500 ASSOCIATES, INC. v. NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET and VERMONT AMERICAN CORPORATION v. 500 ASSOCIATES, INC.; AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 22, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000339-MR
500 ASSOCIATES, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 02-CI-00911 AND 02-CI-00924
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
AND
NO.
2004-CA-000451-MR
VERMONT AMERICAN CORPORATION
v.
APPELLEE
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 02-CI-00911 AND 02-CI-00924
500 ASSOCIATES, INC.; AND
NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
500 Associates, Inc. (500) has appealed from
the November 4, 2003, opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit
Court which assessed liability for environmental contamination
at a vacant industrial lot located at 500 East Main Street in
downtown Louisville, Kentucky, (the property site) where
hazardous substances have been released.
Vermont American
Corporation (VAC) filed a cross-appeal in this case, appealing
the same order.1
Having concluded that the circuit court’s
ruling was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
FACTS
On February 12, 1998, the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, now known as the Environmental
and Public Protection Cabinet, (the Cabinet) instituted the
underlying action by filing an administrative complaint against
VAC and 500 to hold both responsible for characterization and
remediation of the property site.
The Cabinet filed this case
based on evidence collected by the Cabinet’s Division of Waste
1
Both 500’s and VAC’s notices of appeal state that they are appealing the
Franklin Circuit Court’s order of January 20, 2004; however, this is the
order overruling the Cabinet’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit
court’s previous November 4, 2003, opinion and order. The November 4, 2004,
order is the order that both 500 and VAC are appealing, as it is the final
and appealable order.
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Management (DWM)2 which the Cabinet claimed showed a violation by
both parties of Kentucky’s Superfund statute, KRS3 224.01-400, by
failing to comply with certain obligations regarding alleged
hazardous substances that were released on the property site.4
The Cabinet sought its response costs from VAC and 500, as well
as substantial civil penalties.
From 1949 to 1986, VAC owned the subject property site
and operated thereon its American Saw and Tool Division, where
it manufactured circular saw blades and hand tools.
During this
37-year period, VAC generated various hazardous wastes
associated with its electroplating and metal heat treatment
operations.5
VAC was registered with the Cabinet as a large-
quantity hazardous waste generator and produced an average of
65,470 gallons of waste water per day.
VAC released untreated
2
To eliminate confusion, we will refer to all divisions of the Cabinet,
including the DWM, as “the Cabinet” throughout this Opinion.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
According to the Hearing Officer, the Cabinet’s initial investigation in
September 1994 of the site was under the federal Superfund program, but
because the site did not score high enough to justify further investigation,
the site was transferred to the state Superfund program. VAC and 500 were
notified by letters dated June 17, 1996, and October 28, 1996, that they were
obligated under KRS 224.01-400 to characterize and remedy the releases on the
site.
5
These operations included metal milling, metal heat treatment, degreasing,
electroplating, and painting, and required considerable amounts of chemicals
such as chromic acid, hydraulic acid, sulfuric acid, sodium hydroxide, sodium
nitrate, nickel chloride, nickel sulfate, trichloroethene, 1-trichloroethane,
toluene, cyanide compounds, acidic salts, and paints.
-3-
waste water and hazardous substances on numerous occasions
during its ownership.
In March 1986 VAC closed its manufacturing operations
and undertook steps to decommission the property.
VAC hired
Petrochem to restore the buildings to acceptable industry
standards.
All decommissioning took place inside the buildings,
except for some cleaning and the partial removal of a roof on
one of the buildings.
hazardous waste.
These activities generated additional
After decommissioning, residues from the
chemicals VAC had used and wastes it had generated were left in
pits and trenches.
Subsequently, in 1986, 500, a group of commercial6 real
estate developers, were working on a redevelopment plan and
became interested in purchasing the buildings on the property
and negotiations with VAC ensued.
In 1987, 500 and VAC entered
into a contract for purchase, which granted 500 access to the
property for purposes of conducting an environmental audit.
500
then conducted a cursory prepurchase investigation and
inspection into the condition of the building and hired an
environmental consultant named Ro-Tech, Inc. to evaluate VAC’s
decommissioning work.
Ro-Tech inspected the property for
6
The Hearing Officer found that 500 should be treated as an industrial real
estate developer because the property in question was industrial at the time
of purchase, regardless of the fact that 500 might develop it into a
commercial site.
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hazardous chemicals and wastes.
At this time, the principals of
500 had specific knowledge of the potential for discovery of
hazardous materials at the property site, since they had
purchased an industrial parcel next to the property which was
contaminated with asbestos.7
Ro-Tech conducted an on-site inspection; obtained
information regarding the decommissioning work performed by
Petrochem; reviewed records concerning VAC’s operations, wastes,
and permits; and discussed the condition and cleanup of the
property with VAC’s environmental, health, and safety director
Tim Daniel.
Ro-Tech questioned Daniel regarding hazardous
chemical spills and he represented that VAC had experienced only
one hazardous chemical spill in 1982, involving approximately
100 gallons of nickel.
According to Daniel, VAC had
subsequently reported this spill to the Jefferson County
Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD), but neither VAC nor MSD
believed that the nickel spill posed an environmental hazard.
Ro-Tech did not take any samples of environmental media or take
samples of soil or groundwater as part of its assessment of the
7
500 argues in its brief that while its association consisted of men
experienced in the purchase of commercial real estate, none had any
specialized knowledge or sophistication concerning industrial property, or
industrial processes such as those that VAC had used. Therefore, 500 argues
that it delegated the inspection to Ro-Tech as professionals and expected RoTech to identify any areas where potential exposure to hazardous materials
existed, and to determine whether those areas had been adequately
decontaminated.
-5-
property site.
Further, Ro-Tech did not review available public
documents about the property.
In discussing the property with 500, Ro-Tech
identified at least one hazardous substance, chromium, as a biproduct of VAC’s operations.
However, Ro-Tech concluded that
Petrochem had followed adequate procedures in the
decommissioning of the facility based upon the standards in
existence at the time, and that VAC had adequately
decontaminated the plating and waste treatment areas.
Accordingly, Ro-Tech’s report to 500 gave the site a clean bill
of health prior to 500’s purchasing the property, and
recommended no further testing.
On August 31, 1987, 500
purchased the property from VAC.8
500 claims that for more than a decade after it
acquired the property, it had no knowledge of any spills.
Accordingly, it took no extraordinary steps when it set about to
remodel the structure.
However, the Hearing Officer found that
500 was made aware by Ro-Tech’s report that hazardous materials
were handled on the site by VAC, that Ro-Tech failed to take
soil samples, and that Ro-Tech identified at least one hazardous
substance, i.e., chromium, on the property.
In 1990, 500
demolished a portion of one of the buildings in order to create
8
Subsequently in 1999, Daniel admitted that VAC had released hazardous
substances on other occasions during its industrial operations.
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a courtyard, which was the same part of the property where VAC
formerly conducted electroplating and waste water treatment
operations.
In doing so, 500 moved concrete and exposed the
earth below.
Also during 1990, 500 entered into an agreement to
sell the property to Doe Anderson Advertising Agency.
Doe
Anderson hired its own environmental consultant, ERCE, to
conduct a two-tier, pre-acquisition assessment of the property,
which unlike the assessment conducted by 500, included a review
of available public records and soil and groundwater sampling.
Analytical results revealed presence of various inorganic
constituents, elevated levels of metals, and volatile organic
compounds.
Further, samples from installed groundwater
monitoring wells indicated various inorganic constituents along
with chlorinated solvents exceeding the groundwater Maximum
Containment Levels in 401 KAR9 34:060.
