RICKY ROBINSON AND HIS WIFE, TONIA ROBINSON; ROBINSON AND HICKS CONSTRUCTION, INC.; DAVID SIZEMORE AND HIS WIFE, VALERIE SIZEMORE; MARK D'ONOFRIO AND HIS WIFE, KRISTI D'ONOFRIO; TERRY NORTH AND HIS WIFE, KIM NORTH; RIZWAN ALI AND HIS WIFE, SHAHEEN ALI; CLARICE W. WALLACE; HOWARD FELTNER AND HIS WIFE, PHYLLIS FELTNER; AND JERRY WYRICK v. ROY CAMPBELL
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 24, 2006; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-000936-MR
RICKY ROBINSON AND HIS WIFE,
TONIA ROBINSON; ROBINSON AND
HICKS CONSTRUCTION, INC.;
DAVID SIZEMORE AND HIS WIFE,
VALERIE SIZEMORE; MARK D’ONOFRIO
AND HIS WIFE, KRISTI D’ONOFRIO;
TERRY NORTH AND HIS WIFE,
KIM NORTH; RIZWAN ALI AND HIS
WIFE, SHAHEEN ALI; CLARICE W.
WALLACE; HOWARD FELTNER AND HIS
WIFE, PHYLLIS FELTNER; AND JERRY WYRICK
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00134
v.
ROY CAMPBELL
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND HENRY, JUDGES; POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
HENRY, JUDGE:
Appellants appeal from an April 26, 2004 order of
the Perry Circuit Court that vacated an arbitrator’s award in
1
Senior Judge John Woods Potter, sitting as Special Judge by Assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
their favor.
Upon review, we vacate the circuit court’s order
and remand for further proceedings.
Appellants are either developers or homeowners in the
Apple Ridge subdivision, a residential mountainside community
built on a mine bench above Highway 80 in Perry County,
Kentucky.
Appellants Ricky and Tania Robinson and Robinson &
Hicks Construction Company, Inc. (hereinafter “RHCC”) purchased
the Apple Ridge property from Appellee Roy Campbell for the
purpose of building a residential subdivision thereon.
Campbell
continued to own the property directly below Apple Ridge and,
after the sale, he began excavating his property for its own
development.
This excavation allegedly undermined the slope of
the mountainside, resulting in damage to the Apple Ridge
development.
Specifically, Appellants allege that the removal of
the subjacent support for the slope caused it to collapse in
places and to sink several feet, resulting in damage to the
Apple Ridge homes and to Apple Ridge Lane (the only access road
to the development) and a decrease in the value of the remaining
undeveloped property.
Appellants further allege that damage
continues to this day, as the slope continues to slide and sink.
Appellants also note that an investigation by the United States
Department of Surface Mining has apparently concluded that
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Campbell’s removal of the toe of the slope has resulted in
damage to their property.
Consequently, on March 11, 1999, the Robinsons and
RHCC filed suit against Campbell in Perry Circuit Court seeking
damages for the destruction of the value of the Apple Ridge
property and for the business damage caused to RHCC.
Eventually, after additional parties entered into the
litigation, it was agreed that the matter would be submitted to
Pierce Hamblin for binding arbitration pursuant to a written
arbitration agreement.
The agreement set forth that Hamblin had
the power “to fully adjudicate this dispute and to grant all
remedies necessary to implement such adjudication.”
It further
stated that “[t]he parties hereby agree to submit to binding
arbitration the respective claims and controversies mentioned
above, together with all demands and differences arising out of
the agreement.”
As required by the agreement, the parties made
submissions to Hamblin, and an arbitration hearing was held on
November 15, 2003 according to rules mutually agreed upon by the
parties.
These rules included an agreement that each witness
would make an oral statement as to the substance of his
testimony and an agreement that cross-examination would not be
permitted.
Following the hearing, Hamblin rendered an
“Arbitration Opinion and Award” on January 16, 2004, finding
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that “the primary and precipitating cause for the damages
sustained by [Appellants] was excavation and/or removal of the
subjacent support system below the mine bench of Apple Ridge
subdivision [by Campbell]” and awarding Appellants the combined
sum of $732,500.00.
Hamblin’s decision rested primarily upon
the results of the investigation conducted by the U.S.
Department of Surface Mining, which found that “one can only
conclude that in this case, the landslide was caused by the
excavation work performed along the toe of the slope below the
subdivision bench.”
Campbell subsequently sought to amend Hamblin’s
arbitration award, ostensibly pursuant to the statutorilypermitted challenges set forth under KRS2 417.130 and 417.170(1).
He specifically claimed that there was a miscalculation of
figures on Hamblin’s part, and also that Hamblin rendered an
award on a matter not submitted to him.
