ANN MICHELLE GREENWELL v. UNIFIED FOODSERVICE PURCHASING CO-OP, LLC; KENCO INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.; CAROL SINGLETON; AND H.W. \"BUTCH\" BIRCHFIELD
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RENDERED:
MARCH 18, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
MODIFIED:
APRIL 1, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
SEPTEMBER 14, 2005 (2005-SC-0288-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000391-MR
ANN MICHELLE GREENWELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN McDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-001438
UNIFIED FOODSERVICE PURCHASING
CO-OP, LLC; KENCO INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC.; CAROL SINGLETON; AND
H.W. "BUTCH" BIRCHFIELD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
In directing a verdict in favor of the
defendants, the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed Ann Michelle
Greenwell’s suit alleging retaliation and the intentional
infliction of emotional distress against her employer for her
prior unfavorable testimony at an unemployment hearing.
Greenwell has appealed from the judgment on directed verdict as
well as from a pre-trial ruling on a motion in limine, in which
the circuit court excluded testimony and documentation based
upon the assertion of attorney-client privilege.
We affirm the
ruling on the motion in limine and the directed verdict on the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, but reverse
and remand on the retaliation claim.
Greenwell is an accountant who in 1990 began her
employment as an accounting analyst for KFC National Purchasing
Co-Op, the predecessor company to Unified Food Service
Purchasing Co-Op, LLC (hereinafter “UFPC”).
UFPC is a private
corporation that provides a bulk food purchasing function for
franchisees of Pizza Hut, KFC, and Taco Bell, among others.
In
1999, Greenwell began work for Kenco Insurance Agency, Inc.
(hereinafter “Kenco”), a subsidiary of UFPC that provides
insurance for its franchisees.
Although she continued to be
employed by Kenco through the pendency of the action below and
before this Court, UFPC dissolved Kenco and terminated all of
Kenco’s employees, including Greenwell, effective March 4, 2005.
Former Kenco president, Gail Wilson, who hired
Greenwell as Agency/Accounting Manager, left the company in
2000, and Brian Taylor was hired as president in March 2001.
At
this point in time, the evidence is clear that a divide existed
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in the office, which numbered approximately eleven people.
In
April, Greenwell discovered that co-employee Lisa Nash had
changed house accounts so that she would receive commissions.
Greenwell sought out Kay Saylor to find out how to access the
transaction log to determine who had made the changes.
Because
she did not believe it was proper for Nash to be receiving these
commissions, Greenwell determined who made the changes and when
they were made and then reported this information to Taylor in
an e-mail.
Taylor agreed that the accounts should be recoded to
house accounts.
About one month later, Greenwell attended a
meeting called by Nash to discuss undermining changes Taylor
wanted to implement.
Greenwell left the meeting, and later
noticed that Nash engaged in a lengthy, long distance telephone
call of a personal nature with Kenco’s prior president.
Greenwell reported the meeting and telephone call to Taylor, who
told her to get the telephone records for Nash’s extension.
Greenwell did so and turned the information over to Taylor.
Taylor resigned from Kenco in June 2001, and filed for
unemployment benefits under KRS Chapter 341.
He also filed a
reverse discrimination action under the Kentucky Civil Rights
Act, KRS Chapter 344.
Greenwell, along with other Kenco
employees, testified at Taylor’s unemployment hearing in
October, and her testimony was favorable to him.
Greenwell was
also subpoenaed to testify at the December 2002 trial in
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Taylor’s discrimination action.
Just prior to the date of
Taylor’s trial, the parties entered into an oral stipulation
that all of the testimony taken in the unemployment hearing
would be considered relevant for all purposes in the upcoming
trial.
However, Taylor’s case settled and never went to trial.
Shortly after Taylor’s case was dismissed in January,
Carol Singleton (the vice-president of Human Resources for UFPC)
and H.W. Birchfield (Kenco’s current president) met with
Greenwell to discuss a personnel issue.
At that time, Singleton
and Birchfield provided Greenwell with a memorandum dated
January 23, 2003, which stated as follows:
It has been brought to our attention that
confidential information available to you
based on your position within Kenco has been
shared with others besides your direct team
leaders. The purpose of this memo is to
ensure understanding on your part of the
severity of this type of breach of
confidentiality. We also want to ensure
there is an understanding on the
inappropriateness of using your position to
gain access to information that is not
needed for purposes of completing your job.