Because extensive
releases of hazardous waste had occurred at the property, and
because ERCE’s investigation revealed the residual effects of
those releases, the level I pre-acquisition assessment included
a recommendation to undertake further investigation of the
potential environmental impact.
500 received a copy of the initial assessment in the
fall of 1990.
500 claimed that this was when it first learned
of contamination at the property, and acknowledged that samples
9
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
-7-
taken from beneath the concrete floors revealed contamination.
However, 500 stated that it contacted VAC after the findings of
ERCE and repeated its request for information regarding the
contamination.
VAC provided no information, and again denied
having any spills or releases during the operations that might
have been the origin of contamination.
500 did not share ERCE’s
findings with the Cabinet, and it did not notify the Cabinet
about contamination at the property after learning about it in
1990.
Despite information it had obtained from several
sources, 500 still failed to take any remedial action at the
property in response to data uncovered through the sampling
analysis.
ERCE then commenced a level II pre-acquisition
assessment in order to identify concentrations of hazardous
materials in the soil, water, and air.
ERCE took four samples
from the remaining pit and trench draining systems in three of
the buildings.
This report identified residual contamination in
the pits in one of the buildings.
Analytical results confirmed
the presence of various inorganic constituents and volatile
organic compounds.
In 1991, 500 retained a second consulting firm, Law
Environmental, Inc., to conduct soil sampling on the property.
Analytical results from 44 soil and soil gas samples across the
property detected volatile organic compounds.
-8-
Law Environmental
confirmed the presence of hazardous substances, but found that
the source was likely another property.
500 neither reported
the results of Law Environmental’s investigation to the Cabinet,
nor took remedial action.
However, Doe Anderson withdrew from
the purchase agreement after these findings were made.
The Cabinet, in September 1994, began its
investigation of the property by requesting information from VAC
and 500 about releases of hazardous substances.
On March 13,
1996, the Cabinet conducted groundwater sampling of the wells
that were installed in 1990.
Relying on the data developed
during this sampling, the Cabinet informed 500 and VAC of the
contamination and of their obligations under KRS 224.01-400.
VAC denied that the site was a source of contamination, and
claimed that 500 caused the releases when it demolished part of
the building where VAC had conducted electroplating operations.
The Cabinet’s investigation confirmed the existence of
contamination on the property site and in the groundwater.
In
1996 the Cabinet informed VAC and 500 that both were obligated
to characterize and remedy the releases on the property.
In March 1997 the Cabinet conducted soil sampling of
the property for analysis, which revealed the presence of
volatile organic compounds.
Again, the Cabinet informed VAC of
its statutory obligations and again VAC denied responsibility,
saying 500 was responsible for the releases because it left the
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sampled areas unprotected and exposed to rainfall.
Then, in
June 1997, the Cabinet conducted further sampling of the
groundwater monitoring wells, which upon analysis showed
elevated levels of chromium, nickel, and other hazardous
substances, more than ten years after any manufacturing
operations had occurred on the property.
On February 12, 1998, after VAC and 500 had
steadfastly refused for years to conduct remedial work, the
Cabinet filed an environmental enforcement action against both
VAC and 500 as jointly and severally responsible under KRS
224.01-400.
The complaint alleged that VAC was a “responsible
party” under the statute because it caused releases of hazardous
substances into the environment and it also possessed and
controlled hazardous substances that were released into the
environment at the property site.
The complaint alleged that
500 was also a “responsible party” for the same reasons.
The
complaint further alleged that both parties were strictly liable
for the releases and were required to characterize10 the extent
of any releases of hazardous substances, to correct the effect
of the releases on the environment, and to reimburse the Cabinet
for the actual and necessary costs it had expended and would
10
VAC has argued that it cannot be liable for providing a site
characterization report when such was not required by the original statute in
effect at the time it owned the property. Because we have concluded that VAC
is liable under the statute for reasons other than the insufficiency of its
site characterization report, we do not discuss this argument further.
-10-
expend in response to the releases.
500 then filed a
contribution claim against VAC pursuant to KRS 224.01-400(25).
VAC objected to the contribution claim, arguing that the Cabinet
was not authorized to determine contribution claims.
500 then
asserted it was entitled to the divisibility of harm and
innocent purchaser defenses as provided in the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation Liability Act (CERCLA) §
113.11
In May 1999 a third firm conducted additional
characterization at the property.
Analytical results from soil
samples demonstrated elevated levels of various metals and
volatile organic compounds.
This matter proceeded to a 17-day hearing before the
Cabinet’s Hearing Officer, at which 17 witnesses testified and
over 70 exhibits were introduced.
On May 8, 2002, the Hearing
Officer issued an 89-page Report and Recommendation finding VAC
and 500 jointly and severally liable for the releases of the
hazardous substances into the environment.
The Hearing Officer
found, in relevant part, as follows:
In this enforcement action, the
[Cabinet] has the burden of going forward
and the burden of persuasion to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence its
11
KRS 224.01-400(25) provides as follows:
Defenses to liability, limitations to
liability, and rights to contribution shall be
determined in accordance with Sections 101(35),
101(40), 107(a) to (d), 107(q) and (r), and 113(f) of
[CERCLA], as amended, and the Federal Clean Water
Act, as amended.
-11-
entitlement to the remedies sought against
VAC and 500. 401 KAR 100:010 Section 12(4);
KRS 224.01-400(18). Under that same
provision, VAC and 500 have the burden to
establish their affirmative defenses.
[ ]
The liability statute currently in
effect, KRS 224.01-400(18), states that:
Any person possessing or controlling a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant which is released to the
environment, or any person who caused a
release to the environment of a hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant, shall
characterize the extent of the release as
necessary to determine the effect of the
release on the environment, and shall take
actions necessary to correct the effect of
the release on the environment [emphases
original] [footnote omitted].
The Hearing Officer made the following recommendations
to the Secretary of the Cabinet:
(1) that he make a finding
that VAC and 500 violated KRS 224.01-400 by causing releases of
hazardous substances to the environment at the property and
thereafter failing to characterize the extent of the releases as
necessary to determine the effect of the releases on the
environment, and that they failed to take action necessary to
correct the effect of the releases on the environment; (2) that
VAC be ordered to pay $160,000.00 and 500 be ordered to pay
$10,500.00 in civil penalties; (3) that VAC and 500 be jointly
ordered to characterize and remedy the releases and pay the
response cost incurred by the Cabinet in the amount of
-12-
$17,828.03; and (4) that both defendants be found jointly and
severally liable to the Cabinet for all costs of
characterization, remediation, and reimbursement, but that the
parties be entitled to contribution from each other with VAC
bearing 95% responsibility and 500 bearing 5% responsibility.12
Both VAC and 500 filed exceptions to the Hearing Officer’s
Report and Recommendation.
The Secretary adopted the Report and
Recommendation in full as shown in the Secretary’s Final Order
entered on June 10, 2002.
The Cabinet’s Secretary, in adopting
the Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendation, stated, in
relevant part as follows:
1.
The Hearing Officer’s Report and
Recommended Order filed in the record
on May 8, 2002, is ADOPTED and
incorporated by reference and made a
part of this Final Order as if set
forth verbatim in this Order.
2.
[VAC] VIOLATED KRS 224.01-400 by
causing a release to the environment of
a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant, and thereafter failing to
characterize the extent of the release
as necessary to determine the effect of
the release on the environment, and
failing to take actions necessary to
correct the effect of the release on
the environment.
3.