In an “Arbitrator’s
Decision” rendered on February 20, 2004, Hamblin found that
Campbell’s contentions lacked merit because, substantively, they
did not fall under the permitted challenges set forth under the
statute.
As to Campbell’s first challenge, Hamblin specifically
found that the “Arbitration Opinion and Award contained no
calculation of figures in which there could have been an
‘evident miscalculation,’ and no mathematical error was pointed
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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to by [Campbell],” and that Campbell’s “objection to the items
of damages awarded is not an objection to the calculation of
same, but to the judgment of the Arbitrator in making the
award.”
As to Campbell’s second contention, Hamblin concluded
that all matters were submitted to him pursuant to the
arbitration agreement.
He further noted: “The award and all
items of damages therein were properly within the scope of
matters submitted to arbitration, and in any event could not be
modified without affecting the merits of the decision upon the
issues submitted.”
Hamblin then stated a general conclusion
that “the challenges forwarded by [Campbell] go to the merits of
the decision, and therefore fail” and noted that even if KRS
417.170(1) allowed an arbitrator to modify or correct an award
based on the merits, no such modification or correction was
necessary here because the award was justified by the evidence.
Campbell subsequently moved the circuit court to
vacate the arbitrator’s award, arguing that – pursuant to Carrs
Fork Corp. v. Kodak Mining Co., 809 S.W.2d 699, 702-03 (Ky.
1991) - the award was so excessive as to be tantamount to fraud,
and also that it was obtained by undue means in violation of KRS
417.160(1)(a).
Campbell specifically objected to the fact that
Appellants had submitted an arbitration memorandum to Hamblin,
arguing that although the arbitration agreement allowed for
concurrent submission of items to be considered by the
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arbitrator and did not require service of those items to
opposing counsel, the failure to serve counsel constituted
obtaining the award by undue means.
Campbell also reiterated
his argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the
damages awarded.
Campbell’s challenge was heard by the circuit court on
April 16, 2004.
At the hearing, the special judge decided to
vacate the arbitrator’s award, with his justification for his
decision reading only as follows: “Well I have a real question
as to what the arbitrator based his decision on and the only
thing that is submitted that he based his decision on, because I
don’t have a transcript of anything else, is this memorandum
which was not supplied to opposing counsel.
sustained.”
Motion to vacate is
An order vacating the award was entered on April
26, 2004, with no specific basis for the ruling given therein.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Appellants raise the following arguments:
(1) The arbitration below was final and binding and not subject
to review by the circuit court; (2) Campbell’s arguments in
support of vacating the arbitration award are disguised
challenges to the evidence that are not reviewable by courts;
and (3) Appellants’ submissions to the arbitrator were
specifically contemplated by the arbitration agreement and do
not constitute fraud that would allow a court to vacate the
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award.
Campbell argues in rebuttal that the circuit court
properly vacated the arbitration award because it was procured
by fraud and undue means – specifically, the “ex parte”
memorandum submitted by Appellants to the arbitrator.
As a general rule, “an arbitrator’s award is not
reviewable by a court.”
Taylor v. Fitz Coal Co., Inc., 618
S.W.2d 432, 432 (Ky. 1981) (Citations omitted).
This is
attributable to the fact that “settlement of disputes by
arbitration is favored in the law of this Commonwealth.”
Lombardo v. Investment Management and Research, Inc., 885 S.W.2d
320, 322 (Ky.App. 1994) (Citations omitted).
“Generally, much
judicial latitude and deference are accorded to an arbitration
decision.
It will not be disturbed by the courts merely because
it was unjust, inadequate, excessive or contrary to law.”
(Internal quotations and citation omitted).
Id.
Moreover, the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting an arbitration award is
specifically nonreviewable.
(Citations omitted).
Taylor, 618 S.W.2d at 432
“This is so because when a court examines
the evidence and imposes its view of the case it substitutes the
decision of another tribunal for the arbitration upon which the
parties have agreed, and in effect sets aside their contract.”
Id. at 433 (Citation omitted).
With this said, the Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act
(hereinafter “KUAA”) – specifically KRS 417.160 – provides that
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a court may vacate an arbitration award pursuant to five
specific grounds: (1) the award was procured by corruption,
fraud, or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality by
an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, or corruption in any of
the arbitrators, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any
party; (3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) the
arbitrators refused to postpone the arbitration hearing upon
sufficient cause being shown therefore, or refused to hear
evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise so conducted
the hearing, contrary to the provisions of KRS 417.090, as to
prejudice substantially the rights of a party; and (5) there was
no arbitration agreement, and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under KRS 417.060, and the party did
not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the
objection. KRS 417.160(1)(a)-(e).