In certain positions, team members have
access to confidential information of
various types – salaries, bonuses, financial
information and phone records. Your
position has been one of those.
We have learned that information relating to
size of bonus and commission income on UFPC
business were related to others. Also you
requested copies of phone records for your
team. Only team leaders should request
copies of information on phone records of
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their direct reports. Needing overall
information relating to costs is necessary
for financial analysis but detailed
information by team member is not needed for
the successful completion of your job
duties. If you feel there is an issue, as a
manager you have a responsibility to take
your concerns to your team leader but do not
have the right to take matters in to [sic]
your own hands. We value the privacy of our
team members and make every effort to
protect same. If there is a true business
reason to access, the team leader makes that
call.
The behavior captured above is inappropriate
and can carry consequences up to and
including termination.
It is undisputed that the two incidents mentioned in the
memorandum had occurred over eighteen months earlier in April
and May 2001.
Furthermore, a week later Birchfield took several
managerial duties away from Greenwell, including authority over
day-to-day operations, approval of his expense reports, and her
ability to provide input regarding anything but accounting
issues.
After receiving the January 23rd memorandum, Greenwell
contacted attorney Stephen Frockt, who had represented Taylor in
his reverse discrimination action.
Greenwell filed a Verified
Complaint on February 17, 2003, alleging retaliation under KRS
Chapter 344 (the Kentucky Civil Rights Act) and as a violation
of public policy against UFPC and Kenco, as well as the
intentional infliction of emotional distress by Singleton and
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Birchfield.
The defendants filed an answer and were later
permitted to file an amended answer.
scheduled for January 20, 2004.
A trial was eventually
Shortly before trial, the
defendants filed motions in limine based upon their assertion of
the attorney-client privilege to exclude any testimony
concerning attorney Julie Foster and related e-mail
correspondence from the Taylor case.
The circuit court granted
these motions in limine, reasoning that the attorney-client
privilege attached to the confidential communication between
Greenwell, a representative of the company, and Foster, an
attorney representing the company in the Taylor case.
The matter proceeded to trial on January 20, 2004, and
concluded on January 22.
Greenwell testified in her own behalf,
and she also relied upon the testimony of fellow employees Donna
Bauer (Kenco’s controller), Saylor, Singleton and Birchfield, as
well as Taylor.
At the close of her case, the defendants moved
for a directed verdict pursuant to CR 50.01.
The defendants
argued that Greenwell had not engaged in any protected conduct
under KRS Chapter 344 as she had only testified under KRS
Chapter 341, and that in any event she had not established that
any retaliatory act was causally related to her support of
Taylor or that she had been subjected to any adverse employment
action.
Furthermore, the defendants argued that Kentucky does
not recognize a public policy violation as actionable absent a
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discharge, which did not happen in this case.
As to her
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the
defendants argued that Greenwell had not presented any evidence
of any conduct that would amount to extraordinary or outrageous
conduct.
On the other hand, Greenwell responded that the jury
should be permitted to determine whether an adverse employment
action had taken place and whether Singleton’s and Birchfield’s
respective conduct was outrageous.
After rhetorically asking “Where’s the beef?”, the
circuit court decided that it would be an abuse of its
discretion to send the case to the jury and granted a directed
verdict on all issues.
The circuit court then indicated that
Greenwell was a “hypersensitive person” and expressed the
thought that the case should never have gotten as far as it did.
A judgment on directed verdict was then entered on February 11,
2004.
This appeal from the judgment as well as from the order
granting the defendants’ motions in limine followed.
On appeal, Greenwell argues that the circuit court
erred in granting the motions in limine and excluding the
confidential communications between her and counsel for the
employer in the Taylor case.
Likewise, she argues that it was
error for the circuit court to direct a verdict in favor of the
appellees.
On the other hand, the appellees assert that the
circuit court properly granted their motions in limine due to
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their assertion of the attorney-client privilege as well as
their motion for a directed verdict because Greenwell failed to
establish prima facie cases for either retaliation or the
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
We shall first address the circuit court’s rulings on
the appellees’ motions in limine.
