SHERRY PRESTON v. DEPARTMENT OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION, BRUCE CRUMP, APPOINTING AUTHORITY WORKFORCE INVESTMENT, OFFICE OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION, VIRGINIA FOX, APPOINTING AUTHORITY); KENTUCKY PERSONNEL BOARD, MARK A. SIPEK, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 13, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001716-MR
SHERRY PRESTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-CI-01109
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION,
BRUCE CRUMP, APPOINTING AUTHORITY
(NOW EDUCATION CABINET, DEPARTMENT FOR
WORKFORCE INVESTMENT, OFFICE OF
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION, VIRGINIA
FOX, APPOINTING AUTHORITY);
KENTUCKY PERSONNEL BOARD, MARK A. SIPEK,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MINTON, SCHRODER, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
Sherry Preston brings this appeal from a circuit
court’s opinion and order affirming the Kentucky Personnel
Board’s decision to uphold her suspensions and ultimate
dismissal from the Carl D. Perkins Comprehensive Rehabilitation
Center, a Division within the Department of Vocational Education
of the Workforce Development Cabinet. 1
Because we agree that
substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings and that it
correctly applied the law, we affirm.
The underlying facts are succinctly set forth in the
circuit court’s opinion and order:
Preston was a merit employee of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky under the [Kentucky
Revised Statutes] KRS Chapter 18A personnel
system. Since 1995, she worked as a
registered nurse for a hospital, a home
health agency[,] and a skilled nursing
facility, before beginning her employment
with the Carl D. Perkins Comprehensive
Rehabilitation Center in 1999. After
joining the Center, Preston taught a
Certified Nurse Assistant (CNA) Program.
Medicaid regulations require a CNA
instructor to be a registered nurse.
Early in her new employment, the
Center’s personnel discovered that Preston
lacked the requisite Medicaid credentials to
teach the Program. The CNA Program was
briefly suspended[,] and Preston was
assigned to work in the Medical Unit. She
willingly accepted this assignment. Preston
resumed teaching the CNA Program after she
completed one year of long-term care
experience as prescribed by Medicare. As a
CNA Program instructor, Preston worked from
8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. during the
Vocational Training Unit’s operational
hours. Based upon her evaluations and the
high graduation rate of her students,
Preston was considered a very good teacher.
Enrollment in the CNA Program dropped
to zero by July 2001. During this period,
the Center’s Medical Unit experienced a need
for nursing help during the third shift,
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 151B.180.
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11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. Barry Newill, the
Center’s Director, implemented a new Center
policy. The Center would not begin a new
CNA class unless at least five students
enrolled in the Program, one-half the size
of a full class. Director Newill also
indicated that he desired to assign Preston
to the Medical Unit to work as a registered
nurse.
On November 9, 2001, Doug Wireman, Unit
Director of Vocational Services, notified
Preston by a letter of the change in her job
assignment and her designated work shift.
The letter informed Preston that she was to
work as a registered nurse during the third
shift at the Medical Unit and that she would
resume her teaching duties when a sufficient
number of students enrolled in the CNA
Program. Preston resisted the change
because she had not practiced as a
registered nurse for three years and feared
that she would jeopardize her nursing
license. Preston did not report to the
Medical Unit for work. She was twice
suspended and finally dismissed after she
left her workplace on November 16, 2001, and
never returned. 2 (FN: From November 16
through November 20, 2001, Preston continued
to appear for work at the Center during her
old hours, and never reported to work at the
Medical Unit. She also used her computer to
send e-mails to other teachers accusing the
Center’s personnel of conspiring against
her. Eventually, Mr. Wireman told her she
would not be paid until she reported to her
reassigned position in the Medical Unit.
The Center paid Preston for holidays, the
2
Preston separately appealed claims of (1) demotion, involuntary
transfer, reclassification, and discrimination (age and political);
(2) her five working day suspension from December 10 through 14,
2001, and her ten working day suspension from December 26, 2001,
through January 10, 2002; and (3) her dismissal effective close of
business February 11, 2002, to the Kentucky Personnel Board (2001391; 2002-016; and 2002-072). The Board consolidated the three
appeals into the one action that forms the basis for the instant
appeal.
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time she spent filing grievances[,] and for
the time she spend meeting with Deputy
Commissioner Crump.) The Department of
Vocational Rehabilitation terminated her
employment effective February 11, 2002.
The [Kentucky Personnel Board] Hearing
Officer found, and the Personnel Board
agreed, that based upon the substantial
evidence of record,
“the Department [of Vocational
Rehabilitation] had the authority
to temporarily assign Preston the
nursing duties it did on
November 9, 2001. KRS 18A.110;
101 [Kentucky Administrative
Regulations] KAR 2:095, Section 1;
101 KAR 2:020.”
The Board also rejected the argument that
Preston should be reclassified as a
vocational rehabilitation teacher. When
Preston failed to return to work, the
Department used 101 KAR 1:345, a regulation
that authorizes suspensions and dismissals
for a lack of good behavior or
unsatisfactory performance. The Board
upheld the Department’s actions.
