JOHNNY CARPENTER v. GINA F. HINES AND NATALIE HINES
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RENDERED: MARCH 3, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-001574-MR
JOHNNY CARPENTER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00620
GINA F. HINES AND
NATALIE HINES
APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
(1) AFFIRMING
AND
(2) GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a summary judgment
awarding appellees twelve years of back child support.
Appellant argues that he was denied due process when the court
refused to allow him an evidentiary hearing to challenge the
underlying 1990 agreed paternity order on grounds of fraud and
lack of notice.
Since the challenge to the 1990 agreed
paternity order has already been addressed and ruled on in the
Whitley District Court, we adjudge that appellant is barred from
relitigating the issues in this case pursuant to the doctrine of
res judicata.
Hence, we affirm.
On October 19, 1990, appellee, Gina Hines filed a
petition for paternity and child support against appellant,
Johnny Carpenter, in the Whitley District Court.
On November 9,
1990, an agreed paternity order was entered in the case
adjudicating Johnny to be the father of Natalie Hines, born
September 22, 1983, and setting Johnny’s child support
obligation at $100 per week.
The agreed order contains the
signature of “Johnny Carpenter”.
Twelve years later, on July 1, 2002, Gina and Natalie
filed an action in the Laurel Circuit Court seeking $78,330 in
back child support and interest, pursuant to the agreed
paternity order.
Natalie turned eighteen on September 22, 2001,
but did not graduate from high school until May 2002.
According
to the complaint, Johnny paid $195 a month in rent for Gina from
1990 through 1994.
At that point, Johnny told Gina he would not
be able to pay anything, but represented that he had been
placing money in a trust fund for Natalie’s college.
He told
Gina that after Natalie graduated from high school there should
be approximately $80,000 in the trust fund.
After Natalie
turned eighteen, Gina confronted Johnny about the trust fund and
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he said he could give her only $1,500.
It is undisputed that no
child support was paid to Gina after 1994.
Johnny’s answer to the Laurel Circuit complaint
alleges that the agreed paternity order in the Whitley District
Court was obtained by fraud.
Johnny maintains that his
signature on the document was forged.
In support of this claim,
Johnny filed the results of a handwriting analysis conducted by
a handwriting expert who determined that the signature on the
agreed paternity order was not Johnny’s.
On August 2, 2002, Johnny filed a CR 60.02 motion to
reopen the 1990 Whitley District Court action.
In this motion,
Johnny apparently alleged that it was not his signature on the
agreed order and that he never received a copy of the summons in
the case or notification of the action.1
Johnny moved the
Whitley District Court to vacate the paternity order based upon
lack of notice and that the signature on the paternity order was
a forgery.
On February 10, 2003, the Whitley District Court
denied Johnny’s motion to vacate the paternity order because,
1
Only select portions of the Whitley District Court record are contained in
the record before us. The appendix to appellant’s brief contains a copy of
the summons issued in the Whitley District Court, an affidavit by Marcia
Smith, appellees’ attorney, filed in the Whitley District Court, and a copy
of the petition for paternity and child support filed in the Whitley District
Court. None of those documents from the Whitley District Court were filed in
the Laurel Circuit Court record before us. Fortney v. Elliott’s Adm’r, 273
S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1954). Consequently, appellees filed a motion to strike these
documents from appellant’s brief, which motion was passed to this three-judge
panel. Accordingly, we grant appellees’ motion to strike these documents
from appellant’s brief.
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according to the record, the agreed paternity order had been
sent to Johnny’s correct address and there was no indication
that it had been returned as undelivered and because Johnny had
admitted to paying some support to Gina.
Also, the court
adjudged that the motion to vacate had not been filed within a
reasonable time under CR 60.02.
On February 26, 2003, Johnny filed a notice of appeal
with the Whitley Circuit Court seeking reversal of the District
Court’s denial of his motion to vacate and a hearing to
demonstrate that the paternity order was fraudulently obtained.
On July 18, 2003, the Whitley Circuit Court ordered that
paternity testing be done in the case.
The results of the
testing established that Johnny was indeed the biological father
of Natalie.
On November 3, 2003, the Whitley Circuit Court
entered an order affirming the district court’s order without a
hearing.
Johnny thereafter filed a motion for discretionary
review with the Court of Appeals.
This Court denied the motion
on February 26, 2004.
On November 19, 2003, Gina and Natalie filed a motion
for summary judgment in the Laurel Circuit Court case, citing
the Whitley Circuit Court’s November 3, 2003, order affirming
the Whitley District Court.
Gina and Natalie later renewed the
motion on grounds that the Court of Appeals had denied
discretionary review of the Whitley District Court decision.
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On
July 6, 2004, the Laurel Circuit Court granted the motion for
summary judgment.
The judgment awarded Gina and Natalie $50,450
in back child support plus prejudgment and postjudgment
interest, with a credit to Johnny for the $195 a month payments
he made from 1990 to 1994.
This appeal by Johnny followed.
Johnny’s primary argument is that his procedural due
process rights were violated when he was not provided with
notice of the Whitley County paternity action and was not
afforded an evidentiary hearing in the Whitley District Court,
the Whitley Circuit Court or the Laurel Circuit Court on his
claims of fraud and lack of notice.
In our view, Johnny is
barred from raising these arguments in the Laurel Circuit Court
under the doctrine of res judicata since these arguments were
raised and litigated in the Whitley District Court.
For the
doctrine of res judicata to apply, there must be identity of
parties, identity of causes of action, and the action must have
been decided on the merits.
419 (Ky. 1970).
Newman v. Newman, 451 S.W.2d 417,
“[T]he rule of res judicata does not act as a
bar if there are different issues or the questions of law
presented are different.”
Id.
Here, the parties are the same
and the underlying cause of action to establish paternity and
child support is the same.
Natalie and Gina are now simply
seeking a judgment for back child support pursuant to the agreed
paternity order in the Whitley District Court.
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Johnny raised
the same issues in the Whitley District Court that he now raises
in the Laurel Circuit Court – lack of notice of the original
paternity action and fraud in obtaining the agreed paternity
order.
The Whitley District Court adjudged that the evidence
demonstrated that Johnny had received notice of the agreed
paternity order that he had signed since he had paid some child
support and the order was not returned as undelivered.
This
ruling was affirmed by the Whitley Circuit Court on appeal, and
discretionary review was denied by this Court.
Accordingly,
Johnny cannot relitigate these same issues in the Laurel Circuit
Court.
Johnny’s final argument is that his procedural due
process rights were violated when the Court of Appeals denied
his motion for discretionary review of the Whitley District
Court order denying his CR 60.02 motion to vacate.
This is not
the proper avenue for challenging this Court’s denial of a
motion for discretionary review in another case.
Thus, the
argument is devoid of merit.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Laurel Circuit Court is affirmed, and the motion to strike is
granted.
ALL CONCUR.
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ENTERED:
March 3, 2006
/s/ Wil Schroder
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Warren N. Scoville
London, Kentucky
Marcia A. Smith
Corbin, Kentucky
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