EVERETT L. LETTERLOUGH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
May 6, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
SEPTEMBER 14, 2005 (2005-SC-0771-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000771-MR
EVERETT L. LETTERLOUGH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-000809
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Everett L. Letterlough has appealed from the
judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Jefferson
Circuit Court on March 16, 2004, following his conditional plea
of guilty to the charges of trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree (cocaine),1 possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon,2 illegal possession of drug paraphernalia
while in possession of a firearm,3 illegal possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) while in possession of a
firearm,4 and being a persistent felony offender in the first
degree (PFO I).5
Having concluded that the trial court’s
findings of fact in support of its order denying Letterlough’s
motion to suppress evidence are supported by substantial
evidence and that its application of the law to those facts is
correct as a matter of law, we affirm.
On January 7, 2003, Detective Mike Brackett of the
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office was told by a confidential
informant, who he deemed to be reliable, that Letterlough was
dealing drugs from Room 129 at the InTown Suites on Wattbourne
Lane in Louisville, Kentucky.
The confidential informant told
Det. Brackett that Letterlough was driving a small, tan, foreign
car, but he did not know the make or model of the vehicle.
Brackett knew from previous experience that this particular
motel was a common location for drug transactions.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412.
2
KRS 527.040.
3
KRS 218A.500, enhanced by KRS 218A.992.
4
KRS 218A.1422, enhanced by KRS 218A.992.
5
KRS 532.080(3).
-2-
After
Det.
receiving this information, Det. Brackett performed a criminal
background check on Letterlough, which showed several past drug
arrests, drug convictions, and “gun involvement.”6
Letterlough
had been recently paroled on July 24, 2002, and was residing at
an address in Louisville.
Det. Brackett and four other police officers proceeded
to InTown Suites to investigate the confidential informant’s
tip.
Upon arriving at the motel at approximately 7:00 p.m.,
Det. Brackett verified from records at the front desk that Room
129 was registered to Letterlough.
Although Det. Brackett did
not see a car that matched the description given by the
confidential informant, he continued his investigation by
setting up surveillance of Room 129.
Approximately 20 minutes later, a car matching the
description given by the confidential informant entered the
parking lot and parked across from Room 129.
Det. Brackett had
obtained a physical description of Letterlough through a
criminal history report, and the driver of the car matched that
description.
Once Letterlough was out of his car, Det. Brackett
and Detective Troy Pitcock approached him.
As the detectives
walked toward Letterlough with their police badges displayed,
Det. Brackett yelled “Everett,” and upon hearing his name,
Letterlough looked in the direction of the detectives.
6
Det.
The record is not clear as to the nature of this “gun involvement.”
-3-
Brackett asked to see Letterlough’s driver’s license to confirm
his identity, but Letterlough claimed his identification was in
his motel room.
Det. Brackett testified that Letterlough then
consented to a pat down search of his outer garments, but the
trial court did not make a factual finding as to this issue.
As
a result of this pat down, Det. Brackett located a fully loaded
.380 caliber automatic pistol in a black holster under
Letterlough’s jacket.
Letterlough was then placed under arrest
for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm.
In the
search incident to arrest, Det. Brackett discovered 11 pieces of
crack cocaine in Letterlough’s right jacket pocket, digital
scales in his left jacket pocket, and six pieces of individually
wrapped crack cocaine along with a small amount of marijuana in
his left front pocket.
Additionally, Det. Brackett found
$1,500.00 in cash in Letterlough’s right rear pants pocket and
$375.00 in cash in his right front pants pocket.
After Letterlough was placed under arrest, he stated
to Det. Brackett that the $1,500.00 was for rent and that he had
intended to give the money to his girlfriend, Ivy Allen, who was
in Room 129.
The detectives escorted Letterlough to Room 129
and Det. Brackett opened the door to the room using the key he
had taken from Letterlough’s person.
-4-
Upon entering the motel
room, Det. Brackett saw two crack pipes on the bed next to
Allen.7
Det. Brackett then asked Letterlough for consent to
search the motel room and his vehicle.
Letterlough agreed to
the search and both he and Allen signed a written consent form.