[VAC] SHALL PAY to the Cabinet a civil
penalty of one hundred sixty thousand
dollars ($160,000) for the violations
cited above pursuant to KRS 224.99-010.
12
VAC has paid $17,828.03 and the response costs incurred by the Cabinet and
awarded in this case.
-13-
4.
[500] VIOLATED KRS 224.01-400 by
possessing or controlling a hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant
which is released to the environment,
and thereafter failing to characterize
the extent of the release as necessary
to determine the effect of the release
on the environment, and failing to take
actions necessary to correct the effect
of the release on the environment.
5.
[500] SHALL PAY to the Cabinet a civil
penalty of ten thousand five hundred
dollars ($10,500) for the violation
cited above pursuant to KRS 224.99-010.
. . .
7.
The Defendants shall CHARACTERIZE the
extent of the releases on the site . .
. .
. . .
9.
The Defendants shall REIMBURSE the
[Cabinet] for its costs of $17,828.03
expended in responding to releases of
hazardous substances at the site within
30 days of entry of this Final Order.
10.
While both VAC and 500 are directly
obligated to the Cabinet for the full
expense and duty to characterize,
remedy, and reimburse [the Cabinet’s]
costs, as between each other VAC and
500 are entitled to a right of
proportionate contribution. As between
them, VAC is 95% responsible and 500 is
5% responsible for those expenses.
Both VAC and 500 filed petitions for review of the
Secretary’s Final Order with the Franklin Circuit Court.
The
circuit court, by opinion and order dated November 4, 2003,
-14-
affirmed in part and reversed in part the Final Order of the
Secretary.
The circuit court held that the Secretary had the
authority to assess penalties against both VAC and 500 and that
the evidence supported the imposition of the penalties of
$160,000.00 and $10,500.00, respectively.
However, the circuit
court agreed with VAC that the Secretary did not have the power
to determine matters of contribution, and remanded the matter of
the response costs and characterization and cleanup to the
Secretary with the direction that the Secretary impose liability
on one of the parties for these matters.13
The circuit court
rejected all of 500’s arguments concluding that it could not be
an innocent purchaser since there was substantial evidence to
support the finding that Ro-Tech’s investigation had been
cursory and inadequate, and that 500 had not acted reasonably in
relying on its expert’s inspections.
Further, the circuit court
held that the Hearing Officer had acted properly in taking
judicial notice that 500, by trenching and thereby exposing the
contaminants to rainfall, had affirmatively contributed to the
migration of the hazardous materials.
While the Hearing Officer
had predicated this conclusion on common sense, the circuit
court located additional authority in the form of 401 KAR
13
The circuit court held that contribution was a remedy that could only be
determined in a court and that on remand it was incumbent upon the Cabinet to
impose the full amount of its response costs upon one of the defendants with
that party then able to commence a common-law contribution action before the
circuit court pursuant to KRS 224.01-400(25).
-15-
34:210(1), for the proposition that precipitation can cause the
diffusion, or leaching, of contaminants.
Since the circuit
court upheld the conclusion that 500’s activities had exposed
the previously latent chemicals to rainfall, it also affirmed
the $10,500.00 penalty assessed against 500.
The Cabinet filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate
the opinion and order of the circuit court in which it argued
that the Hearing Officer’s findings and the Secretary’s Final
Order holding that VAC and 500 were jointly and severally liable
for the Cabinet’s response costs and characterization and
cleanup obligations should not be disturbed.
It argued that the
finding that both parties violated KRS 224.01-400 and the
decision to remand the matter to the Secretary to determine
liability for the response costs and characterization and
cleanup obligations rendered the opinion and order inherently
inconsistent.
On January 20, 2004, the circuit court issued a
second opinion and order overruling the Cabinet’s motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court’s previous November 4,
2003, opinion and order.
Appeals by all three parties followed.
The Cabinet filed a motion to dismiss its appeal on January 11,
2005, which was granted by this Court by order entered on April
27, 2005.
-16-
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our standard of review14 of a circuit court’s
affirmance of an administrative decision is to determine whether
the circuit court’s findings upholding the Cabinet’s decision
are clearly erroneous.15
The circuit court’s role as an
appellate court is to review the administrative decision, not to
reinterpret or to reconsider the merits of the claim,16 nor to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight
of the evidence.17
Thus, the circuit court must determine both
14
Pursuant to KRS 13B.150(1), “[r]eview of a final order shall be conducted
by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record[.]”
Moreover, KRS 13B.150(2) states as follows:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact. The court may affirm the final
order or it may reverse the final order, in whole or
in part, and remand the case for further proceedings
if it finds the agency’s final order is:
. . .
(b)
In excess of the statutory authority of
the agency;
(c)
Without support of substantial evidence
on the whole record;
(d)
Arbitrary, capricious, or characterized
by abuse of discretion; [or]
. . .
(g)
Deficient as otherwise provided by law.
15
Johnson v. Galen Health Care, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Ky.App. 2001).
also Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01.
See
16
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. King, 657 S.W.2d 250, 251
(Ky.App. 1983); Johnson, 39 S.W.3d at 833.
17
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 309 (Ky. 1972)
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“[i]f the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence
of probative value” and “whether or not the administrative
agency has applied the correct rule of law to the facts so
found.”18
“The test of substantiality of evidence is whether . .
. it has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the
minds of reasonable [persons].19
Further, “‘the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported
by substantial evidence.’”20
As long as there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the agency’s decision, the
court must defer to the agency, even if there is conflicting
evidence.21
An administrative agency, such as the Cabinet, is
18
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance
Commission, 437 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Ky. 1969) (citing Brown Hotel Co. v.
Edwards, 365 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1962). See also Kentucky Board of Nursing v.
Ward, 890 S.W.2d 641, 642-43 (Ky.App. 1994) (stating that “[w]hether an
agency’s ruling is arbitrary can be determined by looking at three factors:
The court should first determine whether the agency acted within the
constraints of its statutory powers or whether it exceeded them. . . .
Second, the court should examine the agency’s procedures to see if a party to
be affected by an administrative order was afforded his procedural due
process. . . . Finally, the reviewing court must determine whether the
agency’s action is supported by substantial evidence. . . . If any of these
three tests are failed, the reviewing court may find that the agency’s action
was arbitrary”).
19
Fuller, 481 S.W.2d at 308 (citing Blankenship v. Lloyd Blankenship Coal
Co., Inc., 463 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1970)).
20
Fuller, 481 S.W.2d at 307 (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. United
States, 298 F.Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1968)).
21
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Ky.
1981).
-18-
“afforded great latitude in its evaluation of the evidence heard
and the credibility of witnesses appearing before it” [citation
omitted].22
“[A]lthough a reviewing court may arrive at a
different conclusion than the trier of fact in its consideration
of the evidence in the record, this does not necessarily deprive
the agency’s decision of support by substantial evidence”
[citation omitted].23
Further, even if this Court would have
come to a different conclusion if it heard the case de novo, it
must affirm the administrative agency’s decision if supported by
substantial evidence.24
“[I]t is the exclusive province of the
administrative trier of fact to pass upon the credibility of
witnesses, and the weight of the evidence” [citation omitted].25
Indeed, an administrative agency’s trier of facts may hear all
the evidence “‘and choose the evidence that he believes’”
[citation omitted].26
“‘If the findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence of probative value, then they must be
accepted as binding and it must then be determined whether or
22
Bowling v. Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d
406, 409-10 (Ky.App. 1995).
23
Bowling, 891 S.W.2d at 410.
24
Id. at 410.
25
Id.
26
Id.