The appellees moved to
exclude any testimony concerning conversations between attorney
Julie Foster and Greenwell as well as e-mail communications.
Attorney Foster had been preparing to defend the Taylor reverse
discrimination action and was interviewing various employees of
Kenco, including Greenwell, regarding their observations.
The
appellees also sought to exclude e-mail communications between
Singleton and Greenwell concerning the scheduling of a meeting
with attorney Foster.
The circuit court excluded all of these
communications, reasoning that the communications in question
were between a representative (Greenwell) of the defendant
company (Kenco) and the company’s attorney, so that the company
was entitled to invoke the privilege.
KRE 503(b) sets out the general rule concerning the
attorney-client privilege as follows:
A client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing a confidential communication
made for the purpose of facilitating the
rendition of professional legal services to
the client:
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(1)
Between the client or a representative
of the client and the client’s lawyer
or a representative of the lawyer;
(2)
Between the lawyer and a representative
of the lawyer;
(3)
By the client or a representative of
the client or the client’s lawyer or a
representative of the lawyer
representing another party in a pending
action and concerning a matter of
common interest therein;
(4)
Between representatives of the client
or between the client and a
representative of the client; or
(5)
Among lawyers and their representatives
representing the same client.
KRE 503(a)(1) defines “client” as “a person, including a public
officer, corporation, association, or other organization or
entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional
legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view
to obtaining professional legal services from the lawyer.”
However, there are several exceptions enumerated under the rule
in situations involving the furtherance of crime or fraud1 or a
breach of duty by the lawyer or the client.2
In Stidham v. Clark,3 the Supreme Court of Kentucky
addressed the invocation of privileges, in that case the
communications of a psychotherapist.
1
KRE 503(d)(1).
2
KRE 503(d)(3).
3
74 S.W.3d 719 (Ky. 2002).
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After noting that the
party asserting the privilege has the burden to prove that it
applies, the Stidham court stated that the opponent of the
privilege would be required to establish, for one, that the
communications were within a specified exception.
Regarding the
burden of proof, the court held:
[A] claim of privilege can be defeated by
proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
including the communication or material
claimed to be privileged, that the privilege
has been waived or that the communication or
material is either outside the scope of (or
“not germane to”) the privilege or falls
within a specified exception to the
privilege.[4]
In her brief, Greenwell focuses not upon the circuit
court’s determination that the privilege exists in this case,
but rather on its failure to address the exceptions to the rule,
which she asserts are applicable here.
While we agree that the
circuit court, unfortunately, failed to address the exceptions
to KRE 503, we nevertheless hold that its decision was proper.
Greenwell did not establish by a preponderance of evidence that
either of the exceptions she advanced would apply to defeat the
privilege.
She did not introduce any evidence that crime or
fraud was being furthered, or that there had been any breach of
duty.
Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion in granting the motions in limine.
4
Id. at 727.
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We shall next address the circuit court’s entry of the
directed verdict on all issues at the close of Greenwell’s case.
In Bierman v. Klapheke,5 the Supreme Court of Kentucky set out
the applicable standard of review as follows:
On a motion for directed verdict, the trial
judge must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
party opposing the motion. When engaging in
appellate review of a ruling on a motion for
directed verdict, the reviewing court must
ascribe to the evidence all reasonable
inferences and deductions which support the
claim of the prevailing party.[] Once the
issue is squarely presented to the trial
judge, who heard and considered the
evidence, a reviewing court cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the
trial judge unless the trial judge is
clearly erroneous.[]
In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated
that, “[i]n reviewing this issue of evidential sufficiency the
appellate court must respect the opinion of the trial judge who
heard the evidence.”6
In general, a trial court is not permitted
to enter a directed verdict “unless there is a complete absence
of proof on a material issue or if no disputed issues of fact
exist upon which reasonable minds could differ.”7
5
967 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Ky. 1998)(citations omitted).
39 S.W.3d 474 (Ky.App. 2001).
It is up to
See also Banks v. Fritsch,
6
Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814, 821 (Ky. 1992).
7
Bierman, 967 S.W.2d at 18-19.
