TIMOTHY DAVID BELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 3, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-001230-MR
TIMOTHY DAVID BELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 03-CR-00360
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM AND McANULTY, JUDGES; PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE.1
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE:
Timothy David Bell appeals from a
judgment of conviction from the Daviess Circuit Court in which
he was convicted of three counts of sexual abuse in the first
degree.
Finding no error, we affirm.
On May 31, 2003, Bell went out drinking with his
friend, Jarred Romines.
Later that night Bell accompanied
Romines back to Romines’s home that Romines shared with his
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
girlfriend and his girlfriend’s eight-year old daughter, B.L.
Romines offered to let Bell stay the night and sleep on a couch
in the living room.
Later that night, after everyone else had fallen
asleep, Bell entered B.L.’s bedroom, woke her and ask if she
wanted to watch a movie with him in the living room.
The two
then went into the living room and sat down on the couch.
While
watching the movie, Bell put his arm around B.L. and then placed
his hand inside her underwear.
B.L. told Bell to stop; instead,
Bell exposed his penis and placed B.L.’s hand on it.
Bell then
made B.L. promise not to tell anyone about the incident.
In May 2003, Bell also visited another of his friends,
Carl.
During the visit, Bell and Carl drank alcohol and played
computer games late into the night.
Since Bell had previously
lived with Carl and his family, Carl agreed to allow Bell to
spend the night sleeping on a couch.
Later, after everyone else
had fallen asleep, Bell entered the bedroom of M.T., Carl’s
five-year old daughter, and touched her between the legs.
On June 11, 2003, after spending the evening drinking
with Romines, Bell again stayed in Romines’s home, gaining
access to B.L again.
After being questioned by Bell, B.L. told
him that she had not told anyone about the previous incident of
sexual abuse.
Bell then touched B.L. again.
B.L. told her mother about the incident.
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The next morning,
B.L.’s mother told
Romines, who called the police.
Later, Bell was arrested, and,
while in police custody, Bell confessed to sexually abusing B.L.
On June 12th, M.T.’s mother found out that Bell had
been arrested for sexually abusing B.L.
M.T.’s mother spoke to
M.T. about good and bad touches and asked if she had been
touched in a bad way.
M.T. began to cry but, eventually, told
her mother that Bell had touched her.
M.T.’s mother then
contacted the police.
On August 6, 2003, a Daviess County grand jury
indicted Bell on two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree
regarding B.L., one count of sexual abuse in the first degree
regarding M.T., one count of possession of marijuana and one
count of alcohol intoxication.
In March 2004, Bell moved the
trial court to sever the offense regarding M.T. from the
offenses regarding B.L. and argued that it would prejudice him
if all three offenses were tried together.
He claimed that the
offense regarding M.T. was not sufficiently similar to the
offenses regarding B.L.
After holding a hearing on the issue,
the trial court denied Bell’s motion to sever.
Because of M.T.’s young age, Bell moved the trial
court for a competency hearing.
The trial court held a
competency hearing on March 25, 2004.
At the hearing, Bell
submitted fifteen questions for the trial court to ask M.T.
trial court refused to use Bell’s questions, commenting that
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The
Bell was attempting to turn the competency hearing into a
deposition.
Ultimately, the trial court questioned M.T. for
twenty-five minutes and, afterwards, found the child to be
competent to testify at trial.
On March 26, 2004, Bell’s case proceeded to trial, and
he was convicted on all three counts of sexual abuse in the
first degree.
On June 6, 2004, the trial court sentenced Bell
to ten years in prison.
He now appeals to this Court.
SEVERANCE
On appeal, Bell argues that the trial court erred when
it denied his motion to sever.
Citing Roark v. Commonwealth, 90
S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2002), Bell argues if the evidence necessary to
prove each offense would not be admissible if separate trials
were held regarding each offense, then joinder would cause undue
prejudice.
Bell argues that the incidents of sexual abuse
regarding B.L. were not sufficiently similar to the incident of
sexual abuse regarding M.T.; thus, the three offenses should not
have been joined together.
Bell insists he was unduly
prejudiced by the joinder.
In addition, Bell insists that he
was not allowed to plead guilty to the offenses regarding B.L.
because he did not confess to abusing M.T.
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
9.12 permits a court to join two or more
indictments for trial if the offenses could
have been joined in a single indictment.
RCr 6.18 states that separate offenses may
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be joined in a single indictment “if the
offenses are of the same or similar
character or are based on the same acts or
transactions connected together or
constituting parts of a common scheme or
plan.” However, RCr 9.16 requires that
offenses shall be separated for trial “[i]f
it appears that a defendant or the
Commonwealth is or will be prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses.” The trial court is
afforded broad discretion in regard to
joinder and its decision will not be
overturned absent a showing of clear abuse
of that discretion.