During the search of the motel room, the detectives found some
bullets and a motel receipt showing Letterlough had already paid
$155.00 for the room for that day.
The detectives also found in
the motel room’s trash can several plastic baggies with their
corners removed.8
The search of Letterlough’s vehicle revealed a
loaded .38 caliber revolver in the rear floorboard, and numerous
live rounds of ammunition in the console, along with an
additional $80.00 in cash.
Letterlough was indicted by a Jefferson County grand
jury on March 20, 2003, for trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree (cocaine) while in possession of a
firearm,9 possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, illegal
use or possession of drug paraphernalia while in possession of a
firearm, illegal possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana) while in possession of a firearm, and being a PFO I.
7
Allen was cited for possession of drug paraphernalia, but failed to appear
in court.
8
Det. Brackett stated this is a common method used by drug dealers to package
crack cocaine intended for sale.
9
KRS 218.1412 and KRS 218A.992.
-5-
Prior to the trial date of March 15, 2004, Letterlough filed a
motion to suppress from evidence the drugs, money, scales and
firearms found on Letterlough’s person, in the motel room, and
in his car.
The motion was based on the alleged warrantless
unconstitutional seizure of Letterlough by the detectives.
Following a hearing on January 30, 2004, the trial
court denied Letterlough’s motion to suppress the evidence in an
order entered on February 26, 2004.10
Thereafter, Letterlough
entered into a conditional guilty plea agreement with the
Commonwealth, and by judgment entered on March 16, 2004, the
trial court convicted Letterlough of trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree (cocaine), possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, illegal possession of drug paraphernalia
while in possession of a firearm, illegal possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) while in possession of a
firearm, and being a PFO I.
He was sentenced to prison for a
total of 17 years to serve.
This appeal followed.
Letterlough contends the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the evidence because the tip from the
confidential informant along with the other information gathered
by the detectives was insufficient to support the reasonable and
10
Honorable Judge Thomas B. Wine presiding.
-6-
articulable suspicion of criminal activity required to justify
an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio.11
We disagree.
Our standard of review in reviewing a trial court’s
decision on a motion to suppress evidence is well-established in
that we must “first determine whether the trial court’s findings
of fact are supported by substantial evidence.
then they are conclusive.12
If they are,
Based on those findings of fact, we
must then conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s
application of the law to those facts to determine whether its
decision is correct as a matter of law.”13
In Ornelas v. United
States,14 the Supreme Court of the United States “recognized that
police may draw inferences of illegal activity from facts that
may appear innocent to a lay person and that a reviewing court
should give due weight to the assessment by the trial court of
the credibility of the officer and the reasonableness of the
inferences.”15
The presence or absence of reasonable suspicion
11
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
12
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78.
13
Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App. 2002) (citing Adcock v.
Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998); and Commonwealth v. Opell, 3 S.W.3d
747, 751 (Ky.App. 1999)).
14
517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996).
15
Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky. 2002).
-7-
is a question of law to be determined on appeal under a de novo
standard of review.16
A police officer does not violate either the United
States Constitution or the Kentucky Constitution by merely
approaching an individual in a public place, by asking him to
identify himself, and “by putting questions to him if the person
is willing to listen[.]”17
A police officer may briefly detain
an individual in a public place, even though there is no
probable cause to arrest him, if there is a reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot.18
“[A] police officer can
subject anyone to an investigatory stop if he is able to point
to some specific and articulable fact which, together with
rational inferences from those facts, support ‘a reasonable and
articulable suspicion’ that the person in question is engaged in
illegal activity” [emphasis original].19
Letterlough cites Lovett v. Commonwealth,20 Alabama v.
White,21 and United States v. Smith,22 for the proposition that
16
Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226, 232 (Ky. 2003) (citing Ornelas, 517
U.S. at 698-99; and Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2001)).
17
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983);
Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Ky. 1999).
18
Terry, 391 U.S. at 21.
19
Simpson v. Commonwealth, 834 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ky.App. 1992) (citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 21).