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the jury to resolve any conflicting evidence as well as any
matters concerning witness credibility.8
The first issue we shall review is Greenwell’s
retaliation claim.
Greenwell claims that she was subjected to
retaliation in violation of KRS 344.280, which provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
It shall be unlawful practice for a person,
or for two (2) or more persons to conspire:
(1)
To retaliate or discriminate in any
manner against a person because he has
opposed a practice declared unlawful by
this chapter, or because he has made a
charge, filed a complaint, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner
in any investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this chapter.
Because the Kentucky Civil Rights Act is virtually identical to
the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, we look at how federal law
has been interpreted.9
As Greenwell pointed out in her brief, Kentucky
follows the burden shifting formula set out by the United States
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.10
Once a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “[t]he burden then
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
8
Id.
Jefferson County v. Zaring, 91 S.W.3d 583 (Ky. 2002)(citing Harker v.
Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 679 S.W.2d 226 (Ky. 1984)).
9
10
411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
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nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”11
If the
employer meets this burden, “the plaintiff must then have an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.”12
In Brooks v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth.,13 the Supreme Court
of Kentucky defined a prima facie case of retaliation as a
demonstration:
(1) that plaintiff engaged in an activity
protected by Title VII; (2) that the
exercise of his civil rights was known by
the defendant; (3) that, thereafter, the
defendant took an employment action adverse
to the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a
causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.
The appellees contend that Greenwell did not meet any of the
four prongs.
We shall examine each one in turn.
The first prong of the prima facie test is that
Greenwell must establish that she was engaged in a protected
activity.
The appellees argue that Greenwell did not engage in
a protected activity under KRS Chapter 344, but rather that she
testified under KRS Chapter 341, dealing with unemployment.
However, Greenwell argues that she meets the requirement under
11
Id. at 802.
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct.
1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 215 (1981).
12
13
132 S.W.3d 790, 803 (Ky. 2004)(citing Christopher v. Stouder Memorial
Hospital, 936 F.2d 870, 877 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1013, 112
S.Ct. 658, 116 L.Ed.2d 749 (1991)).
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the participation clause because she was subpoenaed to testify
in Taylor’s KRS Chapter 344 reverse discrimination action and
her testimony from the unemployment hearing was included in that
record by joint oral stipulation.
The federal courts have examined the participation
clause and have consistently held that “the explicit language of
[the] participation clause is expansive and seemingly contains
no limitations.”14
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently held that “[t]he ‘exceptionally broad
protections’ of the participation clause extends [sic] to
persons who have ‘participated in any manner’ in Title VII
proceedings.”15
In the present matter, it is clear that
Greenwell did not actually testify in Taylor’s KRS Chapter 344
proceeding, although she was under subpoena to testify, because
that case settled prior to trial.
But it is equally clear that
the parties entered into an oral stipulation to include the
transcript of the Taylor unemployment hearing, which included
Greenwell’s testimony, in the record of his reverse
discrimination case.
Therefore, construing her participation
broadly as we must do, we hold that the inclusion of the
unemployment hearing transcript in the record of the KRS Chapter
344 proceeding, coupled with Greenwell’s being under subpoena to
14
Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2nd Cir. 2003).
15
Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000).
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testify at trial, is sufficient under the participation clause
to establish that Greenwell engaged in a protected activity
under KRS Chapter 344.
The circuit court was clearly erroneous
in holding otherwise.
Likewise, we must hold that the appellees
knew about Greenwell’s testimony at the unemployment hearing and
about the inclusion of the hearing transcript in Taylor’s
reverse discrimination action.
We shall next examine the adverse-action element.
In
Brooks, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, relying upon the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in Hollins v. Atlantic Co.,
Inc.,16 indicated that a plaintiff is required to identify “‘a
materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of his
employment to state a claim for retaliation.’”17
The Brooks
court further cited the Hollins case to define a materially
adverse change as “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or
an alteration of job responsibilities.”18
Furthermore, the court
stated, “[a] material modification in duties and loss of
prestige may rise to the level of adverse action.”19
In that
case, Brooks was singled out from other employees and had to get
permission from her supervisor to leave her desk for any reason.
16
188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999).
17
Brooks, 132 S.W.3d at 802.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 803.