-19-
not the administrative agency has applied the correct rule of
law to the facts so found’” [citations omitted].27
“It is fundamental that administrative agencies
are creatures of statute and must find within the statute
warrant for the exercise of any authority which they claim”
[citation omitted].28
When considering a claim, an
administrative officer is not required to provide a detailed
analysis of the facts and the law.29
However, he is required to
set forth sufficient facts to support conclusions that are
reached, so the parties understand the decision, and to permit a
meaningful appellate review.30
Although a finding for which
there is substantial evidence may not normally be disturbed on
appeal, the parties “are entitled to at least a modicum of
attention and consideration to their individual case[,]”31 and to
be certain that the decision was the product of a correct
27
Johnson, 39 S.W.3d at 832.
28
Department for Natural Resources & Environmental Protection v. Stearns Coal
& Lumber Co., 563 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Ky. 1978). See also Pearl v. Marshall,
491 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Ky. 1973) (stating that “findings of fact are essential
to support the orders of administrative agencies, at least where the order
issued by the agency rests upon a factual determination. . . . The goal of
the administrative process must be to insure uniformity of treatment by
administrative agencies to all persons who are similarly situated”).
29
Big Sandy Community Action Program v. Chaffins, 502 S.W.2d 526, 531 (Ky.
1973).
30
Shields v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 634 S.W.2d 440, 444
(Ky.App. 1982). See also Cook v. Paducah Recapping Service, 694 S.W.2d 684,
689 (Ky. 1985).
31
Shields, 634 S.W.2d at 444. See also Kentland Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Yates,
743 S.W.2d 47, 49-50 (Ky.App. 1988).
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understanding of the evidence.32
After reviewing the entire
record before us, we conclude that the circuit court’s
affirmance of the Secretary’s Final Order was not clearly
erroneous, as the Hearing Officer’s recommendations were based
on substantial evidence and were not arbitrary.
The record
reveals that the Cabinet acted within its powers granted by
statute, there is no evidence that any party’s due process
rights were violated, there was substantial evidence to support
the Cabinet’s decision, and the correct rule of law was applied.
500’S ARGUMENTS
Judicial Notice
500 argues on appeal that there was no evidence that
it caused any of the harm at the property site and that it
exceeded both the scope of the Hearing Officer’s and the circuit
court’s power to take judicial notice of a scientific fact such
as the effect of rain water on contamination of soil containing
hazardous substances.
KRE33 201, titled “Judicial notice of
adjudicative facts” states in section (b) that “[a] judicially
noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in
that it is . . . (2) [c]apable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
32
See Cook, 694 S.W.2d at 689.
33
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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reasonably be questioned.”
In affirming the Cabinet’s decision,
the circuit court stated as follows:
500 claims that the [H]earing [O]fficer
made two errors. . . . [S]econd the hearing
officer took judicial notice of scientific
hypotheses that were allegedly not supported
by substantial evidence and arguably far
from common knowledge.
. . .
500’s judicial notice argument fails .
. . . When digging trenches to obtain soil
samples, 500 allowed the trenches and soils
removed from the trenches to remain exposed
after sampling. . . . The [Cabinet] argues
that these trenches contained hazardous
chemicals that 500 exposed to at least one
heavy rainfall and constituted a release. .
. . A “[r]elease” is defined in the
Kentucky Superfund statute . . . .34 500
takes the position the [H]earing [O]fficer
erred by finding “it is a matter of common
knowledge that exposing contamination to
rainfall increases the potential for harm
from contaminant migration. . .” . 500
finds fault with the following portion of
the Report:
196. . . . I conclude that
neither [500 nor VAC] was able to
distinguish their proportionate
contribution to (the [p]roperty).
While VAC was the operator and
clearly the source for all the
materials on (the [p]roperty), I
cannot determine what portion of
the releases were caused by acts
of 500. The evidence and common
sense dictate[ ] that some share
of the release occurred due to
500’s allowing areas to be exposed
to weather [emphasis original].
34
KRS 224.01-400(1)(b).
-22-
500 argues that no evidence in the
record supports a finding that rain played
any part in the contamination. 500 asserts
that the ability of water to disseminate
soil-based contaminants is not the subject
of common sense but instead a scientific
matter not appropriate for judicial notice.
This Court disagrees. The Cabinet’s
regulations contain numerous
acknowledgements of an increased potential
for harm from precipitation. 401 KAR
34:210(1) imposes a system for ensuring that
hazardous waste piles are protected “from
precipitation so that neither run-off nor
leachate is generated.” The [H]earing
[O]fficer did not err by taking judicial
notice that exposing contaminants to natural
elements, such as rainwater, increases the
likelihood of contamination migration.
Courts have found where human activity
causes movement of hazardous substances, the
current landowner shares liability for the
resulting harm. . . .35
Evidence demonstrates that 500’s own
activities caused releases of hazardous
substances at the [p]roperty. 500
demolished buildings without taking any
precautions to prevent hazardous materials
inside the building from being released. . .
. 500 removed roofs, walls and concrete
floors of buildings exposing to the elements
any hazardous materials beneath the floors.36
. . . Substantial evidence supports the
imposition of a $10,500 penalty against 500.
. . .
While the Hearing Officer stated that judicial notice
was proper in this case based on common sense, the circuit court
further supported the use of judicial notice through reliance
35
United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir. 2000).
36
150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 706.
-23-
upon the Cabinet’s administrative regulations.
The Cabinet
argues that when an administrative regulation is available there
is no need for expert or lay testimony as to a scientific fact.
However, it cites no support for this argument, and we are
unable to find any law directly on point to support this
argument.
500 argues that a number of courts have recognized
that the ultimate fact in question is not susceptible of
judicial notice; however, it only points this Court to one case,
Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James & Co., Inc.37
We find its
reliance upon Joslyn is misplaced.
In Joslyn, the federal district court ruled that a
purchaser of a parcel of land was not the responsible party
under CERCLA.38
However, Joslyn and this case are
distinguishable upon their facts.
In Joslyn, the former owner
of the property argued that the current owner would be the
responsible party for the clean up of the land “‘even if [the
current owner] had not moved a grain of dirt’” and “solely on
the basis that rainfall obviously causes hazardous materials to
leach through the soil.”39
The district court found that this
was not sufficient evidence to sustain the former owner’s burden
37
836 F.Supp. 1264 (W.D.La. 1993).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 1269-70.
-24-
of proof.40
However, 500 did more in this case than simply own
the property.
500 actually moved a contaminated building and
left the resulting open areas exposed to rain, which 500’s own
expert stated could have caused contamination to the soil
underneath.
500 provided expert testimony at the hearing before
the Cabinet’s Hearing Officer from Mark Mangun.41
500
argues that Mangun provided undisputed testimony that upon
reviewing subsequent soil sample data, there was no scientific
support that the contamination could be traced to the demolition
of buildings, to rain, or to any 500 activity.
500 further
argues that there was no other expert testimony provided and no
lay witnesses who testified of any personal knowledge to
contradict Mangun’s testimony.42
Mangun also testified that the
decommissioning activity by Petrochem prior to the purchase by
500 would have “almost certainly removed any contaminants from
at or near the surface levels,” and 500 thus argues that if
there are no contaminates at or near the surface, then it could
not have caused any contamination by removing the concrete.
40
Joslyn, 836 F.Supp. at 1270.
41
The Hearing Officer found that Mangun had been an environmental consultant
for 20 years. Mangun testified that he had only performed two preacquistion
site assessments during the time period when Ro-Tech performed its assessment
for 500.
