LINK OWENS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
MARCH 17, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001592-MR
LINK OWENS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00047
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MINTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Link Owens (Owens) brings this appeal
from an order of the Knox Circuit Court, entered July 8, 2004,
denying his motion made pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42, following an evidentiary hearing.
We
affirm.
The matter before us originally arose from an incident
that occurred on May 15, 1995, when Owens, co-defendant Tommy
Hooker, and the victim, Owens’ former father-in-law Teddy
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
Williams, spent the day drinking beer at Williams’ house.
According to Williams’ testimony, later on in the evening he
brought up to Owens the sore subject of Owens’ not paying child
support to Owens’ three children, who were Williams’
grandchildren.
There was also some other discussion as to
Owens’ ability to handle himself in a fight.
The group got
hungry and Williams suggested getting a sandwich from the
kitchen.
Owens went to the kitchen and Williams followed.
After Williams entered the kitchen, Owens turned and stabbed him
with a knife.
(Williams later testified that the knife was not
one of the two he kept in the kitchen).
Hooker approached
Williams from behind and stabbed him once in the back.
When the
police arrived, while Williams was fading in and out of
consciousness, he identified Owens and Hooker as the assailants.
Williams sustained a massive loss of blood at the scene.
At the
hospital after being transported to the emergency room, Williams
once again identified Owens and Hooker as the assailants.
Owens
and Hooker were arrested a short time later in a nearby house.
Owens’ hair was wet, and it appeared to the police that he had
recently showered.
Williams sustained multiple stab wounds to
the front of his body (most seriously to his stomach), and one
to his back.
The injuries required an extensive and lengthy
recuperative period.
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Owens and Hooker were tried together.
At trial,
Williams identified both defendants as the assailants, and
neither defendant testified.
After a two-day trial, Hooker was
adjudged guilty of second-degree assault2 and sentenced to ten
years’ imprisonment.
Owens was adjudged guilty of first-degree
assault3 and second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO II)4
and sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment.
Both were
sentenced pursuant to the jury recommendations, Hooker on April
16, 1996, and Owens on April 12, 1996.
Hooker appealed as a matter of right to this Court,
which affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a new
penalty phase, upon concluding that the trial court committed
reversible error by refusing to include in the penalty phase
requested jury instructions that Hooker was not compelled to
testify and that “no adverse inference” should be drawn from his
election not to do so.5
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes 508.020, class C felony.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes 508.010, class B felony.
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes 532.080.
5
Hooker v. Commonwealth, 96-CA-001133-MR, rendered September 12, 1997, not to
be published. The decision in Hooker was rendered after the court failed to
find any Kentucky case law concerning a requested “no adverse inference”
instruction during the penalty phase when no persistent felony offender (PFO)
charge was involved. Subsequent to the rendering of Hooker, in Young v.
Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 148, 171 (Ky. 2001), the Kentucky Supreme Court
concluded, adversely to the decision in Hooker, that the giving of a “no
adverse inference” instruction pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure 9.54(3) (upon request) in the penalty phase of a trial where the
jury had already found the defendant guilty and was only deliberating the
appropriate punishment was pointless.
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In the meantime, Owens appealed as a matter of right
to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed his judgment in
Owens v. Commonwealth, 950 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. 1997), concluding no
error from Owens’ one appeal issue:
Appellant argues that the trial court
erred when it allowed two police officers,
James Gray and Pat Olfen, to give hearsay
testimony which bolstered the victim's
testimony and invaded the province of the
jury. Officer Gray, of the Barbourville
Police Department, testified that when he
arrived at the scene of the assault, Teddy
Williams was on the floor and bleeding
badly. When Officer Gray asked Williams who
had attacked him, Williams identified
appellant as one of the assailants. Officer
Olfen testified similarly stating that he
overheard Williams identify appellant as one
of his attackers. At trial, the victim
Williams, testified that appellant was one
of his attackers and that he had told this
to the police on the evening of the crime.
He was cross-examined as to his account of
what transpired. . .
In this case, after the victim had
testified that he made the out-of-court
identification of appellant, the
Commonwealth was entitled to introduce the
hearsay statements of the police officers to
corroborate the fact of the prior out-ofcourt identification. Brown v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 564 S.W.2d 24 (1978).
Such corroborating testimony does not
substitute the credibility of the
corroborating witness for that of the fact
witness on essential matters. To determine
whether the underlying facts are as
asserted, the trier of fact must rely on the
identifying witness. As Preston( v.
Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1966))
reasoned, corroboration is entirely proper
to prove that at a former time, without the
suggestion of others who might have
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influenced his recollection, the witness
recognized and declared the accused to be
the person who committed the act.
On April 14, 1999, Owens, pro-se, filed an RCr 11.42
motion, raising multiple issues, three of which are before us.
Appointed counsel filed a supplemental RCr 11.42 motion, and an
evidentiary hearing was held on May 26, 2004.
On July 8, 2004,
the trial court entered its order overruling Owens’ motion.
This appeal follows.
