PATRICIA TURNER,(PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ARTHUR G. TURNER, DECEASED) v. APPALACHIAN REGIONAL HEALTHCARE, INC., D/B/A APPALACHIAN REGIONAL HOSPITAL; and CHUKS ONWU, M.D.
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RENDERED:
May 27, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
OCTOBER 12, 2005 (2005-SC-0514-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000977-MR
PATRICIA TURNER,(PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE ESTATE OF ARTHUR G. TURNER, DECEASED)1
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00517
APPALACHIAN REGIONAL HEALTHCARE,
INC., D/B/A APPALACHIAN REGIONAL
HOSPITAL; and CHUKS ONWU, M.D.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.2
1
Patricia Turner substituted as appellant, subsequent to the death of Arthur
Turner, by order entered April 15, 2005.
2
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
Arthur Turner filed a medical malpractice
action against his surgeon and the hospital in which the surgery
was performed.
After Turner failed to identify an expert
witness for nearly three and a half years, both defendants filed
motions for summary judgment.
We must decide whether the
affidavit of a consulting expert satisfied the requirement of CR
56.03 and 56.05 to establish the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment, and whether the trial court properly entertained the
hospital’s motion, although heard on less than the ten days’
notice required by CR 56.03.
We hold that the affidavit of a
consulting expert is not sufficient and that, under the
circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in
hearing the hospital’s motion.
We therefore affirm the summary
judgment of the Perry Circuit Court dismissing the action.
The plaintiff, Arthur G. Turner, was a patient of Dr.
Chuks Onwu at Appalachian Regional Hospital (“ARH”) in September
1999.
Following surgery performed by Onwu, Turner developed
complications and was transported to the University of Kentucky
Medical Center where he underwent additional surgery.
Turner
filed a complaint in September 2000 against Onwu and ARH
alleging that their negligence was the cause of his
complications and damages.
Both defendants in their respective
answers denied negligence.
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In March 2001, Turner’s deposition was taken.
By June
2002, Turner had taken no steps to prosecute the action and Onwu
filed a motion to dismiss under CR 41.02.
motion.
ARH joined in this
At about the same time, the trial court, apparently
coincidentally, entered its own show cause order regarding
possible dismissal for lack of prosecution.3
The result of these
motions was a scheduling order entered by the trial court on
August 20, 2002.
The trial court ordered Turner to identify his
expert witnesses, “including all standard of care and causation
experts, with corresponding CR 26.02(4) information” within 120
days, or by December 18, 2002.
The order further noted that the
pending motions to dismiss for lack of prosecution would be
passed “subject to the Plaintiff’s identification of expert in
compliance with the deadlines imposed in this Order.”
In March 2003, both defendants filed motions for
summary judgment on the ground that Turner had failed to provide
expert testimony that they had deviated from the applicable
standard of care.
Before a hearing was conducted on the
motions, which had been continued for reasons not clear from the
record, ARH filed a motion to stay the proceedings because its
insurer was insolvent.
The trial court granted this motion,
staying proceedings until a scheduled January 16, 2004 status
conference, but it ordered ARH’s counsel to produce an
3
CR 77.02(2).
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additional set of medical records and a set of x-rays.
documents were produced in October and November 2003.
These
As a
result of the status conference, the trial court, by order
entered January 26, removed the case from the inactive docket
and placed it back on the active docket.
On January 19, 2004, Onwu’s counsel requested the
identity of Turner’s expert witnesses, and indicated he intended
to renew his motion for summary judgment if notification was not
made in thirty days.
After identification did not occur, Onwu
filed his renewed motion for summary judgment on February 24 and
noticed it for hearing on March 5, 2004.
On February 25, ARH
filed a motion for summary judgment as well, adopting the
arguments of Onwu and likewise setting its motion for hearing on
March 5.
On the day of and immediately before the scheduled
hearing, Turner filed a response to the motions.
In his
response, Turner objected to the ARH’s failure to comply with
the ten-day notice requirement of CR 56.03, and he attached an
affidavit of his consulting expert, Alexander Mead, M.D., who
criticized Onwu’s, but not ARH’s, actions.