42
500 also points out in its brief that Jeff Grow, a Cabinet employee and
registered geologist, testified that it would be “pure speculation” that the
movement of concrete by 500 caused the contamination at the property site.
-25-
However, a closer look at Mangun’s testimony shows
that it was conflicting.
Mangun testified that while 500 dealt
with commercial property, the property in question was
industrial in nature.
He defined the difference as “commercial
property would be more office buildings and industrial property
usually has manufacturing.”
He testified that when performing
an assessment, the type of property was the focus, not whether
the clients were commercial versus industrial, while the extent
of understanding of the two types of clients may vary.
He
stated that during the time period in which 500 purchased the
property, it was unusual for buyers of commercial property to
have inspections done as performed by Ro-Tech, but not uncommon
for industrial buyers.43
He stated that Ro-Tech’s inspection was
more than was typically done for commercial buyers.
When
performing these type of assessments for pre-purchase
investigations, he would have reviewed “information supplied by
the facility, the operations and process that went on at the
facility, the data that [he] generate[d] or other consultants
generated and then rely on [his] experience with geology and in
site assessments to come to conclusions as to what the data
43
Mangun stated that this type of preacquisition industrial site assessment
would involve “looking at prior uses of the site, [i]f the site was still in
operation, talking to the current owners of what happened, coming up with
past histories, doing a walk-through of the site, [and] interviewing people.”
He further stated that it would probably not include review of the state
environmental file, but sometimes would include the review of the corporate
environmental file.
-26-
means.”
He also would determine the current status of
environmental regulations.
Mangun testified this was the kind
of information that is regularly relied upon by environmental
consultants in investigating site characterization issues.
However, Mangun went on to state that based on the
facts known about the property,44 he would have probably
recommended a soil sample, and he would have reviewed the
records of the Cabinet and “probably” the records of the MSD,
and the Jefferson County Pollution Control Board.
Mangun
admitted that there was contamination on the concrete and wall
surfaces at the property site, and that 500’s demolition
activities and subsequent sampling may have caused the release
of the contaminate in the soil environment.
He acknowledged
that it was possible when taking down contaminated buildings and
removing their concrete floors, to “slightly” increase the
mobility of contamination, and that rain falling into open
trenches containing contamination possibly could have spread the
contamination.
He testified that certain industrial operations
were more likely to impact the soil, including electroplating
and degreasing, as were performed on the property site.
Mangun acknowledged that the Phase I and Phase II
44
These facts included treatment of hazardous wastes in pits, disposal of
hazardous wastes without treatment, including corrosives and acids in pipes
to the city sewer, spilling of 2,400 gallons of nickel plating waste, use of
degreasing solvents, storage of chlorinated solvents in aboveground storage
tanks, and engaging in electroplating and degreasing operations for 37 years.
-27-
assessments performed by ERCE four years after the one performed
by Ro-Tech was more expansive and included soil sampling.
While
Mangun stated that the standard and level of work changed
overtime, the underlying purpose had not changed.
Mangun
further testified that he believed 500 was aware of the ERCE
reports of contamination at the site, but he was not aware that
500 had taken any steps to actually clean up the contamination
or to prevent migration of the contamination.
The Hearing
Officer had the discretion to weigh all parts of Mangun’s
testimony and to determine which parts to believe.
Thus, even
without taking judicial notice of leaching, there was
substantial evidence of record from Mangun’s testimony to
support the finding of the Hearing Officer that 500’s actions
contributed to the cause of the contamination.
The Innocent Purchaser Defense
In the alternative to this argument, 500 asserts the
innocent purchaser defense under CERCLA, as defined in 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(b).
As stated previously, a defendant in a
Kentucky Superfund action may be eligible for the same defenses,
limitations of liability, and rights of contribution available
under CERCLA.
The requirements for the innocent purchaser
defense are set out in 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) as follows:
There shall be no liability under
subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a
-28-
preponderance of the evidence that the
release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by – (1)
(2)
an act of war;
(3)
45
an act of God;
an act or omission of a third
party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than
one whose act or omission occurs
in connection with a contractual
relationship,45 existing directly
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35) defines contractual relationship as follows:
(A)
The term “contractual relationship”, for the
purpose of section 9607(b)(3) of this title,
includes, but is not limited to, land
contracts, deeds, easements, leases, or other
instruments transferring title or possession,
unless the real property on which the facility
concerned is located was acquired by the
defendant after the disposal or placement of
the hazardous substance on, in, or at the
facility, and one or more of the circumstances
described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also
established by the defendant by a preponderance
of the evidence:
(i)
At the time the defendant acquired the
facility the defendant did not know and
had no reason to know that any hazardous
substance which is the subject of the
release or threatened release was
disposed of on, in, or at the facility
[emphasis added].
(ii)
The defendant is a government entity
which acquired the facility by escheat,
or through any other involuntary transfer
or acquisition, or through the exercise
of eminent domain authority by purchase
or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by
inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the
defendant must establish that the defendant has
satisfied the requirements of section
9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of this title[.]
-29-
(B)
Reason to know
(i)
All appropriate inquires
To establish that the defendant had no reason
to know of the matter described in subparagraph
(A)(i), the defendant must demonstrate to the
court that–
(I)
on or before the date on which the
defendant acquired the facility, the
defendant carried out all appropriate
inquiries, as provided in clauses (ii)
and (iv), into the previous ownership and
uses of the facility in accordance with
generally accepted good commercial and
customary standards and practices; and
(II)
the defendant took reasonable steps to—
(aa)
(bb)
(cc)
stop any continuing release;
prevent any threatened future
release; and
prevent or limit any human,
environmental, or natural resource
exposure to any previously released
hazardous substance.
. . .
(iv) Interim standards and practices
(I)
Property purchased before May 31, 1997
With respect to property purchased before May
31, 1997, in making a determination with
respect to a defendant described in clause (i),
a court shall take into account—
(aa)
(bb)
(cc)
(dd)
(ee)
any specialized knowledge or experience
on the part of the defendant;
the relationship of the purchase price to
the value of the property, if the
property was not contaminated;
commonly known or reasonably
ascertainable information about the
property;
the obviousness of the presence or likely
presence of contamination at the
property; and
the ability of the defendant to detect
the contamination by appropriate
inspection.
. . .
-30-
or indirectly, with the defendant
(except where the sole contractual
arrangement arises from a
published tariff and acceptance
for carriage by a common carrier
by rail), if the defendant
establishes by a preponderance of
the evidence that (a) he exercised
due care with respect to the
hazardous substance concerned,
taking into consideration the
characteristics of such hazardous
substance, in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances,
and (b) he took precautions
against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts
or omissions [emphasis added]; or
(4)
any combination of the foregoing
paragraphs.
The Hearing Officer explained this defense as follows:
(C)
Nothing in this paragraph or in section
9607(b)(3) of this title shall diminish the
liability of any previous owner or operator of
such facility who would otherwise be liable
under this chapter. Notwithstanding this
paragraph, if the defendant obtained actual
knowledge of the release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance at such facility when
the defendant owned the real property and then
subsequently transferred ownership of the
property to another person without disclosing
such knowledge, such defendant shall be treated
as liable under section 9607(a)(1) of this
title and no defense under section 9607(b)(3)
of this title shall be available to such
defendant.
(D)
Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the
liability under this chapter of a defendant
who, by any act or omission, caused or
contributed to the release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance which is the
subject of the action relating to the facility.