Before us, Owens asserts ineffective assistance of
trial counsel for counsel’s failure to 1) request a “no adverse
inference” instruction in the guilt and PFO penalty phases of
the trial; 2) allow Owens to testify; and 3) provide “conflictfree” representation.
We affirm.
Our standard of review of an RCr 11.42 motion is
stated in Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 467-69 (Ky.
2003):
(An RCr 11.42) motion is limited to the
issues that were not and could not be raised
on direct appeal. An issue raised and
rejected on direct appeal may not be
reconsidered in these proceedings by simply
claiming that it amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel. Haight v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436 (2001),
citing Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975
S.W.2d 905 (1998).
The standards which measure ineffective
assistance of counsel have been set out in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord
Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37
-5-
(1985). In order to be ineffective, the
performance of defense counsel must be below
the objective standard of reasonableness and
so prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of
a fair trial and a reasonable result.
Strickland, supra. It must be demonstrated
that, absent the errors by trial counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the
jury would have reached a different result.
See Norton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d
175 (2001). The purpose of RCr 11.42 is to
provide a forum for known grievances, not to
provide an opportunity to research for
grievances. Gilliam v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
652 S.W.2d 856 (1983); Haight, supra.
The RCr 11.42 motion must set forth all
facts necessary to establish the existence
of a constitutional violation. The court
will not presume that facts omitted from the
motion establish the existence of such a
violation. Cf. Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
803 S.W.2d 573 (1990).
...
The burden is on the movant to establish
convincingly that he has been deprived of
some substantial right which would justify
the extraordinary relief afforded by postconviction proceedings. Dorton v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 117 (1968);
See also Haight.
...
As noted in Strickland, no particular set of
detailed rules for counsel's conduct can
satisfactorily take into account the variety
of circumstances faced by defense counsel or
the range of legitimate decisions regarding
how best to represent a criminal defendant.
Any such set of rules would interfere with
the constitutionally protected independence
of counsel and restrict the wide latitude
counsel must have in making tactical
decisions.
...
Judicial review of the performance of
defense counsel must be very deferential to
counsel and to the circumstances under which
they are required to operate. There is
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always a strong presumption that the conduct
of counsel falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance because
hindsight is always perfect. Cf. Bell v.
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152
L.Ed.2d 914 (2002).
Technical errors which do not deprive a
defendant of a substantive or procedural
right to which the law entitles the
defendant or a fair trial are not sufficient
to establish prejudice under Strickland. Cf.
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S
.Ct. 838, 12 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); Baze v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 23 S.W.3d 619 (2000);
Norton, supra.
As stated in Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky.
1998), “(w)hen the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing,
the reviewing court must defer to the determinations of fact and
witness credibility made by the trial judge.
McQueen v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 694 (1986); Commonwealth v.
Anderson, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 276 (1996); McQueen v. Scroggy, 99
F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996).”
When an evidentiary hearing is held
on an RCr 11.42 motion, the movant has “the burden to establish
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right
which would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by the
post-conviction proceeding.”
Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d
878, 884 (Ky. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Stopher v.
Conliffe, 170 S.W.3d 307 (Ky. 2005).
We review questions of
fact under the clearly erroneous standard of Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01 and questions of law de novo.
See
generally Brown v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Ky.App.
-7-
1999).
As we conclude that the findings of the circuit court
are supported by substantial evidence and are not an abuse of
discretion, and the court correctly applied the law, we affirm.
With regard to Owens’ first issue as to trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to request an adverse
inference instruction in both the guilt and penalty phases of
the trial, the trial court concluded as follows:
The Court finds that (Owens’)
assertions are without merit or substance
and amount to nothing more than mere
speculation. (Owens’ defense attorney)
testified during (Owens’) Evidentiary
Hearing that he addressed the no adverse
inference instruction to the members of the
jury during voir dire. Further, trial
Counsel indicated to the Court that it was
part of his trial strategy not to call
(Owens) as a witness as was it his intent to
discredit the victim’s testimony.
Furthermore, the record is indicative of the
fact that the Court stated on numerous
occasions during the course of the trial
proceedings that the burden rests on the
Commonwealth to prove each count of the
indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. It is
the ultimate opinion of this Court that
there is no reasonable probability that the
outcome of the case would had (sic) been
different had a no adverse inference
instruction been given as is mandated in the
second part of the mandated test set forth
in Strickland v. Washington, 46 U.S. 668
(1984).
As no factual issues are at hand, our review is de novo.
Pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the test for
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ineffective assistance of counsel requires a finding that
counsel’s performance was deficient, and without the deficient
performance, the outcome would have been different.
Case law is
clear that, pursuant to RCr 9.54(3), a “no adverse inference”
instruction is required to be given, in either the guilt phase
or the penalty phase where a determination of guilt as to PFO is
considered, only if requested.
Watkins v. Commonwealth, 105
S.W.3d 449, 451-52 (Ky. 2003).
Owens fails, however, to cite us
to any authority requiring the trial court to sua sponte give a
“no adverse inference” instruction in either the guilt or PFO
phase of trial, or authority that concludes that a failure to so
request renders counsel ineffective.
The court in Ice v.
Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Ky. 1984), provided that,
with regard to a “no adverse inference” instruction in the guilt
phase of a capital trial:
We disagree that the trial judge should
have instructed the jury sua sponte. It is
a matter of judgment for defense counsel to
decide whether such an instruction is more
harmful than beneficial. Counsel may decide
it merely calls attention to the problem.
We adhere to the requirement that such an
instruction shall be given when requested.
Thus, we cannot conclude that counsel erred in failing to make a
request in either the guilt or PFO phase for a “no adverse
inference” instruction nor, in light of the voir dire on the
subject and the victim’s identification of Owens as the
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assailant, that this failure affected the outcome of the trial.
Thus, the trial court did not err in its application of the law.
With regard to Owens’ next contention that counsel was
ineffective in not allowing him to testify, the trial court made
the following findings:
Testimonial evidence by trial counsel
and (Owens) pertaining specifically to the
aforementioned issue was tendered to the
Court during (Owens’) Evidentiary Hearing.
(Owens’ defense counsel) proffered to this
Court several reasons that led to his
decision not to call (Owens) as a defense
witness and they were as follows: (1)
(Owens’) status as a convicted felon, under
(Kentucky Rules of Evidence) KRE 609, would
have been disclosed to the jury, (2)
(Owens’) defense would not have accomplished
anything in having each defendant take the
stand and implicate the other as being the
sole aggressor, (3) Counsel was of the
opinion that (Owens’) disdainful demeanor
would have made him a terrible witness, and
(4) Further, Counsel testified that (Owens)
told multiple stories that varied in details
and as a result, Counsel believed that
(Owens) intended to testify falsely on the
witness stand and ultimately commit fraud
upon the Court. Trial Counsel further
stated he told (Owens) he would withdraw if
(Owens) testified because of the potential
that (Owens) intended to lie.
(Owens) now contends that he demanded
to testify on his own behalf and that his
story of the events never varied. In
addition, (Owens) contends that through the
action or inaction of trial counsel, he was
never afforded the opportunity to present to
the jury evidence he believes was
exculpatory to his involvement in the
assault of the victim. (Owens) admitted on
the record that while in fact he disclosed
to the Court his dissatisfaction with his
-10-
appointed counsel, he never made the Court
aware of his demand to take the stand as
witness and testify on his own behalf. It
is the opinion of this Court that trial
counsel’s decision not to call (Owens) as a
witness was well-founded trial strategy and
entirely reasonable in light of counsel’s
basis for such decision, and as such does
not provide grounds for relief.
As indicated above, as the reviewing court we must defer to the
determinations of fact and witness credibility that have been
made by the trial court and that are supported by substantial
evidence.
Owens admitted at the evidentiary hearing that he
never made the court aware at trial of his desire to testify.
If this were a direct appeal issue, Owens’ inaction would have
constituted a waiver, as it would have indicated “no desire to
testify, and . . . no indication that he disagreed with defense
counsel's strategy or was frustrated or prevented from
testifying by defense counsel.”
453.
See generally Watkins, supra at
Counsel’s listed reasons for his advice to Owens not to
testify (which Owens testified at the evidentiary hearing at one
point he believed to be in his best interest) were indicative of
trial strategy – Owens’ status as a convicted felon, his
demeanor (which was familiar to counsel as he had represented
Owens in another trial in which he did not testify), and his
defenses that ranged from blaming his co-defendant to multiple
versions of what happened, including that he was not present.
In our de novo review, Owens has not cited us to any authority
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indicative of deficient performance by counsel that would have
affected the outcome.
As the trial court correctly applied the
law, we find no error.
Owens’ last contention, that counsel was ineffective
in failing to provide “conflict-free” representation, was
resolved by the trial court as follows:
Testimonial evidence taken at the
Evidentiary Hearing confirmed that counsel
explained in detail to (Owens) the
advantages and disadvantages of joint
representation and had (Owens) sign a
“Waiver of Dual or Multiple Representation
RCr 8.30(1)” of which (Owens) admitted on
the record that he understood the contents
thereof. (Owens’) signature and admission
of record precludes (Owens) from now
successfully arguing that he was unaware of
possibilities of conflicts of interests
between the said parties. Furthermore, when
in fact the conflict did arise, (Owens’)
counsel took every available precautions
(sic) to protect (Owens’) interests.
Before us Owens contends that a conflict existed when codefendant Hooker, who up until the morning of trial was supposed
to testify and accept responsibility for the crime, chose not to
testify, causing Owens’ defense to evaporate and leaving trial
counsel ineffective for failing to have another theory upon
which to proceed.
We disagree.
First, Owens was made aware of
the potential for conflict at the beginning of counsel’s
representation, and waived the conflict by signing a waiver
form.
See generally Hayes v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 481, 485
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(Ky.App. 1987).
Second, while we do not disagree that Hooker’s
decision not to testify was potentially detrimental to Owens’
defense, there is nothing in the record to indicate how counsel
both being public defenders resulted in this being a prejudicial
conflict.
Both Owens and Hooker could have been represented by
counsel unconnected in any fashion, and the same result could
have occurred.
The trial court correctly applied the law.
There was no ineffective assistance.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Knox
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sarah J. Jost
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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