CATINA BROCKMAN (THEODORE H. LAVIT, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST) v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY (REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 9, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
ORDERED PUBLISHED:
FEBRUARY 10, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000982-MR
CATINA BROCKMAN (THEODORE H. LAVIT,
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00058-02
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
(HON. DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE,
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Theodore H. Lavit, Real Party In Interest, has
appealed from an order entered on April 30, 2004, by Judge
Doughlas M. George of the Taylor Circuit Court which held Lavit
in contempt of court and fined him $825.001 for his failure to
appear in court on November 10, 2003, for the trial of
1
The $825.00 represented the juror’s fee paid to 66 jurors that reported for
jury duty in Brockman’s case.
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Catina Brockman.
Having concluded
that the trial court erred by finding Lavit in indirect criminal
contempt of court without allowing him to have a jury trial, we
vacate and remand.
Lavit represented Brockman on various criminal charges
which were set for a trial to begin in the Taylor Circuit Court
at 8:30 a.m. on Monday, November 10, 2003.
At 8:35 a.m. on the
morning of trial, Dawn Gregory, an attorney in Lavit’s office,
appeared in court and explained to Judge George that Lavit had
called his own office that morning and stated that he was too
ill to try Brockman’s case.
The case was continued, but Judge
George stated that someone would have to pay the costs for the
jurors and that Lavit should present a doctor’s excuse.
On November 25, 2003, Judge George entered an order
assessing an $825.00 fee against Lavit.
Judge George’s order
stated that the fee was being assessed as “extraordinary
expenses” pursuant to CR2 3.02(3), which is applicable to a
criminal proceeding pursuant to RCr3 13.04.
Lavit filed a motion
to set aside the trial court’s order and asked for a hearing.
The trial court heard Lavit’s motion on December 2,
2003, at which time Lavit again advised Judge George, this time
in person, that he had been prepared to try Brockman’s case on
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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November 10, 2003, but was absent from court only as a result of
an illness.
He stated that due to his illness he had attempted
to contact the judge during the evening of November 9, 2003, and
that on the morning of November 10, 2003, he concluded that he
could not have effectively represented his client at that time
in a three-day criminal trial.
He presented Judge George with
the requested medical excuse stating he had an “acute illness.”
No other evidence was presented regarding the reasons for
Lavit’s absence or to contradict the medical excuse and Lavit’s
statement that he was in fact ill.
Judge George stated that he
would reconsider his order assessing the fee.
On March 24, 2004, Judge George entered another order
setting a “Show Cause Hearing” for April 20, 2004, for Lavit to
“show cause why he should not be assessed the jury fee for the
trial which was canceled on November 10, 2003[.]”
At the
hearing on April 20, 2004, Lavit presented Judge George with a
letter from his doctor which set forth the symptoms he presented
with on November 10, 2003, and a diagnosis of upper respiratory
infection.
Judge George asked the Commonwealth’s Attorney if he
wished to question the doctor further regarding the matter or
had any evidence to present.
hearing concluded.
The Commonwealth declined and the
Judge George then entered his order of April
30, 2004, finding Lavit in contempt and assessing the $825.00
jury fee against him.
-3-
In this order Judge George indicated that in finding
that Lavit was not prepared for trial on November 10, 2003, he
“finds the Motion filed on December 4, 2003 (over twenty days
after the November 10th trial date) most instructive as to
Defense Counsel’s preparedness for trial.”4
Additionally, Judge
George noted that Lavit had a routine examination previously
scheduled with his doctor on November 10, 2003, as well as
having a motion scheduled to be heard before the Casey Circuit
Court on that date.
Based on this evidence, Judge George found
Lavit to be in contempt of court and assessed the jury fee.
This appeal followed.
In its brief, the Commonwealth, on behalf of Judge
George, contends that Lavit was not held in contempt of court,
but merely assessed “additional costs” in a case requiring
“extraordinary services” under CR 3.02(3).
We disagree and
quote from Judge George’s order of April 30, 2004, which
specifically stated as follows:
“This Court has considerable discretion in
the use of its contempt powers and finds the
$825 jury fee assessment against Honorable
Theodore Lavit to be necessary due to his
lack of respect for this Court” [emphases
added].
