BOBBY A. JONES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 4, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000952-MR
BOBBY A. JONES
APPELLANT
ON REMAND FROM SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
NO. 2005-SC-000821-DG
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00100
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TAYLOR AND VANMETER, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
This matter is before us on remand by the
Kentucky Supreme Court by Opinion and Order dated May 10, 2006.
The Supreme Court vacated our opinion rendered July 1, 2005, and
ordered us to reconsider in light of Potts v. Commonwealth, 172
S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2005).
Having reviewed Potts, we believe the
facts in the instant appeal are distinguishable from the facts
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
in Potts.
Unlike Potts, the error at issue in this appeal
constituted a palpable error under Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 10.26.
Thus, upon reconsideration, we reverse and remand.2
Bobby A. Jones brings this appeal from an April 26,
2004, judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court upon a jury
verdict finding him guilty of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon and sentencing him to three years and six
months’ imprisonment.
In 1995, appellant pled guilty to the
felony charge of criminal mischief and was sentenced to five
years’ imprisonment which was probated.
In April 2003,
appellant pawned a Ruger .22 caliber rifle at a local pawn shop.
He pawned the rifle for $80.00.
A detective from the Montgomery
County Sheriff’s Department discovered that appellant had pawned
the rifle.
The detective was aware of appellant’s prior felony
conviction.
Thereupon, the detective secured a search warrant
for appellant’s home.
No firearms were found during the search.
The detective then filed a criminal complaint against appellant
alleging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
2
This is the same result reached by this Court in our original opinion
rendered July 1, 2005. In Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2005),
the defendant appealed a conviction for drug trafficking. On appeal, the
defendant claimed the trial court erred in “overruling” his motion for
directed verdict of acquittal due to insufficient evidence. However, as in
this case, defendant’s motion failed to state specific grounds as required by
Ky. R. Civ. P. 50.01. The Supreme Court reviewed the issue for palpable
error and concluded that it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find
defendant guilty of drug trafficking. In this case, we believe it was
unreasonable to find appellant guilty of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon where the Commonwealth failed to present evidence to prove a
critical element of the offense charged.
-2-
Appellant was subsequently indicted upon the offense
of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was
convicted in a jury trial in March of 2004.
By judgment entered
April 26, 2004, the circuit court sentenced appellant to three
years and six months’ imprisonment, thus precipitating this
appeal.
Appellant raises three allegations of error on appeal.
We view appellant’s second allegation of error as presenting a
troublesome issue – whether appellant was entitled to a directed
verdict of acquittal because the Commonwealth failed to present
sufficient direct evidence demonstrating the .22 caliber rifle
was capable of expelling “a projectile by the action of an
explosive” as required under KRS 527.040 and KRS 527.010(4).
For reasons hereinafter discussed, we are of the opinion that
appellant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal upon
the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon
under KRS 527.040.
A directed verdict is proper if under the evidence as
a whole it would have been clearly unreasonable for the jury to
have found appellant guilty of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon.
(Ky. 1991).
See Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186
The Commonwealth believes that this allegation of
error was not properly preserved for our review.
The record
indicates that appellant moved for a directed verdict at the
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close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief and renewed the motion
at the close of his case.
However, the Commonwealth points out
that appellant’s trial counsel failed to state specific grounds
for the motion.
Even if the issue was not properly preserved,
we are of the opinion that the failure of the trial court to
grant appellant’s motion for directed verdict constituted
palpable error under RCr 10.26.
An error is considered palpable
if it affects the defendant’s substantial rights and resulted in
manifest injustice.
The offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon is codified in KRS 527.040 and states, in relevant part,
as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon when he
possesses, manufactures, or transports a
firearm when he has been convicted of a
felony, as defined by the laws of the
jurisdiction in which he was convicted, in
any state or federal court and has not:
(a) Been granted a full pardon by the
Governor or by the President of the United
States;
(b) Been granted relief by the United States
Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the
Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended.
A firearm is defined by KRS 527.010(4) as meaning “any weapon
which will expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.”
Appellant argues that he was entitled to a directed
verdict of acquittal because the Commonwealth failed to present
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evidence that the .22 caliber rifle was capable of being fired.
Appellant reminds this Court that the Commonwealth has the
burden of proving each and every element of a charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.
S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1967).
See Goodhue v. Commonwealth, 415
There was no direct evidence concerning
the functionality of the .22 caliber rifle.
There was evidence
presented that appellant pawned a .22 caliber rifle and received
$80.00 from the pawn shop for the rifle.
The evidence presented
by the Commonwealth, however, is simply insufficient to support
the jury’s finding that the rifle was functional and capable of
being fired.
Simply put, the Commonwealth failed to sustain its
burden of proving the functionality of the rifle beyond a
reasonable doubt.
It is well-established that the failure of the
Commonwealth to prove each element of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt results in palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a defendant under RCr 10.26.
Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 721 (Ky.App. 1985).
Perkins v.
As the
Commonwealth failed to prove an essential element (functionality
of the rifle) of the indicted offense, we hold the failure of
the trial court to direct a verdict constituted palpable error
and reverse appellant’s conviction upon possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon under KRS 527.040.
-5-
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Montgomery Circuit Court is reversed and this cause remanded for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Astrida L. Lemkins
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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