasonable jurors to believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that Nevitt was guilty of the charged crimes.
It was not unreasonable for the jury to find him guilty, and he
was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
See
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991).
As an alternative to this argument on the sufficiency
of the evidence, Nevitt contends that he was deprived of a
unanimous jury verdict.
He claims that the court’s instructions
failed to distinguish the offenses in any meaningful way and
that there was no method to insure that all of the jurors were
convicting on each of the same alleged offenses.
We are
persuaded that Nevitt is not entitled to relief on this ground.
Nevitt’s trial counsel prepared and tendered the very
instructions about which Nevitt now complains.
He failed to
comply with RCr 9.54 by not presenting to the trial court the
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argument or legal theory that he now presents on appeal for the
first time.
Moreover, counsel “cannot deliberately forego
making an objection to a curable trial defect when he is aware
of the basis for an objection.”
Salisbury v. Commonwealth, 556
S.W.2d 922, 927 (Ky.App. 1977).
Counsel either invited or
acquiesced in the error, if any, and there are no grounds for
reversal.
See Gibson v. Thomas, 307 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1957);
Futtrell v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1969).
Finally, Nevitt argues that “the same general facts
were necessarily used by the jury over and over in arriving at
its guilty verdicts.”
He contends that since this process
resulted in a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy, it constitutes an error warranting
reversal of his conviction.
We disagree.
As our summary of the evidence indicates, the jury was
presented with essentially matching accounts of the many
separate crimes perpetrated against M.C.
After being instructed
on the multiple crimes, it returned one guilty verdict.
Nevitt
was not placed in jeopardy twice with respect to any of the
counts, and he is not entitled to the relief he seeks.
The judgment of the Bullitt Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julia K. Pearson
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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