Clearly, Judge George assessed the jury fee against Lavit for
contempt of court.
4
The order specifically noted 14 requests from the 13-page motion and also
noted “that this list is a brief summary and not exhaustive of the relief
sought via this Motion.”
-4-
This Court has previously held that an attorney’s
failure to appear in court when he has a duty to appear is
“treated as criminal contempt[ ] with criminal intent being an
essential element of the offense” [emphases original].5
Criminal
contempt may be either “direct” or “indirect” in nature.6
A
direct contempt occurs while the actor is before the court and
is “an affront to the dignity of the court” which may be
punished summarily.7
Indirect criminal contempt, on the other
hand, “‘is committed outside the presence of the court and
requires a hearing and the presentation of evidence’ in order
‘to establish a violation of the court’s order.
It may be
punished only in proceedings that comport with due process.’”8
The absence of an attorney from a scheduled court proceeding
constitutes an indirect criminal contempt.9
When the contempt is criminal in nature, as here, all
the elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.10
“Evidence necessary for a finding of contempt must show willful
disobedience toward, or open disrespect for, the rule or order
5
Commonwealth v. Pace, 15 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Ky.App. 2000).
6
Id.; Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Ky. 1996).
7
Burge, 947 S.W.2d at 808.
8
Pace, 15 S.W.3d at 395 (quoting Burge, 947 S.W.2d at 808).
9
Id.
10
See Brannon v. Commonwealth, 162 Ky. 350, 172 S.W. 703 (1915).
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of a court.”11
A party is entitled to a jury trial on the
disputed facts related to whether he is guilty of contemptuous
conduct if the fine is “serious” rather than “petty”, and that
determination will be made “within the context of the risk and
possible deprivation faced by a particular contemnor.”12
Since
Lavit faces a potential fine of $825.00, which is not petty, he
is entitled to a jury trial on whether he is guilty of indirect
criminal contempt.
Lavit argues that the evidence before the trial court
was insufficient to support a finding of criminal contempt
because there was no evidence showing that he intended to commit
a contemptuous act.
Rather, he contends that his explanation
that his absence was justified due to an illness which prevented
him from being able to appear and to effectively represent his
client was unrefuted.
He further notes that he did not become
too ill to appear in court until the day of the trial and that
he contacted his office the morning of the scheduled trial and
asked an associate to appear and to advise the trial court of
his illness, which she did.
Further, when the trial court
requested that he provide an excuse from a medical doctor
concerning the illness, he did so.
11
Pace, 15 S.W.3d at 396.
12
International Association of Firefighters, Local 526, AFL-CIO v. LexingtonFayette Urban County Government, 555 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Ky. 1977).
-6-
After reviewing the record below, we conclude that
whether Lavit’s actions were contemptuous turns on various
issues of fact.
From those disputed facts a jury could make
certain findings and reasonable inferences that would support a
finding of contempt of court.
Some of the issues which are in
dispute, and which may affect the jury’s determination of
whether Lavit acted contemptuously, include whether Lavit was
prepared to go to trial on November 10, 2003; the purpose of
Lavit’s call to Judge Weddle on November 9, 2003; and why Lavit
attempted to call Judge George on November 9, 2003, if he had
intended to try the Brockman case up until he awakened on
November 10, 2003.
On remand, Judge George shall be disqualified from
presiding over Lavit’s contempt proceedings since he may have to
provide testimony concerning whether he was available at his
home on November 9, 2003, and since he has expressed an opinion
concerning the merits of the proceeding.13
If a jury finds Lavit
guilty of indirect criminal contempt, then the new trial judge
will exercise his or her discretion in assessing the fine.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Taylor
Circuit Court is vacated and this matter is remanded for a jury
trial before a new trial judge.
ALL CONCUR.
13
Kentucky Revised Statutes 26A.015(2)(a) and (d) 4.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY:
Daniel T. Taylor III
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Raymond F. Debolt, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, HON.
DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE:
No brief filed.
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY:
Raymond F. Debolt, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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