JAMES WILLIAM BOSLER, III v. ADELAIDE COURTNEY CROMWELL-BOSLER; AND ROBERT G. STALLINGS, ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 24, 2006; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000401-MR
AND
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2004-CA-000640-MR
JAMES WILLIAM BOSLER, III
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEALS FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JOAN L. BYER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-500563
v.
ADELAIDE COURTNEY CROMWELL-BOSLER;
AND ROBERT G. STALLINGS, ATTORNEY
FOR PETITIONER
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
WITH DIRECTIONS APPEAL NO. 2004-CA-000401-MR
AFFIRMING CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2004-CA-000640-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, MINTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
James William Bosler, III brings Appeal No.
2004-CA-000401-MR from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order of the Jefferson Family Court entered November 13,
2003.
Adelaide Courtney Cromwell-Bosler brings Cross-Appeal No.
2004-CA-000640-MR from the same order.
We affirm in part and
reverse in part and remand with directions Appeal No. 2004-CA000401-MR and affirm Cross-Appeal No. 2004-CA-000640-MR.
James and Adelaide were married November 24, 1990.
The marriage was dissolved by decree of dissolution entered
September 20, 2002.
The parties’ property settlement agreement
was incorporated into the decree of dissolution.
Pursuant to
the agreement, the parties shared joint custody of their two
children, Lauren and Caroline.
Adelaide was designated primary
residential custodian, and James agreed to pay child support of
$1,205.46 per month.
Relevant to this appeal, the agreement
provided James would pay Lauren’s tuition at Our Lady of Lourdes
School through the end of the 2002-2003 school year.
The
agreement further provided that James would not be responsible
for payment of Lauren’s tuition after the end of the 2002-2003
school year.1
On February 20, 2003, Adelaide filed a motion seeking,
inter alia, payment by James of Lauren’s private school tuition.
James filed a motion on May 14, 2003, seeking removal of a
guardian ad litem previously appointed to represent the
children.
motions.
On May 22, 2003, a hearing was conducted on the
At the hearing, testimony was presented that Lauren
suffered an “emotional crisis” in the fall of 2002 and was not
functioning well at Our Lady of Lourdes School.
1
Adelaide
Both the family court and the parties have treated the payment of
educational expenses for Lauren as a form of child support.
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testified that as a result of these events she transferred
Lauren to Meredith-Dunn School (Meredith-Dunn) in November 2002.
The court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order on November 13, 2003.
Therein, the court found
that James admitted being responsible for tuition at Our Lady of
Lourdes for the 2002-2003 school year.
As concerns the payment
of tuition at Meredith-Dunn, the court stated the following:
KRS 403.211(3) permits the Court to
deviate from the Child Support Guidelines if
the Court makes a written finding or a
specific finding on the record that the
application of the guidelines would be
unjust or inappropriate in a particular
case. It sets forth several criteria to
deviate from the guidelines, including a
child’s extraordinary educational or special
needs. According to KRS 403.211(4), the
Court in its discretion is permitted to
determine what is “extraordinary.”
In the present action, the parties’
minor child, Lauren, has had trouble in
school since at least the first grade. Dr.
George Haarmon evaluated her in the spring
of 2001 when she was in the first grade at
Our Lady of Lourdes School. He determined
that she needed remedial help in several
subjects and needed to be in a structured
classroom. Although he found that she did
not meet the criteria for any learning
disability at that time, he recommended that
she be evaluated in two years at the end of
third grade.
Lauren continued to have problems at
both home and school over the next year.
(The Court notes that her parents separated
in July of 2001.) Kathy Beam [Principal at
Meredith Dunn School] met with Ms. CromwellBosler and Lauren’s teacher and principal in
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the fall of 2001 when Lauren was in the
second grade. At that time, Ms. Beam could
not determine if Lauren had a learning
disability or an auditory processing
problem. She recommended that she be
evaluated for attention deficit disorder and
for a hearing problem.
Lauren’s situation reached crisis
proportions in the fall of 2002. Her
parents’ divorce became final on September
20, 2002. She continued to do poorly at Our
Lady of Lourdes School. Ms. CromwellBosler, who has a master’s [degree] in
elementary education, decided that Lauren
could not function at that school and took
her to Meredith Dunn School to be evaluated
in November of 2002. That school determined
that Lauren met the admissions criteria for
that school, i.e., she was of average to
above average intelligence with a learning
disability. However, Lauren’s emotional
situation reached the breaking point soon
thereafter and she was admitted to Caritas
Peace Center because she was depressed and
expressed thoughts of suicide.