In response to
questioning by the trial court, Turner’s counsel candidly
admitted that Mead was a consulting expert and not an expert
witness.
Additionally, Turner’s counsel did not request a
continuance of the summary judgment hearing.
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The trial court
took the motions under advisement and by order entered March 11,
2004 granted the motions for summary judgment.
Turner subsequently filed a motion to vacate, which
motion was overruled.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, a reviewing court must determine “whether
the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”4
The record is to be
reviewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion for summary judgment, and all doubts are to be resolved
in his or her favor.5
In a medical malpractice case, expert testimony is
required to establish the standard of care and whether a breach
of the standard of care occurred.6
The plaintiff’s failure to
provide expert medical proof is generally fatal to his or her
cause of action, and such a case is appropriate for summary
disposition under CR 56.7
While Kentucky case law recognizes two
exceptions to the requirement for expert testimony in medical
4
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996).
5
See Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480
(Ky. 1991).
6
Jarboe v. Harting, 397 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1965); Morris v. Hoffman, 551
S.W.2d 8, 9 (Ky.App. 1977).
7
Simmons v. Stephenson, 84 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Ky.App. 2002).
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malpractice cases,8 Turner concedes that those exceptions are not
applicable to his case.
Onwu’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
As to Onwu’s motion for summary judgment, Turner
argues that he had presented sufficient evidence, in the form of
Mead’s affidavit, to survive summary judgment.
While Mead’s
affidavit is critical of Onwu, importantly Turner identified
Mead as his consulting expert and not as a testifying expert.
As previously noted, expert testimony is required to
establish the standard of care and the breach of the defendant
in meeting the standard of care.
The determination of whether
any genuine issue of material fact exists is based on the
“pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
stipulations and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits”9 tendered in support of, or in opposition to, the
motion.
CR 56.05 sets forth the requirements for affidavits
supporting or opposing summary judgment.
Such affidavits “shall
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
8
See Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Ky. 1992) (the exceptions are
(1) situations in which a lay person can conclude that such things do not
happen if proper skill and care has been used, such as when a foreign object
is left in the body, and (2) situations in which the defendant doctor makes
admissions of a technical character from which an inference of negligence can
be made).
9
CR 56.03.
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affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”10
An affidavit containing evidence that would not be admissible at
trial, such as hearsay evidence, does not suffice.11
At all points in the proceeding, Mead was presented by
Turner as being his consulting expert, whose function was to
assist Turner in securing an expert to testify at trial on
Turner’s behalf.
Further, Mead’s affidavit identifies him as a
consulting expert, and at the hearing on the summary judgment
motion, Turner’s counsel, while not ruling out that Mead may
ultimately testify, stated, “[i]n all candor to the Court [Mead]
is a consulting expert.”
As such, any discovery of facts known
to and opinions held by Mead would be limited,12 since the rules
contemplate that such an expert witness will not be called to
testify at trial.13
As a consulting expert is not to testify at
trial, Mead’s affidavit did not meet the requirements of CR
56.05.14
While authority exists that any objection to an
affidavit that does not meet the requirements of CR 56.05 is
waived if a party fails to move to strike the deficient
affidavit, the record in this case is clear that Onwu in fact
objected to the use of Mead’s affidavit at the March 5 hearing.
10
CR 56.05.
11
Nelson v. Martin, 552 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Ky.App. 1977).
12
CR 26.02(4)(b).
13
Id.
14
Chappell v. Bradley, 834 F.Supp. 1030, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
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Since Turner failed to name his expert witness as
previously ordered by the trial court, and failed to present any
admissible expert testimony that Onwu had failed to meet the
applicable standard of care, the Perry Circuit Court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of Onwu.
Turner argues that the trial court erred in failing to
vacate the summary judgment upon his filing of additional
information from a Dr. Stephen A. Hurst.
As an initial matter,
we note that the information from Dr. Hurst was not signed,
notarized, or provided on any sort of professional letterhead or
stationary.
