CHARLES H. WESTERFIELD; GLENDA K. WESTERFIELD; MONTY MAZE AND JUDY MAZE v. JOHN ILER
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 3, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000924-MR
AND
NO. 2004-CA-001864-MR
CHARLES H. WESTERFIELD;
GLENDA K. WESTERFIELD;
MONTY MAZE AND JUDY MAZE
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEALS FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00324
JOHN ILER
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2004-CA-000927-MR
JOHN ILER
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00324
CHARLES H. WESTERFIELD;
GLENDA K. WESTERFIELD;
MONTY MAZE AND JUDY MAZE
CROSS-APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2004-CA-001901-MR
JOHN ILER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00324
v.
CHARLES H. WESTERFIELD;
GLENDA K. WESTERFIELD;
MONTY MAZE AND JUDY MAZE
AND
APPELLEES
NO. 2004-CA-001916-MR
CHARLES H. WESTERFIELD;
GLENDA K. WESTERFIELD;
MONTY MAZE AND JUDY MAZE
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00324
v.
JOHN ILER
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND HENRY, JUDGES.
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DYCHE, JUDGE:
John Iler, Charles and Glenda Westerfield
(Westerfields), and Monty and Judy Maze (Mazes) all own
adjoining property in Ohio County, Kentucky.
This case concerns
a disputed access roadway called the Cromwell-Hines Mill Road
that traverses the various properties.
John Iler brought suit against the Westerfields and
Mazes alleging that they had impermissibly hindered his right to
use the roadway.
(For the sake of convenience, the appellants
will be referred collectively herein as “the Westerfields.”)
The trial court found that the roadway in question was formerly
maintained by Ohio County.
The issue of who had rights to the
roadway pursuant to KRS 178.116 was tried before a jury.
The
jury found that the roadway provided necessary access to Iler’s
property (“Sandefur farm”) and judgment was entered in his
favor.
These appeals follow.
The Westerfields first argue that KRS 178.116 is
unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous because it defines
“necessary access” as “access to any farm, tract of land, or
dwelling. . . .”
KRS 178.116(5).
This issue was not presented
to the trial court and is not properly preserved for appellate
review.
Next, the Westerfields argue that they were entitled
to a directed verdict because the evidence established that Iler
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had other access to his property and therefore the road in
question could not be deemed “necessary access.”
Appellate review of the denial of a directed verdict
is limited to a determination of whether the jury’s verdict was
flagrantly contrary to the evidence presented at trial.
Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 787 (Ky.
2004).
A reviewing court must take all evidence which favors
the prevailing party as true and is not at liberty to determine
the credibility and weight of the evidence.
Id.
Additionally,
the prevailing party is entitled to all reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from the evidence.
Id.
The Westerfields point to evidence that Iler owned
other adjoining property and that his mother owned property that
allowed him access to the Sandefur farm.
Regardless of the
veracity of that evidence, it does not bear directly on Iler’s
right to use the roadway as ingress to the Sandefur farm under
the definition of “necessary access” in KRS 178.116.
Our review
of the record indicates that this evidence is insufficient to
overturn a jury verdict on this issue.
Third, the Westerfields argue that the trial court
erred by determining the parameters of the roadway to be
eighteen feet in width and relying on evidence taken at a posttrial hearing.
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The determination of the location and dimensions of a
passway are within the discretion of the trial court.
Clarkson, 338 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Ky. 1960).
Daniel v.
Although some
evidence was taken at trial, there was no explicit finding made
concerning the dimensions of the roadway.
Therefore, it was
reasonable for the trial court to take evidence at a post-trial
hearing.
Our review of the record indicates no abuse of
discretion.
Next, the Westerfields argue that they were entitled
to a jury instruction on adverse possession.
We disagree.
The establishment of a claim through adverse
possession requires evidence of possession of a disputed
property under a claim of right that is hostile to the title
owner’s interest.
Phillips v. Akers, 103 S.W.3d 705, 708
(Ky.App. 2002). Additionally, the claimant must demonstrate that
the possession was actual, open and notorious, exclusive, and
continuous for a period of fifteen years.
Id.
Our review of the record indicates that the trial
court properly refused to instruct on adverse possession because
there was insufficient proof of exclusive possession of the
roadway.
It is next contended that the trial court should have
dismissed the suit for Iler’s failure to join his ex-wife as an
indispensable party.
The trial court correctly refused to
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dismiss the suit because the sole issue at trial was whether the
roadway provided necessary access for Iler himself.
The joinder
of Iler’s ex-wife would have had no bearing on the rights of the
parties in this matter.
The Westerfields also argue that the trial court erred
by allowing evidence of settlement negotiations.
However, the
record indicates that the trial court sustained the objections
to this evidence and admonished the jury.
No further request
for relief was made and we find the trial court’s admonition
properly cured any error in this regard.
It is argued that the trial court erred by allowing
Iler’s daughter, April Cardwell, a registered nurse, to testify
regarding the mental health of her grandmother, who was a
witness for the Westerfields.
Specifically, they argue that the
nurse was not qualified to state an expert opinion on this
matter.
We find that Cardwell was not offered as an expert and
stated a permissible lay opinion regarding the mental health of
her grandmother.
Finally, the Westerfields argue that the trial court
erred by refusing to allow evidence that one of Iler’s tenants
who resided in a mobile home on his adjoining property was
arrested on methamphetamine charges.
We find that this evidence
is irrelevant to this case and that the trial court properly
refused to admit it.
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On cross-appeal, Iler argues that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to make findings concerning the dimensions
of the roadway because appeals had already been filed to this
Court.
The appeals that Iler references were not in response to
a final judgment, so jurisdiction remained in the trial court.
All other issues on cross-appeal are moot based on our findings
above.
The judgment of the Ohio Circuit Court is affirmed in
all respects.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR CHARLES H.
WESTERFIELD, GLENDA K.
WESTERFIELD, MONTY MAZE,
AND JUDY MAZE:
Mike McKown
Hartford, KY
BRIEF FOR JOHN ILER:
E. Glenn Miller
130 E. Washington Street –
Suite #108
Hartford, KY
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