BILLY JOE LEDFORD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 24, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000749-MR
BILLY JOE LEDFORD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MENIFEE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00022
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2004-CA-000750-MR
BILLY JOE LEDFORD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MENIFEE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00025
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Billy Joe Ledford has appealed from two orders
of the Menifee Circuit Court denying his motions to suppress
evidence obtained from confidential communications he had with
his psychotherapist on the grounds that such communications were
privileged pursuant to KRE 507.
We affirm.
On August 8, 2002, the Menifee County grand jury
indicted Ledford on one count of Sexual Abuse, First Degree,2
charging him with having sexual contact with a minor under the
age of twelve during the winter of 2001-2002.
After entering a
not guilty plea, Ledford filed a motion to suppress all of the
confidential communications he made to psychotherapist Stephen
Johnson in 2002 for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his
mental condition, relying upon KRE 507.
Johnson disclosed those
communications to Kentucky State Police in a letter dated June
11, 2002.
At a suppression hearing in early 2003, Johnson
testified that he was a licensed clinical social worker and
psychotherapist, and worked for the University of Kentucky,
Department of Psychiatry.
He first saw Ledford in early June
2002 on a self-referral for treatment.
After discussing with
him that all of the information he shared with him would be
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
KRS 510.110.
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confidential, unless it related to harm to himself or others in
the future, Ledford made admissions to him regarding child
sexual abuse he had committed.
Johnson then told him he needed
to determine whether he had to report his admissions.
When he
determined that he was “mandated” to report Ledford’s admission,
Johnson contacted the Department of Social Services by telephone
to report the information.
KSP Detective David Owens contacted
him regarding the report and requested that he draft a letter
memorializing the report, which he did.
Johnson saw Ledford
again, and told him about the report he made to law enforcement.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court indicated
that it would delay its ruling on the motion to suppress pending
a decision by the Supreme Court of Kentucky on an identical
issue.
On August 18, 2003, the Menifee County grand jury
indicted Ledford on three more charges, related to actions that
took place between 1980 and 1990.
He was charged with one count
each of Sodomy, First Degree,3 for deviate sexual intercourse
with a minor under the age of twelve, and of Sodomy, Third
Degree,4 for deviate sexual intercourse with a minor under the
age of sixteen.
He was also charged with one count of Sexual
Abuse, First Degree, for sexual contact with a minor under the
3
KRS 510.070.
4
KRS 510.090.
-3-
age of twelve.
Ledford again entered a not guilty plea, and
filed another motion to suppress evidence pursuant to KRE 507.
On January 23, 2004, the circuit court signed
identical orders denying Ledford’s motions to suppress.5
Ledford
then moved to enter conditional guilty pleas pursuant to RCr
8.09 in both cases.
Following the guilty plea hearing, the
circuit court accepted his pleas and entered a Judgment and
Sentence in each case on March 30, 2004.6
Pursuant to his
agreement with the Commonwealth, the circuit court found Ledford
guilty on the sexual abuse counts of the two indictments and
sentenced him to two three-year sentences, to be served
concurrently.
The sodomy charges in indictment No. 03-CR-00025
were both dismissed.
Ledford was permitted to remain free on
bond pending resolution of his appeals.
This Court held
Ledford’s consolidated appeals in abeyance pending final
disposition by the Supreme Court in Carrier v. Commonwealth,7
which became final on September 23, 2004.
On appeal, Ledford presents two arguments, neither of
which was raised before the circuit court in the motions to
suppress.
He argues that because his communications to Johnson
5
These orders, as well as the other motions filed and orders signed that day,
were filed into the official record on January 27, 2004.
6
The judgments were amended on April 2, 2004, to show that the guilty pleas
were conditional.
7
142 S.W.3d 670 (Ky. 2004).
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dealt with past conduct and no child was in present danger of
abuse, his communications were protected by the psychotherapistpatient privilege and Johnson was not mandated to report his
admissions.
Ledford also makes a public policy argument, in
that a mental health professional should not be permitted to
deceive a patient by claiming that communications are
confidential and then disclose that information to authorities.
On the other hand, the Commonwealth argues that the circuit
court did not commit any error in denying Ledford’s motions to
suppress.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth points out that Ledford
failed to preserve his arguments for appellate review by first
raising them before the circuit court, that his first argument
is based on facts not in the record, and that it is beyond the
power of the courts to set aside the public policy of the
legislature as being contrary to public interest.
We shall first address the Commonwealth’s concerns
that Ledford’s arguments were based on facts not in the record
and that he failed to preserve either of his arguments for
appellate review.
Pursuant to CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv), the statement
of the case is to include “ample references to the specific
pages of the record . . . supporting each of the statements
narrated in the summary.”
We agree with the Commonwealth that
Ledford’s statement of the case contains factual assertions that
are not in the certified record on appeal.
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Therefore, we shall
ignore any factual references that are not found in the record
before us.
Likewise, we agree with the Commonwealth that
Ledford did not first raise the arguments in his brief to the
circuit court.
The law of this Commonwealth is clear that this
Court “is without authority to review issues not raised in or
decided by the trial court.”8
To be considered on appellate
review, errors “must be precisely preserved and identified in
the lower court.”9
At the circuit court level, Ledford merely
argued that his confidential communications should be suppressed
pursuant to the psychotherapist-patient privilege found in KRE
507.