A significant factor in determining whether
joinder is proper, or whether prejudice
exists, is the extent to which evidence of
one offense would be admissible in a trial
of the other offense. In this light,
“evidence of independent sexual acts between
the accused and persons other than the
victim, if similar to the act charged, and
not too remote in time, are admissible to
show intent, motive or a common plan.”
(Citations omitted.) Berry v. Commonwealth,
84 S.W.3d 82, 87 (Ky.App. 2001).
Despite Bell’s insistence to the contrary, the incidents of
sexual abuse regarding B.L. and the incident regarding M.T. are
sufficiently similar to support joinder.
Both victims were
prepubescent females and were approximately the same age.
was eight years old, while M.T. was five years old.
the same tactic to gain access to both children.
B.L.
Bell used
He befriended
the man in each household, the boyfriend of B.L.’s mother in
B.L.’s case and M.T.’s father in M.T.’s case.
He drank with
both men and then, after getting drunk with each man, received
permission to spend the night at their respective homes.
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Then,
after everyone else was asleep, Bell slipped into each child’s
bedroom.
And, during each incident, he touched each child’s
vaginal area.
We also note that each incident of abuse occurred
within a relatively short time period.
If separate trials had
been held for each offense, the evidence regarding each offense
would have been admissible in a separate trial for each offense.
The trial court simply did not abuse its broad discretion when
it denied Bell’s motion to sever.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY BELL AT THE COMPETENCY HEARING
In addition, Bell argues that the trial court erred
when it refused to ask M.T. his fifteen questions.
Bell points
out that the trial court granted his motion for a competency
hearing but then refused to ask M.T. his questions which were
specifically about the incident of sexual abuse.
Bell cites KRE
601, which deals with the competency of witnesses, and argues
that specific questions regarding an alleged criminal incident
are necessary to determine if the witness accurately perceived
the incident and is capable of testifying about it.
The competency of witnesses is controlled by KRE 601.
According to this rule:
(a) General. Every person is competent to
be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules or by statute.
(b) Minimal qualifications. A person is
disqualified to testify as a witness if the
trial court determines that he:
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(1) Lacked the capacity to perceive
accurately the matters about which he
proposes to testify;
(2) Lacks the capacity to recollect facts;
(3) Lacks the capacity to express himself so
as to be understood, either directly or
through an interpreter; or
(4) Lacks the capacity to understand the
obligation of a witness to tell the truth.
The qualifications for competency are minimal, and, as can be
seen, all witnesses are presumed to be competent.
This
presumption applies to children as well as adults. Bart v.
Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Ky. 1997).
Since the trial
court is in the unique position to observe a witness testify, it
is within the trial court’s sound discretion to determine
whether the witness is competent to testify. Id.
When there is
a question regarding a child witness’s competency, the trial
court is obligated to hold a hearing and carefully examine the
child to determine if he or she is sufficiently intelligent to
observe, to recall and to relate the facts. Id.
In addition and
perhaps most importantly, the trial court must determine if the
child has developed a moral obligation to testify truthfully.
Id.
The questions submitted by Bell would have challenged
M.T.’s credibility but would have not tested her competency, and
the court was under no obligations to use them.
Moreover, we
agree with the trial court that Bell was merely attempting to
use the competency hearing as an opportunity to depose M.T.
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Bell has failed to show that the trial court abused its
discretion when it refused to use his questions during the
competency hearing.
COMPETENCY OF CHILD VICTIM TO TESTIFY
Finally, Bell argues that the trial court erred when
it determined that M.T. was competent to testify.
He argues
that M.T. lacked the capacity to describe the sexual abuse
because she testified at trial that she did not know how old she
was when Bell abused her; did not know in which house the abuse
occurred; did not know the season in which the abuse occurred;
did not know on what day the abuse had occurred and could not
describe what Bell wore at the time he abused her.
During the competency hearing, M.T. responded to the
trial court’s questions and testified that she knew her first
and last name; the street on which she lived; where she attended
elementary school and the grade in which she was enrolled.
M.T.
also testified that she knew the alphabet; remembered what she
had last received for Christmas; remembered what she had done
the previous summer and what she had eaten for supper the night
before.
In addition, at the hearing, the trial court showed
nine pictures to M.T.
She was asked to evaluate each picture
and determine whether the person in the picture was lying or
telling the truth.
She correctly evaluated each picture.
trial court then showed four more pictures to M.T. and
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The
instructed her to pick out which person in the pictures would
get in trouble for lying.
well.
She correctly performed this test as
At the hearing, M.T. also testified that she knew the
difference between telling the truth and lying, testified that
she knew that she was supposed to always tell the truth and
promised to testify truthfully at trial.
The testimony adduced at the competency hearing was
more than sufficient to support the trial court’s decision
finding M.T. competent to testify.
And we note that M.T.’s
trial testimony upon which Bell relies to support his argument
that M.T. was incompetent does not reflect upon her competency
but reflects upon her credibility.
The record supports that the
trial court did not abused its considerable discretion in
finding M.T. competent.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Euva D. May
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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