-31-
Compiling these requirements as
applicable in this case, the innocent
purchaser defense is available if 500
establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence all of the following: (1) 500 did
not know and had no reason to know of the
contamination, having undertaken appropriate
inquiry at the time of the acquisition; (2)
500 exercised due care once the hazardous
substance was discovered[;] and (3) some
other party was the sole cause of the
release. If 500 is unable to establish any
one of the requirements, the defense is not
available.46
The innocent purchaser defense is an affirmative
defense and thus the defendant is required to prove “each of the
required elements by a preponderance of the evidence” [citations
omitted].47
“‘A defendant’s failure to meet its burden on any
one of the required elements precludes the application of the
defense’” [citations omitted].48
The Hearing Officer analyzed
each element49 of the innocent purchaser defense and set out in
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (35)(B)(IV)(I)(aa-ee), and found that there
was no distinction between 500’s knowledge as a commercial
46
In addition to the due care requirements and precaution requirements of 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(B)(3)(a) and (b), a defendant must prove the elements of 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B). See Foster v. United States, 922 F.Supp. 642, 654
(D.D.C. 1996).
47
Foster, 922 F.Supp. at 654.
48
Id.
49
The Hearing Officer found no evidence in the record regarding the second
element that CERCLA lists, i.e., “the relationship of the purchase price to
the value of the property if uncontaminated.” 42 U.S.C.A. §
9601(35)(B)(IV)(I)(bb).
-32-
developer or an industrial developer,50 because 500 was
purchasing industrial property that was located next to another
piece of industrial property which was known by 500 to be
asbestos-laden.51
Holding 500 to the standard of an industrial
developer, the Hearing Officer found 500’s reliance on Ro-Tech’s
cursory inspection an inappropriate inquiry, “given the nature
of known property use,” and thus 500 failed to adequately
evaluate commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information
about the property site.52
In evaluating “the obviousness of the
presence or likely presence of contamination at the [property
site],53 the Hearing Officer found that “[w]hile there was no
visible mark from the releases, the nature of the operations at
the facility increased the likelihood of contamination and
warranted an investigation to determine with greater precision
whether a release occurred.”
In addressing the fifth factor of
“‘the ability to detect . . . contamination by appropriate
inspection[,]’” the Hearing Officer stated as follows:
Before it acquired this property, 500 could
have conducted an appropriate investigation
50
This is relevant to the first element which states “any specialized
knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant.” 42 U.S.C.A. §
9601(35)(B)(IV)(I)(aa).
51
The Hearing Officer stated in her report: “Like it or not, 500 became a
developer of industrial and commercial property and should be held to the
standard of inquiry that a reasonable industrial developer would have made at
that time.”
52
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B)(IV)(I)(cc).
53
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B)(IV)(I)(dd).
-33-
for contamination. According to the
experts, an examination of public records
would have suggested sampling was needed,
and sampling has revealed contamination.
Instead, 500 chose not to review public
records or conduct sampling. 500’s own
expert at trial would have recommended
sampling to an industrial user under the
circumstances of the site at the time of the
purchase. To reward 500’s lack of diligence
with a liability exemption would be directly
contrary to the policy of CERCLA, which
“does not sanction willful or negligent
blindness.”54
Further, the Hearing Officer found that after
500 acquired the property, it failed to exercise due care.
The
standard as set out under CERCLA states that the purchaser must
establish that “he exercised due care with respect to the
hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the
characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances[.]”55
While the Hearing Officer
acknowledged that there was evidence that 500 took some steps to
secure the property site from further harm of release,56 there is
54
The Hearing Officer cited United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169
(4th Cir. 1988) and Westfarm Associates v. Washington Sub. San. Com’n, 66
F.3d 669, 682 (4th Cir. 1995) in support of this holding.
55
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3)(a).
56
The Hearing Officer stated that “[500] prevented access to the site by
fencing and installing a security system. 500 also asked its consultant
whether paving the area or any other measures would be appropriate.” Later
in her report, the Hearing Officer stated that 500, unlike VAC, did cooperate
with the Cabinet once aware of the site problem. The Hearing Officer stated,
“500’s culpability in the case is much less. 500 is not a manufacturing
company accustomed to environmental regulations and issues. Instead, it is a
partnership composed of developers and architects. 500 did not cause the
initial releases, it merely became an unknowing waste site owner without
-34-
also evidence to the contrary that 500 failed to exercise “due
care” required under CERCLA, as the Hearing Officer stated as
follows:
[500] demolished buildings without taking
any precautions to prevent materials in the
buildings from being released to the
environment. By removing the concrete floor
and leaving material under it open to the
elements, it allowed rainfall to be
introduced into contaminated areas. It is a
matter of common knowledge, requiring no
expert opinion, that rainfall onto soil will
facilitate movement of that soil and in this
case contaminants. 500 also left exposed
pits formerly associated with manufacturing
operations after removing the roof and walls
of buildings. An additional failure to
exercise due care occurred in March, 1997,
when one of the 500 principals helped direct
excavation activities intended to expose
materials to obtain samples. The areas
exposed and sampled were specifically
selected because they were points of
possible contamination, and some samples
from exposed areas did exhibit
contamination. However, 500 left those
exposed areas unprotected. These exposed
areas remained unprotected during at least
one heavy thunderstorm. This rainfall
allowed contamination that might have been
present to travel to some extent.57
Upon its appellate review, the circuit court concluded
that 500 failed to undertake all appropriate inquiries into the
making an examination of the site adequate to find the contamination.
culpability here is very small.”
57
Its
The Hearing Officer stated in her report that 500 failed to meet the first
two elements of the defense, i.e., failure to make an appropriate inquiry at
the time of acquisition and failure to exercise due care once the hazardous
substance was discovered, and, thus, there was no need to address whether 500
met its burden to establish that some other party was the sole cause of the
release.
-35-
past use of the property before acquiring it, and subsequently
failed to exercise due care, and stated in part as follows:
500 claims that the [H]earing [O]fficer
made two errors. First, the hearing officer
denied 500 the innocent purchaser defense
under U.S. v. Township of Brighton[.]58. . .
The innocent purchaser defense requires that
on or before the date on which [ ] 500
acquired the facility, 500 carry out all
appropriate inquiries into the previous
ownership and uses of the facility in
accordance with generally accepted good
commercial and customary standards and
practices; and take reasonable steps to stop
any continuing release; prevent any
threatened future release; and prevent or
limit any human, environmental, or natural
resource exposure to any previously released
hazardous substance. . . .59 500 contends
that it met this standard by hiring Ro-Tech
to perform an environmental investigation.
Although 500 asserts they reasonably relied
on Ro-Tech’s environmental report,
substantial evidence supports a contrary
finding.
Tim Daniels of VAC communicated to RoTech that VAC experienced a chemical spill
involving approximately one hundred gallons
of nickel in 1982. Ro-Tech failed to
perform soil or water sampling. Ro-Tech
also did not examine available public
records that would have indicated the extent
of potential contamination on the
[p]roperty. . . . Sanborn maps of the area
classified the [p]roperty for long-term
industrial use. . . . The [H]earing
[O]fficer reasonably determined that RoTech’s investigation was cursory at best and
500 unreasonably relied upon it. This fact
constitutes substantial evidence that
58
153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998).
59
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35).
-36-
neither 500 nor Ro-Tech made appropriate
inquiries or inspection of the [p]roperty in
order to qualify for the innocent purchaser
defense. . . .60
500 argues that there was not substantial evidence to
support this finding, but rather the evidence showed that 500
acted as a reasonable developer by retaining an expert “to
conduct whatever the expert deemed necessary and then rely on
the expert’s conclusion.”