With respect to all
arbitration agreements entered into after the effective date of
the KUAA – July 13, 1984 - a court may only set aside an
arbitration award pursuant to those grounds set forth in KRS
417.160.
3D Enterprises Contracting Corp. v. Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Government, 134 S.W.3d 558, 562-63 (Ky. 2004).
The difficulty with which we are faced in considering
the parties’ arguments is that we are unable to ascertain from
the circuit court’s rulings the exact basis for its decision to
vacate.
As previously noted, the court simply stated: “Well I
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have a real question as to what the arbitrator based his
decision on and the only thing that is submitted that he based
his decision on, because I don’t have a transcript of anything
else, is this memorandum which was not supplied to opposing
counsel.
Motion to vacate is sustained.”
Campbell generally argues that the circuit court
properly vacated the arbitration award because it was procured
by fraud and undue means – specifically, the “ex parte”
memorandum submitted by Appellants to the arbitrator.
Appellants, on the other hand, contend that the circuit court
“made no finding that the award had been procured by corruption,
fraud or other undue means,” and that its decision “was clearly
based upon his inability to review the sufficiency of the
evidence.”
Obviously, then, the parties themselves cannot even
agree on the basis for the circuit court’s decision.
We are
similarly unable to make this determination.
In this same context, we have reservations as to
whether the circuit court considered the appropriate standards
in vacating the arbitrator’s award.
The 3D Enterprises decision
cited above, which sets forth that all arbitration awards
arising from agreements entered into after the effective date of
the KUAA can only be vacated pursuant to those grounds set forth
in KRS 417.160, was issued on May 20, 2004 – shortly after the
circuit court entered its vacating order.
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This is of particular
importance here because this decision partially overruled Carrs
Fork to the extent that that case allowed for courts to vacate
arbitration awards arising from post-KUAA agreements on
equitable grounds – including the ground that an award is so
grossly excessive as to be, in effect, a fraud.
Enterprises, 134 S.W.3d at 561-63.
See 3D
Campbell specifically relied
upon this ground as a basis for relief in his motion to vacate,
which raises a concern that the Carrs Fork case was an
inappropriate consideration in the circuit court’s decision.
While the circuit court did not specifically cite to Carrs Fork
in its decision to vacate, it did raise a question about the
evidentiary basis for the arbitrator’s award – a dubious
consideration in light of 3D Enterprises and Taylor v. Fitz Coal
Co., Inc.
Moreover, given that the only grounds for vacating an
arbitration award, per 3D Enterprises, are those set forth
within KRS 417.160, we find it troublesome that the circuit
court failed to address them – or even mention the statute – in
ordering the award here to be vacated.
This again raises the
question of whether the circuit court used the appropriate
standards in reviewing the arbitrator’s award.
Consequently,
given our inability to ascertain the basis of the circuit
court’s ruling and the concerns noted above, we believe that it
is appropriate in this case to vacate the court’s order and
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remand this matter for further consideration consistent with KRS
417.160, 3D Enterprises, and this opinion.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN
PART AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE: I concur in the majority’s
decision to set aside the circuit court order vacating the
arbitrator’s award, but dissent from its remand of the case for
the circuit court to reconsider its ruling in light of a 1984
statute as recently construed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
I would remand the case with direction to reinstate the award of
the arbitrator.
In 3D Enterprises Contracting Corp. v. LexingtonFayette Urban County Government, 134 S.W.3d 588 (Ky. 2004),
decided after the lower court rendered the decision at issue in
this appeal, the Supreme Court raised the rather high bar for a
party seeking to set aside an arbitration award even higher.
The facts upon which appellee relied in getting the circuit
court to set aside the award in this case were merely the
submission of an allegedly improper memorandum to the arbitrator
prior to the arbitration.
To me, it is clear that those facts
are on their face insufficient to justify setting aside the
award as having been procured by “corruption, fraud or other
undue means” under KRS 417.16(1)(a).
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Thus, taking as true
appellee’s allegations, there is no basis upon which he could
prevail on remand and consequently nothing to be gained by
reconsideration on remand.
As long ago noted by the Court in Blight's Lessee v.
Atwell, 7 T.B. Mon. 264, 23 Ky. 264, 266 (1828):
... it would seem to be doing a vain and
useless thing to reverse the judgment and
remand the cause to the court below for
further proceedings, if from the face of the
record, the plaintiff was shewn to have no
title to the land in contest, and could not,
therefore, succeed in recovering judgment.
So it is in this case.
Because appellee’s allegations are
insufficient to meet the statutory standard for setting aside
the award of the arbitrator, the only appropriate action on
remand is the reinstatement of that award.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
D. Eric Lycan
Lexington, Kentucky
Warren N. Scoville
London, Kentucky
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