20
103 S.W.3d 72, 77-78 (Ky. 2003).
21
496 U.S. 325, 328, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).
-8-
“[a] confidential informant’s tip alone is ordinarily
insufficient to establish probable cause if it has not been
corroborated by police investigation or supplemented with
additional information” [emphasis added].
The case before us is
easily distinguishable from Lovett and Smith, since our case
concerns reasonable and articulable suspicion to support a Terry
stop and not probable cause to support a search warrant.
Our
case is also easily distinguishable from White since the
informant in this case, unlike the one in White, was known to
the police officer and was not anonymous.
Letterlough also relies on Adams v. Williams,23 for the
statement that “an informant’s tip that has a low degree of
reliability requires additional information to establish
reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.”
However, in
Adams the Supreme Court held that a Terry “stop and frisk” was
proper when the police officer acted upon an unverified tip from
an informant who was known to the officer personally and who had
provided information in the past.
Thus, Adams actually supports
the Commonwealth’s position.
In fact, all of the cases relied upon by Letterlough
are easily distinguishable from our case because they either
involve a search warrant, a warrantless arrest, or an anonymous
22
783 F.2d 648, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1986).
23
407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923-24, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
-9-
tipster.
It appears that in arguing these various cases
Letterlough is “mixing apples and oranges.”
While it is correct
that information from an anonymous tipster that is not
predictive of a person’s conduct and is not corroborated is not
sufficient to support a Terry stop24 and that information
obtained from a confidential informant may be insufficient to
establish probable cause to support a search warrant or a
warrantless arrest,25 it is not correct that information obtained
from a reliable, confidential informant when coupled with some
independent verification from a police investigation cannot be
sufficient to support a Terry stop.26
In the case before us, Det. Brackett testified the
confidential informant had supplied him with reliable
information in one prior criminal case.
The detectives also
knew from their experience as narcotic investigators that the
InTown Suites, where the informant said Letterlough was dealing
drugs from Room 129, was known for having high incidents of drug
trafficking.27
The detectives then did a criminal background
24
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000)
(stating that “[t]he anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive
information and therefore left the police without means to test the
informant’s knowledge or credibility”).
25
State v. Rose, 503 So.2d 499, 500 (La. 1986).
26
Adams, 407 U.S. at 146.
27
Banks, 68 S.W.3d at 350 (noting that “[i]n Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), the United States
Supreme Court stated that an individual’s presence in a high crime area may
-10-
check on Letterlough and learned that he had several prior drug
convictions and previous gun involvement.
The detectives also
determined that Letterlough was on parole and he lived at a
Louisville address.
The detectives then went to the motel where
they determined that Letterlough was indeed registered in Room
129.
Their surveillance of the motel parking lot allowed them
to identify the car the informant said Letterlough would be
driving and then to question Letterlough himself.
While certain actions by Letterlough may be as
consistent with legal activities as illegal ones, that is not
the test.28
Rather, all that is required is that the
“investigatory stop must be justified by some objective
manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be,
engaged in criminal activity.”29
There is no requirement that
the person actually be engaged in criminal activity at the time
of the investigatory stop or before that time.
The analysis of
whether a particular investigatory stop is constitutionally
permissible “proceeds with various objective observations,
be considered as a factor in deciding whether an officer can conduct a Terry
stop. However, the mere instance of being in a high crime area, without any
more articulable facts is insufficient to justify such a stop”).
28
Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Ky. 1999) (stating that
“[a]lthough Appellant’s conduct prior to the seizure may have been as
consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, that fact in and
of itself did not preclude Officer Richmond from entertaining a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity could have been occurring once Appellant
failed to comply with the request to remove his hands from his pockets”).
29
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621
(1981).
-11-
information from police reports, if such are available, and
consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain
kinds of lawbreakers.
From these data, a trained officer draws
inferences and makes deductions – inferences and deductions that
might well elude an untrained person.”30
Thus, based on the
information the detectives gathered about Letterlough and their
inferences and deductions, there was sufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s factual findings; and the trial
court’s application of the law concerning an investigatory stop
to those facts is correct.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Daniel T. Goyette
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
30
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
-12-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.