Preston appealed to the circuit court, which upheld
the Board’s actions.
In so doing, the court concluded that
because the unit director notified Preston of her new
assignment, the Department acted unlawfully by failing to follow
its own regulation 101 KAR 2:095, 3 which requires that such an
3
Section 2. Attendance; Hours of Work. (1) The number of hours a
full-time employee shall be required to work shall be thirty-seven
and one-half (37 1/2) hours per week unless specified otherwise by
the appointing authority or the statutes.
(2) The normal work day shall be from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., local
time, Monday through Friday.
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action be taken at the direction of the appointing authority.
Regardless, the court held that Preston’s suspensions and
dismissals were not void ab initio because overwhelming evidence
in the record demonstrated that (a) Preston would have
disregarded the temporary assignment had the appointing
authority notified her of the change; and (b) the Department
never intended to dismiss Preston until her unreasonable
behavior and absences from work led to her suspensions and
dismissal.
(3) An appointing authority may require an employee to work hours
and days other than regular days and hours, including an overtime or
inclement weather schedule if it is in the best interest of the
agency.
(4) An employee who works for an agency which requires more than one
(1) shift or seven (7) days a week operation may be reassigned from
one shift to another or from one post to another or alternate days
off by the agency to meet staffing requirements or to maintain
security or provide essential services of the agency.
(5) An employee shall give reasonable notice in advance of absence
from a work station.
Section 3. Work Station and Temporary Assignment. (1) Each employee
shall be assigned a work station by the appointing authority.
(2) A work station may be changed to better meet the needs of the
agency.
(3) An employee may be temporarily assigned to a different work
station in a different county for a period of up to sixty (60)
calendar days. Temporary assignment may be renewed with the
approval of the Secretary of Personnel. A temporarily reassigned
employee shall be reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with
regulatory provisions and the appointing authority shall notify the
employee in writing prior to the effective date of the action.
(4) An appointing authority may assign an employee to work in a
different site within the county of employment.
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Additionally, despite Preston’s arguments that her
position description and evaluation listed her duties as that of
a teacher and not a registered nurse and that the Department
erred by assigning new duties of a registered nurse to her in
contravention of 101 KAR 2:095, the court concluded that the
Department did not err by not reclassifying Preston as a
teacher, as the evidence supported that at all times Preston
held the state position and classification of a registered nurse
and lacked the teaching certificate or statement of eligibility
in the appropriate subject area for a teacher.
This appeal
followed.
Before us, Preston makes alternative arguments.
First, she argues that the circuit court incorrectly applied the
law when it determined that although the Department did not act
in accord with its regulations in that others than the
appointing authority suspended or dismissed Preston, it was not
illegal because there was substantial evidence that Preston
would not have acted any differently had the regulation been
followed and the appointing authority had formally reassigned
her.
Alternatively, Preston argues that even if the appointing
authority had legally reassigned her, the circuit court
incorrectly applied the law when it upheld the Board’s decision
that there was no substantial change in her job duties.
disagree.
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We
On appeal of the decision of the circuit court, in
reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, our standard
of review is as follows.
If there is substantial evidence in
the record to support an agency's findings, the findings are not
clearly erroneous or arbitrary and will be upheld even though
there may be conflicting evidence in the record. 4
“The fact that
a reviewing court may not have come to the same conclusion
regarding the same findings of fact does not warrant
substitution of a court's discretion for that of an
administrative agency.” 5
So the fundamental question before us is whether the
facts found by the Board are "supported by substantial evidence" 6
and, if so, whether the Board "incorrectly applied the correct
rule of law to the facts presented to it[,]" 7 or, stated another
way, the applicable standard of review is as follows:
Judicial review of the acts of an
administrative agency is concerned with the
question of arbitrariness. The findings of
fact of an administrative agency which are
supported by substantial evidence of
4
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 856
(Ky. 1981).
5
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Landmark Community
Newspapers of Kentucky, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575, 582 (Ky. 2002).
6
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Springer, 437 S.W.2d
501, 502 (Ky. 1969).
7
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Stirrat, 688 S.W.2d
750, 751-752 (Ky.App. 1984).
-7-
probative value must be accepted as binding
by the reviewing court. The court may not
substitute its opinion as to the weight of
the evidence given by the Commission. Upon
determining that the Commission's findings
were supported by substantial evidence, the
court's review is then limited to
determining whether the Commission applied
the correct rule of law. 8
Preston’s first argument addresses the circuit court’s
conclusion that the Department failed to follow the regulation
requiring the appointing authority to make the temporary
reassignment but that this failure did not void the
reassignment.