500 further argues that the circuit
court found problems with Ro-Tech’s actions,61 and not 500’s
actions; and 500 argues that since there was no evidence that
500 negligently hired Ro-Tech, 500 should not be found at fault
for relying on Ro-Tech.
To the contrary, the Cabinet argues
that it was not its responsibility to prove that 500 had
negligently hired Ro-Tech, but rather it was 500’s burden to
prove the elements of the innocent purchase defense.
We agree.
By asserting the innocent purchaser defense, 500
“shift[ed] the burden of proof on th[e] question [of causation]
from the plaintiff to the defendant, who must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the release or threatened
release was caused solely by an unrelated third party”
60
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35).
61
The Hearing Officer in her opinion stated that the Ro-Tech inspection was
cursory and found fault with Ro-Tech’s investigation because it did not
inspect the pubic records or undertake soil sampling and it failed to perform
testing to determine whether the nickel spill acknowledged by Daniel had
caused contamination. Mangun testified that he would have recommended
sampling at the time 500 purchased the property.
-37-
[citations omitted].62
Thus, in reviewing the evidence the
circuit court properly upheld the Secretary’s denial of 500’s
innocent purchaser defense as 500 failed to meet certain
elements of the defense.
There is a “heavy burden of proof
necessary to avoid liability” through the innocent purchaser
defense, and there is a “high duty of inquiry attached to
commercial transactions[.]”63
There is proof of record that
regardless of whether 500 properly relied on Ro-Tech’s
evaluation of the site, it failed to take due care when it
demolished the site and took no action to abate the problem once
it knew of the contamination problems at the property site.64
Limitations of Liability
500’s second alternative argument is that even if this
Court concludes that it was properly denied the innocent
purchaser defense, then there should be limitations on its
liability.
It asserts this limitation as an affirmative and
separate defense available in Kentucky Superfund cases to avoid
the strict liability scheme when no causation can be proved.65
KRS 224.01-400(25) states that a defendant’s liability
can be limited to zero if it is shown by a preponderance of the
62
Foster, 922 F.Supp. at 658.
63
Id. at 654-55.
64
Id. at 655.
65
See Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318-19.
-38-
evidence that the contamination on the site represented a
divisible harm and 500’s contribution to the harm was zero.
In
support of this defense, 500 argues that there is no evidence
that it caused or permitted release of the contaminants, and
thus it is entitled to a reduction of its liability to zero.
The Hearing Officer found as follows:
I have reviewed and considered the
voluminous citations offered by both
parties. I conclude that 500 bears some
share of proportionate responsibility for
the harm in this case, that 500 did not
establish that the harm was divisible, and
that the divisibility defense is unavailable
to 500.
First, I conclude from the evidence
that at least some portion of the harm at
the site resulted from 500’s movement of
concrete floors (exposing contamination to
the elements) and 500’s failure to protect
the contaminated area from rainfall. It is
a matter of common knowledge that exposing
contamination to rainfall increases the
potential for harm from contaminant
migration, and contamination kept under a
concrete floor is less likely to be exposed
to rainfall. In numerous sections the
regulations acknowledge the increased
potential for harm from precipitation where
they include requirements designed to
minimize exposure of waste piles to
precipitation. It would require me to
ignore basic physics to believe that
exposing the contamination to precipitation
would not cause it to migrate and spread to
some degree into the soil. Case law has
made clear that where human activity is
involved in the movement of hazardous
substances on property, the current
landowner shares liability for resulting
-39-
harm. U.S. v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d
698, 706 (6th Cir. 2000).
The record provides me no reasonable
basis to determine how much of the
contamination resulted from the original
release, and how much resulted from 500’s
exposure and spread of contamination that
has clearly occurred. Unlike the situation
in Brighton Township, where the defendant
suggested apportionment according to volume
contributed or to the areas of the site used
by a particular defendant, in this case 500
has shown no evidence that its share of the
harm can be fairly distinguished from that
of VAC. Since there is some element of
fault on 500’s part, and I cannot fairly
apportion the amount, I must conclude that
the harm is indivisible and reject 500’s
defense.
Since I conclude that there was some
portion of fault attributable to 500, it is
unnecessary for me to address whether a
landowner would bear some proportion of
liability merely by their status as
landowner, as indicated by Meyer.66
The circuit court did not directly address this
defense, but found 500 liable and did not reverse the Cabinet on
this issue.
As we have discussed earlier, we conclude that
there was substantial evidence to show that 500 contributed to
the contamination of the site.
Thus, we also agree that this
defense is not proper; and we conclude that the circuit court
did not err in affirming the Cabinet on this issue.
66
United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989).
-40-
VAC ARGUMENT
VAC argues in its appeal that it was improper for the
Hearing Officer to penalize VAC for failing to provide an
adequate site characterization report, and further that the
Cabinet failed to provide guidelines for such reports, making
VAC’s compliance therewith impossible.
The Hearing Officer
assessed a penalty against VAC in the amount of $160,000.00.67
Both VAC and 500 submitted site characterization reports.68
The
Hearing Officer found that 500’s report was adequate, but that
VAC’s report was not.69
VAC argues that there was no purpose
served under the statute by requiring duplicative site
characterization reports and that because 500 was the entity in
possession or control of the property at the time the
requirement became effective, 500 was in a better position to
file the report, and since 500 filed an adequate report, there
was compliance with the statute and VAC should not be penalized.
VAC further argues that the circuit court failed to make a
finding of fact on the merits of this argument and that it is
clear from the Hearing Officer’s report that its only reason for
67
The amount of the penalty was based on eight days of violations, at
$20,000.00 per day.
68
The Cabinet did not respond to VAC’s site characterization report.
69
The Hearing Officer found that VAC’s plan addressed some, but not all
contaminants it released at the site and that it did not include a plan for
addressing the chlorinated solvents at the site.
-41-
penalizing VAC was based on the inadequacy of the site
characterization report.
In reviewing the Hearing Officer’s report, we reject
VAC’s arguments.
The Hearing Officer found that VAC violated
KRS 224.01-400(18) and in great detail stated her reasons for
assessing the penalty which included reasons other than the
failure of VAC to file an adequate site characterization report.
The Hearing Officer stated as follows:
The Secretary has discretion, within
the statutory limits, to impose the penalty
he believes appropriate to achieve the goal
of assuring compliance with environmental
laws. While violations did occur during a
lengthy time period, I do not recommend that
the Secretary exercise his discretion to
impose penalties for every day of those
violations from the time of the releases
until now. At a certain point, the amount
of such a penalty would become meaninglessly
large, and loses its effect to deter
violations. Further, for penalty purposes
the twin failures to characterize and to
remedy the releases should be merged, as
they arise from the same set of
circumstances.
Consistent with the above, I recommend
that the Secretary impose a penalty for each
of the days on which the record shows that
Defendants received notice from [the
Cabinet] of the contamination giving rise to
their obligations under the statute (and
thereafter did not fully comply), and each
of the days that the [Cabinet] was on-site
conducting sampling activities, for a total
of eight days (in VAC’s case) or seven days
(in 500’s case). Eight days of penalty at a
rate up to $25,000.00 per day would result
in a penalty between $0 and $200,000. Such
-42-
a penalty would be sufficiently punitive to
achieve the Cabinet’s goals given the
factors outlined above, without becoming
meaninglessly large.
In VAC’s case, on at lease five
occasions VAC received notice from the
[Cabinet] concerning the contamination on
site: September 30, 1994; May 17, 1996; July
17, 1996; October 28, 1996; and April 23,
1997. Also, the [Cabinet] or its designees
were on site to conduct sampling on three
occasions: March 13, 1996; March 13, 1997;
and June 12, 1997. Therefore, penalties
should be assessed against VAC for eight
days of violations.