Lauren’s situation has stabilized since
November of 2002. She has made great
strides in reading and math. She has become
more self-confident and happy. Her
psychiatrist, Dr. Ora Frankel, has
recommended that Lauren remain at Meredith
Dunn. Therefore, the Court will deviate
from the Child Support Guidelines and order
Ms. Bosler be responsible for 26% and Dr.
Bosler to be responsible for 74% of Lauren’s
tuition at Meredith Dunn School, effective
February 20, 2003, when Ms. Cromwell-Bosler
filed her motion, and continuing until
further Order of the Court.2
2
An agreed order was entered May 31, 2005, whereby the parties agreed
Adelaide Courtney Cromwell-Bosler would be “responsible for paying any
private school tuition, including but not limited to Meredith-Dunn School
specifically through 2008, for their children, effective the date of this
Order.” Lauren’s private school tuition from February 2003 through the end
of the 2004-2005 school year remains in dispute.
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The court also awarded Adelaide $750.00 in attorney’s fees and
denied James’s motion to remove the guardian ad litem appointed
for the children.
These appeals follow.
James and Adelaide raise numerous issues in this
appeal and cross-appeal.
The primary point of contention of
both parties, however, is whether James is responsible for
payment of Lauren’s tuition at Meredith-Dunn from February 20,
2003, through the 2004-2005 school year.
James contends the family court erred by ordering him
to pay Lauren’s tuition at Meredith-Dunn.
James specifically
contends the court did not have sufficient evidence to determine
whether Lauren had “extraordinary educational needs” pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.211(3) to justify a
deviation from the child support guidelines.
Before beginning our analysis, we note that our
standard of review is governed by Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 52.01,
which provides that findings of fact by the circuit court shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, with due regard being
given to the opportunity of the court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses.
In divorce actions, this Court will not
disturb the findings of a trial court unless those findings are
clearly erroneous.
1988).
Cochran v. Cochran, 746 S.W.2d 568 (Ky.App.
Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if supported
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by substantial evidence.
Ky. State Racing Comm’n v. Fuller, 481
S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1972).
KRS 403.211(3)(b) provides for deviation from the
child support guidelines where the court makes a specific or
written finding that application of the guidelines would be
unjust or inappropriate based upon the child’s extraordinary
educational needs. It is well-established that extraordinary
educational needs are “those things not ordinarily necessary to
the acquisition of a common school education but which become
necessary because of the special needs of a particular student.”
Smith v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Ky.App. 1992).
Pursuant to KRS 403.211(4), a determination of whether
a student’s needs are “extraordinary” is within the discretion
of the trial court.
In the case sub judice, the court made
detailed written findings.
The court considered the testimony
of several witnesses including Lauren’s psychiatrist, Dr. Ora
Frankel.
Dr. Frankel diagnosed Lauren with major affective
disorder, unipolar depression, and attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder.
remain at Meredith-Dunn.
Dr. Frankel recommended that Lauren
Based upon our review of the record,
we do not believe the court abused its discretion in determining
that Lauren had extraordinary educational needs.
James next contends that there was not a material
change in circumstances justifying modification of child support
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pursuant to KRS 403.213(1).
Essentially, James contends that
Adelaide was aware of Lauren’s situation when she entered into
the property settlement agreement; thus, there was not a
material change in circumstance to justify modifying child
support.
The record reflects the following:
(1) the parties
entered into the property settlement agreement on September 18,
2002; (2) Lauren had previously experienced difficulty in
school, but her condition reached “crisis proportions” in the
fall of 2002; and (3) Lauren was ultimately hospitalized at
Caritas Peace Center in November 2002.
In light of these facts,
we believe James’s contention that a material change in
circumstances did not occur to be without merit.
James next contends the family court erred by
modifying child support without consideration of Adelaide’s
gross income.
James specifically asserts that the court did not
have Adelaide’s income information and, thus, could not make a
determination of whether a modification of support was
appropriate.
A review of the record reflects the court found
that Adelaide received monthly maintenance of $2,750 from
October 1, 2002, to October 1, 2003, and would receive $2,500.00
per month from October 1, 2003, through October 1, 2006.
Thus,
the court did have sufficient income information for Adelaide
and did not modify child support without considering the income
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of both parties.
Thus, we find James’s argument to be without
merit.
James also contends the family court erred by
modifying child support without modifying maintenance.
James
argues that pursuant to the parties’ property settlement
agreement, if Adelaide sought a modification of child support,
the terms of the maintenance agreement would be “set aside.”
The parties’ agreement clearly states that if Adelaide seeks a
modification of child support for any reason James “shall be
entitled to seek a reduction of maintenance.”