Thus, that information clearly did not comport with
the requirements of CR 56.05.
Second, the ten-day notice
requirement of CR 56.03 exists precisely to give an opposing
party ample time to line up affidavits in a form sufficient to
satisfy the rule.
Not only did Turner fail to do so within the
time period contemplated by CR 56.03, i.e., by March 5, 2004,
the date of the original hearing on the summary judgment motion,
but he also failed to do so by the time the motion to vacate was
heard on April 16, some six weeks later.
The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in failing to vacate the summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.
ARH’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
With respect to ARH’s motion for summary judgment,
Turner complains that the trial court erred in granting summary
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judgment following a hearing held on less than the ten-day
notice required by CR 56.03.
Turner does not complain of the
notice provided by Onwu.
In Perkins v. Hausladen,15 the Kentucky Supreme Court
declined to adopt a hard and fast rule with respect to the
ten-day notice requirement.
The court stated:
We need not decide whether there is an
inflexible rule that violation of the ten
day notice requirement requires automatic
reversal. There may be unusual situations
where no possible prejudice could have
resulted from a premature hearing. But this
case is not one of them. As pointed out in
their Brief, the Perkinses were put at a
"disadvantage by not being able to put on
any affidavits, additional legal research,
nor other evidence to contradict the
motion."
In a complex negligence case, such as
this, the nuances of the pretrial
depositions and discovery cannot be properly
addressed or fairly assessed at a summary
judgment motion made on the day of trial.16
The court in Perkins17 also quoted at length the
treatise on Kentucky Practice:
"As the annotations following the sub-rule
demonstrate, the 10-day lead time provided
before hearing the motion is extremely
important and, although not jurisdictional,
may not be lightly disregarded. . . .
[R]equests for extension of time to respond
15
828 S.W.2d 652.
16
Id. at 656-57.
17
Id. at 656.
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to such motions are usually freely granted,
and it may be an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to refuse to grant reasonable
extensions."18
Our view is that the facts and circumstances of this
case represent that “unusual situation[] where no possible
prejudice could have resulted from a premature hearing.”
In the
instant case, (1) both Onwu and ARH filed motions for summary
judgment nearly a year prior to the February 2004 motions, both
based on the same ground that Turner had failed to identify his
expert witnesses; (2) Onwu’s timely motion was adopted by ARH;
(3) Turner, while objecting to the lack of ARH’s compliance with
the ten-day notice requirement, did not request a continuance of
the hearing in order to correct his deficiency, i.e., to
identify an expert witness as to ARH’s standard of care and
breach of duty; and (4) in his motion to vacate, Turner still
failed to identify an expert to address ARH’s standard of care
and breach of duty.
Under the unusual facts and circumstances
of this case, the trial court did not err in proceeding to rule
on ARH’s motion for summary judgment, notwithstanding ARH’s
giving nine days’ notice instead of the ten-day notice required
by the rule.
One further complaint raised by Turner is that ARH
failed to provide “legible” copies of its records and x-rays
18
See 7 Bertelsman and Philipps, Kentucky Practice, CR 56.03, cmt. 3 (4th
ed.) (the same quotation appears in the 5th edition of the treatise).
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until November 2003.
The record, however, discloses that
medical records in fact were turned over to Turner early in the
proceedings.
Turner was subsequently subjected to (a) three
simultaneous motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute in June
2002, (b) the entry of the trial court’s August 2002 discovery
scheduling order, and (c) two motions for summary judgment filed
in March 2003 for failure to identify experts.
Not until the
“stay period,” necessitated by the insolvency of ARH’s insurer,
did Turner express any objection as to the quality or quantity
of the records that had been produced.
At best, this issue
appears to be a smoke screen to hide Turner’s failure to
identify expert witnesses under CR 26.02(4).
The judgment of the Perry Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Alva A. Hollon, Jr.
Jacksonville, Florida
Mark E. Nichols
Melanie S. Marrs
Lexington, Kentucky
Kenneth A. Buckle
Hyden, Kentucky
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