These are the facts as found by the Personnel Board
hearing officer and adopted by the Board.
First, in September
2001, Preston did not accept well her immediate supervisor’s
comment that she would probably be assigned to the Medical Unit
as her enrollment had dropped to zero.
Preston voiced an
objection, citing mistreatment by the Medical Unit; and she may
also have cited concerns about her own competence to practice
nursing in that unit.
Preston and her supervisor then worked on
starting a phlebotomy class for her to teach and worked on
recruiting more students for the CNA class.
Second, in October
2001, Preston’s supervisor and the Center director found that no
new students had been enrolled in the CNA class.
8
And Preston
Burch v. Taylor Drug Store, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Ky.App. 1998)
(citations omitted).
-8-
and the director discussed the class enrollment and a temporary
assignment to the Medical Unit.
Preston vociferously voiced
concerns about being a nurse since she had been teaching so long
and she had had conflicts in the past with the Medical Unit
staff, stating that she should be fired or layed off, which the
director indicated were not options.
The director told the
commissioner (the appointing authority) that he was considering
temporarily assigning Preston to the Medical Unit as she was a
registered nurse (RN) but that Preston had said that she would
not work there.
The commissioner considered temporary
reassignment, detail to special duty, and layoff.
The latter
two reassignments he thought did not fit as the CNA class was
expected to continue when students enrolled.
Third, in November
2001, the commissioner, as appointing authority, authorized the
director and Preston’s immediate supervisor to temporarily
reassign her to the Medical Unit.
When Preston received the
memo, she loudly and angrily responded that she would not work
in the Medical Unit and asked for leave and to be fired.
Despite the circuit court’s conclusion to the
contrary, the commissioner testified before the Board’s hearing
officer that as appointing authority, he “could approve (the
temporary reassignment) verbally[,] which is the way (he)
approved it . . .
to (the director) who passed it on to (the
immediate supervisor).”
The Board made findings based upon the
-9-
commissioner’s testimony.
As the reviewing court, we must
accept these findings as correct if supported by substantial
evidence, defined as:
[E]vidence, taken alone or in light of all
the evidence[] that has sufficient probative
value to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable people. If there is substantial
evidence to support the agency's findings, a
court must defer to that finding even though
there is evidence to the contrary. 9
Based on this testimony, we conclude that there is substantial
evidence that this Court must accept as binding that the
commissioner did authorize Preston’s temporary reassignment to
the Medical Unit. 10
And, as 101 KAR 2:095 § 3(4) provides that
“[a]n appointing authority may assign an employee to work in a
different site within the county of employment[,]” the Board
correctly applied the law in holding that the Department had the
authority to temporarily reassign Preston.
Similarly, there is substantial evidence, which we
must accept as binding, to support the Board’s finding that the
Center needed nursing help on the Medical Unit’s third shift.
Testimony from the Medical Unit’s manager indicated that the
third shift was understaffed.
The unit operated three shifts.
Full staffing on each shift was one RN, three Licensed Practical
Nurses (LPNs), and two patient aides.
The RN position on each
9
Thompson v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, 85 S.W.3d
621, 624 (Ky.App. 2002) (citations omitted).
10
Burch, supra at 834.
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shift was filled.
The first shift was fully staffed.
second shift needed a patient aide.
LPN and a patient aide.
The
The third shift needed a
Thus, reassigning Preston to the third
shift in the LPN position was authorized by the appointing
authority, under 101 KAR 2:095 § 2, which provides:
(2) The normal work day shall be from 8 a.m.
to 4:30 p.m., local time, Monday through
Friday.
(3) An appointing authority may require an
employee to work hours and days other than
regular days and hours . . . .
(4) An employee who works for an agency
which requires more than one (1) shift or
seven (7) days a week operation may be
reassigned from one shift to another . . .
to meet staffing requirements . . . .
While Preston argues that 101 KAR 2:095 § 2 does not allow for a
temporary change in work hours as her Vocational Training Unit
was a single shift unit, unlike the three shift Medical Unit,
that section of the regulation speaks to the needs of the agency
that requires more than one shift, not a particular unit of an
agency.
We find no incorrect application of the law.
In so concluding, we note that this Court has reached
the same conclusion, albeit on different grounds, as the circuit
court below.
In concluding that the Department acted unlawfully
by failing to follow the procedure which requires the appointing
authority to approve a temporary reassignment, the circuit court
failed to take note of the binding findings of fact that the
-11-
temporary reassignment to the third shift was authorized by the
commissioner as the appointing authority.
Our review, conducted
under Burch supports our conclusion that the facts relied upon
by the Board are supported by substantial evidence and that the
Board correctly applied the law.