The agreement
does not provide, as James contends, that maintenance shall be
“set aside” if a modification of child support is sought.
Thus,
under the agreement, James is entitled to move for modification
of maintenance but clearly such modification is not mandatory.
James next argues that the circuit court effectively
set aside the terms of the property settlement agreement by
ordering him to pay tuition at Meredith-Dunn which was not
provided for in the parties’ agreement.
James specifically
asserts that Adelaide “is asking the Court to set aside part of
the agreement of the parties as it relates to private school
tuition and to keep the parts that are advantageous . . . .”
James argues that if Adelaide wanted to set aside the property
settlement agreement, she was required to file a motion pursuant
to CR 59 within ten days of the decree being entered.
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KRS 403.180 provides that a court may modify the
provisions of an agreement as to child support, child custody or
visitation.
Parties cannot prevent the court from modifying the
terms of their agreement regarding matters of child support.
Berry v. Cabinet for Families & Children ex rel. Howard, 998
S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1999).
As such, James’s contention that the
court could not modify child support without setting aside the
entire property settlement agreement is without merit.
James next contends the court erred by awarding
$750.00 in attorney’s fees to Adelaide.
Specifically, James
contends the family court relied solely upon the disparity in
the parties’ income and did not consider the other financial
resources of the parties.
Adelaide counters in her cross-appeal
that the award was not adequate given the large disparity in the
parties’ income and the lack of liquidity in the assets that she
was awarded.
KRS 403.220 clearly provides that the court may award
attorney’s fees “after considering the financial resources of
the both parties.”
It is well-established that an award of
attorney’s fees is entirely within the discretion of the trial
court.
Tucker v. Hill, 763 S.W.2d 144 (Ky.App. 1988).
Likewise, a trial court is not required to make specific
findings of fact regarding the financial resources of the
parties.
Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 798 S.W.2d 145
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(Ky.App. 1990).
The trial court is merely obligated to
“consider” the financial resources of the parties.
Id.
A review of the record in this case reveals that the
family court considered the provisions of KRS 403.220 and
applied the proper standard for awarding attorney’s fees.
The
court was very familiar with the financial resources of both
parties.
The record reveals that James had monthly gross income
of $8,000.00, while Adelaide’s income was limited to maintenance
in the amount of $2,750.00 per month ($2,500.00 effective
October 1, 2003).
Although Adelaide received considerable
assets through the division of property provided for in the
property settlement agreement, approximately half of the value
of the property she received was from the marital residence.
As
such, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in awarding
$750.00 in attorney’s fees to Adelaide.
Finally, James contends that the retention of a
guardian ad litem in this case and the costs associated
therewith are no longer warranted.
James points out that Lauren
is now being treated by both a therapist and a psychiatrist, and
receives the services of the parent coordinator appointed by the
court.
James argues the services of the guardian ad litem are
no longer necessary and the guardian should be removed.
A guardian ad litem was appointed for Lauren and
Caroline in the dissolution proceeding on February 14, 2002.
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A
dependency action had apparently been initiated in January 2002
and concluded in May 2002 where the guardian was also appointed.
The guardian continued to represent the children in the postdecree dissolution proceedings.
KRS 387.305(5) governs the appointment of a guardian
ad litem and provides, in relevant part, that “the duties of a
guardian ad litem shall be to advocate for the client’s best
interest in the proceeding through which the guardian ad litem
was appointed.”
We are not aware of any authority, nor have the
parties cited this Court to any that would allow for the
continued representation of the children by a guardian after
entry of the decree of dissolution.
Additionally, the family
court made no findings sufficient to warrant the continued
representation of the children by a guardian.
As such, we
conclude the court abused its discretion by denying James’s
motion to remove the guardian.
The only remaining argument for consideration is
Adelaide’s assertion that modification of the child support
should have been retroactive to November 2002, rather than
February 2003.
KRS 403.213(1) provides that modification of
child support may “be modified only as to installments accruing
subsequent to the filing of the motion for modification.”
Although Lauren was transferred to Meredith-Dunn in November
2002, Adelaide did not file her motion until February 2003.
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Thus, the court properly ordered that the modification was
effective as of the filing of the motion in February 2003.
For the foregoing reasons, Appeal No. 2004-CA-000401MR is affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded with
directions to remove the guardian ad litem from further
representation of the children in this action.
Cross-Appeal No.
2004-CA-000640-MR is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS:
Teresa M. Kinberger
Louisville, Kentucky
Peter L. Ostermiller
Louisville, Kentucky
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