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The change in her duties “subjected her to greater supervisory
scrutiny, carried an imputed diminished level of trust, and
marked an objective decrease in prestige.”20
Here, Greenwell argues that she was subjected to
adverse employment actions when she received the January 23,
2003, memorandum regarding inappropriate behavior, when her
managerial duties were withdrawn one week later by Birchfield in
an e-mail announcement to the company, and when she did not
receive a promotion.
The appellees argue that Greenwell failed
to show any evidence of a material adverse change to establish
an adverse employment action.
In a light most favorable to
Greenwell, we hold that there is at least sufficient evidence to
allow her to defeat a motion for directed verdict at the close
of her case.
Whether the evidence is sufficient to establish
any adverse employment action is best left to the jury to
decide.
The final prong of the prima facie case for
retaliation is evidence of a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.
The
Brooks court indicated that in the absence of direct evidence,
“the causal connection of a prima facie case of retaliation must
20
Id. at 804.
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be established through circumstantial evidence.”21
More
precisely,
Circumstantial evidence of a causal
connection is “evidence sufficient to raise
the inference that [the] protected activity
was the likely reason for the adverse
action.” . . . In most cases, this requires
proof that (1) the decision maker
responsible for making the adverse decision
was aware of the protected activity at the
time that the adverse decision was made, and
(2) there is a close temporal relationship
between the protected activity and the
adverse action.[22]
In the present case, Greenwell relies upon the close
temporal proximity of the dismissal of Taylor’s reverse
discrimination case to the January 23, 2003, memorandum and the
e-mail concerning her managerial duties.
This circumstantial
evidence is sufficient, when regarded in a light most favorable
to Greenwell, to establish this prong of the prima facie case of
retaliation.
Because we have held that Greenwell established her
prima facie case, the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting would
then apply.
At the outset, we note that the appellees were not
required to present their case-in-chief because a directed
verdict was granted at the end of Greenwell’s case.
However,
the appellees were able to put forth some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions that were taken regarding
21
22
Id.
Id. (Citations omitted.)
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Greenwell.
Assuming that the appellees’ evidence would be
sufficient to shift the burden back to require her to establish
pretext, Greenwell argues that she presented evidence that the
appellees’ proffered reasons were merely pretext.
In support,
she points to trial testimony from several witnesses that
establishes that the circumstances surrounding the incidents
listed in the January 23, 2003, memorandum did not happen as
reported in that document.
In a light most favorable to her, we
hold that Greenwell produced sufficient evidence to establish
pretext on the appellees’ part.
Because we have held that Greenwell engaged in a
protected activity under KRS Chapter 344, we need not address
her public policy argument.
Because we have held, in a light most favorable to
her, that Greenwell established a prima facie case for
retaliation as well as pretext, we hold that the circuit court
was clearly erroneous in granting a directed verdict on the
issue of retaliation, and accordingly reverse the judgment in
this regard.
We shall next address Greenwell’s intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim against Singleton and
Birchfield.
23
In Humana of Kentucky v. Seitz,23 the Supreme Court
796 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Ky. 1990).
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of Kentucky set out the elements of a prima facie case of
outrageous conduct as follows:
1) the wrongdoer’s conduct must be
intentional or reckless;
2) the conduct must be outrageous and
intolerable in that it offends against
the generally accepted standards of
decency and morality;
3) there must be a causal connection between
the wrongdoer’s conduct and the emotional
distress; and
4) the emotional distress must be severe.
In Seitz, the Supreme Court held that the hospital staff’s
callous treatment of a patient after the birth of her stillborn
child did not reach the level of outrageous conduct sufficient
to establish a prima facie case.
In her brief, Greenwell simply submits that it was
outrageous for Singleton and Birchfield to retaliate against her
for refusing to testify untruthfully.
However, the appellees
point out, and we agree, that Greenwell did not present any
evidence that she was retaliated against because she refused to
commit perjury.
Because Greenwell failed to establish any
evidence of outrageous and intolerable conduct, we agree that
she failed to prove a prima facie case of intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
Therefore, the circuit court was not
clearly erroneous in granting a directed verdict on this issue.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Stephen S. Frockt
Prospect, KY
John T. Lovett
Marcia L. Pearson
Louisville, KY
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