The order of temporary
reassignment was authorized by the appointing authority; thus,
the Board acted within its statutory authority. 11
As the order
was not void, the disciplinary actions and the dismissal are not
void ab initio.
Preston’s second issue asserts that the circuit
court’s opinion and order was erroneous and contrary to law in
that even if the Department had the authority to change her work
site and hours, it had no authority to change her job duties;
and her reassignment from a position in which she taught to a
position in which she was required to perform nursing duties
resulted in her being constructively discharged.
We disagree.
Preston concedes the Board’s finding that she was
always classified as a RN but questions the Board’s and the
circuit court’s conclusions that she could be reassigned to
duties within her RN classification but not within her position
description of CNA program teacher.
11
In accord with 101 KAR
Commonwealth of Kentucky Transportation Cabinet Department of
Vehicle Regulation v. Cornell, 796 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Ky.App. 1990).
-12-
2:020 § 1(1), 12 class specifications are general in nature.
Still, consistent with her CNA program teaching duties and her
reassignment to the Medical Unit, Preston’s RN specification
generally included teaching in addition to nursing duties.
According to 101 KAR 2:020 § 1(6), the more detailed listing of
12
Section 1. Interpretation of Class Specifications. (1) Class
specifications shall describe and explain the job duties and
responsibilities typically assigned to a position within a
particular class.
(2) Class specifications shall indicate the kinds of positions to be
allocated to the various job classifications as determined by their
characteristics and duties or responsibilities. Characteristics and
duties or responsibilities of a class shall be general statements
indicating the level of responsibility and discretion of positions
in that job classification.
(3) Examples of duties or responsibilities shall not be construed
as:
(a) Describing what the duties or responsibilities of an individual
position shall be; or limiting the appointing authority's ability to
temporarily take away from, add to, or otherwise alter the duties
and responsibilities of an individual position.
(4) The use of an individual expression or illustration describing
the duties or responsibilities of a class shall not be regarded as
excluding assignment of other duties or responsibilities not
mentioned which are of similar kind or quality.
(5) Minimum requirements shall be comprehensive statements of the
minimum background as to education, experience and other
qualifications which will be required in all cases as evidence of an
appointee's ability to perform the work [properly].
(6) Position descriptions shall state, in detail, the duties and
responsibilities assigned to an individual position. If the duties
and responsibilities assigned to a position are to be changed in a
material and permanent way, the supervisor making the recommendation
shall timely submit to the appointing authority for the agency a
position description, stating the duties and responsibilities to be
assigned. If the appointing authority approves the material and
permanent assignment of the duties and responsibilities, the new
position description shall be forwarded to the secretary with the
appointing authority's recommendation for reclassification.
-13-
duties and responsibilities assigned to an individual position
is in a position description.
While Preston’s position
description listed her title as registered nurse, under the work
performed, her duties were described as a teacher in the CNA
program.
Regardless, in accord with 101 KAR 2:020 § 1(3)(a),
the appointing authority may “temporarily take away from, add
to, or otherwise alter the duties and responsibilities of an
individual position[,]” and in accord with 101 KAR 2:020 § 1(6),
the appointing authority only needs to change a position
description if the duties and responsibilities change in a
material and permanent way.
So even if Preston’s position
description was insufficient to cover her duties and
responsibilities in the Medical Unit, as it was a temporary
assignment, it was allowed under the regulation without a
corresponding change in the position description.
Based on Preston’s concession, we conclude that there
is substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings that
Preston was classified as a RN, a position that indisputably fit
within the job duties and responsibilities in the Medical Unit.
Additionally, the Board correctly applied the law in that the
regulations allow an appointing authority to add to or otherwise
alter the duties and responsibilities of an individual position;
and no change in the position description is needed unless the
-14-
change is material and permanent.
As this reassignment was
temporary, the Board correctly followed the law. 13
As to Preston’s argument that the reassignment
amounted to a constructive discharge, as has been shown above,
the temporary reassignment was authorized.
The facts indicate
that Preston was reassigned because she had no class enrollment
and was reassigned to a position with duties within her
classification of RN to a shift that was understaffed.
While
the change was obviously not optimum for her, it is difficult
based on this record to conclude that the Department’s actions
were so intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to resign. 14
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion and order of
the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul F. Fauri
Frankfort, Kentucky
Sue G. Simon
Frankfort, Kentucky
13
This Court notes that Preston is correct that the Board incorrectly
cited 101 KAR 2:095 § 1(3) in paragraph seven of its conclusion, but
a reading of the conclusions in context indicates that the Board
quoted from 101 KAR 2:020 § 1(3) in paragraph four (also incorrectly
cited as 2:095) of its conclusions, and from context apparently
meant to carry that citation through to paragraph seven.
14
Commonwealth Tourism Cabinet v. Stosberg, 948 S.W.2d 425 (Ky.App.
1997).
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