. . .
Next, I consider what penalty amount
between $0 and $25,000 daily would be
appropriate. The facts differ greatly as
between VAC and 500. Concerning VAC, the
factors concerning seriousness, economic
benefit, culpability, and good faith weigh
most strongly in favor of a severe penalty.
VAC has caused multiple releases during its
operation of the facility and its actions
have resulted in releases thereafter. It
has been informed of its duties and
responded with little more than finger
pointing.
VAC argues that any penalty should be
small. It notes that it submitted a
characterization report in 1999 that it
believed would be sufficient, and that the
requirements for such a report are not
clear. However, the characterization report
VAC submitted is clearly not sufficient
under any criteria. The purpose of such a
report is to define the extent of
contamination so that a remedial plan can be
developed and implemented. Instead, VAC’s
report focuses on who caused the
contamination, and does not address the
extent of contamination from the releases
-43-
noted above, including VAC’s own operations
on site.
VAC’s actions and inaction with respect
to its releases as discussed above provide
compelling reasons for the Hearing Officer
to assess a severe civil penalty against
VAC. Therefore, I recommend that VAC be
assessed a penalty of $20,000 per day for
each of eight days, for a total penalty of
$160,000.
The Hearing Officer specifically addressed
the seriousness of the violations in relation to the penalty in
her report and stated as follows:
The first criterion is the seriousness
of the violations, taking into account the
purpose of the regulations and the effect or
potential effect of the violation on the
environment. The intent of the statute
prohibiting persons from causing releases or
maintaining releases is to ensure hazardous
materials do not impair human health or the
natural environment. The intent of the
statute governing release characterization
is to determine the nature and extent of the
release to develop a meaningful plan for
minimizing the effects of the release.
The seriousness of the release is also
impacted by the nature and extent of the
release, and the potential or actual harm
from the release. In this case, a variety
of hazardous substances discussed above were
released, including cancer-causing
materials. While some of the concentrations
of the materials were not high, they were
above the levels considered to be safe for
human exposure. Other samples were very
high in concentration. There remains some
uncertainty as to the size of the area
affected by the releases however it can be
said that the impact of the releases
extended to areas off-site and to the
-44-
groundwater. Further, the release was
discovered many years ago, thus the exposure
has been longstanding, increasing the
seriousness of the violation. Based on
these factors, I find these violations to be
very serious.
The Hearing Officer’s report shows other reasons
forming the basis of the Hearing Officer’s assessment of
penalties,70 including that VAC benefited economically from its
failure to remedy the contamination,71 it exhibited wanton
disregard for the impacts of its activities on the local
environment by failing to act after directed to do so by the
Cabinet, and it further failed to cooperate with the Cabinet
during its investigation process, showing no effort of good
faith.
Despite, VAC’s argument to the contrary, the circuit
court did address the seriousness of the assessment of the
Cabinet’s penalty on VAC and stated as follows:
VAC’S argument fails because it is too
narrow. When assessing the penalty, the
[H]earing [O]fficer considered several
factors concerning the seriousness, economic
benefit, culpability and good faith
demonstrated by VAC, not simply the
inadequate site characterization report.
The record is replete with specific
70
The Hearing Officer acknowledged that there was little or no evidence of
either of VAC’s or 500’s ability to pay a penalty, but acknowledged that both
were ongoing entities. Further, the Hearing Officer stated that there was no
evidence of a history of violations by either defendant.
71
The Hearing Officer stated in her report that “VAC was able to sell its
goods without bearing the true cost of production, which should have included
the costs of compliance with laws governing remediation. Its profit margin
in those goods was increased by avoiding investigation and clean-up.”
-45-
incidents of spills of hazardous materials
attributable to VAC in violation of KRS
224.99-100(1).72 Tim Daniel of VAC testified
to one specific example. In 1983 or 1984 he
discovered a hole in a junction box, a
container through which untreated wastewater
passed after the electroplating process, . .
. that caused the release of an unknown
quantity of hazardous substances. VAC
determined this was not a release and chose
not to report it to the appropriate local or
state authorities. This and other evidence
shows hazardous substances released by VAC
contaminated the surfaces of the
[p]roperty.73 Substantial evidence supports
the [H]earing [O]fficer’s finding that VAC
also benefited economically by avoiding the
cost of cleanup and failed to act after
being directed to do so. Accordingly, the
[H]earing [O]fficer reasonably found that
VAC exhibited a wanton disregard for the
impacts of its activities on the local
environment. . . .
Considering that KRS 224.99-010(1) permits
the [Cabinet] to fine VAC up to $25,000 for
each day in which a statutory violation
continues, substantial evidence exists to
support a reasonable and conservative fine
of $160,000 against VAC.74
72
“Among these incidents, (1) VAC’s 1982 spill of nickel plating solution
onto the Main Street sidewalk, (2) VAC’s leak from hole in wastewater
treatment pipe, (3) VAC’s 1983/1984 release of untreated wastewater into soil
beneath the wastewater treatment area[,] and (4) VAC’s 1987 abandonment of
pits and trenches. . . .”
73
“In 1990, ERCE, . . . discovered residue in one abandoned pit located in
the bonded warehouse that contained extremely high levels of chromium, nickel
and lead. These residues were not removed during the decommissioning of the
facility. . . .”
74
“VAC could have been assessed a $25,000 penalty for each day beginning in
the 1980s when the releases occurred and the remediation statute was in
effect, up to at least the day of hearing, a period that extended over 10
years.”
-46-
In review of the portions of the Hearing Officer’s
report and the circuit court’s order that we have cited above,
we conclude that VAC’s claims are without merit.
The penalty
against VAC clearly is based on much more than its failure to
file a site characterization report.
The circuit court took the
time in its order to fully address this argument.
Therefore, we
hold that there was substantial evidence to support the penalty
regardless of the adequacy of VAC’s site characterization report
and affirm this portion of the circuit court’s order.75
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Franklin
Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
75
As a subpart to this argument, VAC argues that pursuant to KRS 244.01400(14)(g), the Cabinet was required to provide guidelines for the
preparation of site characterization reports and by failing to do so, its
decision to find VAC’s report inadequate is arbitrary. KRS 224.01-400(14)(g)
states as follows:
The Cabinet shall be the lead agency for
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant
emergency spill response and, after consultation with
other affected federal, state, and local agencies and
private organizations, shall establish a contingency
plan for undertaking emergency actions in response to
the release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant. The contingency plan shall: . . .
[e]stablish procedures and techniques for
identifying, containing, removing, and disposing of
hazardous substances released or being released.
The Cabinet argues that this statute does not apply to site characterization
plans submitted by liable persons under KRS 224.01-400(18). We agree and
conclude that there is no merit to this argument. Further, we agree with the
Hearing Officer that what made VAC’s report defective was that it did not
address all contaminants at the site and a plain reading of the statute would
apprise the regulated community that all contaminants must be addressed.
-47-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, 500
ASSOCIATES:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE, VERMONT
AMERICAN CORPORATION:
Glenn A. Cohen
Paul J. Hershberg
Cynthia L. Effinger
Louisville, Kentucky
Charles G. Middleton III
Dana L. Collins
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT,
500 ASSOCIATES:
Paul J. Hershberg
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
VERMONT AMERICAN CORPORATION:
Charles G. Middleton III
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, ENVIRONMENTAL
CABINET:
Barbara M. Pauley
Troy A. McPeak
Frankfort, Kentucky
-48-
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