However, on appeal, he presents arguments that Johnson did
not have a duty to report pursuant to KRS 620.030, as he only
reported past conduct and no child was presently in danger, and
that the ruling was against public interest.
While we agree
with the Commonwealth that Ledford did not raise those precise
arguments to the circuit court, meaning that his appeal is
subject to dismissal, we shall nevertheless review these
arguments on a de novo basis.
KRE 507 defines the general psychotherapist-patient
privilege as follows:
A patient, or the patient’s authorized
representative, has a privilege to refuse to
8
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1989).
9
Forester v. Forester, 979 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Ky.App. 1998), citing Skaggs v.
Assad, By and Through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1986).
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disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing confidential communications,
made for the purpose of diagnosis or
treatment of the patient’s mental condition,
between the patient, the patient’s
psychotherapist, or persons who are
participating in the diagnosis or treatment
under the direction of the psychotherapist,
including members of the patient’s family.
There are several exceptions to the general rule set out in KRE
507(c), none of which apply here.
However, another exception is
found in KRS Chapter 620, which abrogates this privilege in
establishing a mandatory duty to report dependency, neglect or
abuse of a child.
KRS 620.030(1) provides that:
Any person who knows or has reasonable cause
to believe that a child is dependent,
neglected or abused shall immediately cause
an oral or written report to be made to a
local law enforcement agency or the Kentucky
State Police; the cabinet or its designated
representative; the Commonwealth’s attorney
of the county; by telephone or otherwise.
KRS 620.050(3) further provides that:
Neither the husband-wife nor any
professional-client/patient privilege,
except the attorney-client and clergypenitent privilege, shall be a ground for
refusing to report under this section or for
excluding evidence regarding a dependent,
neglected, or abused child or the cause
thereof, in any judicial proceedings
resulting from a report pursuant to this
section. This subsection shall also apply
in any criminal proceeding in District or
Circuit Court regarding a dependent,
neglected, or abused child.
-7-
Ledford first argues that the reporting requirements
of KRS 620.030 and 620.050 apply only to communications
regarding a child who is currently being abused or is otherwise
at risk.
He relies upon the present tense language in the
statute, as well as the expressed purpose of the KRS Chapter 620
(which he identifies as preventing abuse, neglect and dependency
of children), to argue that the reporting requirement does not
apply to past instances of abuse.
He states that the minors at
issue in these cases were out of danger at the time of the
communication, and therefore do not fall within KRS Chapter
620’s exception to the privilege.
On the other hand, the
Commonwealth correctly points out that the record in these cases
is scant, and that there is no evidence concerning whether
Ledford was seeking to suppress communications regarding either
past or present abuse.
The appellant in Carrier raised a similar argument in
the context that the provisions of KRS Chapter 620 should not
apply after a child victim reaches the age of majority, when
protection as a dependent, neglected or abused child is no
longer needed.
The Supreme Court disagreed, citing the opinion
on review of the Court of Appeals in apparent reliance on its
rationale:
Under KRS 620.030(1) and (2), the duty to
report arises when there is ‘reasonable
cause to believe that a child is dependent,
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neglected or abused.’ (emphasis added). In
the present case, that would have been at
the time appellant confessed to Dr. Runyon
that he had sexually abused the victims.
However, KRS 620.050(2) contains no
requirement that the challenged evidence be
recent or relate to a recently abused or
neglected child. That statute merely speaks
in terms of ‘evidence regarding a dependent,
neglected, or abused child.’ Thus, in our
view, if the person had a duty under KRS
Chapter 620 to report the neglect or abuse
at the time the communications were made,
whether or not the records of these
communications were being sought
contemporaneously, then the claimed
privilege to these records is abrogated by
the statute. In essence, KRS Chapter 620 is
triggered not by the time when the
communications (or records thereof)
regarding the abuse or neglect is being
sought but rather by the time the
communications regarding the abuse is made.
Accordingly, the trial court properly found
that the records of Dr. Runyon in the
instant case, although not sought until
1999, were not privileged.[10]
While this rationale applies more specifically to the records
documenting abuse, we nevertheless conclude that Ledford has
failed in his burden of proving that the privilege of KRE 507
applies,11 and that the circuit court properly denied his motions
to suppress.
Ledford’s second argument is a public policy one, in
which he argues that it is in the best interest of the public to
allow those individuals who need mental health treatment to
10
Carrier, 142 S.W.3d at 675.
11
Stidham v. Clark, 74 S.W.3d 719 (Ky. 2002).
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obtain it, without the risk of disclosure.
In particular, he
alludes that Johnson deceived him into disclosing his conduct by
assuring him that his communications were privileged, all the
while, he claimed, planning to disclose the information he
received.
The Commonwealth argues that the court does not have
the power to set aside the public policy of the legislature as
being contrary to the public interest.
In Commonwealth, ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson,12 the
Supreme Court held:
The establishment of public policy is
granted to the legislature alone. It is
beyond the power of a court to vitiate an
act of the legislature on the grounds that
public policy promulgated therein is
contrary to what the court considers to be
in the public interest. It is the
prerogative of the legislature to declare
that acts constitute a violation of public
policy.
Here, the legislature expressed the purpose of KRS Chapter 620
in KRS 620.010, which clearly evidences a desire and public
policy to protect children from being dependent, neglected or
abused.
This Court cannot set aside this expressed public
policy, as Ledford requests we do.
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Menifee
Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
12
828 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Ky. 1992).
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Grover A. Carrington
Mt. Sterling, KY
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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